How could you know that? — Banno

"presume" doesn't mean "know".

That overwhelmingly folk agree on some things being red and others being not-red shows that red is not a private phenomena. — Banno

No it doesn't.

If colours are only a type of "mental phenomena" (think about that term...), then since your "mental phenomena" are quite distinct from mine, your red is quite different to mine. — Banno

Different token doesn't mean different type. Pain is a mental phenomenon, but presumably the pain I feel when I stub my toe isn't "quite different" to the pain you feel when you stub your toe.

Yet you can ask for the red pen and e happy with the result.

Red is therefore not a private experience. — Banno

As mentioned before, this is a non sequitur.

And you can say that words like "pain" and "sour" and "funny" refer to distal objects or their properties, but you'd be wrong.

But the Standard Model says absolutely nothing about trees, cats, bacteria, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

English words like "tree" and "cat" and "bacteria" refer to distal objects. English words like "position" and "momentum" refer to a distal object's properties. English words like "red" and "funny" and "sour" do not refer to distal objects or their properties but to the properties of conscious experience.

But it also makes no sense, for the reasons given, to say that red is no more than my-perception-of red. — Banno

I don't think anyone is suggesting that. The second and third paragraphs of the OP make it clear that he isn't saying that colours are just his personal experiences; he's only saying that colours – like smells and tastes and pain – are types of mental phenomena.

But are extension in space and motion likewise not in external objects? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The Standard Model certainly says so, so I accept that.

But what evidence is there of colours as something other than mental phenomena? We have empirical evidence of an object's surface layer of electrons reflecting certain wavelengths of light, but what of colour?

I haven't said anything about illusions or being "less real". I'm just saying that it's wrong to claim that colours are mind-independent properties of distal objects, just as it would be wrong to claim that smells and tastes and pain and being funny are mind-independent properties of distal objects.

All these things are real; it's just that they're not located where conscious experience isn't – and conscious experience does not extend beyond the brain.

Does claiming that pain only exists in the head entail that distal objects "don't really exist"? If not, then why would claiming that colour only exists in the head entail this?

Do you at the very least accept that colour percepts exist (e.g. when dreaming and hallucinating), and that these percepts are at least correlated to certain neural activity in the visual cortex?

But, I have the impression that you believe that all human beings have mental phenomena, regardless if they have dreams or not, hallucinations or not, etc — Richard B

Yes. Mental phenomena are either reducible to brain activity or are caused by brain activity. We dream/hallucinate/see (in colour) when the visual cortex is active. I see no reason to believe that dreaming and hallucinating involve mental phenomena but that ordinary waking experiences do not - that would seem like special pleading. Their only relevant difference is their cause.

Even if one wants to claim that colours are also a property of distal objects one cannot deny that colours are a property of mental phenomena, else one cannot make sense of dreaming and hallucinating in colour.

But then I deny that colours are properties of distal objects on the grounds that a) such things are unnecessary, given that colours as mental phenomena is sufficient, and that b) things like the Standard Model do not describe colours; they only describe various arrangements of atoms with a surface layer of electrons that reflect light at certain wavelengths.

And then the same principle for things like smells and tastes.

To put it another way, if I imagine a world full of beings who do not dream, hallucinate, etc, I do not need to posit mental phenomena for these being. — Richard B

Like a world of inorganic matter? Sure. What’s the relevance?

Do you really believe that the only way to make sense of dreams, hallucinations, etc is to posit mental phenomena. — Richard B

Yes. We don’t explain them by positing the direct acquaintance of some distal object. I don’t dream about dragons because my eyes are open and I’m looking at a dragon in my bedroom; I dream about dragons because my visual cortex is active when I sleep.

And it doesn’t happen under different conditions. That something novel occurs in one set of conditions doesn’t mean it applies to all. So using this one example while dismissing the rest is tantamount to pseudoscience. — NOS4A2

If the same distal object and proximal stimulus is responsible for different colour experiences then the colours experienced in this case are not properties of the distal object or proximal stimulus.

The fact that in other scenarios we have the same colour experiences neither a) refutes the above nor b) entails that the colours experienced in these other scenarios are properties of the distal object or proximal stimulus.

And as for less “artificial” scenarios, there is empirical evidence of sex differences in colour perception.

