Bathroom stalls are easy (cubicles for all) — Isaac

All the toilets at a nightclub I go to are unisex.

Like I've said twice in this thread:

Biological sex is based on a combination of traits:

- chromosomes (in humans, XY is male, XX female)
- genitals (penis vs. vagina)
- gonads (testes vs. ovaries)
- hormones (males have higher relative levels of testosterone than women, while women have higher levels of estrogen)
- secondary sex characteristics that aren’t connected with the reproductive system but distinguish the sexes, and usually appear at puberty (breasts, facial hair, size of larynx, subcutaneous fat, etc.)

Using genitals and gonads alone, more than 99.9% of people fall into two non-overlapping classes—male and female—and the other traits almost always occur with these.
You seem to be focused on the XX chromosomes and not the rest of the characteristics. — Harry Hindu

Yet you accepted that someone who is XX male is male and so clearly it's false to say that "in humans, XY is male, XX female". It may be that incidentally 99.9% of men have XY chromosomes, but given that there are men who don't have XY chromosomes it follows that having XY (or XX) chromosomes isn't a measure of biological sex. It certainly may influence biological sex, but the reality of genetics is that other things can influence it as well, even if they don't occur as often.

There are people who have XX chromosomes (which you admit is possible for men), that have high levels of testosterone and low levels of estrogen, do not have breasts, and do have facial hair. What determines whether or not such a person is a man or a woman? Does it depend on them having a penis and testes? What if they lost them in an accident?

The problem is that you haven't defined gender in such a way that makes it useful to use if it's not related to sex. — Harry Hindu

Sex and gender distinction

An easy way to think about it; if your brain were transplanted into a body with breasts, a vagina, a womb, ovaries, etc., would you identify as a man or a woman? I'd still identify as a man.

Would you refer to someone with XX male syndrome using "he" or "she" (or both or neither)? — Michael

Easy. Male = he/him — Harry Hindu

So it's one's physical appearance that determines whether or not one is a man or a woman (rather than one's genes)?

How is it that "gender" became part of a discussion on changing "sex" if they aren't both related or the same thing? — Harry Hindu

You said that pronouns refer to sex. In modern usage pronouns refer (also) to gender.

Only one of those has something to do with what we are discussing.

https://www.docdroid.net/57t8V1q/clarke-2019-extened-clinical-assessment-pdf#page=6

A total of 156 cases met age criteria and were undergoing assessment in the specified time period (47 male-bodied young people; 109 female-bodied young people). Four cases were excluded due to dropping out after one session, 20 female-bodied young people were excluded due to intending to pursue medical interventions in adult services, 4 cases that gave practical reasons as to why they were not seeking medical interventions at that time were also excluded (two males; two females). Of the remaining 128 cases, 12 cases (9.4%) met criteria for GD emerging in adolescence, were actively requesting medical interventions at outset of assessment and ceased wishing to pursue medical interventions and/or no longer felt that their gender identity was incongruent with their biological sex.

...

Out of the 12 cases, the majority had not received a formal diagnosis of GD.

So only 9.4% wanted to pursue medical intervention but then changed their mind, and of them a majority had never even been formally diagnosed with gender dysphoria.

And from that you want to conclude that of the people who have been formally diagnosed with gender dysphoria and have actually transitioned there's a high rate of regret? That's very bad logic.

Do you have an actual study that concludes that there is a high rate of regret amongst people who actually transitioned?

The survey in 2015 was conducted by national center for transgender equality. — emancipate

And the other two surveys weren't.

I would present you a non-bias source but unfortunately the entire western media is pumping out pro trans propaganda

Are you saying that you don't have a source? If not then why do you believe that there is a high rate of regret? If your opinion is based on some evidence that show me the evidence.

Then could you link me your non-biased source that shows a high degree of transition regret?

Also I don't think https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24872188/ or https://www.jsm.jsexmed.org/article/S1743-6095%2818%2930057-2/fulltext were surveys conducted by a trans rights activist organisation.

