Different thing ≠ Different kind of thing. My Whiskey cup and my Teacup are different things, but the same kind of thing. — Isaac
To say X's justification is 'sufficient' but X's belief is false is a contradiction. — Isaac
Externalists about justification think that factors external to the subject can be relevant for justification; for example, process reliabilists think that justified beliefs are those which are formed by a cognitive process which tends to produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones.
Yes (barring my concerns above about the use of 'sufficiently reasonable' in cases where p turns out to be false). Pretty much how I opened when I talked about the role of the beliefs of the community in establishing the truth of "John is a bachelor". But you insisted that... — Isaac
Nothing about the JTB definition of knowledge has anything to do with what I or the language community believes. — Michael
...hence I'm struggling to understand how this new definition fits in with your approach. In this new definition it has everything to do with what I believe and what the beliefs of the language community - those are literally the only measures you're using. — Isaac
"It's raining" on the end of
"John knows that it is raining iff:
1. John believes that it is raining,
2. John is justified in believing that it is raining, and
3. It is raining"
...might mean something more akin to "I believe it's raining, and I've good strong justifications for believing so" — Isaac
And the JTB definition is saying something like "you need a whiskey cup and a teacup" and your responses are saying something like "this is redundant, it's actually just saying 'you need a good enough cup'". — Michael
If you tell me that your name is Isaac and show me what looks to me to be a valid driving license that says that your name is Isaac then my belief that your name is Isaac is sufficiently reasonable given the evidence I have. But unknown to me you lied to me and showed me a fake ID. — Michael
In fact, you now agree with me on this point. Instead you interpret 3 as "a community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe that it is raining were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis that it is raining." This is of course very different to what I or the language community believe in practice. — Michael
Yes, that's right (with my little addition). Knowledge doesn't require a whiskey cup and a teacup, it just requires a good enough cup. — Isaac
Hence, the 'truth' part of JTB is not distinct from the justification part. — Isaac
Well then the fact that I can lie and show you a fake ID makes your having taken my word and examined my ID insufficient. Otherwise what could 'sufficient' possibly mean? Sufficient for what? It's obviously not sufficient for the job at hand (establishing the truth), so what is it you're claiming it's sufficient at? — Isaac
But it's not very different at all. "What the language community believes" and "what a community of epistemic peers come to believe after having exhausted their stock of conceivable tests", are very often almost exactly the same thing. — Isaac
Again, we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games. So "this table is solid" - well, it's apparently not, if you test it with techniques of advanced scientific understanding, but that's not the meaning of the claim. The meaning is something entirely more mundane than the 'true' solidity of the table. The claim is about solidity in the ordinary sense. It really doesn't require much exhaustive testing to establish this 'ordinary sense' of solidity, so the beliefs of the language community and the beliefs of a community of epistemic peers who've exhausted all conceivable tests are more often than not one and the same, for certain types of common claim. — Isaac
Sufficient to warrant Michael's belief. Michael, btw, is not a community.Well then the fact that I can lie and show you a fake ID makes your having taken my word and examined my ID insufficient. Otherwise what could 'sufficient' possibly mean? Sufficient for what? — Isaac
That is not the task at hand; it cannot be. Michael can't establish Isaacian truth, because Michael is not a community of epistemic peers. Michael is just an individual in a community. Furthermore, what is a community belief in the first place, if not the aggregation of individual beliefs?It's obviously not sufficient for the job at hand (establishing the truth), so what is it you're claiming it's sufficient at? — Isaac
Regarding that, Dr. Richard Kimble did not murder his wife.Again, we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games. — Isaac
The below is the claim of yours that I have been arguing against:
Hence, the 'truth' part of JTB is not distinct from the justification part. — Isaac
It is. There is a difference between "S's belief that p is sufficiently reasonable given the actual evidence that S considered when forming his belief that p" and "A community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe that p were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis that p". — Michael
Even if you want to argue that they are both types of justification, it is still the case that they are different things (of the same type), and that the JTB definition requires both of them. — Michael
Im not saying that one's reasoning must be sufficient to prove one's belief, only that one's reasoning must be sufficient for it to be rational to form one's belief. — Michael
One way to understand this distinction is to adopt the process reliabilist's position that a justified belief is one that is formed by a cognitive process which tends to produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones, and an unjustified belief is one that is formed by a cognitive process which doesn't produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones. — Michael
how can you know that they are often almost exactly the same thing? Given that there isn't a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology and has comprehensively tested some hypothesis there are no results to compare with what the language community actually believes. — Michael
