It's part of a larger argument, that I've tried to develop here and elsewhere. — Wayfarer

Thanks for the outline.

Part of me wants to dive into discussing it further, and another part is saying I should allocate my time better. So I'm going to pass on diving in. At least for now.

I stand by the basic claim that numbers, logical principles, and the like, cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter. — Wayfarer

Saying this unironically, in the process of posting on the Internet, is hard to fathom from my perspective.

Do you think that computers do not deal with numbers and apply logical principles, or do you think that the processes occurring in computers cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter, or...?

It seems that if sensory input isn't coming in to the brain, the brain will create it's own hallucinatory input to compensate. People in sensory deprivation tanks hallucinate fairly quickly when deprived of external stimuli. What is the evolutionary benefit of this? — RogueAI

Sensory deprivation tanks weren't part of the environment our ancestors were exposed to. There is no reason to think that there is an evolutionary benefit to how we respond, to an environment that played no role in the natural selection of our ancestors.

Did you happen to observe my recent demonstration, here on the forums, of how predictable people can be?
— wonderer1

No. I'll take a look if you provide a link. I'm skeptical that the level of prediction you are talking about is as rigorous as what would be required to claim strict determinism. I don't doubt that events in the past have effects in the present and future. That's different. — T Clark

I'm not claiming it "is as rigorous as what would be required to claim strict determinism", but it is a piece of evidence that I think makes the most sense on determinism.

Anyway, what I'm referring to can be found on this page starting with my post which is about the tenth one down on that page. (Sorry I don't yet know how to provide a more direct link.)

Yes, but it is oriented around a more 'expansive' understanding of what consciousness is. There is a long tradition of consciousness as an interior movie, an interior monologue, things going on "in the head." The whole layer of intelligence involved in the micro-coordination of our overt actions and behaviours is ignored by many people. — Pantagruel

I don't disagree with the notion that there is intelligence involved in the automation of our motor skills, but it seems likely to result in confusion to refer to that automation as consciousness. I think there is no avoiding a degree of fuzziness, in trying to consider consciousness in isolation from the rest of the causal web, but nonetheless it is still worthwhile considering how our brains instantiate consciousness. There is certainly no shortage of things to be learned in doing so.

Some proponents of embodied cognition would argue that the environment provides the body with all the stimulus necessary for navigation to food and shelter. So there's no need to assign inference to this navigation. — frank

That doesn't sound like a very well thought out way of modeling things to me.

Additionally, the embodied consciousness thesis is often bundled with that of embedded cognition (environmental factors are also integral to cognition). And there is extensive experimental evidence to that effect. If cognition isn't construed narrowly as just thinking, but is understood as a kind of enaction, then the theory of embodied consciousness really isn't that far-fetched. After all, think about how intimately the nature of our thoughts is entwined with the nuances of our physical form, the dexterity of our fingers, the nature of our other senses. Knowledge is the result of a "hunger" which is then satisfied. Imagine how different our thoughts would be if we were instead squid-like creatures who absorbed sunlight through an algae-symbiote living in our skin. — Pantagruel

I don't see the theory of embodied consciousness as far-fetched at all. From my perspective it seems pretty intuitively obvious.

It llooks like specificity about reference frames is not clear in someone's mind.

We've had a few threads here on the forum where I've made the case that the idea of causality is unnecessary and misleading. Admittedly, most people have found my arguments unconvincing. — T Clark

Did you happen to observe my recent demonstration, here on the forums, of how predictable people can be?

Perhaps you meant that it is meaningless in the sense that it is of no significance to us whether or not the Universe is deterministic, and I would agree with that. — Janus

Perhaps it depends on your preferences. Few long term determinists, that I have observed, fail to recognize the monkeymindedness of retribution. I think humans recognizing their nature is a good thing.

Of course that's fallacious in all sorts of way. Not least, it's an appeal to consequences.