There are many, many cases of post-operation regret but for some reason that part never gets highlighted. — emancipate

https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/media-s-detransition-narrative-fueling-misconceptions-trans-advocates-say-n1102686

In a 2015 survey of nearly 28,000 people conducted by the U.S.-based National Center for Transgender Equality, only 8 percent of respondents reported detransitioning, and 62 percent of those people said they only detransitioned temporarily. The most common reason for detransitioning, according to the survey, was pressure from a parent, while only 0.4 percent of respondents said they detransitioned after realizing transitioning wasn’t right for them.

The results of a 50-year survey published in 2010 of a cohort of 767 transgender people in Sweden found that about 2 percent of participants expressed regret after undergoing gender-affirming surgery.

The numbers are even lower for nonsurgical transition methods, like taking puberty blockers. According to a 2018 study of a cohort of transgender young adults at the largest gender-identity clinic in the Netherlands, 1.9 percent of adolescents who started puberty suppressants did not go on to pursue hormone therapy, typically the next step in the transition process.

There are factual distinctions that make a difference between males and females, which is why we make the scientifically interesting distinction between the two. — Cobra

What are these factual distinctions?

This person is intersex, as it says on the wiki. People with abnormal or mixed-sex characteristics/traits have always been "intersex". Intersex is uncommon and a fact. Just like male and female. There are males, females and then intersex. This is the only time the 'they/them' pronoun makes any form of sense outside of arbitrary made-up identities. I respect the intersex and they must be protected. The other arbitrary trivial identities are just that. — Cobra

Words like "male", "female", "him", and "her" existed long before we knew anything about DNA. DNA is just the blueprint that directs how a foetus develops. Typically the presence of a Y chromosome is required for a penis and testes to develop, but when the SRY gene is included in an X chromosome it also causes a penis and testes to develop.

On what grounds would you say that having a Y chromosome is a necessary characteristic of being a man? As someone who is partial to Wittgenstein's approach to language, I can't see the connection. I could (at least historically) understand the connection between the use (and so meaning) of the word "man" and the presence of a penis and testes (amongst other observable traits), and so that male and female refer to phenotypes, and so that an XX male is a male (as the condition explicitly says), but genotypes seem to me to be irrelevant.

I was going to double check the OP, but noticed he's removed it entirely. DavidJohnson, if there was an issue or a mistake in the post, no worry, it happens. — Philosophim

I posted his question in my post:

@DavidJohnson

You need to clarify what you mean by different characters. Is the number 22 two different characters or 1 repeated character?

esevene
333

It is relevant because he is asking for a character in the first question. Where I get the character then? This is why I thought about an adjective. Trying to be original — javi2541997

He is saying that there is a single answer, let's say "xxx".

The first character is an answer to the question "What is the third character (number, letter, or symbol) you will type to solve this?"

The second character is an answer to the question "How many different characters will you type to solve this?" (although this could be more than one character)

The third character is an answer to the question "What is the first character you will type to solve this?"

I was thinking about Púrpura because it was the first word that came to my mind — javi2541997

Why would that be relevant to the puzzle? It doesn't ask you to think of a word.

Púrpura comes firstly and then the characters — javi2541997

Where does Púrpura come from?

Your answer could just as well be "b2b" or "323" or anything else where the first and last characters are the same. — DavidJohnson

Yes. Your questions don't entail a single possible answer.

Below you will find three questions. Answer each question in order with no spaces between them. So if the answer to the first question is a, the answer to the second question is b, and the answer to the third question is c then the solution is abc. There is no "trick", by the way. You can arrive at the solution through pure logic.

What is the third character (number, letter, or symbol) you will type to solve this?

How many different characters will you type to solve this?

What is the first character you will type to solve this? — DavidJohnson

a2a

Would you refer to someone with XX male syndrome using "he" or "she" (or both or neither)?