We just use the word "true" when we believe something — Michael
would you like to admit that your interpretation of meaning is an oversimplification? — Michael
Sufficient to warrant Michael's belief. — InPitzotl
what is a community belief in the first place, if not the aggregation of individual beliefs? — InPitzotl
Again, we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games. — Isaac
Regarding that, did not murder his wife. — InPitzotl
No, this doesn't work. The difference is one of degree. There's no 'both of them' it makes no sense. There are only justifications of better or worse degree. Knowledge requires a justification held by the subject, and a justification meeting a very high threshold held by the language community. Since the subject is also a part of the language community, these are very often one and the same. — Isaac
This just kicks the can. What is it to be sufficient to rationally form a belief? If you know that I can lie and fake my ID then on what grounds is it sufficient to form a rational belief about my identity from only my spoken word and an unexamined ID? It's clearly flawed. — Isaac
But there is (or at least, that's my claim). For most ordinary language claims, the matter being discussed is ordinary (something we establish by touch, sight, smell - everyday stuff). For this category there is indeed an epistemic community who have exhausted all relevant tests. A tree's a tree because everyone agrees it's a tree. If it feels like a tree, looks like a tree, behaves like a tree...it's a tree. Because the language community have defined 'tree' as something which feels, looks and behaves like that. There's no God-written encyclopedia we can look stuff up in to find out what it really, really is. — Isaac
We just use the word "true" when we believe something — Michael
We=a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis - in most cases of ordinary language object recognition - cases such as 'it's raining'. — Isaac
I've never denied that, having consistently argued that meaning is contextual, including the meaning of 'true'. Your persistence in trying to pin me down to only one meaning notwithstanding. — Isaac
Yes, well, you have me there. As I said - look hard enough and you'll find that mistake you're searching for. I've been arguing that they are of no different kind (and as such not subject to Gettier's complaint). That particular expression there appears to say that they are no different at all, which is clearly wrong. What now? Do I fall on my sword? — Isaac
JTB definition of truth:
S knows P IFF
1. P is true
2. P is justified
3. S believes P
How do we know P is true? I know you've tried to explain your position on the matter but what I'm having difficulty with is the implicit assumption in stating 1 separately that there's another (not justification, 2) method to decide whether a proposition is true/not. What is this method? How does it differ from justification (2)? — Agent Smith
How is "P is true" satisfied? — Agent Smith
Depends on what P is. If it's "it is raining" then it's satisfied if the physical events in the atmosphere (that happen regardless of our beliefs) are such that water falls from the clouds. — Michael
You mean to say each case of knowledge has its own satisfying conditions? — Agent Smith
In other words, knowledge is undefined? — Agent Smith
Plus, can you go into detail as to how "physical events in the atmosphere"satisfy the proposition "it is raining"? — Agent Smith
Yes. The thing that makes "it is raining" true isn't the same thing that makes "it is sunny" true. That should be obvious. — Michael
No. Defining it as "P is true" is sufficient. — Michael
Why would I need to? — Michael
No, no. Not that kinda difference. I mean in terms of a methodology (a rule). — Agent Smith
I'm sorry, I don't understand. What do you mean? P is knowledge if P is true? No one has to believe P and nor is there a need to justify P? Discover knowledge! :chin: How does one know that if P is knowledge, P is true? — Agent Smith
I don't know what a community belief could be if not the aggregation of individual beliefs. — Isaac
I think you have this backwards. According to Isaacian theory of truth, truth is determined by community beliefs. If truth is determined by community beliefs, and community beliefs are an aggregation of individual beliefs, then truth has as a prerequisite individual beliefs. So regarding the question of how individuals should form beliefs, it is you, sir, who is kicking the can; because according to your theory of truth, it is categorically impossible.As above, this just kicks the can, doesn't answer the question of what 'sufficient' means here. — Isaac
No, I'm not talking about Sam Sheppard in real life; fiction uses language as well. One of the key differences actually makes fictive works more relevant--fictive works can establish in-universe truths canonically. Our eponymous fugitive is such precisely because a community of epistemic peers formally declared him such... a fact that conflicts with his canonical innocence. IOW, I'm directly challenging your notion that you're correctly describing folk theories of truth. It is indeed the case that Dr. Richard Kimble was eventually exonerated, but that was not a fictive guarantee. The folk concept is that people can be in such situations, be formally fugitives, and yet be innocent, if the state of affairs is such that they did not in fact commit the murder... the peers don't define the truth, the state of affairs does (R murdered W is impossible if the state of affairs is such that R did not kill W, regardless of what a community of peers says).If I recall he was exonerated. The community carried out one of their conceivable tests (assuming you're talking about Sam Sheppard in reality - otherwise, your point is not at all clear) — Isaac
S knows P IFF
1. P is true
2. P is justified
3. S believes P — Agent Smith
That's a (B) question, so it has a (B) answer.How do we know P is true? — Agent Smith
