I have to hope that what reason I have has done a good job filtering and weighing its inputs to reach a sound conclusion. If I try to justify my belief, I will surely succeed. It's one of my best things, as it is for everyone; rationalizing is our super power. Now I have to hope, as well, that my post-hoc justifications are everything they seem to be. — Srap Tasmaner

I'd suggest looking at logic/language as providing a quite valuable way of comparing different intuitons we have:

1. With each other. (In an internal dialogue.)
2. With the intuitions of other people.
3. With empirical evidence.

So, yes, I broadly agree with what you posted, Janus, but I reserve a bit of Humean horror that the foundations of my rationality are not themselves rational. — Srap Tasmaner

I wouldn't say that the foundations aren't rational, but that the foundations are intuitive, and intuition is a foundational aspect of human rationality. It's just that many philosophically minded people have tended to think simplistically of rationality as somewhat synonymous with logic.

Chess provides a clear example, as usual: there's a saying among masters that the move you want to play is the right move, even if it seems impossible. This is intuition, and the idea is that careful analysis will justify your inclination, so some part of your mind must have zipped through that analysis without bothering to keep you informed... — Srap Tasmaner

Right. Going with intuition is relying on the deep learning which has occurred in neural nets between our ears.

But in that case I'm having trouble making sense of "Then they can hark back to that chance encounter, and come to the conclusion that at that time, according to one of them, the decision lay in the uncertain future, while to the other, it lay in the certain past."

Isn't that saying that they can hark back to something that didn't happen?

I know I'm nitpicking on details somewhat irrelevant to answering the question, but I'll give others time to think about it before suggesting an answer.

Two people pass each other on the street; and according to one of the two people, an Andromedean space fleet has already set off on its journey, while to the other, the decision as to whether or not the journey will actually take place has not yet been made.

I'm not sure how "according to one of the people" is supposed to be interpreted. Are these two people supposed to have magical physics defying clairvoyance?

You are like Sam Elliot at the end of The Big Lebowski.

:up:

Very thoughtful post.

Yes. Note 'used by a speaker'. They are on that sense imbued with intentionality, namely, that of the speaker, to convey or represent something. — Wayfarer

What is this "imbuing"? Sounds kind of hand wavy.

What disqualifies ChatGPT from being a speaker imbuing it's output with intentionality, regardless of whether the information processing involved is different than what occurs in human brains?

...that kind of analysis is what is appropriate... — Wayfarer

Well, I'm autistic, and I have my own style that I find works for me.

Which states that:

In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents. — Wayfarer

By the way Wayfarer,

The sentence immediately following what you quoted there from the SEP says:

Furthermore, to the extent that a speaker utters words from some natural language or draws pictures or symbols from a formal language for the purpose of conveying to others the contents of her mental states, these artifacts used by a speaker too have contents or intentionality.

Do you agree with that statement?

Owned the first edition. Nothing whatever to do with the point at issue. — Wayfarer

I didn't asked if you owned the book. I asked, "Are you familiar with the Zen notion of beginners mind?"

...You've already suggested a couple of times that ChatGPT might possess intentionality, which in both cases, ChatGPT itself has rejected. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer, it seems unlikely that I'll be able to keep up with your rate of posting, but I do want to respond to this much for now.

As I've said, there are different ways of understanding intentionality. Furthermore, you haven't been paying close attention. What I asked was (going from memory) "Does the output of ChatGPT have intentionality?" and in response to the way you responded to that, I asked, "Do you interpret the output of ChatGPT as having intentionality?" (As being about something.) Which you haven't answered.

The reason I asked was to get you thinking about the question. I think that you do interpret the output of ChatGPT as being about something, after all, you've said that you have been making use of it a lot lately. Why would you do that, if you didn't think that the output is about something?

Besides, when you mention neural networks or artificial intelligence, you do so precisely because of what they represent: you are saying that they represent the way in which physical systems are able to embody intentionality. So again your argument is recursive - you are imputing intentionality to those systems on the basis of your rational ability to draw reasoned conclusions, which is the very faculty that is in question. — Wayfarer

You misunderstand, I'm not trying to make an argument in talking about neural nets. I am presenting a hypothesis for consideration. It would take effort on your part, that you haven't shown a willingness to make, for you to grasp the hypothesis, which is fine.

So I can't see how your proposed definition:

I think that only physical systems with outputs, that are about some aspect of their inputs have intentionality.
— wonderer1

squares with what is given in the SEP article. — Wayfarer

Yes, I know it would take a paradigm shift for you to get it. You would need to spend some time, studying stuff, that I suspect you would find boring, to reach the point of grasping what I am trying to communicate, about what is involved in understanding oneself.

