Some notes on 'transcendental arguments': 'What is typical of transcendental arguments proper is that they purport to establish the conditions necessary for experience, or experience of a certain kind, as a whole; and, at their most controversial, to establish a conclusion about the nature and existence of the external world, or other minds, as these – and particularly the world’s existence – can be derived in consequence of paying attention to what has to be the case for there to be experience, or in order for experience to be as it is.” (A. C. Grayling, The Refutation of Skepticism, pg. 83). So the strategy of transcendental arguments is that they start with a given - some incontrovertible fact of experience - and seek to answer the question: “what must be true given this experience.”

Descartes' cogito ergo sum argument is one example. There are others in The Critique of Pure Reason.

I don't think that the argument from reason is setting out to prove that reason is infallible or all-knowing - simply that it comprises the relationships of ideas, and so that can't be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the physical cause-and-effect relationships that are grist to the naturalist mill. — Wayfarer

This is the thing, though, you keep eliding the difference between propositions and epistemic agents holding those propositions true (or probable, whatever).

Logic is not the natural science of thought. That's psychology. Logic, taken narrowly, is a science of some of the relations among propositions, but includes no concept of an agent at all. You can take it somewhat more broadly, as it used to be, but then we're really looking to logic for normative guidance on what works. Decision theory kinda lands in here, and lives at the intersection of psychology, philosophy, and economics.

But to reiterate: taking "logic" as we usually do these days, my believing that P does not entail my believing that Q, even if P entails Q. If there's a relation between my believing that P and my believing that Q, logic may play some part in that, but it is unquestionably also a matter of psychology, as it's my belief states that are at issue.

Logic is not the natural science of thought. That's psychology. — Srap Tasmaner

Isn't that psychologism? The philosophical position that asserts that all meaningful statements or concepts can ultimately be reduced to psychological terms or explained in psychological language. It suggests that the study of psychology is foundational and can provide a comprehensive understanding of all aspects of human experience, including areas traditionally studied by other disciplines such as logic, mathematics, or philosophy.

Psychologism was particularly influential in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, primarily associated with figures like Wilhelm Wundt, Edward Titchener, and Oswald Külpe. They sought to establish psychology as a fundamental science that could explain all aspects of human cognition and behavior, including areas previously considered the domain of philosophy, such as logic and ethics. Frege criticized Husserl's philosophy of maths on the grounds of psychologism.

But critics argue that psychologism commits the "psychological fallacy" by conflating psychological descriptions or explanations with logical or conceptual analysis. They claim that not all meaningful concepts or statements can be reduced to psychological terms, and that the proper understanding of logic, mathematics, and philosophy couldn't be reduced to psychological terminology. Accordingly, sychologism was largely rejected as a philosophical position in the early 20th century.

The target of the argument is re-iterated in this post, the passage commencing 'The materialist worldview presumes a mechanistic base level. This doesn't mean necessarily deterministic - there can be chance at the basic level of reality in a mechanistic worldview (e.g. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and the 'quantum leap'.) However at the level of basic physics, nature is free of purpose, free of meaning or intentionality, free of normativity, and absent of any and all forms of subjectivity. If one is operating within a materialistic framework, then one cannot attribute purpose to what happens at the basic level."

You seem to be taking it for granted that a pure deduction cannot be at the same time a neural process. — Janus

Not 'taking for granted': presenting an argument for it — Wayfarer

I don't think so. That's what I asked for earlier:

That's why you need an actual argument showing that if brain state A, with contents P, causes brain state B, with contents Q, that a causal relation between A and B is incompatible with a logical relation between P and Q. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not sure there's exactly an argument here at all, and even if there is, whether it works. Certainly if the whole thing turns on libertarian free will (that "obscure and panicky doctrine" as Peter Strawson called it), that's a kettle of fish of a different color.

On the other hand, I'm also inclined, as I've indicated in recent postings, just to let it rip. Maybe naturalism does show that the sort of reasoning we think we do is a myth.

Isn't that psychologism? — Wayfarer

It isn't.

I don't have to reduce logic to psychology to point out that logic describes some relations between propositions and no relations among an epistemic agent's belief states. It's a known fact. You won't find a logician anywhere who would claim otherwise.

