Uttering the phrase isn’t the only thing you’ve done. — NOS4A2

What else have I done?

Admittedly “abuse of power” doesn’t outline any real crime. I guess it's just a political term of art. That’s why I believe the only “punishment” for that specific act ought to be decided at the ballot box. — NOS4A2

Then let's not consider some elected official. Ought the employee who falsely accuses (and knowingly so) his colleague of theft be fired? Ought the intelligence agent who verbally reveals classified national security information to a stranger in the pub be arrested?

@NOS4A2

I deleted my comment from a few seconds ago because I think I misinterpreted you.

Probably unisex toilets, sports teams divided by biological sex, and prisons divided by gender identity.

Can intersex people pass their intersex genes down to other generations? — Harry Hindu

Yes. According to this, "infertility affects many – but not all – intersex people." Each person's sex gametes (sperm or egg) contain a complete set of that person's genes, and so can be passed on to the child.

Are there intersex genes, or male and female genes that sometimes get muddled in process of sex - of merging two different sets of genes together? — Harry Hindu

There are X chromosomes and Y chromosomes, with particular combinations being responsible for particular phenotypes (e.g. XX typically responsible for the development of breasts and a vagina, and XY typically responsible for the development of a penis), but this relationship is not absolute (e.g. those with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome have XY chromosomes but develop breasts and a vagina), and there are more combinations than just XX and XY.

Asking what counts as a "male gene" or a "female gene" strikes me as a confused question. The words "male" and "female" had a meaning well before we understood anything about genes. I don't think that when we referred to someone as being male we were unknowingly referring to them as having a particular sequence of DNA.

All we can say is that in almost all cases where we describe someone using the adjective "male", that person has XY chromosomes and that in almost all cases where we describe someone using the adjective "female", that person has XX chromosomes. But there are plenty of people who defy this "rule", whether that be because they have a different set of chromosomes or because they have an ambiguous phenotype or because their phenotype does not correspond to the "typical" phenotype of people with their set of chromosomes.

Not that any of this has any bearing on the political discussion on whether or not and how we should divide bathrooms and sports teams and prisons. The etymology of English vocabulary is irrelevant.

If a person is born with a tail are they considered interspecies? — Harry Hindu

No.

Not really, When it comes to the brain sure, but sex parts - no.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/256369 — Harry Hindu

I'm not sure what you're trying to argue there, or if you've misunderstood my argument here.

I accept that "99.9% of people fall into two non-overlapping classes — male and female" as you say, but also that 0.1% of people fall outside these classes, and so are classified as neither male nor female but as intersex.

Malcolm Perry seems to be arguing that there's no such thing as being intersex; that every human is either male or female, even if it's difficult for us to determine which. And that's simply not the case. Human biology is complex, and the English nouns "male" and "female" do not fully capture this complexity.

Absolutely if my fear of being punished compels me to commit the crime, then that is my responsibility—I could have done otherwise— but you are guilty of something like abusing your position. — NOS4A2

How have I abused my position? You obeyed, so I didn't punish you, and I might not have even threatened to punish you for disobeying. The only thing I've done is uttered the phrase "throw Trump in prison". You may (correctly or incorrectly) believe that you would be punished for disobeying, but I haven't done or said anything to that effect.

So this doesn't work unless you want to say that, by virtue of my position, the very utterance "throw Trump in prison" is the abuse of power and ought be punished, in which case you accept the principle that some speech acts ought be restricted, even if the restriction depends both on content and the relative "positions" of the speaker and the audience (whereas others might think that content alone is sufficient).

You have to give some money up front, as no contract killer will simply accept your word. — Harry Hindu

Assume one does. I promise John £1,000 if he kills my wife. John then kills my wife. I renege on my promise. Ought I be punished for my involvement in the (conspiray to) murder?

Hiring someone to kill your wife in exchange for cash has a similar component. If you made the exact same request but didn’t exchange any cash, the contract killer wouldn’t kill. The exact same request, but one does not convince. Why? The exchange of money, not the request, is the reason a contract killer would kill your wife. — NOS4A2

There's not always the exchange of money, it might only be the promise of money, and surely a promise is just a speech-act? But there might not even be a promise; there might simply be a request of one friend to another. If I beg John to kill my wife, and he does, ought I be punished?

