That's an ambiguous question.

Given that no King of France exists, a case can be made that "the King of France is bald" is neither true nor false, and is why I specifically phrased my conclusion as "not true" rather than "false".

With that in mind, the case can be made that "the King of France is bald" is false if and only if the King of France exists and is not bald, and so yes, it would follow.

What about 'If "the king of France is bald" is false then " the King of France exists" is true? — Janus

What about it?

There is at that world no sentence "there is gold in those hills" that is either true or false; and yet there is still gold in those hills. Hence it is truth that there is gold in those hills, and that the sentence "there is gold in those hills" is true. — Banno

You appear to be switching between truths in a world and truths at a world, given that you start by saying that there is no sentence that is either true or false and then end by saying that there is a sentence that is true.

The nature of this oddity is that the sentence (proposition may be a better choice here) is not one of the things in the world, but a construct from those things. This is shown by the substitutional interpretation, but hidden by interpretations that treat sentences as what we might loosely call something like "substantial" things such as hills and gold...

In a second-order logic sentences such as f(a) and ∃(x)f(x) are not in the domain. — Banno

I still don't see the problem with the premise. Do you find anything objectionable about the below?

1. If the King of France is bald then the King of France exists

Perhaps performing a T-schema substitution will make it clearer:

1. If "the King of France is bald" is true then "the King of France exists" is true

And then, using modus tollens:

2. If "the King of France exists" is not true then "the King of France is bald" is not true.

Michael was poking around in this when he earlier said that realism inevitably courts skepticism. — Leontiskos

I didn't say it. I just quoted the IEP article on brains in a vat:

One proposal is to construe metaphysical realism as the position that there are no a priori epistemically derived constraints on reality (Gaifman, 1993). By stating the thesis negatively, the realist sidesteps the thorny problems concerning correspondence or a “ready made” world, and shifts the burden of proof on the challenger to refute the thesis. One virtue of this construal is that it defines metaphysical realism at a sufficient level of generality to apply to all philosophers who currently espouse metaphysical realism. For Putnam’s metaphysical realist will also agree that truth and reality cannot be subject to “epistemically derived constraints.” This general characterization of metaphysical realism is enough to provide a target for the Brains in a Vat argument. For there is a good argument to the effect that if metaphysical realism is true, then global skepticism is also true, that is, it is possible that all of our referential beliefs about the world are false. As Thomas Nagel puts it, “realism makes skepticism intelligible,” (1986, 73) because once we open the gap between truth and epistemology, we must countenance the possibility that all of our beliefs, no matter how well justified, nevertheless fail to accurately depict the world as it really is. [See Fallibilism.] Donald Davidson also emphasizes this aspect of metaphysical realism: “metaphysical realism is skepticism in one of its traditional garbs. It asks: why couldn’t all my beliefs hang together and yet be comprehensively false about the actual world?” (1986, 309)

The Brain in a Vat scenario is just an illustration of this kind of global skepticism: it depicts a situation where all our beliefs about the world would presumably be false, even though they are well justified. Thus if one can prove that we cannot be brains in a vat, by modus tollens one can prove that metaphysical realism is false. Or, to put it in more schematic form:

If metaphysical realism is true, then global skepticism is possible
If global skepticism is possible, then we can be brains in a vat
But we cannot be brains in a vat
Thus, metaphysical realism is false (1,2,3)

The problem is that his idiosyncratically defined "anti-realism" doesn't seem to offer a substantive alternative. — Leontiskos

It's not my "idiosyncratically defined" anti-realism. It just is what anti-realism is according to Michael Dummett, the man who coined the term "anti-realism":

For Dummett, realism is best understood as semantic realism, i.e. the view that every declarative sentence in one's language is bivalent (determinately true or false) and evidence-transcendent (independent of our means of coming to know which), while anti-realism rejects this view in favour of a concept of knowable (or assertible) truth. Historically, these debates had been understood as disagreements about whether a certain type of entity objectively exists or not. Thus we may speak of realism or anti-realism with respect to other minds, the past, the future, universals, mathematical entities (such as natural numbers), moral categories, the material world, or even thought. The novelty of Dummett's approach consisted in seeing these disputes as at base analogous to the dispute between intuitionism and Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics.