We hallucinate and dream, sure, but these are biological acts, not things worthy of their own noun phrase upon which we can ascribe properties. Properties are properties of things, not actions. The body is real, while what the body does is merely an account of what the body is doing from this time and that. — NOS4A2

I dream and hallucinate in colour. The colours I dream and hallucinate are properties of my dreams and hallucinations. Waking experiences are of the exact same kind - neural activity in the visual cortex - differing only in their cause and intensity.

White and gold or blue and black, for example, is unlikely to be the measurable properties of these objects in the brain. — NOS4A2

There are neural correlates of self-reported colour percepts. This is how neuroscientists are able to intentionally stimulate particular colour experiences in test subjects - they know which areas of the brain to excite to have the subject see red.

The distal object is a backlit screen, capable of shooting light in all sorts of different directions, or stopping light, sometimes through liquid crystal, etc. it seems to me such conditions can illicit different experiences. The dress itself did not illicit a different experience, as everyone saw it was blue and black upon viewing off the screen. This seems to me to suggest the conditions had much to do with it. — NOS4A2

And those conditions are the same for everyone; yet we have different colour experiences. So the point stands, and your comments here are irrelevant.

I can deny that they are properties of mental phenomena because mental phenomena do not exist. Again, nothing of the sort has ever been found, and until they have, it needs to be explained in terms of things that are actually there.

Subjective accounts of states of affairs are limited by the fact that one cannot be aware of what is actually occurring behind his own eyes, or in the brain, at any given moment, so treating them as accurate assessments of the biology seems to me absurd. — NOS4A2

We have evidence of neural correlates of consciousness. We have evidence of visual perception caused by direct neural stimulation.

None of what I am saying requires substance or property dualism. I am not saying that mental phenomena is non-physical. I am only saying that colour is a property of conscious experience and that conscious experience does not extend beyond the brain. This is perfectly consistent with conscious experience being reducible to neural activity.

Again, this is the only way to make sense of dreams, hallucinations, synesthesia, and differences in colour perception – all of which are real.

So while I can’t explain it in terms of naive realism, if it is strictly limited to artificial conditions, I don’t think it suggests phenomenology. — NOS4A2

But it's the same distal object and same proximal stimulus, yet a different colour experience. So how does that not suggest phenomenology? Any differences in colour experience must be explained by differences in the body or brain.

See also neuronal basis of perception:

In particular a stimulus can be perceptually suppressed for seconds or even minutes at a time: the image is projected into one of the observer's eyes but is invisible, not seen. In this manner the neural mechanisms that respond to the subjective percept rather than the physical stimulus can be isolated, permitting visual consciousness to be tracked in the brain.

...

In spite of the constant visual stimulus, observers consciously see the horizontal grating alternate every few seconds with the vertical one.

...

A number of fMRI experiments ... demonstrate quite conclusively that activity in the upper stages of the ventral pathway ... follow the percept and not the retinal stimulus.

It seems to me that the science is incredibly clear. Conscious experience is in the head. It is usually caused by and covariant with some external stimulus, but they are nonetheless distinct. There really is no place to deny it.

Even if you want to say that colours are also properties of mind-independent things, you simply cannot deny that they are (also) properties of mental phenomena. It is the only way to make sense of dreams, hallucinations, synesthesia, and variations in colour perception – all of which are real.

Some people describe the colour of the dress in this photo as black and blue, others as white and gold. They can be looking at the exact same photo on the exact same screen, their eyes reacting to the exact same wavelength of light. And yet they see different colours. This is explained by differences in the way their visual cortex behaves in response to optical stimulation.



And then manual stimulation of the appropriate areas of the visual cortex can cause people to see (coloured) things.

What more are you looking for?

It means that if you see a banana, you’re not seeing one in your head. I can record you looking at a banana, the location of both your head and the banana, and discern that nothing about the banana is in your head. — NOS4A2

I'm not saying that the banana is in my head. I'm saying that colours are in my head. They are a property of the visual percepts that are produced by activity in the visual cortex.

We’ve examined many brains and discovered no such thing. — NOS4A2

Sure we have. It's how we make sense of synesthesia, dreams, hallucinations, variations in colour perception, and so on. Visual phenomenology is distinct from distal objects and proximal stimuli. The second and third are often the causal explanation for the first, but that's all there is to it. Yours is the mistaken, naive view that projects the properties of the first onto the second.