The officer’s who carry out arrests due to a superior’s orders have to obey or face repercussion. It’s that dynamic, not the words, that convinces him to follow those orders. — NOS4A2

You question the physics of my words inciting you to commit a crime but don't question the physics of some nebulous "dynamic" between me and you inciting you to commit a crime? That doesn't seem very consistent.

Surely if your fear of being punished by me "compels" you to commit a crime then that's entirely the responsibility of you and your psychology?

It is only the tiny tiny minority of people you appear to be fixated on that may need more scientific basis to determine their sex. — Malcolm Parry

There is no single determinant in these cases. You seem to believe that the English words "male" and "female" refer to two clearly defined, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive biological qualities, but that simply isn't the case. Human biology is far more complex than our vocabulary accounts for.

The reality is that the English words "male" and "female" developed to name the two main phenotypes that typically distinguish humans, with other words like "hermaphrodite" used to name those with a phenotype that differs from the typical two. We later discovered that these two phenotypes are typically caused by two main sets of chromosomes (XY and XX), but also that there are more than these two sets of chromosomes, and that the relationship between sex chromosomes and phenotype is not absolute (e.g. those with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome have XY chromosomes but a phenotype that we would typically name "female").

It seems you are confusing actions with speech. — Harry Hindu

How do you distinguish between action and speech in the cases mentioned?

Biden isn't physically placing handcuffs on Trump and throwing him in jail; he's only uttered the phrase "Have Trump arrested and thrown in jail" to his Attorney General.

I'm not physically placing a gun in John Smith's hand and pulling the trigger; I'm only uttering the phrase "I'll give you £1,000 if you kill my wife" to him.

Molecular biology in the cases that are not immediately apparent. — Malcolm Parry

What molecules determine someone to be either a man or a woman?

But also your use of "immediately apparent" suggests that you think that biological sex is determined by outward appearance, and so not a concern of molecular biology at all, and brings back into question those who have undergone (complete) sex reassignment surgery.

You don't appear to be maintaining a consistent position.

It has worked quite well until about a decade ago. Not sure why it has become so complicated. — Malcolm Parry

And yet in your answer to my question above you didn't say "anyone can use bathroom A and anyone can use bathroom B".

So again you don't appear to be maintaining a consistent position.

It is extremely simple. If someone is indistinguishable then no one will know or care. The law does not need to get involved. Just like they don't need to get involved when very masculine looking women go to the loo.

If Buck Angel is a woman then Buck Angel can go to the female facilities. — Malcolm Parry

So the law ought allow for anyone to use any bathroom?

I recognise that intersex people have ambiguous genitalia, reproductive organs, chromosones etc. But they aren't neither or both sexes. — Malcolm Parry

So which aspect of an intersex person’s biology determines them to be either male or female?

Biology — Malcolm Parry

What about biology determines if someone is male or female? You don’t seem to recognise that being intersex is a biological condition.

I would say only natural but if someone has surgery and looks like a woman, who would know otherwise? — Malcolm Parry

That’s part of why the answer to these questions isn’t so simple. If a transgender man is outwardly indistinguishable from a cisgender man and a transgender woman outwardly indistinguishable from a cisgender woman then how is something like bathroom usage to be legislated and policed?

If we legislate to say that sex chromosomes determine which bathroom someone can use (ignoring for the moment the case of being intersex) then someone like Buck Angel (as he has already been mentioned) is going to face constant abuse and arrest for using the “women’s” bathroom because by outward appearance he looks like the typical biological man.

There is no person that is not male or female. There may be difficulty categorising them when they are young but they are either male or female. — Malcolm Parry

Determined by what?

If there is some doubt then they should use the facilities that most reflect their appearance. — Malcolm Parry

Is this also true of those who undergo sex reassignment surgery (including genitals)? Or is it only “natural” appearance that matters?

Is it not obvious why there is segregation? — Malcolm Parry

I’m not disputing your suggestions, just seeking clarity.

Yes. They are one sex or the other. — Malcolm Parry

They’re intersex

Non Binary Team A or B according to their biological sex. — Malcolm Parry

It was non-binary with ambiguous genitalia, i.e biologically intersex.