I dunno if there is much point. Whatever I say will sound condescending. I presume you are at least aware of the discussion of is-ought in Ethics... what you call the "bottom-up" is an example of the naturalistic fallacy in which it is presumed that what we ought do is just what we have previously done. Gather whatever data you like and normalise it how you will, it does not tell us what we should do... — Banno

What it does do is tell us somewhat, about how to better understand our own natures, and the natures of others. I guess for someone like me, who sees no positive value in living in disharmony with my nature, it seems like valuable stuff to understand.

I find the hostility rather baffling.

Maybe it would help if you gave a definition of the will as expressed by a philosophy that rings true for you. The concept has been approached many different ways and those ways have prompted very different 'psychological' perspectives. — Paine

Would you point at one or more of the psychological perspectives that you see see as most worthy of consideration? I'd be interested in looking into some of them.

I have my own neuropsych perspective on the subject, and would be interested in what others who have thought seriously about the subject have to say.

To take a step back, I see the whole issue of determinism as a metaphysical one, not subject to empirical verification or falsification. It's a matter of point of view, not fact. I don't see it as a very useful way of thinking - it's misleading. — T Clark

I don't see it as misleading, but I do recognize that people often jump to wrong conclusions about determinism and equate it to fatalism. I've described my view in the past as "interactive determinism", in an attempt to head people off from jumping to simplistic conclusions. In any case, I'd be interested in hearing more about what you see as misleading.

For that matter, I think the idea of causation can be misleading except in the simplest cases. — T Clark

I don't see the idea of causation as misleading. However, I do think humans are extremely susceptible to jumping to simplistic causal explanations, as a consequence of the fact that we can't grasp the full causal web, even if we recognize it exists and want to grasp it.

So you would agree that if "embodied consciousness" refers to the belief that consciousness arises from the whole body, then it must be wrong, since the human body doesn't adapt to diverse earthly environments, but we adapt psychologically. You're saying all that's left is to assert that consciousness is associated with brain states. I agree with that. I don't think any serious philosopher would object to that. — frank

I think it would be a matter of simplistic thinking to assert either consciousness comes from the whole body, XOR consciousness comes from the brain. The brain plays a central role, but other parts of the body play a role in how the brain is functioning as well. Hormones, blood flow, and the oxygen and glucose content of the blood, are some of the aspects of how parts of the body outside the brain have an impact on consciousness. Then of course there are the sensory and motor nerves, with paths all over the body, which play a big role in how our consciousness develops.

Yes. And my claim is that the idea of determinism is meaningless if prediction is not possible, even in theory. — T Clark

I suspect that what people typically mean these days when saying the accept determinism is that they accept it as a corollary of accepting physical causal closure. So I don't see it as a meaningless idea inasmuch as it conveys such a perspective at the very least.

I would think a better objection might be that, in light of the predictive issues, a hypothesis of determinism might not be falsifiable. Does that maybe get more at your objection?

If consciousness is strictly a bodily function, we'd have to explain how it is that the body doesn't adapt, but the mind does. — frank

The body does adapt, in that the strength of connections in your brain changes every time you learn something. It's simply a matter of us not being able to see and note the microscopic changes in brains hidden behind skulls. The changes to our bodies are there, and can be measured under the right circumstances, but it is easy to overlook such changes because they are hardly obvious.

I don't pretend to really understand it, but if I am not misinformed, as jgill pointed out, from the standpoint of the ship, as you approach the speed of light, the distance traversed approaches zero and the time to cross it also approaches zero. It takes a million years for light to cross a gap of a million light years only for an observer stationary with respect to it. For the photon, no distance and no time. — petrichor

I'm not a physicist, and it has been 40 years since I took a course discussing special relativity and QM, so take this with a grain of salt...