@Banno, @Janus, @Srap Tasmaner

A painting of a mountain is accurate or inaccurate (allowing for degree). A description of a mountain is true or false (allowing for degree).

If there are no paintings then there is no X such that X is accurate/inaccurate (it makes no sense to say that the mountain is accurate/inaccurate). If there are no descriptions then there is no X such that X is true/false (it makes no sense to say that the mountain is true/false). But the mountain still exists even if it isn't painted or described.

This is all I am saying.

You talked before about truth being a relation between a sentence and something else in the world. Well, there is only a relation between a sentence and something else in the world if there is a sentence.

All I am explaining is that truths-without-sentences doesn’t make sense (much like truths-without-other-things-in-the-world doesn’t make sense).

I really think that this post (also from six days ago) is pretty clear.

The traditional view is that there are truth-makers and truth-bearers. Truth and falsehood are properties of truth-bearers, not properties of truth-makers, and not the truth-makers themselves.

If the appropriate truth-maker exists/occurs then the truth-bearer is true, otherwise the truth-bearer is false.

A truth-maker can exist even if a truth-bearer doesn't, but if a truth-bearer doesn't exist then nothing exists that has the property of being either true (correct/accurate) or false (incorrect/inaccurate). — Michael

I don't really know what the practical implications of your view are. — frank

There aren't any. This was never meant as some deep, substantive philosophical point. I was simply explaining the ordinary grammar of the word "true". Which is why I don't understand why I have faced such fervent opposition.

It's almost as if you and other think I'm saying something I'm not.

The existence of a planet is a state of affairs. So you accept that there are states of affairs that have not been described. — frank

Here's a post of mine from six days ago:

And the existence of gold does not depend on us saying "gold exists". — Michael

There is some state of affairs even when there is no one to describe it, right? — frank

What do you mean by a state of affairs?

If you're asking if planets exist that haven't been described, then yes. I have explicitly said this many times.

But planets aren't truths and nor is truth a property of planets. Truth (and falsity) is a property of the sentences that describe a planet (or try to).

Do you have to have those descriptions in hand in order for there to be truth? Where no description is available (say about something across the galaxy), would you say there is no truth? — frank

You are asking this question:

Do you have to have those descriptions in hand in order for there to be true descriptions? Where no description is available (say about something across the galaxy), would you say there is no true description?

I don't even understand how to answer such a question. It seems inherently confused.

I understand what you're saying. You're saying truth is a concept that couldn't have been meaningful 50 million years ago because there was no one to recognize any kind of concept. From our point of view, there were rocks and clouds, but those concepts didn't exist then, which means there was no one to observe that they existed. — frank

I'm saying that a truth is something like a correct description, that a falsehood is something like "an incorrect description", that descriptions didn't exist 50 million years ago, and so that neither truths nor falsehoods existed 50 million years ago.

Even if you want to claim that descriptions are abstract and not utterances, they still depend on the existence of utterances. Perhaps we might think of them as emergent abstractions.

It misleads Michael to think that truths only exist when sentences exist. — Banno

I don't think there's anything misleading about this:

1. Truth and falsity are properties of truth-bearers
2. Truth-bearers are features of language, not mind-independent abstract objects

The straightforward conclusion is that if a language does not exist then nothing else that exists has the property of being true or false, much like nothing else that exists has the property of being semantically meaningful.

Note that I'm not saying that if a language does not exist then nothing else exists.

As I mentioned before to frank, I think you're equivocating on the term "truth". When you talk about there being truths in (not at) a world without language you are not using the word "truth" to refer to the property that truth-bearers have, but something else.