When pronouns, "he" and " her" are a reference to one's sex, not gender - whatever that is if it's not the same as sex. — Harry Hindu

According to who or what?

How we actually use language determines what words mean and pronoun-usage in the modern age is more complex than it may have been historically.

A male and female cannot transition to the opposite sex because they lack the necessary attributes of the opposite sex to do so. — Cobra

What are these "necessary" attributes?

Transsexualism and transvestitism is an elaborate sexual masquerade--and certainly not the only sexual and non-sexual masquerade which humans perform. But let's stay honest: A man wearing a dress (even if an artificial vagina has been created) is still a masquerading man. A woman wearing a beard and a suit (even if an artificial penis has been created) is still a masquerading woman. — Bitter Crank

What determines someone to be a man or a woman? Genotype? Phenotype? Psychology? Social role? Naming?

Sorry, I've been too busy the last few days to come on here, and I guess the other moderators are the same. They've been approved now and as you have more than 5 approved you can post freely.

Really? You think a conflict of interest that directly plays into how a nation's laws are made - which itself is nothing but one case among others - is a minor trifle compared to a slightly outsized bar-room brawl? Nah, don't talk to me about priorities. — StreetlightX

I think that the stock market is just a game that rich people play with each other and I don't care if a few hundred of them have advance knowledge to guide their buys and sells.

And I don't understand the connection between insider trading and legislation. I agree that the fact that they can trade at all will influence how they will legislate on certain issues, e.g. if they own stocks in a pharmaceutical company then they might be inclined to vote against anything that would lower the share price, but that's a separate issue to insider trading. I'd be in favour of banning them from trading for that reason.

And, as Baden mentioned, it's a mischaracterisation to describe the attack as a "slightly outsized bar-room brawl". The video above shows that.

Do you know why GoFundMe is your country's healthcare insurer? Hint: it isn't because of Jan 6. — StreetlightX

Not my country, but not because of insider trading either. I suspect it's because the majority of the politicians and/or their donors either don't want to see their taxes increased or because they own shares in health services. Or they just like the idea of poor people suffering.

If you think Jan 6 was ever even remotely a genuine threat to the certification of the Presidential election than it deserves to have been one.

By contrast, Pelosi's insider trading is a real thing. — StreetlightX

The attack was a real thing as well. People were hurt. It might not have had a chance of succeeding, but it did far more harm than Pelosi buying or selling stocks with knowledge that few other people had.

Your priorities here really are bizarre.

Nah, I just don't buy into liberal side-shows that matter to no one. If there was even a tenth of the energy invested into, I dunno, Pelosi's insider trading, or the treatment of Julian Assange, or the general political rot that is the democratic party as a whole - things that matter and have widespread, systematic ramifications for people who live real lives and don't magpie themselves to the latest shiny spectacle involving men in camo dress-up - maybe it might be OK to let this shit fly. — StreetlightX

You think Pelosi's insider trading matters but that a violent attempt to prevent the certification of the Presidential election doesn't?

Oh well if Mitch McConnell said it it must be true. The man is known for his integrity and honest commentary, a liberal darling. — StreetlightX

I'm not saying it's true because he said it. I'm pointing out that if even Republicans like Mitch McConnell and Ted Cruz are using such language to describe it then it's a stretch to characterise the investigation as just some Democrat propaganda or whatever.

Even Mitch McConnell called it a "failed insurrection" (1:43).

Trying to frame this as just some Democrat hysteria or whatever is pretty ridiculous.

Bloody Democrats. Trying to politicise a peaceful protest.

OK, that'll do now. It's no use flogging a dead horse. If you can't even bring yourself to acknowledge (even for that sake of argument) that the same expressions can mean different things in different contexts, then I can't possible explain my preferred model to you. It's like trying to explain atomic theory to someone who refuses to acknowledge that atoms could, even in theory, exist, it just can't be done — Isaac

See above.

'True' means different things in different contexts.
'Know' means different things in different contexts.
'Actually' means different things in different contexts.
'Fact' means different things in different contexts.
and so on...

