I'm not convinced we know what is random versus that which is not random. We detect patterns, as far as human cognition allows and we ascribe characteristics to those patterns - again in human terms. But words like 'random' or 'accidental' seem to have emotional connotations and function as tips of icebergs. — Tom Storm

I'd say it takes some effort to find something in the world that looks like it might be truly random.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_random_number_generator

You are correct that "random" has emotional connotations for many. In the Christian environment of my childhood, with the belief that there was a God that was going to make everything right, and the feeling of security that comes with that - it can be unnerving to consider the possibility that there is a random aspect of some sort, to the world. I, being very much a science nerd, realized fairly early on that it looks an awful lot like there is a random aspect to reality. It's a somewhat controversial topic in physics. The Multi Worlds Interpretation of QM is considered a deterministic interpretation. I'm kind of partial to the MWI, but not because I have anywhere near the expertise needed to judge between interpretations. I find it relatively easy to 'picture' an MWI world, as compared to the worlds of other interpretations of QM, and that undoubtedly biases my view.

Anyway, after that longer than intended digression, I was curious as to whether you found the following excerpt from that link to be emotional?

In computing, a hardware random number generator (HRNG) or true random number generator (TRNG) is a device that generates random numbers from a physical process, rather than by means of an algorithm. Such devices are often based on microscopic phenomena that generate low-level, statistically random "noise" signals, such as thermal noise, the photoelectric effect, involving a beam splitter, and other quantum phenomena. These stochastic processes are, in theory, completely unpredictable for as long as an equation governing such phenomena is unknown or uncomputable. This is in contrast to the paradigm of pseudo-random number generation commonly implemented in computer programs.

This TLS accelerator computer card uses a hardware random number generator to generate cryptographic keys to encrypt data sent over computer networks.
A hardware random number generator typically consists of a transducer to convert some aspect of the physical phenomena to an electrical signal, an amplifier and other electronic circuitry to increase the amplitude of the random fluctuations to a measurable level, and some type of analog-to-digital converter to convert the output into a digital number, often a simple binary digit 0 or 1. By repeatedly sampling the randomly varying signal, a series of random numbers is obtained.

Just because it's the only argument you're willing to consider doesn't mean it's the only argument or the main one. — T Clark

Indeed. Here's a scientific take.

No worries. I guess where I was heading is that if animals have rudimentary intentionality, what does this say about a more evolved human version? Is intentionality just a hallmark of complexity (an idea mocked by many). — Tom Storm

I would mock that idea as well. It's not simply a matter of degree of complexity. I think that only physical systems with outputs, that are about some aspect of their inputs have intentionality.

I strongly encourage watching this video (or otherwise look into the subject) in order to develop an intuitive recognition of how networks of neurons can be systems with outputs that are about some aspect of the system's input. For me, understanding this stuff has been of immense benefit in understanding intuition, when to trust and distrust my intuitions, and how to improve my intuitions. Understanding the fine details of what is discussed in the video isn't so important for the context of this thread, as developing a recognition of how intentionality can emerge in what is a relatively simple system.

Wayfarer argues that human rationality and intentionality is special. He's not the only one. Can we infer anything additional about this matter from understanding animal behaviour? — Tom Storm

Well, a substantial amount has been learned about human brains from studying animal brains, but if "this matter" is the human capacity for philosophical thought, then I'd think understanding of animal behavior would be of limited usefulness. (Now if "this matter" was the behavior of humans on a philosophy forum, much might be learned by watching a documentary on chimpanzees.)

Anyway, in response to your question I'm at an I don't know where to begin state, so I'll defer to Kurt Vonnegut:

Tiger got to hunt, bird got to fly;
Man got to sit and wonder 'why, why, why? '
Tiger got to sleep, bird got to land;
Man got to tell himself he understand.

Delete

I think consideration of the role of networks of neurons, and disregarding the molecular details on which the neurons supervene, is an appropriate level of looking at things for the purpose of this discussion
— wonderer1

It might be, were this a computer science or neuroscience forum. — Wayfarer

It's disappointing to see such anti-intellectualism here. Especially in light of Fooloso4 having so recently posted this.

Philosophy has become in large part insular and self-referential. Written by philosophers for philosophers. With a specialized language designed only for the initiated, a cramped style of writing intended to ward off attack, overburdened by its own theory laden stranglehold on thinking and seeing, enamored by its linguistic prowess and the production of problems that only arise within this hermetically sealed sterile environment. It either laments the fact that it is regarded as irrelevant or takes this to be the sign of its superiority. — Fooloso4

:up:

The SEP entry would be a good starting point https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality — Wayfarer

You know I've already provided that link, right? Is your ego so bruised already that you need to try to put me down in the estimations of the rest of the forum?