The above sounds right. I'll point out some things to consider about the following:

If, from the photon's perspective, there is zero distance between its origin and destination, maybe in some sense, rather than there being an actual photon crossing a distance, it is rather a matter of the two electrons on either end just interacting and transferring a quantum of energy from one to the other. One loses an energy level and the other gains one, maybe like a billiard ball transferring its energy to another ball. How it is determined which electron will interact with which other one halfway "across" the universe though is beyond me! It makes me wonder if we really understand what is going on with space and time at all. The model of a photon as a thing that passes through space works as a model, but maybe thinking about it like that gives the wrong intuition about what is actually happening. — petrichor

One problem I see with such a view is that photons do seem to travel through the intervening space between the initial and terminal electron. If that was not the case, I don't know how gravitational lensing could be explained.

Closer to home we can consider shadows. From our frame of reference it takes eight minutes for light
to travel from the Sun to the Earth. Yet our shadows on the ground move 'instantaneously' when we move. If it was "a matter of the two electrons on either end just interacting and transferring a quantum of energy from one to the other, how would the electron on the Sun know which electron on the Earth to interact with, such that shadows appear as they do when we are walking along?

And it is the same dichotomistic logic down at the level of sensory receptors or enzymatic regulation. You have to be able to make a choice, and indeed not choose that in the most definite sense by doing its very opposite, to in fact have choices, and thus what we think of as creative agency or freewill. — apokrisis

As I said earlier, trying to explain way too much, way too simplistically.

So is my idea of ‘7’ different to yours? (Better not be, else it might be hard to do business.) — Wayfarer

It is unlikely that for practical purposes of doing business, my idea of '7' is substantially different than yours. However in terms of more subtle associations we each make with '7', certainly. Perhaps you consider '7' to. be a lucky number. One of us might even have not so subtle differences in our associations with '7', as are seen in synesthesia.

The answer is networks of neurons. This wikipedia page on artificial neural networks might help with further questions you might have.

So there is what Ned Block has characterized as the "Harder Problem of Consciousness." This speaks to Philosophim's point about experiencing other consciousnesses.. the problem as I understand it is: how can I know what it's like to be you, without actually being you. The physicalist rejoinder may be: well the brain stuff is the same, so the mental states must be the same.. but the brain stuff is only approximately the same, not exactly the same, and the difference in brain states means different mental states, and these mental states are simply not accessible to another, at least, not in an "experiential" way. — NotAristotle

My physicalist rejoinder is... Of course we all have unique brains and that is of some relevance. However the more important matter is that consciousness is a process that occurs in a specific brain, and therefore it's illogical to think that one could experience, experiences that only occur in the brain of someone other than you. So no problem.

In other words, what is it about this arrangement of physical matter and energy that allows consciousness, and how is it different from some other assortment of physical matter and energy that does not allow consciousness? That is, if we think consciousness arises from a physical substrata, what about that physical substrata gives rise to consciousness? — NotAristotle

Information processing. This physical arrangement of matter allows consciousness, because it is structured in a way conducive to being able to do a massive amount of information processing.

It is an argument from ignorance because you are basing your belief that determinism is false on your ignorance of what determines Ned's behavior. You haven't observed Ned behaving contradictory to the predictor's output. You are just sticking with your unjustified assumption that Ned could act contrary, despite having never observed such a situation.

However, there seems to be no reason Ned could choose not to follow the prediction... — NotAristotle

But if determinism is true, then Ned will not act contrary to the prediction. Furthermore understanding the details of how the prediction was made should demonstrate that Ned will not act contrary to the prediction, and therefore if you fully understood how the prediction was made you would have a reason to think Ned could not act contrary to the prediction. The fact that you lack a reason to believe the prediction, when you don't know the details that went into making the prediction suggests you are relying on your ignorance of the determinitive factors as your basis for your conclusion. IOW, you are making an argument from ignorance.