You keep asking in one context, then when you bring up a different context claim that I'm being inconsistent, despite me explaining every time that these words have different meanings in different contexts. — Isaac

I'll remind you of something I said at the very start of our discussion:

You're conflating the strict meaning of the sentence with its use in practice. This is addressed in Moore's paradox: "It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining". The sentence is consistent, and possibly true, but not something that anyone would say in real life as assertions of something's truth tacitly imply that one believes that thing to be true. — Michael

In practice people just use the phrases "it is true that it is raining" and "I believe that it's raining" interchangeably but in the abstract we understand the meaning of "it is true that it is raining" as something like "a community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe that it is raining were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis that it is raining".

And to repeat something I said yesterday:

Even if an ordinary language approach would have us interpret "I know that it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" as meaning the same thing, a deeper analysis of the word "know" would have us define "knowledge" as "a well-reasoned belief that corresponds to the facts". — Michael

Even if in practice people just use the phrases "I know that it's raining" and "I believe that it's raining" interchangeably, when asked to consider it in the abstract we will admit that our beliefs can be wrong and that if our belief is wrong then we don't have knowledge, and so understand the meaning of "I know that it's raining" as something like "I am justified in believing that it's raining and my belief is true".

From the beginning I have accepted that the meaning of words can be interpreted differently in different contexts. But I don't think this is what is happening here. You're just changing your argument when its flaws are exposed. And depending on what day it is, your argument is that there’s nothing more to the truth than what I believe, and so if I believe that your argument is flawed then your argument is flawed.

Because there's two paths. (1) I've made a mistake - you can ask for clarification or suggest that I might have done so, or (2) I've no idea what I'm talking about and keep irrationally changing my opinion. (1) is the most charitable, you're repeatedly choosing (2) seems odd in the circumstances (a discussion forum). — Isaac

I think what's happening is that you start by arguing that the truth is what someone believes, I prove that wrong, you try to save your position by saying that you really mean that the truth is what the language community believes, I prove that wrong, you try to save your position by saying that you really mean that the truth is what a community of epistemic peers would believe were they to comprehensively test some hypothesis, I prove that this entails that truth and justification are distinct and both required for knowledge, and so you circle back to saying that the truth is what the language community believes.

Argh! The meaning of words is different in different contexts. I just don't know what more I can do to get this seemingly simple notion across to you (even if you don't agree with it, you seem to keep acting as if I hadn't even mentioned it). 'Truth' in one context might mean "what a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis", in another it might simply mean "everyone agrees with me", or "I'm really, really sure about this".

You keep comparing my use in one context with my use in another. — Isaac

We are talking specifically about its meaning in the context of the JTB definition of knowledge. For me to know that there is a desk next to my bed I must believe that there is a desk next to my bed, I must have a good reason for believing that there is a desk next to my bed, and it must be true that there is a desk next to my bed.

What does it mean for "there is a desk next to my bed" to be true? Clearly it can't mean that the language community believes that there is a desk next to my bed because the language community doesn't believe anything about there being or not being a desk next to my bed, and yet either "there is a desk next to my bed" is true or it isn't. And it can't mean that I believe that there is a desk next to my bed because I can be wrong.

You can make sense of this by explaining that "there is a desk next to my bed" is true iff a community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe that there is a desk next to my bed if they were to comprehensively test the hypothesis that there is a desk next to my bed, but then you would have to admit that this (the T) is a very different thing to the actual reason why I believe what I do about there being a desk next to my bed and whether or not this actual reason is a good one (the J), and so you must admit that the T and the J in the JTB definition are different conditions (as you finally admitted to here).

And after you have admitted that the T and the J in the JTB definition are different conditions you must either accept that both are required for me to know that there is a desk next to my bed or you must explain which (if either) is sufficient.

Can I know that there is a desk next to my bed if "there is a desk next to my bed" is false? I say that I can't. I can only know that there is a desk next to my bed if there is a desk next to my bed.