Not that difficult — Malcolm Parry

The general gist I get from your answer is that the divisions should be “cisgender women” and “everyone else”?

The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated

If your concern is the risk of sexual assault, a relevant question is: is a transgender woman more likely to sexually assault a cisgender woman in a women's prison than a cisgender man to sexually assault a transgender woman in a men's prison?

It may be that placing transgender women in men’s prisons and transgender men in women’s prisons results in more victims of sexual assault than placing transgender women in women’s prisons and transgender men in men’s prisons.

I think that many of these discussions tend to get caught up in pointless arguments about what the “real” meaning of a word is.

If you choose to use the words "man" and "woman" to refer to the general biological dichotomy found in humans, then fine. If you choose to the use the words to refer to some general psychological or social dichotomy, then fine. It simply doesn't matter.

The pertinent question is: should bathrooms, sports teams, prisons, etc. be divided by biological sex, by gender identity, by something else, or by nothing at all?

@NOS4A2

If Biden, when he was President, were to have instructed the Department of Justice to arrest his political opponents and hold them in prison without trial, and if they were to then do so, would you place (some) responsibility on Biden, and argue that this warrants impeachment and removal from office (and perhaps also arrest), or would you blame only the individual officers who carry out the instruction?

Should I be punished for hiring a contract killer to kill my spouse? I didn't kill her; I just asked someone else to and promised him money.

Many of us believe in free will, and argue against hard determinism, and so deny the claim that speech can have some irresistible, compulsive force on others, but still accept that encouragement and persuasion are very real psychological phenomena, and that speech that encourages or persuades others to engage in (certain) unlawful activity ought itself be unlawful.

So in detail. I think we're construing the scope of behavioural concepts a bit differently still. I'm including statements like {"this is a duck"} and concepts/norms/behaviours like {what makes "this is a duck" correctly assertible} as part of the same idea. They're functions of a linguistic community and its environment {yes I am that debased, seeing language as functional}. — fdrake

How does this address such statements as:

1. The universe was created by a supremely powerful deity
2. Intelligent extra-terrestrial life has visited Earth in secret
3. I will get married next year
4. If Hitler hadn't killed himself then he would have been assassinated

If there's any truth to these statements it certainly doesn't seem to concern norms and behaviours.

Mathematical platonists distinguish themselves from non-platonists like nominalists. Each group seems to understand what the other means, hence their disagreement. I'm asking if infinitesimals exist in the sense that would satisfy mathematical platonism.

In short, it isn't obvious that mathematical platonism necessitates a commitment to only one construal (one use of ∃) of what it means to exist. — J

From here, "[p]latonism about mathematics (or mathematical platonism) is the metaphysical view that there are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us and our language, thought, and practices."

I'm not sure how this can be further distinguished. Either some set is a mind-independent abstract object or it's not.

Different people may mean different things by "exist" but I don't think different people mean different things by "mathematical platonism", else there wouldn't be much sense in discussing which of platonism, formalism, intuitionism, fictionalism, nominalism, etc. are correct.

My claim is that it doesn't make sense to argue that both of these are true:

1. Quine atoms exist in the platonistic sense
2. Quine atoms don't exist in the platonistic sense

One of them is true and one of them is false. However, regardless of which of (1) and (2) is true, both of these are true:

3. Quine atoms exist according to New Foundations
4. Quine atoms don't exist according to ZFC

And notice the difference between saying that Quine atoms exist according to New Foundations and saying that New Foundations is correct to claim that Quine atoms exist.

Mathematical fictionalists claim that (1) is false and that (2), (3), and (4) are true.

Perhaps a more helpful phrasing of (3) and (4) is this:

3. There is a set that contains only itself according to New Foundations
4. There is not a set that contains only itself according to ZFC

I assume Harry is arguing for platonism and Sally is arguing against platonism.

Suppose I say, "x exists according to Harry." You say, "x does not exist according to Sally." What is the subject of the dispute between Harry and Sally? Are they in disagreement about x, or about what 'exists' means? — J

The question is ambiguous. Consider these two claims:

1. According to the Lord of the Rings canon, orcs exist
2. According to crazy folk, fairies exist

Mathematical fictionalists are saying something like (1), not (2).