As in, you draw a distinction between these two claims:

1. There are truths
2. There are true truth-bearers

Such that "there are truths in a world without language" is true but that "there are true truth-bearers in a world without language" is false.

But compare with drawing a distinction between these two claims:

1. There are falsehoods
2. There are false truth-bearers

Such that "there are falsehoods in a world without language" is true but that "there are false truth-bearers in a world without language" is false.

I don't think that this latter distinction makes any sense, and so I question the sense of the former distinction. If you're not saying that a truth-bearer is true then I don't know what you mean by saying that there is a truth.

They're independent of any particular mind. That's what makes them abstract objects. — frank

Do they exist if language doesn't? This is the core of the issue. If sentences are features of language then even if sentences are abstract my point still stands: if there is no language then nothing has the property of being true or false, much like if there is no language then nothing has the property of being semantically meaningful.

In the case of a proposition, it's because it's the meaning of an uttered sentence.

...

Sounds and marks are intentionally used to express truth or falsehood. — frank

I don't see how that's a better explanation. You say that meanings are truth-apt and are abstract objects that are, somehow, expressed by an utterance.

I will simply say that a meaningful utterance is truth-apt.

There's no need to resort to Platonism.

Sentences are abstract objects. — frank

Are they mind-independent? Do sentences exist even if language doesn't?

How can a sound have the property of truth? — frank

How can an abstract object have the property of truth? How can a sound be "connected" to an abstract object?

Michael's argument talks about the existence of sentences. Hence it make use of quantification in a second-order language - a language about language. In a first-order language we can make the an inference by quantifying over a predication - from f(a) to ∃(x)f(x). In second order logic one might perform a similar operation over a group of predicates. If we have ϕ(f(a)), we can infer ∃Pϕ(P) - if f(a) is ϕ, then something (P, in this case) is ϕ. But at issue here is a choice in how this is to be understood. Is it about just the things (a,b,c...) that make up the domain of the logic, or does it bring something new, P, into the ontology? The first is the substitutional interpretation, the second is the quantificational interpretation. This second interpretation has Platonic overtones, since it seems to invoke the existence of a certain sort of abstract "thing". — Banno

I really don't understand the difficulty you're having with the English-language argument. You seem to understand what "if human minds do not exist then gold still exists" means, and so presumably you understand what "if languages do not exist then gold still exists" means, and so presumably you understand what "if sentences do not exist then gold still exists" means, and so presumably you understand what "if sentences do not exist then gold does not exist" means.

What I'm saying is what I've said above:

1. Truth is a property of truth-bearers, and
2. Truth-bearers are features of language, not mind-independent abstract objects à la Platonism

I'll reference the SEP article on truth again:

We thus find the usual candidate truth-bearers linked in a tight circle: interpreted sentences, the propositions they express, the belief speakers might hold towards them, and the acts of assertion they might perform with them are all connected by providing something meaningful. This makes them reasonable bearers of truth.

I don't think I'm arguing for anything controversial.

And it's still not clear to me what you find objectionable about the above. At various points you seem to agree with me on both (1) and (2).

What also isn't clear to me is how you can agree with both (1) and (2) and yet also claim that there were truths when there wasn't a language. That seems to be a very obvious inconsistency. At the very least you're equivocating on the term "truth".

At the same time, he wants to be a realist. — frank

No I don't. But I don't think anything I'm arguing is inconsistent with realism. Realism doesn't require Platonism, does it?

Is there an unknown truth regarding Park? Or not? — frank

We don't know what happened to Yoon Park.
We don't know if "Yoon Park was kidnapped" is true.
We don't know if "Yoon Park ran away" is true.
We don't know if "Yoon Park drowned" is true.

It's very simple. I really don't understand what you find objectionable, or even what you think I'm saying, because I'm starting to suspect that you're reading something into my words that just isn't there.

So I'll try to be as clear as I can:

1. Truth and falsehood are properties of truth-bearers
2. Truth-bearers are features of language, not mind-independent abstract objects

Which of these do you disagree with?

Are you saying that an unknown sentence is true? — frank

No, I'm saying that it's possible to say something truthful that answers the question, even if we don't know that what we are saying is true.

How do you know it's possible for anyone to state the reason for Park's disappearance? We may never know. — frank

We don't need to know that a sentence is true for it to be true.

I mean what the word ordinarily means. It is possible to say something truthful that answers the question.

How is this not clear?

I see. So when you say the answer exists, you mean it exists in potential? — frank

I'm saying that it is possible to say something truthful that answers the question.

The answer exists? Where is it? — frank

No, when I say that there's an answer to the question I am saying that it is possible to answer the question with a truthful sentence.

They're talking about why Yoon Park disappeared. There's some truth regarding this, but we don't know what it is. Where's the truthbearer? — frank

There's an answer to the question "why did Yoon Park disappear?" and the sentence "Yoon Park disappeared because he was kidnapped" is either true or false.

So given that you accept that truth-bearers did not exist 65 million years ago, what about my position do you disagree with? Do you disagree with my claim that truth is (only) a property of truth-bearers? Are you claiming that truth can be a property of something else, or that truth isn't a property but an entity of some kind in its own right?

So this is my question: when someone says "The truth of the matter is unknown." What does that mean? Where is the truthbearer? — frank

That depends on what they're talking about. If they're talking about the existence of aliens then either they're saying that the truth of the sentence "aliens exist" is unknown or they're saying that the existence of aliens is unknown.

I agree. — frank

Truth is (only) a property of truth-bearers.
Truth-bearers did not exist 65 million years ago.
Therefore, truth was not a property of anything that existed 65 million years ago.

Ask any scientist. — frank

They will agree with me that feathered dinosaurs existed 65 million years ago.

So it is true now, but it wasn't true then? For real? — frank

Truth bearers didn't exist 65 million years ago. Do you agree or disagree?

I have the normal English language where it is true that some dinosaurs had feathers.

I was referring to this:

And it's also fine to say "I don't know nothing" when claiming ignorance, even though a literal interpretation of the sentence means the opposite.

So you're more than welcome to talk about there having been truth-bearers 10 million years ago, but that's just a case of fictionalism. The truth (pun intended) is that truth-bearers didn't exist 10 million years ago (but dinosaurs did), and it is only the sentences we use now (about the past) that are either true or false. — Michael

You're just repeating the same fictionalist account.

Truth-bearers didn't exist 10 million years ago, even if our everyday claims imply that they did.

See my previous comment.

You can say it however you like, but my language community agrees that it's fine to say

10 million years ago it was true that some dinosaurs had feathers. — frank

And it's also fine to say "I don't know nothing" when claiming ignorance, even though a literal interpretation of the sentence means the opposite.

So you're more than welcome to talk about there having been truth-bearers 10 million years ago, but that's just a case of fictionalism. The truth (pun intended) is that truth-bearers didn't exist 10 million years ago (but dinosaurs did), and it is only the sentences we use now (about the past) that are either true or false.

But to be pedantic dinosaurs went extinct 65 million years ago.

10 million years ago, it was true that some dinosaurs had feathers. — frank

What does "it" refer to?

I would instead say:

1. "10 million years ago some dinosaurs had feathers" is true.

Or just:

2. 10 million years ago some dinosaurs had feathers

You seem to think that (1) and (2) are true only if some truth-bearer existed 10 million years ago. Why? I don't think it's necessary at all.

The existence of dinosaurs does not depend on the existence of a truth-bearer.

Right, so as you're looking for your sunglasses, you are, in a sense, looking for a truth (whatever your truthbearer is). — frank

No, I'm looking for my sunglasses.

You have expectations, hypotheses, speculations, etc. You don't know which, if any of them is true, but you believe there is some truth regarding the matter. — frank

I believe that some sentence is true, yes.

Likewise, if you're a realist, you have confidence that the pre-human world was full of events, all of which are describable in principle. Just as you have confidence that there is some true statement about some unknown detail of Pluto, you believe there are all sorts of true statements about worlds where humans do not exist. — frank

You're conflating Truth in a World and Truth at a World.

but knowable truths is essential to realism. — frank

That's anti-realism. Realists allow for unknowable truths. We had a long discussion about this when discussing Fitch's paradox:

Fitch’s paradox of knowability ... concerns any theory committed to the thesis that all truths are knowable. Historical examples of such theories arguably include Michael Dummett’s semantic antirealism ..., mathematical constructivism ..., Hilary Putnam’s internal realism ..., Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatic theory of truth ..., logical positivism ..., Kant’s transcendental idealism ..., and George Berkeley’s idealism.

...

The realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle.

But I don't know why you've brought up knowability here because I'm not discussing that anymore. I'm only saying that truth and falsity are properties of sentences, that sentences are features of language, and that language depends on language users.

Ok. This is truth skepticism. That's just what it's called. — frank

You're going to have to flesh this out. From here:

Five different forms of truth skepticism are examined and defused: (1) the view that truth is indefinable, (2) that it is unattainable and unknowable, (3) that it is inextricably metaphysical and hence not scientifically respectable, (4) that there is no such thing as truth, and (5) that truth is inherently paradoxical, and so must either be abandoned or revised.

I suppose that maybe a case can be made for (1), but I'm not arguing for any of the others.

Sentences are also abstract objects. — frank

Are they mind-independent abstract objects? I don’t believe in any such things.

Truth and falsity are properties of sentences, sentences are features of language, and language is a social (and psychological) activity performed by and between people.

So if there are no people there is nothing which has the property of being either true or false. But assuming that idealism/phenomenalism isn't the case, there is still gold and rain and so on.

So when a person says, "It's raining." they may mean that things have gotten worse.

You need a theory of meaning that covers this kind of speech. What do you propose? — frank

Then what they say is true if and only if things have gotten worse.

If all you mean to say is that Tarski’s T-schema is an impoverished account of natural language then I agree, and I’ve addressed some issues with it earlier.

But none of this is relevant to what I’m claiming, which is that being true and being false are properties of sentences, not properties of rain (and that there is no Platonic third thing that “sits” between the two).

And if it does, then the world (or region) satisfies the sentence in question. If not, not. — bongo fury

If by this you mean that the sentence “it is raining” is true if and only if the rain exists then that is exactly what I have been saying.

Is it satisfaction-apt? That was my point. — bongo fury

I don’t know what you mean.

Rain exists or it doesn’t.

When we say a sentence is true, we are talking about what the sentence is about, not the sentence itself as an object. — Apustimelogist

When we say that the sentence "it is raining" is true we are saying that the sentence is true, we're not saying that the rain is true, and when we say that the sentence "it is raining" is false we are saying that the sentence is false, we're not saying that the rain is false. Rain isn't truth-apt. Rain just exists or doesn't.

Again, that there is such a sentence in the domain of sentences is true, but not enough to carry your argument. The conclusion just becomes an example of "if P &~P then Q" - asserting that a sentence that is in the domain of sentences is not in the domain of sentences, implies anything. — Banno

I don't know what you're talking about here. You seem to understand what it means for gold to exist or to not exist, so why is it so difficult to understand what it means for a painting or a sentence to exist or to not exist?

If you want to make it simpler then let's assume that as a species we have no spoken or signed language, only a written language. If a sentence exists then a written sentence exists.

Does that painting of the reconstruction Jesus's face exist? No, it's not a painting, it's digital. — Banno

OK, well I'm talking about a painting. There's a canvas with paint on it. It's really not complicated.