Can I know that there is a desk next to my bed if I have no good reason for believing that there is a desk next to my bed? I say that I can't. I can only know that there is a desk next to my bed if I have a good reason for believing so, otherwise it's just a lucky guess.

To me, understanding truth as "what a community of epistemic peers who have access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test a hypothesis" (in some uses) doesn't seem at all 'a deeper analysis' it seems the obvious ordinary use of the word (in those cases). — Isaac

And to me and most others, understanding knowledge as requiring a justified true belief seems the obvious ordinary use of the word.

Rep. Liz Cheney says Trump sat in the White House dining room and watched the Capitol riot unfold on TV instead of taking immediate action to stop the violence

The House Select Committee investigating the January 6 Capitol riot has "firsthand testimony" that former President Donald Trump watched the violence unfold on television instead of taking immediate action to stop the attack, Rep. Liz Cheney said on Sunday.

"We are learning much more about what former President Trump was doing while the violent assault was underway. The committee has firsthand testimony now that he was sitting in the dining room next to the Oval Office watching the attack on television as the assault on the Capitol occurred," Cheney, vice chair of the panel, told ABC News' George Stephanopoulos.

The Wyoming Republican called Trump's conduct that day "a dereliction of duty."

"We know, as you know well, that the briefing room at the White House is just a mere few steps from the Oval Office. The president could have at any moment walked those very few steps into the briefing room, gone on live television, and told his supporters who were assaulting the Capitol to stop. He could have told them to stand down. He could have told them to go home, and he failed to do so," she said.

The January 6 committee also has firsthand testimony that members of Trump's staff, including his daughter and then-White House senior advisor, Ivanka Trump, "went in at least twice to ask him to please stop this violence," Cheney said.

Prior to the investigation's findings, several news reports last year highlighted that Trump watched the riot on television and did not take steps to intervene.

Just five days after the riot, The Washington Post reported that Trump was glued to the TV screen as members of Congress locked down in the Capitol sought his help.

Post reporter Carol Leonnig, co-author of the book "I Alone Can Fix It," described Trump as "almost giddy" while he watched the riot on television. Journalists Bob Woodward and Robert Costa also reported in their book "Peril" that Trump ignored pleas to step in and instead continued watching the attack on TV.

Hours afterward, Trump released a video urging his supporters to go home while also telling them: "We love you, you're very special." Twitter and Facebook later suspended Trump from their platforms due to further risks of violence.

"It took Trump 187 minutes to make a statement calling off the mob that attacked our Capitol," the January 6 committee tweeted on Monday. "The former President's dereliction of duty is cause for serious concern."

Swiftly indeed...

No, no. Not that kinda difference. I mean in terms of a methodology (a rule). — Agent Smith

I don't know what you mean by a methodology.

To say that "it is raining" is true is to say that it is raining, and it is raining if there are clouds and water is falling from them.

To say that "it is sunny" is true is to say that it is sunny, and it is sunny if the sun is visible in the sky.

That's all there is to it.

I'm sorry, I don't understand. What do you mean? P is knowledge if P is true? No one has to believe P and nor is there a need to justify P? Discover knowledge! :chin: How does one know that if P is knowledge, P is true? — Agent Smith

I don't know what you're asking.

You mean to say each case of knowledge has its own satisfying conditions? — Agent Smith

Yes. The thing that makes "it is raining" true isn't the same thing that makes "it is sunny" true. That should be obvious.

In other words, knowledge is undefined? — Agent Smith

No. Defining it as "P is true" is sufficient.

Plus, can you go into detail as to how "physical events in the atmosphere"satisfy the proposition "it is raining"? — Agent Smith

Why would I need to? As an English speaker you know what "it is raining" means, you know what "it is sunny" means, and you know that they mean different things. And unless you want to argue for something like idealism then you should understand that whether or not it is raining or sunny has nothing to do with what I actually believe. The weather is something that happens outside my head and without my involvement.