Right. Going with intuition is relying on the deep learning which has occurred in neural nets between our ears.
— wonderer1

I think that's right, but our intuitions can fool us, so we do need to examine the reasoning and its foundational presuppositions and our desires and aversions that underly our intuitions — Janus

Absolutely our intuitions can fool us. And logic is subject to GIGO, and can fool us as well. Since I have Feynman on the brain, another quote:

“The first principle is that you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool.”

I would add to what you said above, that we can learn from the study of applications of Artificial Neural Nets (ANNs), to improve the effectiveness with which we use our brains. A key consideration with ANNs is the training set, or the set of inputs that were involved in an ANN learning whatever it learned. Analogously, we can consider the size and scope of the training set that went into the deep learning underlying our intuitions, and consider whether our intuitions are likely to be trustworthy or untrustworthy under whatever the present circumstances are. In doing so we might recognize a benefit to increasing the size and/or scope of our training sets, and improve the training of our neural nets, resulting in an improvement to the reliability to our intuitions in the future.

I don't have to reduce logic to psychology to point out that logic describes some relations between propositions and no relations among an epistemic agent's belief states. — Srap Tasmaner

However, if I adopt a view on account of logic, then that informs my 'belief states', I am willing to accept it, and act on it.

you need an actual argument showing that if brain state A, with contents P — Srap Tasmaner

How could you specify 'content' in this sense? How would you ascertain what the 'brain state' is for some ostensible content? Could 'believing that p'be described in terms of the state of billions of neurons at a given instant in time? I don't think it could, as the brain, being a dynamic neural network, is constantly changing. The element of constancy amongst that flux is syntactic and semantic - not physiological.

But these "givens" that state what, for example, all experience must be like are not purely logically given (that is they are not tautologies in that their negations are not logical contradictions) they are synthetic generalizations from experience, and I think they represent what we find it impossible to imagine.

That's a theory similar to J S Mill's. To which the Kantian rejoinder is, that it would be impossible to arrive at 'synthetic generalisations from experience' without the faculty of reason and the innate categories of the understanding which can contrast like and unlike within a context and against a background. But if you want to launch into explaining the foundations of logic, then go right ahead, but it would seem to me it's going to involve a lot of writing.

There is no need to write a treatise on the foundations of logic; logical principles are actually fairly simple.

We arrive at synthetic generalizations from experience by recognizing what the general characteristics of different experiences are: so, it is a form of cognition: re-cognition. I don't see it as involving any logical deduction; it is more like pattern recognition.

Of course, we have to also think about it coherently as well, and that does involve thinking consistently or in logical terms in keeping with the principle of validity; that is we should avoid contradicting ourselves.

A simple example is that we can recognize that all our experiences of sensory objects are spatiotemporal, from which we generalize to saying that all experiences of sensory objects must be spatiotemporal because we cannot imagine how it could be otherwise.

I would add to what you said above, that we can learn from the study of applications of Artificial Neural Nets (ANNs), to improve the effectiveness with which we use our brains. A key consideration with ANNs is the training set, or the set of inputs that were involved in an ANN learning whatever it learned. Analogously, we can consider the size and scope of the training set that went into the deep learning underlying our intuitions, and consider whether our intuitions are likely to be trustworthy or untrustworthy under whatever the present circumstances are. In doing so we might recognize a benefit to increasing the size and/or scope of our training sets, and improve the training of our neural nets, resulting in an improvement to the reliability to our intuitions in the future. — wonderer1

That sounds like an interesting avenue of investigation, that I am yet to take the first step upon. If only we had more time!

Can you recommend an introductory text?

However, if I adopt a view on account of logic, then that informs my 'belief states', I am willing to accept it, and act on it. — Wayfarer

Adopt, willing, accept, act -- all of this is beyond the purview of logic. It's really straightforward. One proposition can entail another; one belief state cannot, in this same sense, entail another.

How could you specify 'content' in this sense? How would you ascertain what the 'brain state' is for some ostensible content? — Wayfarer

It was "for the sake of argument," but that branch of the discussion never materialized.

Robert Kowalski (early developer of Prolog) has been suggesting that instead of trying to get machines to think like us, we ought to consider learning to think more like machines. Wrote a book about it.

One proposition can entail another; one belief state cannot, in this same sense, entail another. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure it can. If I believe that P, and this entails that I believe that Q, then that is entailment. You're splitting hairs.