1. With sufficient information about Ned’s internal states and sufficient information about the surrounding environment, Ned’s immediate actions could be predicted.
2. There is sufficient information about Ned’s internal states and sufficient information about the surrounding environment.
3. Therefore, Ned’s immediate actions can be predicted. — NotAristotle

I probably should have been more explicit as to what I saw as question begging. Earlier you said:

the concern is whether in principle, if this information were acquired, could Ned act in opposition to it. And the answer to that seems to be yes. — NotAristotle

On the other hand the conclusion of your argument at the top of this post contradicts your earlier claim that Ned could act in opposition to the prediction. So I am unclear about what you are arguing.

The SEOW is everywhere.
:wink:

Jabberwock has been busy in the Ukraine thread.

Think of it this way, although a crude and oversimplified example, if you flick a domino to start a 1,000,000 domino chain of them hitting each other one-by-one, there is nothing it is like to be those dominos hitting each other. They just hit each other: they are unconscious.

An “unconscious experiencer”, like an AI, is just a more complex version of this: it is mechanical parts hitting each other or transferring this or that—it is quantitative through-and-through just like the domino’s hitting each other. There is nothing it is like to be an AI in the sense like there is something to be like a qualitative experiencer: qualia (in the sense of instances of qualitative experience) have a “special” property of there being something it is like to be it (or perhaps to have it). — Bob Ross

Strings of dominos performing calculations.

This is some disappointing reasoning Bob. Different complex systems have different emergent properties/qualities. Trivializing and then ignoring the complexity of physical systems doesn't make for serious thinking on the subject IMO.

Yes, he has a deep understanding of the workings of biological organisms, and many clear thoughts. However, his speculative theory of biosemiotics is deficient for the reasons I described. When you study biosemiotics further, in the future, keep in mind the issue I mentioned, and now that it's been pointed out to you, it ought to become evident that it's a very real problem, indicating that biosemiotics is quite insufficient. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. It seems like a mix of scientific understanding and pseudoscience that is trying to explain way too much, way too simplistically.

I suppose we could stipulate that Ned has enough information about his immediate environment to make an accurate prediction about how he will act. It doesn't really concern us whether this sort of information can, as a matter of practicality, be acquired; the concern is whether in principle, if this information were acquired, could Ned act in opposition to it. And the answer to that seems to be yes. — NotAristotle

I'd like to see your reasoning for that layed out. It appears to me that you must be begging the question.

1. Determinism doesn't propose that what detemines human behavior is purely a function of physical states internal to an individual. Inputs from the external world play a role in determining people's actions as well, and since your scanner isn't measuring the state of everything in the universe, you don't have sufficient information to make the prediction. Ned may walk out the door, smell the scents from a nearby bakery, and go get a donut. Furthermore, your scenario itself points out stimuli that seems likely to be relevant to Neds future actions, "After the procedure, Ned waits for the results to print..."

2. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle points towards it being impossible to gather complete information on Ned's internal state. Though perhaps a 'close enough' superscan is still worth considering.

3. There are issues with being able to do the fantastically complex computations needed to predict what Ned will do. At best, you would get a list of probabilities for future actions.

Now we take this utterly for granted. But it wasn't so until quite recently. That's the point, we are no longer bothered that we don't understand gravity intuitively, but are perfectly content with the theory and sometimes have trouble comprehending what this issue of understanding could even mean. Wasn't always this way. — Manuel

Thanks for the clarification. I have a much better sense of where Chomsky is coming from now.

Nicely done.

I take him to mean that "strong emergence" happens all the time. I don't see any intuitive (I'm not speaking of a theoretical account) reasoning that would get a rational human being to expect or not be surprised that liquid can emerge from what looks to me to be completely liquid-less particle, in isolation. — Manuel

I'm surprised at the way (it appears to me) that Chomsky seems to hold up intuition as the standard for what qualifies as understanding. Human intuitions generally arise as matters of pattern recognition based on things we observe all the time. However, observing hydrogen and oxygen atoms either in isolation or when combined into a water molecule is not something we do all the time. We simply don't have the sensory capabilities to make such observations unaided, let alone under all the conditions that would be needed in order for us to develop accurate intuitions about such things.