We could talk about the evolutionary psychology of that.

OK then, give us a well-informed materialists' account of the significance of intentionality. — Wayfarer

The sort of low level intentionality I have been discussing provides the subconscious infrastructure for consciousness.

As for whether output - written text - has any kind of ‘intentionality’, I would say, clearly not. Written text means nothing without being interpreted.

And have you interpreted ChatGPT's output as being about something? (Like your conscious mind interpret's the outputs of your subconscious as being about something.)

Do animals have intentionality? They seem to from my perspective. What does this add to the discussion? — Tom Storm

In my experience, people have widely varying concepts in mind when using the word "intentionality" so many may disagree with what I am talking about being intentionality, but yes. I'd say animal with enough of a neural network to call a brain, likely have the low level intentionality I've been discussing. That's a different matter though, than having 'a big enough pile' of low level intentionality for consciousness to emerge.

Edit: I forgot to answer your last question. I don't have a clear idea of what you are asking with your question, but what I see it as adding to the discussion, is further consideration and clarification of the paradigm I'm presenting.

Question: In philosophy, 'intentionality' is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. Do AI systems such as ChatGPT possess this power?


ChatGPT: AI systems, including ChatGPT, do not possess intentionality in the same way that humans do. Intentionality is typically associated with consciousness and subjective experience, which are currently not attributes of AI systems.

That was funny, but note ChatGPT simply says ChatGPT does not have intentionality "in the same way that humans do." Which of course any well informed materialist would agree with. Then ChatGPT goes on producing output which doesn't directly respond to the question.

Whether ChatGPT has consciousness is not relevant. The point was to consider intentionality at low (subconscious) levels, on which intentionality at conscious levels could supervene.

Also, you didn't ask ChatGPT the question I proposed which was, "Do the outputs of ChatGPT have intentionality?" Since you posted an output of ChatGPT, do you think that output is about something?

That's was kind of my impression as well.

Perhaps someday we will figure out how cooperation strategies were encoded into the biology that underlies our moral sense. But I do not expect that to happen soon. — Mark S

It looks me like it is happening now, but in bits and pieces. Neuroscience is a toddler by comparison with more fundamental sciences, but it has come an enormous way from the abyssmal state I found it in when I first started looking into it seriously 36 years ago.

Which question, exactly? It starts with the presumption that we can arrive at true beliefs through reasoned inference, and then asks what must be the case in order for this to be so. — Wayfarer

I meant beg the question in the sense discussed here, assuming that would be the usage most common on the forum. In any case, what I meant by beg the question was assume the conclusion. I interpreted you saying, "...if such theories were true, our thoughts, and so also our reasoning, would be determined on the molecular level by neurochemistry, leaving no role for the free exercise of reason.", as suggesting that exercise of reason is assumed to be incompatible with the determinism of physics, when that is what your argument seeks to show.

Having looked at that sentence from your opening paragraph again, I'll also point out that my theory is that neurons supervene on the molecular level, but it is at the level of networks of neurons that our reasoning is determined in the most interesting regards. That's simplistic of course, since among other things, various organs dumping hormones into our bloodstreams and intake of a variety of substances also plays a deterministic role in how we reason. (Speaking of which... [reaches for a gummie]) However, I think consideration of the role of networks of neurons, and disregarding the molecular details on which the neurons supervene, is an appropriate level of looking at things for the purpose of this discussion. That's the level at which intentionality seems to emerge.

Has anyone, with two X chromosomes and no Y, spoken up in this thread?

Well, it's not altogether clear even that human thoughts "have intentionality" ... :chin: — 180 Proof

The SEP goes on to say:

‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher’s word: ever since the idea, if not the word itself, was introduced into philosophy by Franz Brentano in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it has been used to refer to the puzzles of representation, all of which lie at the interface between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language.

So do we blame old Franz for creating all of this confusion? :gasp:

Another thought regarding which I'll preface with an exverpt from the SEP entry:

In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents. Furthermore, to the extent that a speaker utters words from some natural language or draws pictures or symbols from a formal language for the purpose of conveying to others the contents of her mental states, these artifacts used by a speaker too have contents or intentionality.

Do the outputs of ChatGPT have intentionality? Why or why not?