He may be the go to guy for Platonism, but for that reason not the go to guy for Plato or Aristotle. Of course he and other Platonists would not agree. — Fooloso4

Yes, I meant Platonism.

Aristotle regards living beings as self-sustaining functioning wholes. The four causes are inherent in a being being the kind of being it is, not something imposed on or interfering with it from the outside. Human beings are by their nature thinking beings. This is not an explanation, but a given. It has nothing to do with Gerson's "form 'thought'". Nothing to do with a transcendent realm accessible to the wise.

Rather than an argument from reason, Wayfarer, Plato and Aristotle use reason to demonstrate the limits of reason. — Fooloso4

Thanks and very interesting.

You're splitting hairs. — Wayfarer

Look at this way: we think of logic as normative, within limits; if P entails Q, and you believe P, then you ought to believe Q. Do people always do what they ought?

Tom, your unwillingness to commit to at least a provisional position on the Random Chaos vs Rational Cosmos question is puzzling to me. — Gnomon

I think that's mostly a problem for you and may explain things. Also 'unwillingness' is not a good word, it implies an ought - I 'ought' to be able to, right? I would say 'inability' would be more appropriate. I hold tentative positions on some matters, and was just writing elsewhere above -

I spend a lot of time in 'provisional credence' country. I hear alarm bells when people say they know something to be certain. — Tom Storm

If the world is all a "blooming buzzing confusion"*1, why bother to post on a philosophy forum? — Gnomon

What an odd question. It is precisely because things are far from clear that I am interested to see what other people make of things. One shouldn't come to a position and then say - 'That's it, I have arrived!' That's the thinking of fundamentalism or monomania.

Humans have cognitive limitations and individuals have intellectual/psychological limitations - to argue that we have equal access to an understanding of reality (whatever that might be) would be absurd. Many of the questions we ask are doubtless unanswerable or have incomprehensible answers for many of us. I am primarily interested in improving the questions.

Doesn't a forum like this presuppose that we can eventually make sense of the complex patterns of Nature, and the even more confusing patterns of Culture? — Gnomon

Christ no. A forum like this showcases opinions, values and beliefs (theorised and untheorised), which come from any number of sources and intellectual processes, some of which seem more credible than others.

For me the task here is mostly to ask what do you believe and why? And then pose the odd question to clarify or identify potential challenges to the belief. We are all here testing beliefs in the marketplace. Although it's clear some people hold dogmatic positions which sometimes seem rather fragile.

In this process skepticism for me isn't denialism or cynicism. It is simply the recognition of uncertainty in our experience and practice. Where possible things should be questioned and justified before they can pass for tentative knowledge. In this process there is also scope for us to change our views.

“Reason” to me is a fairly ambiguous concept, and so then too is the notion of “rationality”. As one minor hint of this: The irrational argument is yet engaged in reasoning, albeit in false or wrong or inaccurate ways, and so it is not arational—for it yet makes use of the laws of thought to obtain its conclusions. On the other hand, to add to this ambiguity, and with a pointer to Janus’s comments, I don’t see rationality as distinct from emotions—finding emotions to hold their sub/unconscious reasoning and, conversely, finding all conscious reasoning to be hewed, if not governed, by emotive dispositions, ranging from overt forms like animosity or compassion to more subtle forms like sereneness, or wonder, or curiosity.

At any rate, due to the just mentioned, I would present what I take to be the OP’s underlying stance differently, this by addressing the issue of truth. (intending to come full circle at the end)

For lack of equivocation, by truth I’m referring to the generalized sum of all individual truths regardless of their type (e.g., abstract or concrete), such that an individual truth is understood to be an instance of conformity to that which is actual, aka that which is real. If this is too abstract in its given terse form, then I’ll here yield to the correspondence theory of truth. Given this:

Is all truth thus understood a fabricated creation or, otherwise, is it a brute aspect of the world that is thereby uncreated?

Of note, when we willfully fabricate what others then accept to be a truth, we as a society term this a deception, aka a lie. So, then, for the theistically minded, are all the mundane truths we accept and live by the fabrication—one can here technically say, the deception—of an omnipotent psyche (thus, an omnipotent deceiver)? On the other hand, for the atheistically minded, is truth an emergent condition fabricated from, i.e. created by, mindless subatomic particles and forces that themselves emerge from a quantum vacuum field as these engage in an emergent process of biological evolution—such that the referent to the term “truth” changes (evolves) with time, never holding any definitive existential property but, instead, only being (often enough, the changing) fabricated stories we tell ourselves about it?