If we were able to resolve individual atoms and observe them under a wide enough variety of conditions, we would observe that hydrogen and oxygen themselves form liquids and even solids under the right conditions of temperature and pressure. For example a phase diagram for hydrogen:

Of course, we are then forced to say, that the particle is not liquid-less, it has the potential for liquidity in certain configurations. But I don't see how the end result of liquidity, is evident from the constituent parts. — Manuel

From my perspective, thinking in terms of "the potential for liquidity" appears to be thinking about the situation in simplistic intuitive terms. (Which of necessity, all of us are doing a lot of the time.). From a scientific perspective (that doesn't put human intuition on a pedestal) there are more sophisticated ways of understanding the details of what it is going on in the case of H2O, and no need for the notion of "the potential for liquidity".

Anyway, if you can shed additional light on what Chomsky sees as the relevance of intuition, I'd be interested.

Fortunately he is retired from medicine. He should see a gastroenterologist ASAP since he is probably full of shit. That can be cured with a quart of potassium citrate and a large toilet. — BC

It's funny how these sorts of discussions always go from UFOs to people who are UFoS.

I could only take ten minutes of Greer talking about how much evidence he had, while not presenting any of this so called evidence. Can you point out where his talk is not all fluff? My intuition is saying "con man".

...but we're primates, first and foremost... — 180 Proof

:100:

They seem much more plausible than most I've seen on the topic.

It all seems like an intentional distraction from the antagonisms existing in the real and political worlds. — jgill

In recent history there does appear to be a correlation between a lot of divisiveness in the country and 'evidence of aliens' coming out. Perhaps it is a means of getting the masses to see the general population as US and to look outwards for the THEM to plug into their US vs THEM thinking?

There hasn't been sufficient conspiracy theory thinking in this thread so far.

Interesting thoughts.

No Peter Gabriel?

But the issue is that if we do not sense the external world directly, but instead our senses are representational, our bodies themselves are also part of what is sensed, and therefore must themselves be representational. I see my hands, touch my head, hear myself speak. I may posit this phone I am typing on is a representation generated by my brain of a phone in the external world, but then so too must also be the hands I am holding it with - both are part of my visual field. And so the external world must not mean "the world beyond my body", but instead is a sort of radically skeptical hypothesis of a world that exists beyond the solipsistic representational bubble I inhabit. My body, being itself represented, must not have a brain doing the representing - a brain in the external world would be doing it. — Inyenzi

Like I said, what I'm suggesting is counterintuitive for a lot of people and it would take time and effort to make the paradigm shift. So I'm probably not going to spend a lot of time trying to convince you. A few points though.

Your body is part of the world. Your eyes take in light and output nerve impulses, on the basis of which your brain produces a model of what is in your visual field. If part of your body is what is in your visual field, your brain will construct a model based on the light reflected from that part of your body, and will represent that sensation as your conscious mind perceives it. Your perception of your body might be thought of as a symbol on a 'map' of reality your brain produces. On the other hand, your body which is a part of reality is the 'territory' represented by the map.

You seem to be confusing map and territory when you say, "our bodies themselves are also part of what is sensed, and therefore must themselves be representational". Your perception of your body and your body are two different things. To make sense of this idea it is important not to conflate the two.

What evidence is there, that a space as described by you in that quote, exists outside of your imagination
— wonderer1

The definition of a vacuum. And the definition of spacetime. And the definition of object permanence and it's implications. — Benj96

Your definition for vacuum is not evidence that there is anything matching that definition.

The dimensions of matter are instrinsic to them. The distance between material is extrinsic to it. We wouldn't say what's the distance of an apple. We would say what are it's dimensions.
If there was no need to make distinctions why bother with different vernacular to describe them? — Benj96

When we are discussing the dimensions of an apple or the distance of an apple from my hand, we are talking about distances in both cases. In the first case, the distance from one side of an apple to the other side of the apple. In the second case, from my hand to the apple.

It looks to me like you are trying to carve nature where there are no joints.