How is "P is true" satisfied? — Agent Smith

Depends on what P is. If it's "it is raining" then it's satisfied if the physical events in the atmosphere (that happen regardless of our beliefs) are such that there are clouds releasing water.

JTB definition of truth:

S knows P IFF

1. P is true
2. P is justified
3. S believes P

How do we know P is true? I know you've tried to explain your position on the matter but what I'm having difficulty with is the implicit assumption in stating 1 separately that there's another (not justification, 2) method to decide whether a proposition is true/not. What is this method? How does it differ from justification (2)? — Agent Smith

We don't need to first know that each of the three conditions are satisfied for us to then have knowledge (that's impossible in principle, we require knowledge to have knowledge?) It is just enough that they are satisfied. And if they are satisfied then it follows that we know P is true.

Note that the JTB definition isn't:

S knows that P iff:

1. S knows that P is true
2. S knows that P is justified
3. S knows that S believes P

No, this doesn't work. The difference is one of degree. There's no 'both of them' it makes no sense. There are only justifications of better or worse degree. Knowledge requires a justification held by the subject, and a justification meeting a very high threshold held by the language community. Since the subject is also a part of the language community, these are very often one and the same. — Isaac

Except that's not what you've been saying. You've been saying that the truth is what a community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test a hypothesis.

There is a very big difference between the actual reason that I have for believing what I do and a hypothetical belief that a hypothetical group have in some hypothetical scenario.

One difference is that the first is about why I believe what I do and the second is about what they believe. The why is not the what. Another difference is that the first is about something factual and the second about something counterfactual. Another difference is that the first is always accessible and the second can be inaccessible (as you agreed with before, accepting that we can be wrong).

This just kicks the can. What is it to be sufficient to rationally form a belief? If you know that I can lie and fake my ID then on what grounds is it sufficient to form a rational belief about my identity from only my spoken word and an unexamined ID? It's clearly flawed. — Isaac

Of course it's flawed. One's reasoning can be fallible. That's how we can be wrong. That's why the common understanding of knowledge is that it's justified true belief, and not simply certain belief (which would have the reasoning entail the truth, and so only two conditions required). You've accepted before that we can be wrong, and so you understand that the reason we have for believing what we do does not entail the truth.

And surely you understand the difference between good reasons for believing something and bad reasons for believing something? You seemed to understand this before when you said "'[It is raining]' might mean something more akin to 'I believe it's raining, and I've good strong justifications for believing so'". What did you mean by the justifications being good and strong? Were you saying that the reason you believe that it is raining necessarily entails that it is raining - that you can't possibly be wrong? I don't think you were.

And do you really want to argue that I'm not justified in believing any of my friends' names because it's possible that they lied to me and have fake IDs?

But there is (or at least, that's my claim). For most ordinary language claims, the matter being discussed is ordinary (something we establish by touch, sight, smell - everyday stuff). For this category there is indeed an epistemic community who have exhausted all relevant tests. A tree's a tree because everyone agrees it's a tree. If it feels like a tree, looks like a tree, behaves like a tree...it's a tree. Because the language community have defined 'tree' as something which feels, looks and behaves like that. There's no God-written encyclopedia we can look stuff up in to find out what it really, really is. — Isaac

I'm alone in my room right now. A community of epistemic peers has never been here to exhaustively test any hypothesis. The truth of "there is a desk next to the bed" has nothing to do with what the language community believes about my room. But there is a truth. Either there is or there isn't a desk next to my bed.

We just use the word "true" when we believe something — Michael

We=a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis - in most cases of ordinary language object recognition - cases such as 'it's raining'. — Isaac

This doesn't answer my question at all. You have defined the truth as "what a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis". We each use the word "true" when we believe something to be the case. If the meaning of a word is to be found just in the actual occasions of its use then how have you come to define truth in such a complicated, counterfactual way?