Plenty from both camps will answer “yes, all truths are fabricated/created”, but then the relativism that unfolds either way becomes detrimental to human welfare. The deceptions of the despotically minded become the lived, incarnate truths of the populous—and opposition to these created truths become collectively condemned at the long-term expense of all. As one example, that climate change is a global hoax becomes truth because some autocrats so state (in large part to keep their wallets fat) and because others so choose to believe. And yet, the nonfabricated truth that it is not a hoax yet pulls us into the inevitable.

On the other hand, if one answers that truth is not a created fabrication, then there will be something more to existence than what physicalism proposes, as the OP suggests. And yes, this can be characterized as Platonism or Neoplatonism wherein the Good is the ultimate truth (and vice versa), and can be furthermore shunned on account of this presently unorthodox view.

But if truth where to be metaphysically uncreated, then this will resonate with the basic laws of thought: what is true can only be itself; it will thereby be impossible that two contradictory truths cooccur at the same time and in the same way; and in it will likewise be impossible that a proposition be both true and false at the same time and in the same way, entailing that the proposition can either be one or the other.

These basic, universal laws of thought will then form the foundations of all rationality. Here, then, rationality becomes a metaphysical derivative of the existential occurrence of (uncreated, rather than fabricated) truth. Nevertheless, truth and rationality can well be deemed in such an interpretation to be staple aspects of existence—this in line to a globally pervading logos—aspects toward whose greater comprehension the increased intelligence that occasionally gets selected for by evolutionary mechanisms develops toward.

-----

I’m still relatively short on time so I’ll likely not participate for long, and I know this post has some gaps in it. But I wanted to chime in a bit all the same, this in my support of the OP. Even if our perspectives might differ somewhat.

Can you recommend an introductory text? — Janus

I'm not really up to date on the books on the subject. One of the seminal texts, and the book I learned the basics from, is Parallel Distributed Processsing. It was written in 1987, but the first few Amazon reviews I read gave the impression that it is still considered an important introduction to the field. There may well be better introductory texts though, and Amazon's purchasers also read might be of some value.

However, I think that this 20 minute youtube video presents a quite good introduction to how trained neural nets work, and the same videographer has a part 2 video covering how learning in ANNs work. For the purposes of getting a sense of how the subject is relevant to our thinking, the first video might be sufficient.

If you are looking for a book on how research into ANNs can be applied to human thought, I don't know of any such books having been written yet. (Not to say I've looked for one.) I've learned by trial and error.

Robert Kowalski (early developer of Prolog) has been suggesting that instead of trying to get machines to think like us, we ought to consider learning to think more like machines. Wrote a book about it. — Srap Tasmaner

Thanks.

:up: cheers

we think of logic as normative, within limits; if P entails Q, and you believe P, then you ought to believe Q. Do people always do what they ought? — Srap Tasmaner

Of course not, but you've already made that point, and I've said that it's not really relevant to the argument at hand.

I want to double back to this early comment to bring out this point.

This [i.e. the OP] appears to be begging the question, by presuming that the exercise of reason is something different than information processing occurring in our brains.

Smuggling in a dualism which isn't part of the materialist view doesn't do anything to contradict a materialist view. — wonderer1

The argument from reason doesn't rely on 'smuggling in' a dualism - it is an explicit appeal to dualism to highlight a fundamental weakness in the type of reducionist physicalism that is being criticized. It is not 'begging the question' but presenting an argument to that effect, which propenents of physicalism are then required to answer.

Naturalism being true only requires beliefs being *caused*, by what at the lowest level are non-rational causes. — wonderer1

Which is exactly what the argument from reason is criticising.

Diverting the thread to AI research and neural networks as a kind of 'general argument for physicalism' is just changing the subject.

Thanks, Javra, I'll mull that over, although I think it's rather more metaphysical than the argument itself warrants. But may come back with some more responses.