I don't know what Harry and Sally are saying.

Repeating the same error does not correct it. — Banno

I haven't made an error. You have. I explained it quite clearly in my last post here which you opted not to address.

Firstly, you brought up chess as an analogy to propositions. My claim is that there is no chess in a barren world because there is nobody in that world playing chess and that there are no propositions in a barren world because there is nobody in that world using propositions.

Secondly, you conflate propositions about a world and propositions in a world. That we use propositions to talk about a world without language does not entail that there are propositions in a world without language.

I believe that there is a truth to logical laws that is not dependent on one or another philosophical doctrine — Wayfarer

Which logical laws, and why those? There's classical logic, intuitionistic logic, dialetheism, three-valued logic, fuzzy logic, free logic, and so on.

How does the issue of correctness arise? — J

If platonism is correct then I suppose a "correct" logic is one that includes these mind-independent logical facts and doesn't include any logical "fictions".

For example, if the law of excluded middle is a mind-independent fact then classical logic is more correct that intuitionistic logic, and if the law of noncontradiction is a mind-independent fact then classical logic is more correct than dialetheism, and if truth is mind-independently bivalent then classical logic is more correct than fuzzy logic.

But if platonism isn't correct then no logic is "correct". They can be consistent or useful, but nothing more substantial.

Couldn't both types of logic exist platonically -- awaiting discovery by sentient beings? To put it another way, if you believe that any abstracta can exist platonically, why draw the line at a single, putatively correct logic? — J

I addressed that in the OP with respect to incompatible mathematical entities, e.g. the Quine atom which is a set that contains itself. New Foundations allows for such a thing but ZFC doesn't.

If platonism is correct then either Quine atoms are mind-independent mathematical entities or they're not.

I don't think it makes any sense to say that they platonistically exist in New Foundations but don't platonistically exist in ZFC. We can only take the approach of mathematical fictionalism and say that they exist according to New Foundations but not according to ZFC.

The salient question I asked which you failed to address was 'if existence is mind-independent, is being prime likewise mind-independent?'. — Janus

I suppose that depends on whether or not numbers are mind-independent, which I discuss in a different topic.

But if we're discussing physical objects then I already stated several times over the past several weeks and pages that gold can exist in a world without minds.

My claim is only that a) truth and falsity are properties of truth-bearers, that b) truth-bearers are propositions, sentences, utterances, beliefs, etc., and that c) propositions, sentences, utterances, beliefs, etc. are not language-independent. This then entails that d) a world without language is a world without truth-bearers is a world without truths and falsehoods.

It's unclear to me which of a), b), c) , or d) you disagree with.

If you accept a), b), and c) but reject d) then you are clearly equivocating, introducing some new meaning to the terms "truth" and "falsehood" distinct from that referenced in a).

What about the laws of logic, like the law of the excluded middle? Does that cease to obtain in the absence of rational sentient beings? — Wayfarer

Classical logic uses the law of excluded middle but intuitionistic logic doesn't, allowing for sentences that are neither true nor false.

You seem to be suggesting that one of these logics is correct. Which may be so if platonism is correct, but not if it isn't.

It being prime and it being true that it is prime are exactly the same. — Janus

Which I addressed above. If "is is prime" and "it is true that it is prime" are being used interchangeably then the phrase "it is true that" is vacuous; "it" refers to nothing and so truth is not being predicating of anything.

But when "truth" and "falsehood" are being predicated of something – when truths and falsehoods are some thing – that thing is a proposition/sentence/utterance, and if platonism about propositions is incorrect then even if there are truths about a world without language there are no truths in a world without language.

for any number we write down it will be true or false that it is prime, even if we don't know the answer. — Janus

What is the word "it" referring to here?

Either it's referring to a proposition, as I have been arguing, or it's not referring to anything, in which case truth and falsity are being predicated of nothing, and so the phrases "it will be true that" and "it will be false that" are vacuous, as I have been arguing.

If all you are saying is that any number we write down is either prime or not, even if we don't know the answer, then I agree and have never claimed otherwise.