I've never denied that, having consistently argued that meaning is contextual, including the meaning of 'true'. Your persistence in trying to pin me down to only one meaning notwithstanding. — Isaac

And how about the meaning of "knowledge"? If it's possible that an ordinary language approach would have us interpret "it is true that it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" as meaning the same thing, but that a deeper analysis of the word "true" would have us define "truth" as "what a community of epistemic peers who have access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test a hypothesis" then it's possible that even if an ordinary language approach would have us interpret "I know that it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" as meaning the same thing, a deeper analysis of the word "know" would have us define "knowledge" as "a well-reasoned belief that corresponds to the facts".

Yes, well, you have me there. As I said - look hard enough and you'll find that mistake you're searching for. I've been arguing that they are of no different kind (and as such not subject to Gettier's complaint). That particular expression there appears to say that they are no different at all, which is clearly wrong. What now? Do I fall on my sword? — Isaac

I don't know why you're wording this as if I'm doing something wrong by pointing out the inconsistencies in your arguments. It is entirely proper for me to do so.

Yes, that's right (with my little addition). Knowledge doesn't require a whiskey cup and a teacup, it just requires a good enough cup. — Isaac

The below is the claim of yours that I have been arguing against:

Hence, the 'truth' part of JTB is not distinct from the justification part. — Isaac

It is. There is a difference between "S's belief that p is sufficiently reasonable given the actual evidence that S considered when forming his belief that p" and "A community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe that p were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis that p".

Even if you want to argue that they are both types of justification, it is still the case that they are different things (of the same type), and that the JTB definition requires both of them.

I need you to first understand this before we can discuss whether or not the JTB definition is correct.

Well then the fact that I can lie and show you a fake ID makes your having taken my word and examined my ID insufficient. Otherwise what could 'sufficient' possibly mean? Sufficient for what? It's obviously not sufficient for the job at hand (establishing the truth), so what is it you're claiming it's sufficient at? — Isaac

Im not saying that one's reasoning must be sufficient to prove one's belief, only that one's reasoning must be sufficient for it to be rational to form one's belief. It is rational for me to believe that your name is Tommy if you tell me that your name is Tommy and show me what seems to me to be a valid government-issued ID that shows your name to be Tommy but it isn't rational for me to believe that your name is Tommy if I see you wearing a Tommy Hilfiger T-shirt.

One way to understand this distinction is to adopt the process reliabilist's position that a justified belief is one that is formed by a cognitive process which tends to produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones, and an unjustified belief is one that is formed by a cognitive process which doesn't produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones. Although I'm sure there are other ways to make sense of the distinction between a justified and an unjustified belief.

But it's not very different at all. "What the language community believes" and "what a community of epistemic peers come to believe after having exhausted their stock of conceivable tests", are very often almost exactly the same thing. — Isaac

Whether or not they very often share a belief has no bearing on whether or not they mean the same thing. At this point we're arguing over what each condition of the JTB definition means.

And how can you know that they are often almost exactly the same thing? Given that there isn't a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology and has comprehensively tested some hypothesis there are no results to compare with what the language community actually believes.

Again, we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games. So "this table is solid" - well, it's apparently not, if you test it with techniques of advanced scientific understanding, but that's not the meaning of the claim. The meaning is something entirely more mundane than the 'true' solidity of the table. The claim is about solidity in the ordinary sense. It really doesn't require much exhaustive testing to establish this 'ordinary sense' of solidity, so the beliefs of the language community and the beliefs of a community of epistemic peers who've exhausted all conceivable tests are more often than not one and the same, for certain types of common claim. — Isaac

And how does this track with what you're now saying about truth? We just use the word "true" when we believe something, but you've recently been arguing that truth is what a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis. Your definition of truth has gone far beyond the actual occasions of the word's use. Would you like to backtrack and say that the truth just is what each person believes with conviction, or would you like to admit that your interpretation of meaning is an oversimplification?