JTB makes no such assumption, even implicitly.I know you've tried to explain your position on the matter but what I'm having difficulty with is the implicit assumption in stating 1 separately that there's another (not justification, 2) method to decide whether a proposition is true/not. — Agent Smith
In the case of P="It's raining", it is rain clouds that do the raining, not us; that is, we do not establish P's truth, the weather does. — InPitzotl
I'm not sure I understand your question. When you claim that it's obvious that thinking is involved, to what are you referring? If you're referring to "...in the formation of truth", this is contradicted by the presumption of realism (which would hold that the states of affairs that we talk about have a nature that is independent of whether humans are thinking of them). P="It's raining" would just exemplify this; and the previous post just elaborated on the view. The weather, not humans thinking about the weather, makes P true.It's obvious that thinking is involved. Can you describe, in detail if possible, the actual ratiocination involved? — Agent Smith
You've been saying that the truth is what a community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test a hypothesis. — Michael
One difference is that the first is about why I believe what I do and the second is about what they believe. — Michael
Surely you understand the difference between good reasons for believing something and bad reasons for believing something? — Michael
What did you mean by the justifications being good and strong? Were you saying that the reason you believe that it is raining necessarily entails that it is raining - that you can't possibly be wrong? I don't think you were. — Michael
And do you really want to argue that I'm not justified in believing any of my friends' names because it's possible that they lied to me and have fake IDs? — Michael
I'm alone in my room right now. A community of epistemic peers has never been here to exhaustively test any hypothesis. The truth of "there is a desk next to the bed" has nothing to do with what the language community believes about my room. But there is a truth. Either there is or there isn't a desk next to my bed. — Michael
You have defined the truth as "what a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis". — Michael
We each use the word "true" when we believe something to be the case. If the meaning of a word is to be found just in the actual occasions of its use then how have you come to define truth in such a complicated, counterfactual way? — Michael
And how about the meaning of "knowledge"? If it's possible that an ordinary language approach would have us interpret "it is true that it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" as meaning the same thing, but that a deeper analysis of the word "true" would have us define "truth" as "what a community of epistemic peers who have access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test a hypothesis" then it's possible that even if an ordinary language approach would have us interpret "I know that it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" as meaning the same thing, a deeper analysis of the word "know" would have us define "knowledge" as "a well-reasoned belief that corresponds to the facts". — Michael
I don't know why you're wording this as if I'm doing something wrong by pointing out the inconsistencies in your arguments. It is entirely proper for me to do so. — Michael
No, I'm not talking about Sam Sheppard in real life; fiction uses language as well. — InPitzotl
regarding the question of how individuals should form beliefs, it is you, sir, who is kicking the can; because according to your theory of truth, it is categorically impossible. — InPitzotl
Argh! The meaning of words is different in different contexts. I just don't know what more I can do to get this seemingly simple notion across to you (even if you don't agree with it, you seem to keep acting as if I hadn't even mentioned it). 'Truth' in one context might mean "what a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis", in another it might simply mean "everyone agrees with me", or "I'm really, really sure about this".
You keep comparing my use in one context with my use in another. — Isaac
To me, understanding truth as "what a community of epistemic peers who have access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test a hypothesis" (in some uses) doesn't seem at all 'a deeper analysis' it seems the obvious ordinary use of the word (in those cases). — Isaac
And after you have admitted that the T and the J in the JTB definition are different conditions you must either accept that both are required for me to know that there is a desk next to my bed or you must explain which (if either) is sufficient. — Michael
Because there's two paths. (1) I've made a mistake - you can ask for clarification or suggest that I might have done so, or (2) I've no idea what I'm talking about and keep irrationally changing my opinion. (1) is the most charitable, you're repeatedly choosing (2) seems odd in the circumstances (a discussion forum). — Isaac
I think what's happening is that you start by arguing that the truth is what someone believes, I prove that wrong, you try to save your position by saying that you really mean that the truth is what the language community believes, I prove that wrong, you try to save your position by saying that you really mean that the truth is what a community of epistemic peers would believe were they to comprehensively test some hypothesis, I prove that this undermines your position against the claim that truth and justification are distinct and both required for knowledge, and so you circle back to saying that the truth is what the language community believes. — Michael
OK, that'll do now. It's no use flogging a dead horse. If you can't even bring yourself to acknowledge (even for that sake of argument) that the same expressions can mean different things in different contexts, then I can't possible explain my preferred model to you. It's like trying to explain atomic theory to someone who refuses to acknowledge that atoms could, even in theory, exist, it just can't be done — Isaac
See above.