Aristotle regards living beings as self-sustaining functioning wholes. The four causes are inherent in a being being the kind of being it is, not something imposed on or interfering with it from the outside. Human beings are by their nature thinking beings. This is not an explanation, but a given. It has nothing to do with Gerson's "form 'thought'". Nothing to do with a transcendent realm accessible to the wise. — Fooloso4

Are the following not characteristic of Aristotle, then?

if happiness [εὐδαιμονία/eudomonia] consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the Intellect [νοῦς/nous], or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already* that this activity is the activity of contemplation [θεωρητική/theoria]. — Nichomachean Ethics, Book X, 1177a11

*In 6.7.2-3 Aristotle says that

Wisdom [σοφία] is the most perfect mode of knowledge. A wise person must have a true conception of unproven first principles and also know the conclusions that follow from them. 'Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence [Intellect; νοῦς] and Scientific Knowledge [ἐπιστήμη]: it must be a consummated knowledge of the most exalted objects.' Contemplation is that activity in which one's νοῦς intuits and delights in first principles."

Surely this does at least suggest 'a transcendent realm accessible to the wise'?

If you want to find the “process of thought” watch a person think. Human thought, like believing and reasoning, is an action performed by persons, and not by any other collection of things and processes. If you want to see a cartwheel or a backflip you do the same thing: watch a person perform these actions.

If thoughts are not persons thinking, beliefs are not persons believing, and reasons not persons reasoning, then they are nothing but words without a referent. There is no other way around it.

Yes, I suppose the issue is to me fully metaphysical regardless of the perspectives one may hold in relation to it. All the same, no worries. I was just passing through.

Diverting the thread to AI research and neural networks as a kind of 'general argument for physicalism' is just changing the subject. — Wayfarer

No, that's just the conclusion your insufficiently trained neural nets jumped to. What it is, is providing food for thought (training inputs) that are relevant to forming more accurate intuitions about how our minds/brains work. Admittedly, it is a bit of a, "He who hath ears to hear, let him hear." sort of thing, as I was discussing with Srap.

It's okay if you don't get it. Developing and strengthening new intuitions, to the point that an epiphany/paradigm shift can occur, takes time. Be patient.

By the way, I don't think you responded to my question about your familiarity with shoshin or beginners mind. Does this ring any bells?

Shoshin (Japanese: 初心) is a concept from Zen Buddhism meaning beginner's mind. It refers to having an attitude of openness, eagerness, and lack of preconceptions when studying, even at an advanced level, just as a beginner would. The term is especially used in the study of Zen Buddhism and Japanese martial arts,[1] and was popularized outside of Japan by Shunryū Suzuki's 1970 book Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind.

The practice of shoshin acts as a counter to the hubris and closed-mindedness often associated with thinking of oneself as an expert.[2] This includes the Einstellung effect, where a person becomes so accustomed to a certain way of doing things that they do not consider or acknowledge new ideas or approaches.[3] The word shoshin is a combination of sho (Japanese: 初), meaning "beginner" or "initial", and shin (Japanese: 心), meaning "mind".[4]

Seems like something a few people here could use some practice at.

Surely this does at least suggest 'a transcendent realm accessible to the wise'? — Wayfarer

What exactly leads you to think so?

:up: It seems that there are, roughly speaking, two kinds of thinkers about the nature of the brain/mind: those who wish to discover new and better ways to think about it, and those who seek for support for what they want to be the case.

Many people dislike science because it is seen to be delivering a picture of humans as exhaustively material beings. Others value a scientific approach because the prime directive is to remain open to the idea that what might seem to "ring true" to us may be profoundly mistaken.

It's okay if you don't get it. — wonderer1

You haven't provided anything to 'get' save reference to a youtube video and various links.

If you're suggesting a superior paradigm, as distinct from an area of study, then go ahead and do that. So far I see nothing of the kind, beyond vague inferences.

It refers to having an attitude of openness, eagerness, and lack of preconceptions when studying

Something which you've in no way demonstrated. Start an OP on whatever it is you're trying to say, rather than constantly de-railing.

Many people dislike science because it is seen to be delivering a picture of humans as exhaustively material beings. — Janus

No, that's scientific materialism. It is not the same thing. It mainly comes from the attempt to apply scientific methodology to philosophical problems, as a few here are doing.

rather than constantly de-railing. — Wayfarer

I will bow out.

Thanks for the thread. I thoroughly enjoyed it.