You are interested in Buddhism, right? Are you familiar with the Zen notion of beginners mind?

Your teacup is full.

It was written – as our exchanges are written, Wayf – by deterministic nonlinear dynamic system-agents which reflexively confabulate ex post facto intentions-of-the-gaps. :sparkle: :eyes: — 180 Proof

:up:

:cool:

As I said, I am biased, because for me MWI is a useful tool for conceiving of aspects of the world. I know that I am not going to study QM to the point of being an expert, so a consequence of that is that I'm likely to remain biased. At least until some breakthrough comes along. OK?

I'm not convinced we know what is random versus that which is not random. We detect patterns, as far as human cognition allows and we ascribe characteristics to those patterns - again in human terms. But words like 'random' or 'accidental' seem to have emotional connotations and function as tips of icebergs. — Tom Storm

I'd say it takes some effort to find something in the world that looks like it might be truly random.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_random_number_generator

You are correct that "random" has emotional connotations for many. In the Christian environment of my childhood, with the belief that there was a God that was going to make everything right, and the feeling of security that comes with that - it can be unnerving to consider the possibility that there is a random aspect of some sort, to the world. I, being very much a science nerd, realized fairly early on that it looks an awful lot like there is a random aspect to reality. It's a somewhat controversial topic in physics. The Multi Worlds Interpretation of QM is considered a deterministic interpretation. I'm kind of partial to the MWI, but not because I have anywhere near the expertise needed to judge between interpretations. I find it relatively easy to 'picture' an MWI world, as compared to the worlds of other interpretations of QM, and that undoubtedly biases my view.

Anyway, after that longer than intended digression, I was curious as to whether you found the following excerpt from that link to be emotional?

In computing, a hardware random number generator (HRNG) or true random number generator (TRNG) is a device that generates random numbers from a physical process, rather than by means of an algorithm. Such devices are often based on microscopic phenomena that generate low-level, statistically random "noise" signals, such as thermal noise, the photoelectric effect, involving a beam splitter, and other quantum phenomena. These stochastic processes are, in theory, completely unpredictable for as long as an equation governing such phenomena is unknown or uncomputable. This is in contrast to the paradigm of pseudo-random number generation commonly implemented in computer programs.

This TLS accelerator computer card uses a hardware random number generator to generate cryptographic keys to encrypt data sent over computer networks.
A hardware random number generator typically consists of a transducer to convert some aspect of the physical phenomena to an electrical signal, an amplifier and other electronic circuitry to increase the amplitude of the random fluctuations to a measurable level, and some type of analog-to-digital converter to convert the output into a digital number, often a simple binary digit 0 or 1. By repeatedly sampling the randomly varying signal, a series of random numbers is obtained.

Just because it's the only argument you're willing to consider doesn't mean it's the only argument or the main one. — T Clark

Indeed. Here's a scientific take.

No worries. I guess where I was heading is that if animals have rudimentary intentionality, what does this say about a more evolved human version? Is intentionality just a hallmark of complexity (an idea mocked by many). — Tom Storm

I would mock that idea as well. It's not simply a matter of degree of complexity. I think that only physical systems with outputs, that are about some aspect of their inputs have intentionality.

I strongly encourage watching this video (or otherwise look into the subject) in order to develop an intuitive recognition of how networks of neurons can be systems with outputs that are about some aspect of the system's input. For me, understanding this stuff has been of immense benefit in understanding intuition, when to trust and distrust my intuitions, and how to improve my intuitions. Understanding the fine details of what is discussed in the video isn't so important for the context of this thread, as developing a recognition of how intentionality can emerge in what is a relatively simple system.

Wayfarer argues that human rationality and intentionality is special. He's not the only one. Can we infer anything additional about this matter from understanding animal behaviour? — Tom Storm

Well, a substantial amount has been learned about human brains from studying animal brains, but if "this matter" is the human capacity for philosophical thought, then I'd think understanding of animal behavior would be of limited usefulness. (Now if "this matter" was the behavior of humans on a philosophy forum, much might be learned by watching a documentary on chimpanzees.)

Anyway, in response to your question I'm at an I don't know where to begin state, so I'll defer to Kurt Vonnegut:

Tiger got to hunt, bird got to fly;
Man got to sit and wonder 'why, why, why? '
Tiger got to sleep, bird got to land;
Man got to tell himself he understand.