'True' means different things in different contexts.
'Know' means different things in different contexts.
'Actually' means different things in different contexts.
'Fact' means different things in different contexts.
and so on...
You keep asking in one context, then when you bring up a different context claim that I'm being inconsistent, despite me explaining every time that these words have different meanings in different contexts. — Isaac
You're conflating the strict meaning of the sentence with its use in practice. This is addressed in Moore's paradox: "It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining". The sentence is consistent, and possibly true, but not something that anyone would say in real life as assertions of something's truth tacitly imply that one believes that thing to be true. — Michael
Even if an ordinary language approach would have us interpret "I know that it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" as meaning the same thing, a deeper analysis of the word "know" would have us define "knowledge" as "a well-reasoned belief that corresponds to the facts". — Michael
Argument:Well then I'm afraid I have no idea what point you're making. What you've said doesn't seem related to what I'm arguing in the slightest. — Isaac
Counter: In the ordinary sense (of folk language games, of the type we would play when we say "the table is solid"), "R murdered W" can only be true if the state of affairs is such that R murdered W, regardless of what a community of peers agrees on.Again, we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games. So "this table is solid" - well, it's apparently not, if you test it with techniques of advanced scientific understanding, but that's not the meaning of the claim. The meaning is something entirely more mundane than the 'true' solidity of the table. The claim is about solidity in the ordinary sense. — Isaac
I'm not sure you understand what you're arguing. Here was your claim:regarding the question of how individuals should form beliefs, it is you, sir, who is kicking the can; because according to your theory of truth, it is categorically impossible. — InPitzotl
...and this is what you just said:To say X's justification is 'sufficient' but X's belief is false is a contradiction. — Isaac
The underlined already concedes the point as far as JTB is concerned; "good enough for most purposes" and "sufficient to warrant belief" mean the same thing. So what, then, are you arguing Isaac?Two justifications for a belief "it's raining"...
1) My head's wet.
2) My epistemic peers have done some exhaustive testing and agree that water is falling from clouds.
Both are of the form "I believe that...", I don't have unfiltered, infallible access to either. (1) is good enough for most purposes, but with (2) the speaker might say "I know that it's raining - their justification is sufficient to use the term. — Isaac
In the ordinary sense (of folk language games, of the type we would play when we say "the table is solid"), "R murdered W" can only be true if the state of affairs is such that R murdered W, regardless of what a community of peers agrees on. — InPitzotl
The underlined already concedes the point as far as JTB is concerned; "good enough for most purposes" and "sufficient to warrant belief" mean the same thing. — InPitzotl
So what, then, are you arguing Isaac? — InPitzotl
Good idea. I'll start attempting to do that multiple posts ago. However, finding common grounds is strictly not in my control; it critically requires your cooperation.Either find some common ground — Isaac
You're losing focus. You replied to a post of mine that explicitly quoted this:See just repeating an assertion about what you believe to be the case doesn't constitute a counter — Isaac
Counters are not just arguments... they are more critically points being made, with said points challenging some previously made point; without these two aspects the argument isn't even relevant. It is precisely these more critical factors that were in question in the quote above.Well then I'm afraid I have no idea what point you're making. What you've said doesn't seem related to what I'm arguing in the slightest. — Isaac
That would be this?:The first was a long exchange following on from the example of using tarot cards, — Isaac
I believe that it rained last night because the cars and road are wet. ...
If in another scenario I believe what I do because it’s my interpretation of a Tarot card reading then my belief would be true but unjustified, and so not knowledge. — Michael
This is too vague; I have a possible match but you could be referring to other things, so I'm going to ask for specificity here.the second was about warning a companion about the weather. — Isaac
Sure.Two different contexts. — Isaac
Okay. But I've heard nothing here challenging the notion of sufficient to warrant belief.Of course the criteria for sufficiency are going to be different in each. — Isaac
It's up to you, but you may want to clarify this; there are readings where this is trivially true, readings where it is trivially false, and readings where you just got something wrong, and possibly other readings. I can only do my best to interpret what I think you mean by what you actually write. I don't think the trivially true or trivially false readings are consistent with what you have been arguing here, so I'm just going to take a stab at it based on what you previously wrote.I'm arguing that both 'know' and 'true' have different meanings in different contexts and as such JTB has no special claim to be a definition of 'knowledge'. — Isaac
I'm sure the nod to bringing this back in line with the thread is appreciated, but it's a bit of a stretch. The issues that Gettier problems bring up related to the JTB model of knowledge are far removed from what you're arguing here.Further, that issues like Gettier problems are best resolved by other definitions of knowledge. — Isaac
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