No such thing exists in your head. — NOS4A2

It does.

I can take a picture of any object and it will undoubtedly show that it is outside your head — NOS4A2

I don't know what this means. But digital cameras work by measuring the energy of the light that strikes its sensors, using this to determine which of the pixels to turn on and at what intensity. Our brains probably work in the same sort of way, but with neurons in the visual cortex in lieu of phosphors on a screen.

Then how come the color of the percept isn’t outside the object if the light is outside the object? — NOS4A2

Your question makes no sense. Colour is a property of visual percepts and visual percepts exist inside my head. So what does "the colour of the percept isn't outside the object" even mean?

Wavelengths travel beyond the objects but the color never does. If the color is determined in part by the wavelength, how is it that if light bounces off an object at a certain wave length, we do not see the color anywhere outside of the object? — NOS4A2

Your question is misguided. Light stimulates our eyes, signals are sent to our brain, and the brain produces a visual percept with such qualities as shape and colour and depth. Our minds and conscious experiences don't literally extend beyond the body to encompass distal objects.

what is an example of a property of the chair that is in the chair itself even if my head (or nobody's head) never existed? — Hanover

The existence of its atoms and their propensity to reflect light at certain wavelengths.

The sorts of things described by the Standard Model are mind-independent. Other things like smells and tastes and colours and pain are mental phenomena, produced by brain activity in response to bodily stimulation.

So far the Republicans appear to be doing a rather bad job. — Echarmion

Well that's just a truism.

I kinda expected them to go all in on blaming her for their favourite topic - the border crisis — Echarmion

They're trying, but "Harris was never given the portfolio of border czar ... instead, Biden asked Harris to lead diplomatic efforts to reduce poverty, violence and corruption in Central America's Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, as well as engage with Mexico on the issue."

... and just treating her as a hapless nobody with no qualifications. — Echarmion

She's the Vice President, a former Senator, and the former Attorney General of California, so that won't work.

The reason a quality like “color” doesn't extend beyond the object is because it is a quality of the object, not the mind. The changes in color within objects and the differences between them are due to changes in the objects themselves, like when a banana turns green to yellow as the chlorophyll breaks down. — NOS4A2

When the structure of some object changes the wavelength of the light it reflects changes, and when the wavelength of the light changes the colour we see changes, because the colour we see is determined (at least in part) by the wavelength of the light that stimulates the eyes.

It doesn't then follow from this that colours are properties of these objects.

If you can be assured there is radiation, why can't you be sure there's red? — Hanover

This question is a little confusing. It's like asking "if you can be assured there is heat, why can't you be sure there's pain?"

I can be sure that there's red and that there's pain, but given our scientific understanding of physics and biology and psychology, it seems to be that red and pain are properties of minds, not properties of pens and fire.

The issue isn't over whether or not these properties exist, but over where in the world these properties exist. At least when it comes to colour, some appear to be locating them in the wrong place.

If "red" is just in your mind, when you ask for a red pen, how is it that the person you are asking hands you what you want? — Banno

I can ask someone to recommend a funny movie, and they can deliver, but I don't think it makes much sense to treat being funny as some mind-independent property of movies.

So the reasoning behind your question appears to be a non sequitur.

Would any of these things even matter to the core followers of his cult? — Christoffer

Nothing matters to his cult.

It's the moderates and independents that he's losing.

Why did his handlers even let him appear? — Wayfarer

Between this and his VP pick, I wonder if one or more of his advisors are intentionally trying to sabotage him.

I really don’t understand your confusion.

12 divided by 4 is 3.
10 divided by 4 is 2.5.
20 divided by 4 is 5.

3 and 5 are whole numbers and 2.5 isn’t. What else is there to say?

Why can the lowest base-12 number (12) be split evenly into halves/thirds/quarters, while the lowest base-10 cannot be split into 1/2 and 1/4? — Mp202020

Because 3 and 4 are divisors of 12 but not divisors of 10.

Even in deciding not to run, Joe Biden did something Trump could never do - which was to put the interests of the Party and the nation above his own. — Wayfarer

I don't even see why being President would be in Biden's interests. It's a lot of work and responsibility. Retirement is the much better option.