Delete

I think consideration of the role of networks of neurons, and disregarding the molecular details on which the neurons supervene, is an appropriate level of looking at things for the purpose of this discussion
— wonderer1

It might be, were this a computer science or neuroscience forum. — Wayfarer

It's disappointing to see such anti-intellectualism here. Especially in light of Fooloso4 having so recently posted this.

Philosophy has become in large part insular and self-referential. Written by philosophers for philosophers. With a specialized language designed only for the initiated, a cramped style of writing intended to ward off attack, overburdened by its own theory laden stranglehold on thinking and seeing, enamored by its linguistic prowess and the production of problems that only arise within this hermetically sealed sterile environment. It either laments the fact that it is regarded as irrelevant or takes this to be the sign of its superiority. — Fooloso4

:up:

The SEP entry would be a good starting point https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality — Wayfarer

You know I've already provided that link, right? Is your ego so bruised already that you need to try to put me down in the estimations of the rest of the forum?

We could talk about the evolutionary psychology of that.

OK then, give us a well-informed materialists' account of the significance of intentionality. — Wayfarer

The sort of low level intentionality I have been discussing provides the subconscious infrastructure for consciousness.

As for whether output - written text - has any kind of ‘intentionality’, I would say, clearly not. Written text means nothing without being interpreted.

And have you interpreted ChatGPT's output as being about something? (Like your conscious mind interpret's the outputs of your subconscious as being about something.)

Do animals have intentionality? They seem to from my perspective. What does this add to the discussion? — Tom Storm

In my experience, people have widely varying concepts in mind when using the word "intentionality" so many may disagree with what I am talking about being intentionality, but yes. I'd say animal with enough of a neural network to call a brain, likely have the low level intentionality I've been discussing. That's a different matter though, than having 'a big enough pile' of low level intentionality for consciousness to emerge.

Edit: I forgot to answer your last question. I don't have a clear idea of what you are asking with your question, but what I see it as adding to the discussion, is further consideration and clarification of the paradigm I'm presenting.

Question: In philosophy, 'intentionality' is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. Do AI systems such as ChatGPT possess this power?


ChatGPT: AI systems, including ChatGPT, do not possess intentionality in the same way that humans do. Intentionality is typically associated with consciousness and subjective experience, which are currently not attributes of AI systems.

That was funny, but note ChatGPT simply says ChatGPT does not have intentionality "in the same way that humans do." Which of course any well informed materialist would agree with. Then ChatGPT goes on producing output which doesn't directly respond to the question.

Whether ChatGPT has consciousness is not relevant. The point was to consider intentionality at low (subconscious) levels, on which intentionality at conscious levels could supervene.

Also, you didn't ask ChatGPT the question I proposed which was, "Do the outputs of ChatGPT have intentionality?" Since you posted an output of ChatGPT, do you think that output is about something?

That's was kind of my impression as well.

Perhaps someday we will figure out how cooperation strategies were encoded into the biology that underlies our moral sense. But I do not expect that to happen soon. — Mark S

It looks me like it is happening now, but in bits and pieces. Neuroscience is a toddler by comparison with more fundamental sciences, but it has come an enormous way from the abyssmal state I found it in when I first started looking into it seriously 36 years ago.

Which question, exactly? It starts with the presumption that we can arrive at true beliefs through reasoned inference, and then asks what must be the case in order for this to be so. — Wayfarer

I meant beg the question in the sense discussed here, assuming that would be the usage most common on the forum. In any case, what I meant by beg the question was assume the conclusion. I interpreted you saying, "...if such theories were true, our thoughts, and so also our reasoning, would be determined on the molecular level by neurochemistry, leaving no role for the free exercise of reason.", as suggesting that exercise of reason is assumed to be incompatible with the determinism of physics, when that is what your argument seeks to show.

Having looked at that sentence from your opening paragraph again, I'll also point out that my theory is that neurons supervene on the molecular level, but it is at the level of networks of neurons that our reasoning is determined in the most interesting regards. That's simplistic of course, since among other things, various organs dumping hormones into our bloodstreams and intake of a variety of substances also plays a deterministic role in how we reason. (Speaking of which... [reaches for a gummie]) However, I think consideration of the role of networks of neurons, and disregarding the molecular details on which the neurons supervene, is an appropriate level of looking at things for the purpose of this discussion. That's the level at which intentionality seems to emerge.

Has anyone, with two X chromosomes and no Y, spoken up in this thread?

