Re your version of [1]: Can processes per se account for anything? I agree with Hume that causation is essentially epistemic. We can have a useful account (ie a symbolic representation) positing that A causes B. But causation is a not necessary concept. In a block universe where time is represented, A and B are part of a single spatio-temporal 'thread'. — Christopher Burke

I agree. There is much we can't be certain about regarding the nature of reality. Still, we are talking about the way a physicalist sees things.

Re your version of [2]:
'Practical purposes' do indicate something important about how we interact with extramental reality. I don't think they can be dismissed so easily as irrelevant to our understanding. You say "we need to resort to simplistic non-physical psychical representations", but most psychologists would dispute that pejorative classification as simplistic ... as would I. — Christopher Burke

It wasn't meant as a pejorative. Just a statement about what the situation is. Hopefully scientific psychologists would recognize, along with Einstein:

The scientific theorist is not to be envied. For Nature, or more precisely experiment, is an inexorable and not very friendly judge of his work. It never says "Yes" to a theory. In the most favorable cases it says "Maybe", and in the great majority of cases simply "No". If an experiment agrees with a theory it means for the latter "Maybe", and if it does not agree it means "No". Probably every theory will someday experience its "No"—most theories, soon after conception.

Psychologists are considering what is going on, in systems much more complex than Einstein considered. Simplistic psychological theories are the most we can reasonably hope for at this point in human history. I'm not saying that psychologists are not doing a great job at improving our understanding of our minds. It's just the nature of the situation humanity is in.

Even if we had a complete model based on all possible data from observation, would we know what it is like to be that bit of reality? — Christopher Burke

Not comprehensively. We aren't capable of fully knowing what it is like to be each other. But that's a limitation that comes with having a physical mind.

“The last dollop in the theory [of Physicalism] – that it subjectively feels like something to be such [neural] circuitry – may have to be stipulated as a fact about reality where explanation stops.”
Steven Pinker, 2018, Enlightenment Now: the Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress — Christopher Burke

I think Pinker is overly pessimistic. There is much understanding to be gained beyond where Pinker suggests explanation might stop.

I fear you've built up this very narrow idea of what materialists think, that isn't actually what materialists think. — flannel jesus

:up:

[1] Physicalism claims that physical representations can account for everything.
[2] We need non-physical psychical representations to account for some things.
[3] Ergo physicalism is a false claim.
...
Where is my error? — Christopher Burke

I would correct your first two premises as follows:

[1]Physicalism claims that physical representations processes occuring in nature can account for everything.
[2]For practical purposes we need to resort to simplistic non-physical psychical representations to account for some things, because we don't have detailed data about what is going on in our brains, nor do we have brains capable of processing such a mountain of data in an expeditious way.

So you would at least need to add some additional premises to reach your conclusion.

These ideas are very definitely testable. To state otherwise would be to say that every mystic who has ever claimed to know the truth is or was a liar. — FrancisRay

Not a liar, just naive, and in too many cases grandiose.
— wonderer1

Oh boy,.. You're calling the Buddha and Lao Tu naive and grandiose? But not yourself? — FrancisRay

Apparently, knowing "the truth" doesn't involve having very good reading comprehension. I didn't say anything about the Buddha or Lao Tzu.

Let's talk about your grandiosity instead. Why would anyone take seriously your claim to know "the truth". Lots of people know all sorts of truths that you don't know. So other than as a naive grandiose claim, how is your claim to know "the truth" to be interpreted?

To make things more concrete... There is an object sitting on the computer case on the right side of my desk. What is "the truth" about the nature of that object. Give as much detail as you can.

These ideas are very definitely testable. To state otherwise would be to say that every mystic who has ever claimed to know the truth is or was a liar. — FrancisRay

Not a liar, just naive, and in too many cases grandiose.

Scientists are not infallible, they are human like everyone else. And the human urge to go along with the popular trend is quite strong, especially when doing so would help in furthering one's career. Hence, to think that scientists at large would orient their scientific labor in support of an official narrative is not at all unreasonable to consider. — Merkwurdichliebe

Not ureasonable I suppose, for someone with a lack of experience with science and scientists. However, regardless of how reasonably understood it might be, that you hold that view (being as ignorant as you demonstrate yourself to be) ignorant conspiracy theory rationalization is what it is.

The concept of "acceleration" involves a fundamental philosophical problem. Acceleration is the rate of increase of velocity. So if an object goes from being at rest, to moving, there is a brief period of time where its "acceleration" is necessarily infinite. — Metaphysician Undercover

Show your math.

NYTimes article:

The university lab which did the testing “disassociates itself from any use, interpretation, or subsequent misrepresentation of the results it provides,” the institute said. “In no case do we draw conclusions about the origin of these samples.”

Similarly, Antígona Segura, one of Mexico’s top astrobiologists, questioned Mr. Maussan’s contentions. “These conclusions are simply not backed up by evidence,” said Dr. Segura, who collaborates with the Nexus for Exoplanet System Science, a NASA initiative to search for life on distant worlds. “The whole thing is very shameful.”

What does "sec**2" even mean? — Metaphysician Undercover

https://www.quora.com/What-does-per-second-squared-mean

In addition, what's interesting about the genes of life on earth is that a lot of it is junk. A lot of it doesn't do anything. It's vestigial. If we share 70% of DNA with this alien, that means we share a hell of a lot of vestigal DNA - that's actually a pretty big problem. — flannel jesus

Good point, although I'm assuming that if there was DNA testing, it wasn't a whole genome sequencing of whatever DNA there was to test. A test that only looked for 100 genes might find 70 matches, while ignoring non-coding DNA.

I'm guessing the 'researchers' won't be releasing any details of any DNA testing.

Do you think the genes for wings in bats is similar to those for birds, is similar to those for flying insects?

They're not. — flannel jesus

That's a bit simplistic. True, insects are quite distant and the genetic distance is going to be relatively large for them. However the four animals in Frank's picture are all tetrapods:

Tetrapods (/ˈtɛtrəˌpɒdz/;[5] from Ancient Greek τετρα- (tetra-) 'four', and πούς (poús) 'foot') are four-limbed vertebrate animals constituting the superclass Tetrapoda (/tɛˈtræpədə/).[6] It includes all extant and extinct amphibians, and the amniotes which in turn evolved into the sauropsids (reptiles, including dinosaurs and therefore birds) and synapsids (extinct pelycosaurs, therapsids and all extant mammals). Some tetrapods such as snakes, legless lizards and caecilians had evolved to become limbless via mutations of the Hox gene,[7] although some do still have a pair of vestigial spurs that are remnants of the hindlimbs.

Note the mention of Hox genes. All of the tetrapod species in Frank's picture have Hox genes playing a strong role in determing much about the body plan, and constraining the course that tetrapod evolution could take.

I do wonder why it is that it has taken so long for the process view to take over. Is it necessarily less intuitive, or is the problem that we drill a sort of naive corpuscularism, a substance metaphysics, into kids for the first 14-18 years of their education? It certainly seems less intuitive. I sort of buy into Donald Hoffman's argument that we evolved to want to focus on concrete objects (thus excluding the "nothing"). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Off the top of my head I can't think of many easily observable examples of feedback outside of social interactions, so I think it is pretty natural that people don't tend to have intuitions that are informed by observing feedback systems. (I suppose the notion of karma suggests somewhat the idea of a feedback sysyem.) I don't see it as so much a matter of our educational systems, as a matter of our lacking the perceptual and cognitive systems to see the feedback occurring in things around us.

I look into some types of feedback systems routinely, and have intuitions conducive to understanding feedback systems to a greater degree than most, but it takes expensive instrumentation for me to be able to observe the relevant processes. I'd have to think about how better intuitions about feedback systems could be cost effectively instilled during K-12 education.

Relativity theory was created for pragmatic purposes, and is fundamentally not truth-apt. — Metaphysician Undercover

Black holes, gravitational lensing, and gravitational waves have all been observed and were predicted on GR. What do you mean by relativity theory not being truth-apt?

:up:

If we can easily recreate the conditions that gave rise to the militaristic, hyper-nationalist Nazis, doesn't that say something about the power of duty to country and leader? — ToothyMaw

Perhaps it says something about how comfortable humans find it, to feel like we have a role in our social primate band?

Perhaps duty is a reification humanity came up with for discussing the strong impulse to take care of the family?

Perhaps one's notion of duty might be a simplistic mythical ideal that doesn't correspond very well with the way things happen in human societies?

This thinking resembles what authors do when they produce fictitious narratives, borrow from their real life experience and make up fantasy tales with no intention of claiming that they are talking about real life events. This type of philosophical thinking is doing the same, but with the delusional attempt in trying to potentially say something of the world we live in. — Richard B

Perhaps I see more value in considering thought experiments than you do? Einstein's thought experiments played an important role in human understanding of relativity theory. Suppose we consider the merits of thought experiments, as a technology for stimulating human minds to look at things from a different perspective?

Anyway, as far as my best guess regarding the world we live in. I don't see any reason to think that it is physically impossible for a BIV to exist. I don't have any reason for confidence that it will ever be technologically possible for humans to maintain a human BIV capable of philosophical conversations 'in a vat'. Furthermore, if in the future the scientific knowledge and technology necessary to maintain a human brain in a vat is available, I'd expect those with the scientific know how and access to the technology would consider creating a BIV to be a silly (and possibly immoral) thing to do.

If we want to talk in more realistic terms, about what sort of technological minds humans might create, we might look at using a technology like spintronic memristors used to instantiate artificial neural networks.

Wittgenstein's "On Certainty" said it best, "505. It is always by favor of Nature that one knows something." — Richard B

Well, I'd quibble over whether using the word "favor" is saying it best. I'm inclined to say something more like, "It is always as a consequence of interactions occurring in Nature that one knows something."

That's why I, not Nagel, suggested that animals probably share the human ability to create analogies & metaphors
— Gnomon

That is a very big claim. It obviously can't be proved, but what aspects of animal behaviour make you think that is plausible? I believe that analogical thinking is uniquely human, because no other species produces symbolic artefacts or behaves in ways indicating such abstraction. Am I wrong here? I'd be interested to know. — Christopher Burke

Our thinking about analogies tends to be strongly associated with language and I don't find it plausible that analogy in a linguistic sense plays much of a role in the behavior of non-human animals. However the 1a definition of "analogy from Merriam-Webster says:

1a: a comparison of two otherwise unlike things based on resemblance of a particular aspect

If we consider analogical thinking more broadly, such as in terms of noverbal pattern recognition, perhaps this youtube cat video provides behavioral evidence suggesting analogical thinking in cats?

...Threatening a public official is a felony... — NOS4A2

...and should be prosecuted. Right?

:100:

I don't think they're paying attention to me. — T Clark

Am I among "they"?

Simply, if the scientist showed that it is physically impossible to have a functional BIV, BIV is not possible. — Richard B

What scientist are you referring to? Under this scenario your belief in scientists would be a function of what the mad scientist (god to you) is feeding you in the way of perceptions, so any beliefs about brains that you have would be a function of the virtual reality presented by the mad scientist tending your vat.

The mad scientist might have fed you sensations that resulted in you having a notion of a brain that is utterly unlike what is in the vat. You don't have knowledge of what is in the vat or even the physics of vat world, so you can't have a scientific proof of the impossibility of the thing in the vat in vat world.

You are saying that a BiV brain is different than a real brain, I think. But then tell me this, is BiV perception the same as real perception? — NotAristotle

Yeah might as well be flexible and say we can't know what a BIV actually is, but under the scenario what you think of as real perception would necessarily be the same as BIV perception.

All right then, do you understand that a "wave" consists of an interaction of the particles which make up the substance which is the medium? — Metaphysician Undercover

I've already said that I have a broader perspective on using "wave" than you seem to. So no. I don't see any value in restricting the usage of "wave" to such a narrow definition.

Do you disagree that space waves in the case of gravitational waves?

I've studied enough physics to know that a wave is an activity of a substance. That's simply what a wave is, and all waves are understood through modeling the movement of the particles within that substance. That's what a wave is, a specific type of activity of a substance which involves an interaction of its particles. Therefore a wave in empty space is simply impossible because there would be no particles there to make the wave. Yet we know from observation, rainbows, and other refractions, that light must consist of waves, therefore there must be a substance there which is waving. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, suppose space is the "substance there which is waving". After all, the gravitational wave observations in recent years, (combined with electromagnetic observations of the source of detected gravitational wave observations) provide some pretty good evidence for space waving.

Since there is no ether identified as the medium within which the waves exist, the only substance which this concept is grounded in is the body which the field is a property of. Establishing the correct relationship between body and field is problematic in current conceptualizations. If the ether which is logically required to support the real existence of waves, was identified such that its real properties could be tested, this would allow us to conceptualize independent existence of the waves, enabling us to properly conceive of the waves as prior in time to the body, and therefore the appearance of a body (particles, atoms, molecules, etc.) as property of the waves. But this implies a conception of the waves which would be completely distinct from the current "field". — Metaphysician Undercover

I find it strange, the way you seem to get hung up on words being used in ways you disapprove of. Analogies play an important role in the way humans communicate things with each other and the use of "wave" to convey somewhat analogical things about electromagnetic fields has been going on for longer than either of us have been alive. It looks to me like you are fighting a losing battle.

What do you see as a problem, with having a notion of "wave" that needs nothing more than space to propagate through?

I disagree. When one demonstrates that BIV is physically impossible, scenarios 2 or 4 were never a logical possibility. What was conceptualize from actual functional brains was demonstrated to be false.

Just because one can say or imagine something does not make it possible.

But as a fictitious narrative, one does not need to worry about the support of empirical evidence. — Richard B

The thing is, if the fact is that you are a brain in a vat, who has been fed all of your perceptions by a mad scientist, then your belief that a brain in a vat is physically impossible is a result of the way your beliefs developed in response to what the mad scientist has been feeding you. So under this scenario you believe what the mad scientist caused you to believe, and so your belief that a BIV is physically impossible doesn't have an informed basis, and would in fact be false.

This is not to say that it is metaphysically possible that you are a BIV , but how could you justify the proposition that it is epistemically impossible?

I was not meaning to imply that the evidence against one's intuitions must come from beyond oneself; as I agree that one should be actively trying to "attack" their own intuitions. — Bob Ross

I'd say the best evidence against one's intuitions necessarily comes from beyond oneself. There is an external reality to learn from.

Your assertion is not very convincing wonderer1. I've read a fair bit of material authored by Richard Feynman, much is available on the net. And, he is very explicit in saying that the flow of current is not in the body of the conducting material, because the electrons are freed from the atoms, and the flow is therefore in the field — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not clear to me what you have in mind with "because the electrons are freed from the atoms". Are you imagining these free electrons as being outside the body of the conducting material, and that the movement of electrons inside the body of the conductor does not play a role in the propagation of energy through the fields?

On your view, why does it matter what material the conductor is composed of, or what the cross sectional area of the conductor is?

I'm not sure. Intuitively it might seem so, but this is a domain that is far far away from that where our intuitions were formed. God may or may not ultimately play dice with the universe, how can we say? — hypericin

Suppose instead of God we have Ged. Ged is a postdoc in a ten dimensional universe who is researching the possibility of intelligence evolving in a three dimensional universe. So Ged sets up a Monte Carlo simulation of a three dimensional universe in order to explore the possibility space. Voila, here we are in the multiple worlds of Ged's simulation. :gasp:

Obviously it is of more interest than the foot, and people spend a great deal on it, but should that be the case? I’m not so sure. For instance, the question of where the brain ends and the rest of the body begins is in my mind insoluble. The carotid arteries, the spine, the endocrine system—all are intimately connected, and are therefor one thing. Removing the rest of the body from a theory of mind is a huge but fairly common mistake. — NOS4A2

The topic is a thought experiment that doesn't need to be nomologically viable to stimulate epistemological consideration of it.

Choosing to consider a brain in a vat as compared to a human body in a vat seems to be an attempt to simplify things to a sort of minimum system for epistemic relevevance, and you seem intent on missing the point.

Why then does electrical energy travel through the field around copper wires, instead of traveling through the copper wires, where the electron particles are supposedly located? Or do you think that particles of the wire, the electrons are actually outside the wire?

However, electrical energy does not travel though the wire as sound travels through air but instead always travels in the space outside of the wires. This is because electric energy is composed of electric and magnetic fields which are created by the moving electrons, but which exist in the space surrounding the wires.
— http://scienceline.ucsb.edu/getkey.php?key=3199 — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm afraid your source is not very good. It seems to be mistaking the skin effect which is applicable to AC signals, for a general rule about electrical conduction.

In either the AC or DC case, electrical current travels through the conductor. That link provides some explanation as to why in the AC case the conduction of current becomes more and more confined to the outermost portions of the conductor as the frequency of the AC signal increases.

This commonsense notion doesn't happen at the micro scale, so that part is strictly speaking impossible. — hypericin

Impossible, or merely simplistic?

I think it is fair to say that human beings are more than brains, and that any brain is so interconnected to the rest of the body that to separate one from the other is to end the human being. — NOS4A2

Sure.

However. people who think seriously about the subject recognize that different parts of the human body do different things. What the brain does seems to be of particular interest. Do you disagree?

The forum does not work well for manifestos. If you want things to work out, focusing on a relatively narrow subject is usually necessary. — T Clark

And welcome to TPF!

This is an excerpt of an interview of Robert Sapolski... — Truth Seeker

Great clip!

Not to say you deserve any praise for posting it. :razz:

1. Intuitions (i.e., intellectual seemings): one ought to take as true what intellectual strikes them as being the case unless sufficient evidence has been prevented that demonstrates the invalidity of it.
— Bob Ross

Obviously your intuitions may be wrong but it also seems to be that I could apply the opposite rule and it wouldn't necessarily have an effect on how well I gather knowledge. — Apustimelogist

Indeed. I'd suggest it could have a salubrious effect on how well a person gathers knowledge, in that someone might be more likely to see through faulty intuitions which impede having a more accurate view as a result of questioning intuitions.

That said, arguments about selection on the basis of form, defined broadly as "developing echolocation," or "developing the ability to fly" do seem fairly controversial. At least part of the fear here is that it introduces too much teleology in to biology, making it seem like purposeful development. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for the very substantive reaponse!

It will take me awhile to respond. I'm envious of your fluency.

For now I'm just going to nitpick. (I'm kind of a professional nitpicker, so I'm fluent in nitpicky.) :razz:

In the case of working evolutionary biologists, I don't see it as a matter of fear that "it introduces too much teleology in to biology". It seems to me that it is more a matter of such scientists being inclined to curiosity as to what sequence of events resulted in such a phenotype - what might be developed by way of a best explanation?

In metaphysics, however, logical analysis allows us to produce a formal proof that all other philosophies and philosophical positions are logically absurd, — FrancisRay

Logical analysis is always subject to Garbage-In/Garbage-Out. Believing oneself to have proven all other philosophies are absurd, is liable to be an epistemic trap which impedes one's ability to learn from others. That is an unfortunate state to be in.

I think these days it is fairly widely understood, amongst those who have looked into the subject beyond high school biology, that there are selection effects that take place through changes in DNA outside the boundaries of genes. (Gene expression promoting regions of DNA, which are not themselves part of a gene, for example.)

So there is a sense in which definitions of evolution in terms of change in allele frequency over time is simplistic. However, perhaps when looked at on geological time scales, changes in allele frequency over time are such a dominant factor that such simplistic definitions are pragmatic for introducing people to the subject?

My question is, has anyone come across ways this is explored as a fractal process? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't come across anything like that.

Panpsychism has always been a problem for physicalism because it seems to be decidedly not what physicalists want to posit, but at the same time it is in no way ruled out by mainstream physicalism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see any real problem. Panpsychism seems like nothing more than an unfalsifiable hypothesis that has no significant explanatory value, and Ockham razor seems like sufficient justification for dismissing panpsychism. From my perspective panpsychism doesn't seem to present any more challenge than solipsism.

Partly because no physicalism that precludes panpsychism has been developed that doesn't seem to spawn massive problems for the theorist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This seems to me, more a matter of unrealistic expectations on the part of critics of physicalism, than it seems a problem for physicalism. Brains are enormously complex, and I say this as an electrical engineer who routinely deals with highly complex systems. Yes there is a huge way to go in developing a understanding of how brains instantiate minds, and no guarantee that human minds are up to the task of developing something approaching an ultimate explanatory theory. However, substantial explanatory progress has been made over my lifetime, and that progress is ongoing. I don't see how anything similar can be claimed for panpsychism.

In any case, I'm interested in hearing more about what you see as "massive problems" for physicalism.

To be honest, it's really weird to me how physicalism is the most popular ontology writ large, but in the context of metaphysics as a specialty it's like a battleship that's taken direct multiple direct torpedo hits, is listing to one side, its magazine blew, and it looks liable to break in half. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, philosophers have proven themselves capable of believing all sorts of weird things, and this appears to me to be an example of such. I think physicalism (in a general sense) is in about as much danger as the heliocentrism of the solar system.