The implication of this is that if p is not necessarily true then I can know that p is true even if it is possible that p is not true. — Michael
I'm not saying that it's a contradiction? I'm just explaining that p → □p is not a valid inference. — Michael
The implication of this is that if p is not necessarily true then I can know that p is true even if it is possible that p is not true. — Michael
Couldn't we be "wrong" about this conclusion?We then conclude that I could be wrong even if I know everything (and assuming that some p is not necessarily true): — Michael
Couldn't we be "wrong" about this conclusion? — 180 Proof
Yeah, in other words, 'knowing everything' that is true, not-true & unknowable.Or maybe it really is the case that it’s possible to be wrong even if you know everything. — Michael
I don't think knowledge entails "certainty" (Peirce-Dewey, Popper-Taleb); only logic & mathematics (i.e. tautologous syntactic transformation systems) produce "necessary truths" (Spinoza, Hume, Witty).And I think certainty is only possible if the truth is necessary, so non-fallible omniscience requires that all truths are necessary. — Michael
Given that knowledge that p entails belief that p it then follows that I could be wrong:
6. Bp ∧ ◇¬p (from 5) — Michael
Is that the right parsing? If you know that p then p is true, after all, and you could not be wrong about p being true, even if p, in some other possible world, might have not been true... — Banno
Is that the right parsing? If you know that p then p is true, after all, and you could not be wrong about p being true, even if p, in some other possible world, might have not been true...
That is, that p might have been false does not imply that you are wrong that p is, as things turned out, true.
The cat is indeed on the mat, you know the cat is on the mat, it is true that the cat is on the mat, you believe that the cat is on the mat, but the cat might have been elsewhere. — Banno
Exactly my thoughts. This seems to be an epistemic version of a modal scope fallacy where the possibility that not-p entails some possibility of not-p as a conjunction with knowing-that-p. But this is impossible: while p is possibly false, there are simply no worlds where p is both known and false (these worlds are contradictory, i.e. impossible). — Kuro
Does omniscience suggest knowledge of all possible errors? — universeness
If one is omniscient then how can its creation be flawed? — universeness
How about omniwoowoo! — universeness
Well, in that case, I hope I am correct. :up:Agreed with all your argument and post — javi2541997
A selfish one. Or at least someone or something who makes us remember that it is over of all criteria and goes beyond to all the limitations of possibilities. Writing this answer I am acknowledging that this has no sense. I guess this is what a omnipotent looks like in the infinite universe of metaphysics or quantum mechanics — javi2541997
I would appreciate it if you could keep on topic and not discuss unrelated issues — Michael
the symbology in your OP is cryptic to say the least. — universeness
It really isn't. It's very basic modal logic — Michael
A good teacher... — universeness
Best to explain as clearly and fully as you can. — universeness
I'm not here to teach. — Michael
those they are attempting to teach oreven create a discussion with. — universeness
Symbolic logical allows us to clarify our terms and better make sense of inferences. — Michael
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