Well, it's not altogether clear even that human thoughts "have intentionality" ... :chin: — 180 Proof

The SEP goes on to say:

‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher’s word: ever since the idea, if not the word itself, was introduced into philosophy by Franz Brentano in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it has been used to refer to the puzzles of representation, all of which lie at the interface between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language.

So do we blame old Franz for creating all of this confusion? :gasp:

Another thought regarding which I'll preface with an exverpt from the SEP entry:

In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents. Furthermore, to the extent that a speaker utters words from some natural language or draws pictures or symbols from a formal language for the purpose of conveying to others the contents of her mental states, these artifacts used by a speaker too have contents or intentionality.

Do the outputs of ChatGPT have intentionality? Why or why not?

The general problem in the argument is framing things as True or Not True in relation to phenomenon instead of understanding it as an abstract game that helps guide us through ‘reality’ rather than something that is directly applicable to ‘reality’. — I like sushi

What are your thoughts on replacing "true" and "false" with "more accurate" and "less accurate"?

Throwing away the notions of true or false altogether seems a bit extreme to me. Wouldn't we, in effect, be throwing out logic as well?

Offhand, I can't think of a better word than strategies. Suggestions are welcome. — Mark S

Your request, that I suggest alternative vocabulary, is fair enough. However, I don't consider myself very qualified to offer a very good alternative, because I think moralistic emotional reactions are largely a function of how the limbic system (paleomammalian cortex) interacts with neocortex, and that isn't an area I've studied sufficiently to speak with much confidence.

Furthermore, the interactions between limbic system and neocortex seem fairly complex, with some capability for each system to override the other. (i.e. Conscious reasoning can somewhat suppress being overridden by the limbic system, but conscious reasoning is also somewhat at the mercy of the limbic system.)

That said, I'd think something like, "evolved in automated biasing of neocortex by the limbic system", might be along the right lines, though it's fairly unwieldy.

2. If naturalism is true, then all beliefs can be fully explained in terms of non-rational causes. — Wayfarer

Sorry about the piecemeal response. I'm at work right now, and addressing things as I have small windows of time.

I disagree with your premise above. Naturalism being true does not entail being able to fully explain all physical systems and in particular there are insurmountable issues to fully explaining complex systems, and brains are the most complicated physical systems we know of. Naturalism being true only requires beliefs being *caused*, by what at the lowest level are non-rational causes.

The basis of the argument is, then, that if materialism were correct, our thoughts would be the product of physical processes which are in themselves devoid of any purpose or intentionality (in line with the axioms of materialism, which holds that everything in the Universe is the product of physical laws and product of non-intentional and non-purposive processes). — Wayfarer

Assuming you are using "intentionality" as discussed in the SEP, this 3blue1brown video provides a good sketch of how the outputs of a neural network can be *about* numerical digits in the visual field provided as inputs to the neural network. So intentionality can be recognized as emerging at relatively low levels in our neurological information processing.

The argument from reason challenges the proposition that everything that exists, and in particular thought and reason, can be explained solely in terms of natural or physical processes. It is, therefore, an argument against materialist philosophy of mind. According to the argument, if such theories were true, our thoughts, and so also our reasoning, would be determined on the molecular level by neurochemistry, leaving no role for the free exercise of reason. — Wayfarer

This appears to be begging the question, by presuming that the exercise of reason is something different than information processing occurring in our brains.

Smuggling in a dualism which isn't part of the materialist view doesn't do anything to contradict a materialist view.

Then there is the issue of "free exercise of reason", which suggests to me a desire to maintain a belief in libertarian free will. However, giving up a naive notion of libertarian free will is a small price to pay for the more accurate understanding that comes with a well informed materialist perspective. (Assuming we want to compare appeals to consequences.)

You could be more specific. But what I said summarizes all there is. — Mark S

The problem with using "strategy" in this context is that it suggests that moralistic fast thinking on the part of humans is part of someone's conscious plan, when it is actually a result of unthinking evolutionary processes.

I didn't see an answer to my question in there.

:up:

I guess I have a problem with your use of "strategy".

Whose strategy is it?

Do you have a different explanation of the content of the fast moral thinking adaptation? — Mark S

Inasmuch as evolution might be said to have a 'purpose' that purpose is to produce individuals with a high probability of success in passing on their genes. When evolution is occuring in a species which gets a lot of benefit from social cooperation we can expect evolutionary changes that take advantage of that environmental niche of living as a member of a social species. However, it isn't realistic to think cooperation is the 'purpose' of that evolution. A relatively high level of cooperation is just a side effect of evolution in such an environmental niche.