At least in Trump's case it benefits him because he can then try to pardon himself of his crimes, or at least shut down all his prosecutions.

You have it backwards.

$1 - 0.999… = x$

With the standard reals this equation can only be:

$1 - 0.999… = 0.000… = 0$

There is no standard real number greater than 0 that can satisfy the equation.

But with the hyperreals this can be:

$1 - 0.\underbrace{999…}_H = {1\over{10^H}}$

Where H is an infinite hyperinteger.

What is worth discussing is why the layman’s mathematical intuitions favour nonstandard analysis, and why standard analysis is standard.

There are different kinds of idealisms. Subjective, objective, epistemological, and so on. You'll need to clarify exactly what kind of idealism you're talking about before you can argue its merits.

I am saying that something like "you ought brush your teeth" just means "brush your teeth" (or possibly "it is in your best interests to brush your teeth", but I don't think this meaning is relevant to this discussion).

I don't know what other thing it could mean. It is this other meaning that others claim is there that I want explained.

Can you give an account of "do this" which is much more coherent than obligation and its synonyms though? — Apustimelogist

It's a command; a phrase we use when we want or need someone to do something.

I've seen several comments that our members wish death on Trump and liken him to Hitler — AmadeusD

What's hilarious is that JD Vance, Trump's choice for Vice President, once likened Trump to Hitler.

... you intend to place yourself under an obligation to do that thing ... — Janus

Which means what?

We have all these different phrases:

1. You ought do this
2. You should do this
3. You must do this
4. You are obliged to do this
5. You have an obligation to do this
6. You have a duty to do this
etc.

They all seem to express the same concept, but nobody is giving a coherent account of what this concept is.

All I ever understand by these phrases is "do this". It's just been phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition, leading to the misplaced belief that it means something more.

CFR means federal regulations. Regulations are not statutes. — NOS4A2

Thanks for the correction. Reading through the order it was actually 509, 510, 515, and 533 that were cited by Garland when appointing Smith. 510 and 515 are the basis for establishing 28 CFR 600.

Relevant to this is United States v. Short, 1956 by the 9th Circuit:

An administrative regulation promulgated within the authority granted by statute has the force of law and will be given full effect by the courts.

Since 1999 when the Independent Counsel Act expired, all of the above is likely what has been used to defend the constitutionality of special councils, e.g. here where the DC Circuit unanimously affirmed the constitutionality of Mueller's appointment.

So again, I expect the 11th Circuit to overturn Cannon's anomalous order.

Being obliged is different from being commanded, because a command is uttered by whim of the commanding entity while an obligation is incurred by following specific procedures, such as promising or contracting etc. — Tobias

And this is the fiction.

We take the command “do this”, we phrase it as the truth-apt proposition “you ought do this”, and then we believe in the existence of some abstract entity - the “obligation” - but when asked to make sense of it we can’t; we just insist that it’s more than a command.

Anscombe understood this.

What I do not understand is why you would hold on to a theory that does not explain a certain distinction we all feel that is relevant in favour of a theory that cannot make heads or tails of it. — Tobias

The distinction you feel is a delusion, perhaps a bewitchment by language.

If I tell you, you ought to pay the fine it means you are obliged to pay the fine. — Tobias

It’s this “obliged” meaning that I’m asking about.

What you want is an explanation why we ought to do things. — Tobias

No, it's not. I want to know what "you ought do this" means. I don't know why I need to keep repeating this?

You just respond with "you ought do what a legitimate authority tells you to do" or "you are bound by what a legitimate authority tells you to do" without ever explaining what the "you ought" or "you are bound" parts of these sentences mean.

All I understand by these phrases is "do what a legitimate authority tells you to do".

And that's fine by me, but you and others seem to want it to mean something more, but seem incapable of making sense of what that something more is.

You need to read more than just the opening sentence.

It points out that by the very wording of the Appointments Clause, "Congress may by law invest the appointment of 'inferior' officers to the President alone, or to courts of law or heads of departments."

It then explains that a special counsel is an "inferior" officer.

So it finds that the Appointments Clause allows for Congress to "invest the appointment of [a special counsel] to the President alone, or to courts of law or heads of departments".

[removed mistaken reference to CFR 600]