The general problem in the argument is framing things as True or Not True in relation to phenomenon instead of understanding it as an abstract game that helps guide us through ‘reality’ rather than something that is directly applicable to ‘reality’. — I like sushi

What are your thoughts on replacing "true" and "false" with "more accurate" and "less accurate"?

Throwing away the notions of true or false altogether seems a bit extreme to me. Wouldn't we, in effect, be throwing out logic as well?

Offhand, I can't think of a better word than strategies. Suggestions are welcome. — Mark S

Your request, that I suggest alternative vocabulary, is fair enough. However, I don't consider myself very qualified to offer a very good alternative, because I think moralistic emotional reactions are largely a function of how the limbic system (paleomammalian cortex) interacts with neocortex, and that isn't an area I've studied sufficiently to speak with much confidence.

Furthermore, the interactions between limbic system and neocortex seem fairly complex, with some capability for each system to override the other. (i.e. Conscious reasoning can somewhat suppress being overridden by the limbic system, but conscious reasoning is also somewhat at the mercy of the limbic system.)

That said, I'd think something like, "evolved in automated biasing of neocortex by the limbic system", might be along the right lines, though it's fairly unwieldy.

2. If naturalism is true, then all beliefs can be fully explained in terms of non-rational causes. — Wayfarer

Sorry about the piecemeal response. I'm at work right now, and addressing things as I have small windows of time.

I disagree with your premise above. Naturalism being true does not entail being able to fully explain all physical systems and in particular there are insurmountable issues to fully explaining complex systems, and brains are the most complicated physical systems we know of. Naturalism being true only requires beliefs being *caused*, by what at the lowest level are non-rational causes.

The basis of the argument is, then, that if materialism were correct, our thoughts would be the product of physical processes which are in themselves devoid of any purpose or intentionality (in line with the axioms of materialism, which holds that everything in the Universe is the product of physical laws and product of non-intentional and non-purposive processes). — Wayfarer

Assuming you are using "intentionality" as discussed in the SEP, this 3blue1brown video provides a good sketch of how the outputs of a neural network can be *about* numerical digits in the visual field provided as inputs to the neural network. So intentionality can be recognized as emerging at relatively low levels in our neurological information processing.

The argument from reason challenges the proposition that everything that exists, and in particular thought and reason, can be explained solely in terms of natural or physical processes. It is, therefore, an argument against materialist philosophy of mind. According to the argument, if such theories were true, our thoughts, and so also our reasoning, would be determined on the molecular level by neurochemistry, leaving no role for the free exercise of reason. — Wayfarer

This appears to be begging the question, by presuming that the exercise of reason is something different than information processing occurring in our brains.

Smuggling in a dualism which isn't part of the materialist view doesn't do anything to contradict a materialist view.

Then there is the issue of "free exercise of reason", which suggests to me a desire to maintain a belief in libertarian free will. However, giving up a naive notion of libertarian free will is a small price to pay for the more accurate understanding that comes with a well informed materialist perspective. (Assuming we want to compare appeals to consequences.)

You could be more specific. But what I said summarizes all there is. — Mark S

The problem with using "strategy" in this context is that it suggests that moralistic fast thinking on the part of humans is part of someone's conscious plan, when it is actually a result of unthinking evolutionary processes.

I didn't see an answer to my question in there.

:up:

I guess I have a problem with your use of "strategy".

Whose strategy is it?

Do you have a different explanation of the content of the fast moral thinking adaptation? — Mark S

Inasmuch as evolution might be said to have a 'purpose' that purpose is to produce individuals with a high probability of success in passing on their genes. When evolution is occuring in a species which gets a lot of benefit from social cooperation we can expect evolutionary changes that take advantage of that environmental niche of living as a member of a social species. However, it isn't realistic to think cooperation is the 'purpose' of that evolution. A relatively high level of cooperation is just a side effect of evolution in such an environmental niche.

Morality as Cooperation Strategies explains fast moral thinking, not slow moral thinking. — Mark S

I think your sense of what is an explanation of what is a bit unrealistic. I think the adaptiveness of fast moral thinking (considered within an evolutionary framework) is more accurate as an explanation for human moral thinking.

It seems to me you're suggesting there's something interesting there that I'm too ignorant/dumb to see it. — Eugen

I used to think that it made sense to see people as being somewhere along a one dimensional line from smart to dumb, but that was 36 years ago. Now I recognize that all of us have different constellations of cognitive strengths and weaknesses that determine what ways of learning we are better or worse at.