I'll try one last time If you won't address what I actually write, there is no point continuing. I haven't uttered any proposition; I've just nominated some extremely large number and asked the question about its primeness. Do you deny that the truth regarding the number's primness is prior to my proposing anything about it, and in fact prior to my even nominating it, or not. If not, why? — Janus

I went over this with the existence of gold, but I'll do it again with a number being prime:

1. "11 is prime" is true
2. It is true that 11 is prime
3. 11 is prime

(1) asserts that a proposition is true. (3) asserts that a number is prime (and says nothing about truth).

(2) either means the same thing as (1), in which case it asserts that a proposition is true, or it means the same thing as (3), in which case it asserts that a number is prime and the phrase "it is true that" is vacuous, being nothing more than grammatical fluff.

When you ask about the truth regarding a number's primeness it's unclear if you're asking me about the truth of the proposition "X is prime" or if you're asking me about the number's primeness, and this ambiguity is causing you to equivocate.

The unambiguous and correct answers to your question are:

1. If I say that the number 11 is prime then what I say is true
2. The number 11 is prime even if I don't say that it is
3. If I say that the number 12 is prime then what I say is false
4. The number 12 is not prime even if I don't say that it isn't

And to a different question:

1. If I say that gold exists then what I say is true
2. Gold exists even if I don't say that it does
3. If I say that vibranium exists then what I say is false
4. Vibranium does not exist even if I don't say that it doesn't

When you clear up the grammar of the questions and answers then it's clear that truth and falsity are properly properties of propositions/sentences/beliefs/utterances, not something that can be divorced from them by clever word play, and is why the SEP article on truth says:

We thus find the usual candidate truth-bearers linked in a tight circle: interpreted sentences, the propositions they express, the belief speakers might hold towards them, and the acts of assertion they might perform with them are all connected by providing something meaningful. This makes them reasonable bearers of truth.

So the relevant discussion concerns whether or not platonism about truthbearers is correct, or if we should adopt a non-platonistic interpretation that allows for a distinction between truths in a world and truths at a world, and I am firmly in favour of the latter.

If you open your mind and think about it you will see that my example of prime numbers throws that assumption into question — Janus

You seem to be saying that the proposition "X is a prime number" is true or false before it is uttered but denying that this is a case of a proposition being true or false.

For a start paintings do not enjoy pre-existence prioir to their being painted, and thought as pre-existents they are not determinate objects like prime numbers are. — Janus

You appear to be assuming mathematical platonism?

Also, it is an observable object—the painting—which will be assessed for accuracy once it exists. What exactly is it that will be assessed for primeness? — Janus

The proposition "X is a prime number" is assessed as accurate/true when uttered.

I don't have to propose anything I can simply present some number: say 579,836,642,549,743,762,649 and there is a truth about whether or not that number is prime. No proposition required. — Janus

But "a truth" means "a true proposition", and so you are saying "there is a true proposition about whether or not that number is prime; no proposition required".

Also, accuracy is not a precisely d;eterminable quality. — Janus

Then neither is the truth of the proposition "the painting is accurate".

Although I'm not a mathematical platonist, I do have some questions about the epistemological argument, specifically with premise (3):

3. If there exist any abstract mathematical objects, then human beings could not attain knowledge of them.

If knowledge is justified true belief then this can be rephrased as:

3. If there exist any abstract mathematical objects, then human beings could not attain justified true beliefs of them.

Is this saying that if mathematical objects are abstract then we cannot conceive of an equation, that we cannot believe that the equation is true, or that we cannot be justified in believing that the equation is true?

Or is there some other sense of knowledge, distinct from justified true belief, at play here?

I think the platonist response would be that premise 2 is false. — Count Timothy von Icarus

At least according to the SEP article here, (2) is platonism:

Platonism is the view that there exist such things as abstract objects — where an abstract object is an object that does not exist in space or time and which is therefore entirely non-physical and non-mental.

Mathematical objects exist in spacetime. There is twoness everywhere there are two of something (e.g. in binary solar systems). — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is moderate/immanent realism:

Immanent Realism: Advocates of this view agree with platonists that there do exist such things as mathematical objects — or universals, or whatever category of alleged abstract objects we're talking about — and that these things are independent of us and our thinking; but immanent realists differ from platonists in holding that these objects exist in the physical world.