Different thing ≠ Different kind of thing. My Whiskey cup and my Teacup are different things, but the same kind of thing. — Isaac

And the JTB definition is saying something like "you need a whiskey cup and a teacup" and your responses are saying something like "this is redundant, it's actually just saying 'you need a cup'".

To say X's justification is 'sufficient' but X's belief is false is a contradiction. — Isaac

No it isn't. If you tell me that your name is Isaac and show me what looks to me to be a valid driving license that says that your name is Isaac then my belief that your name is Isaac is sufficiently reasonable given the evidence I have. But unknown to me you lied to me and showed me a fake ID. My belief is false. I have a reasonable, albeit false, belief.

To re-quote something you quoted earlier:

Externalists about justification think that factors external to the subject can be relevant for justification; for example, process reliabilists think that justified beliefs are those which are formed by a cognitive process which tends to produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones.

The above definition of a justified belief is one that can allow for justified false beliefs. Justification, according to the JTB definition, doesn't require certainty. Justifications can be fallible.

If you want to argue that a justified belief must be infallible then you have a very different understanding of knowledge; one that entails that we lack much knowledge that we erroneously believe we have, as very little in life is certain (maths only perhaps?).

Yes (barring my concerns above about the use of 'sufficiently reasonable' in cases where p turns out to be false). Pretty much how I opened when I talked about the role of the beliefs of the community in establishing the truth of "John is a bachelor". But you insisted that... — Isaac

Nothing about the JTB definition of knowledge has anything to do with what I or the language community believes. — Michael

...hence I'm struggling to understand how this new definition fits in with your approach. In this new definition it has everything to do with what I believe and what the beliefs of the language community - those are literally the only measures you're using. — Isaac

I was responding to this:

"It's raining" on the end of

"John knows that it is raining iff:

1. John believes that it is raining,
2. John is justified in believing that it is raining, and
3. It is raining"

...might mean something more akin to "I believe it's raining, and I've good strong justifications for believing so" — Isaac

I was saying that the third condition has nothing to do with what I or the language community believes (although specifically I was referring to the general form "S knows a fact iff the fact is as S justifiably believes it to be", which obviously at least has something to do with what S believes).

In fact, you now agree with me on this point (although you seem to have lost your previous understanding of having "good strong justifications for believing so"). Instead you interpret 3 as "a community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe that it is raining were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis that it is raining." This is of course very different to what I or the language community believe in practice.

I don't dispute that. I'm disputing that 'actually is...' is any different kind of thing to 'I believe'. — Isaac

You're changing your position again. You were saying that the truth is what a community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test some hypothesis (and which can be inaccessible, hence why we can be wrong). That's not the same thing as what I believe (given whatever limited evidence I have available to me).

Yes, I agree with that, even with my 'epistemic peer' definition of truth. If a person isn't aware of that justification (despite the fact that it exists) but rather uses another, flawed, one, then they can't be said to have knowledge. This doesn't change the fact that both are forms of justification. — Isaac

How many times do I have to explain this to you? When the JTB definition says that a belief must be justified it is saying that the individual's belief must be sufficiently reasonable given the actual evidence they considered when forming their belief.

You seem to have so much trouble with the words "true" and "justified" in the context of the JTB definition. I don't know why this is. So let's just do away with them and explain in excruciating detail what the JTB definition is saying:

S knows that p iff:

1. S believes that p,
2. S's belief that p is sufficiently reasonable given the actual evidence that S considered when forming his belief that p, and
3. A community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe that p were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis that p

2 and 3 do not mean the same thing. It is possible that 2 obtains but that 3 doesn't, and so that S doesn't have knowledge. It is possible that 3 obtains but that 2 doesn't, and so that S doesn't have knowledge. Both 2 and 3, which are different things, must obtain for S to have knowledge.

If you want to rename JTB to J₁J₂B then go ahead, but it's such a trivial concern that doesn't address anything of substance that I don't know why you'd spend page after page trying to do so. The rest of us understanding perfectly what is meant by JTB.