Could you please shed some light onto it for me, please? — Eugen

I think it is largely a matter of intuitively grokking what Chomsky meant, and I'd suggest that the best way for you to do that might be to think about the problems you would run into if you tried to provide a full explanation of what it is like for you to see a sunset.

There is no hard problem because <<How is it like to see a sunset?>> is a non-question" :vomit: — Eugen

What Chomsky is doing with that statement is attempting to foster a recognition in his listeners. It didn't work in your case, but that's just the way it goes.

Matthew 13:1-8

Dude, I was sarcastic... of course I won't start the classic silly debate ''Hey, we can get to flying from parts that don't fly." — Eugen

Cool. So we can consider it a bare assertion when you say:

The hard problem states it's illogical to get consciousness from non-consciousness, and there is absolutely no answer to that to this moment.

Really? How come? I want details, please! — Eugen

Lay out your argument and I will point the fallacy out for you.

The hard problem states it's illogical to get consciousness from non-consciousness, and there is absolutely no answer to that to this moment. — Eugen

Sure there is an answer. The hard problem, as you state it, commits a fallacy of composition. (Or fallacy of division, depending on the details.)

I'm planning to create an OP, but it's going to take a few days. It's a deep topic. — Wayfarer

I'm looking forward to it. :up:

I'm aware of that book, but no, haven't read it. — Wayfarer

Bummer, it'd make it easier to communicate some things to you if you had. Yes, Kahneman is quite brilliant, and presents important things to understand about intuition, and does so a whole lot better than I could.

Anyway, maybe we could switch to discussing the argument from reason that you mentioned?

I will add that the principle difference between the neo-Kantian Cassirer, and standard view of physicalism, is that the latter sees mind and being as the emergent products of physical processes which are understood to be inherently non-intentional and non-teleological. — Wayfarer

Are you using "non-intentional" in the sense of intentionality or in a sense related to motivation, or other?

If in the sense of intentionality, then I could make a case that intentionality supervenes on neural networks. It seems likely it would take some charitable consideration and effort on your part to understand it, but it is well worth understanding for those interested in understanding themselves. (Particularly if interested in the nature of intuition.)

Of course we all have different brains, and as a consequence, different constellations of cognitive strengths and weaknesses. This impacts what we find interesting, and I'm certainly not suggesting you should be interested in the things I'm interested in.

Have at it. :up: — Pantagruel

Thanks Pantagruel.

Getting back to this:

I don’t think there is one. There are major gaps and conundrums in physics, even without considering the very tenuous connection it might have with how or if mind ‘emerges from’ neural networks, and the implications of that. I think the sense of what is physical, in this context, is post-Cartesian. This is the view that emerges from first of all dividing the world into the two domains of extended matter and ‘thinking substance’ and then by demonstrating the conceptual difficulties with the ‘thinking substance’ (a.k.a. ‘ghost in the machine’.) So having eliminated that problematical conception of the mind, there is purportedly nothing left other than ‘the physical’ in terms of which mind can be explained.

Do you think that is near the mark? — Wayfarer

I interpret the sentence I bolded to be suggesting that I am proposing a sort of 'physicalism of the gaps'. That is not at all the case. What I would like to see is more people developing the cognitive toolkit to recognize that an understanding of human thought and consciousness, as supervening on physical processes, is extraordinarily explanatory and not just a simplistic parsimony.

Sure there are gaps and conundrums in all sciences and not just physics, but despite there being unknowns in many areas, I think it is important to understand what Sean Carroll was attempting to communicate with his article, The Laws Underlying The Physics of Everyday Life Are Completely Understood.

The connection between physics, and the information processing that occurs in neural networks, is no more tenuous than the connection between physics, and the information processing occuring in the device you are using to read this post. However, the ability to recognize the explanatory power of neural networks in understanding human thought, supervenes on a fairly broad knowledge of science generally. So I don't hold out much hope of this being persuasive to people who lack the knowledge base required for such recognition to occur.

Still it seems worth trying to communicate this idea, despite the difficulty in doing so, and perhaps talking about things at the level of psychology might be somewhat effective at conveying aspects of my thinking on this subject. Have you read Daniel Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow?

Any objection to your thread being used as Wayfarer and I have been discussing?

So, the odd thing is that even if we can have intuitive intellectual knowledge of reality, we cannot be certain that we can, no matter how certain we might feel about it. — Janus

:100: :up:

Do you think that is near the mark? — Wayfarer

No, I don't. However, before I go into detail, do you think one of us should start a new OP? Or is there an old thread of yours appropriate to discuss things in?

:up: