I. Chat GPT says Chomsky does not believe in the complete reductionism of consciousness to matter. Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain any quote in this regard. Do you think Chat GPT gave me the right answer? If so, are there any citations? — Eugen

I've done some pretty extensive testing of ChatGPT's ability to analyze complex philosophical texts. I personally would not rely on it at all in this regard. I use it as a speculative foil to reveal any flaws in my own logic.

Agree. It can be helpful at times, but not a trustworthy source.

I'm interested to see where this goes. I haven't read Chomsky, but I believe that science ultimately leads to metaphysics.

I dedicated a reading group on this topic, the attached essay is, I believe, the clearest articulation of "mysterianism", which he thinks should instead be called "common sense". I'll repost the link of the article below, and if you so choose, you can browse the thread.

https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/ChomskyMysteriesNatureHidden2009.pdf

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12417/chomskys-mysteries-of-nature-how-deeply-hidden-reading-group/p1

I) He's said that science is not reductionist, that it instead is opportunist, you get what you can from it. He has said several times that we no longer have a clear notion of "matter", so reducing consciousness to matter doesn't make sense.

This can be found on YouTube, on many interviews on this topic, including this one:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kzRkho1s5FA

II) More so type 2, simply put: given we are natural creatures, we will have the capacity to understand some things and others not. If we had no natural limit to understanding, we would have no scope, thus we couldn't develop anything.

This is discussed with significant depth and sources in the attached article, but, it is a long-ish read.

Too bad you missed the boat on asking Chomsky himself!

Thank you! ''I)" is pretty clear.

But for ''II)" I have some things to say. Logic is enough to accept that consciousness is either a. 100% reducible, b. not 100% reducible, or c. fundamental.

Q1. So by saying consciousness isn't reducible to matter, does Chomsky leave the room open for options b and c, or he is saying that there are other options that our mind cannot comprehend?
Q2. If the latter, why would he believe that?

If we had no natural limit to understanding, we would have no scope, thus we couldn't develop anything. — Manuel

- No, not at all. We would have a scope, of course. That scope would be to understand everything.

Q3. What serious arguments does Chomsky have for imposing this limit on the matter of consciousness?

Chat GPT says Chomsky does not believe in the complete reductionism of consciousness to matter. Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain any quote in this regard. Do you think Chat GPT gave me the right answer? — Eugen

In his video interview Noam Chomsky - Mysterianism, Language, and Human Understanding, Chomsky says:

1min - "I'm cited as one of the culprits responsible for this strange post-modern heresy (New Mysterianism) which I happily accept though I would prefer a different term for it , namely Truism, that's what I thought forty years ago, in proposing a distinction between problems which fall within our cognitive capacities , which may be vary hard, but in principle fall within them , and mysteries that do not fall within them at all"

3min - "The reason it's Truism is that if we are biological organism s, not angels, then our cognitive faculties are similar to those that are called physical capacities and they should be studied much as other systems of the body are . These Truisms, and that is what they are, are commonly rejected in the study of mental faculties , language in particular, that seems to me to be one instance of a curious tendency to treat mental aspects of the human organism differently from so called physical aspects . It is a kind of methodological dualism, which is much more pernicious than Cartesian metaphysical dualism "

As Chomsky says that treating mental aspects differently to physical aspects is a pernicious dualism, it seems clear that Chat GPT is misleading to say that Chomsky does not believe in the complete reductionism of consciousness to matter. It is not about consciousness being reducible to matter, nor matter being reducible to consciousness, rather it is about there being no dualism between the mental and the physical.

What type of mysterianism does Chomsky embrace? — Eugen

As regards type 1 Mysterianism, as Chomsky said "our cognitive faculties are similar to those that are called physical capacities and they should be studied much as other systems of the body are ", for Chomsky, consciousness is fundamental, as gravity is fundamental.

As regards type 2 Mysterianism, as Chomsky said "in proposing a distinction between problems which fall within our cognitive capacities, which may be vary hard, but in principle fall within them , and mysteries that do not fall within them at all", for Chomsky some mysteries fall within our cognitive capacities and some fall outside it.

But for ''II)" I have some things to say. Logic is enough to accept that consciousness is either a. 100% reducible, b. not 100% reducible, or c. fundamental. — Eugen

According to him, consciousness is emergent (he says that "radical emergence" happens all the time, which I think is true), as is liquid from molecules who appear to lack this property in isolation.

You would perhaps reply by saying that this means consciousness must be reducible to particles, because if it is emergent, the reduction follows. Not quite. Consciousness arises in brains, which are a very specific arrangement of matter, as far as we can see 99.999999% of the universe doesn't have creatures with brains.

But saying consciousness is reducible to brains doesn't make any sense, how is that a reduction? I don't see how a brain is a "lower level" phenomena of mind, it seems to me to be a higher one, in terms of, we discover brains through consciousness, otherwise, we couldn't even postulate them.

So Chomsky would invert the now classical slogan "the mental is the neurophysiological at a higher level." I believe he discusses this in New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind. Or if not, in the first essay of Power and Prospects. Don't remember which one.

Q1. So by saying consciousness isn't reducible to matter, does Chomsky leave the room open for options b and c, or he is saying that there are other options that our mind cannot comprehend?
Q2. If the latter, why would he believe that? — Eugen

It's in the provided essay. We don't know what matter is, almost nothing about it. Physicists don't even agree on what a particle is - that's a problem. What we do know about matter quite intimately, are its (conscious) mental aspects, what we see, feel, talk with others, read, etc. That's as clear as anything could be for a human being.

Newton proved we don't understand motion: we provide descriptions for in our theories, but we don't have the capacity to understand it, which he made clear in his famous "It is inconceivable..." quote.

Understanding the world vs. understanding theories of the world, are very different things. The latter is a massive lowering of standards of understanding.

And what happened with the problem of motion? We simply got used to it, in fact, we take it for granted, forgetting we don't understand it, outside our theories.

If we can't understand motion, it is unlikely we will comprehend how matter can think. We know we are thinking matter, but we don't understand how it is possible. He quotes Locke and Priestley here, and several others, worth looking at the article.

According to him, consciousness is emergent — Manuel

Where does Chomsky say that "consciousness is emergent" ?

There is a difference between weak emergence, as liquid from molecules, and strong emergence, as minds from brains.

In the video Noam Chomsky Mysterianism, Language, and Human Understanding, at 13.40 min onwards he says that at the moment we do not understand the principles as to how a mind can emerge from a brain.

"The phrase we do not yet understand however should strike a note of caution."

Newton proved we don't understand motion: we provide descriptions for in our theories — Manuel

Yes, as Chomsky said in the video 9min onwards, we can create theories about something without understanding what that something is.

"Well accordingly the goals of scientific inquiry were implicitly restricted from the intelligibility of nature, which was in fact the criterion for true understanding in early modern science, Galilean science, and its successors, they abandoned that and moved to something much narrower, intelligibility of theories about the world".

Where does Chomsky say that "consciousness is emergent" ?

There is a difference between weak emergence, as liquid from molecules, and strong emergence, as minds from brains. — RussellA

He doesn't make a difference between strong and weak emergence.

He doesn't say it explicitly, but I think it's quite clear:

https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/ChomskyMysteriesNatureHidden2009.pdf

Top of page 192.

He doesn't make a difference between strong and weak emergence. He doesn't say it explicitly, but I think it's quite clear. — Manuel

Chomsky: The Mysteries of Nature: How deeply hidden ?

Chomsky makes the distinction between the weak emergence of liquids from molecules and "radical emergence", ie, strong emergence, between two entities that are “absolutely incompatible with one another.”

page 192 - common objection today is that such ideas invoke an unacceptable form of “radical emergence,” unlike the emergence of liquids from molecules, where the properties of the liquid can in some reasonable sense be regarded as inhering in the molecules.

I read Chomsky as saying that we don't know enough about consciousness to even sensibly theorise about its origin, including whether or not it emerges from the physical brain.

page 171: “we do not really understand [because] we are still unable to form a conception of how consciousness arises in matter, even if we are certain that it does.”

page 178: Similarly it is premature to hold that “it is empirically evident that states of consciousness are the necessary consequence of neuronal activity.” Too little is understood about the functioning of the brain

page 192: In Nagel’s phrase, “we can see how liquidity is the logical result of the molecules ‘rolling around on each other’ at the microscopic level,” though “nothing comparable is to be expected in the case of neurons” and consciousness.

unlike the emergence of liquids from molecules, where the properties of the liquid can in some reasonable sense be regarded as inhering in the molecules. — RussellA

I think it is meant as somewhat ironic, because as he says later on in the same page:

"It should be noted that the molecule-liquid example, commonly used, is not a very telling one. We also cannot conceive of a liquid turning into two gases by electrolysis, and there is no intuitive sense in which the properties of water, bases, and acids inhere in Hydrogen or Oxygen or other atoms." (my bold)

As the quote in your quoting of him in p.171, says, "even if we are certain it does." We can't doubt that experience comes from the brain.

As for the quote in page 178, the point is stress that it might not only be neurons that are the cause of consciousness, there is a whole lot of other activity going on in the brain. These other parts of the brain likely play an important role on consciousness, but we've still to figure it out.

He references Randy Gallistel, who he thinks is persuasive on this topic.

Thank you for your contribuition! I will come back with answers, but for now, I am reading Chomsky's Mysteries Nature Hidden. I have read a bit and I'm like ''Ok, he's a materialist", next minute I am ''Ooops... he's going for fundamental consciousness." :lol:

Chomsky and the question "has consciousness emerged from the matter of the brain"

Pity we can't ask Chomsky.

I think it is meant as somewhat ironic — Manuel

p 193 - There is something about the nature of Hydrogen and Oxygen “in virtue of which they are intrinsically suited to constituting water,” so the sciences discovered after long labors, providing reasons “in the nature of things why the emerging thing is as it is.” What seemed “brute emergence” was assimilated into science as ordinary emergence—not, to be sure, of the liquidity variety, relying on conceivability.

Chomsky is distinguishing between strong emergence and weak emergence. With scientific understanding, what used to be thought of a strong emergence is now understood as weak emergence. For example, closing the gap between chemistry and physics with a better understanding of the quantum theory. Today, how consciousness is related to the brain is a mystery. Various theories have been proposed, including strong emergence and panpsychism. But as Chomsky writes, we don't know enough at the moment to come up with a definitive solution.

As the quote in your quoting of him in p.171, says, "even if we are certain it does." We can't doubt that experience comes from the brain. — Manuel

page 171: “we do not really understand [because] we are still unable to form a conception of how consciousness arises in matter, even if we are certain that it does.”

Consciousness and matter are certainly related, but that does not mean consciousness has emerged from the matter of the brain. There are other possibilities, for example, panpsychism, whereby consciousness is fundamental in the natural world, and being fundamental, cannot be described as having emerged from matter.

As for the quote in page 178, the point is stress that it might not only be neurons that are the cause of consciousness, there is a whole lot of other activity going on in the brain. These other parts of the brain likely play an important role on consciousness, but we've still to figure it out. — Manuel

I agree. At this moment in time, Chomsky is saying we don't know enough about the relation of consciousness to the brain to sensibly propose how they are related, whether by emergence or otherwise.

He references Randy Gallistel, who he thinks is persuasive on this topic. — Manuel

page 177 - C.R. Gallistel points out that “we clearly do not understand how the nervous system computes,” or even “the foundations of its ability to compute,” even for “the small set of arithmetic and logical operations that are fundamental to any computation.”

This reinforces my point that Chomsky is saying we don't know how consciousness and brain are related, even to sensibly propose that the mind emerges from the brain, as opposed, for example, to panpsychism, whereby consciousness is fundamental in the natural world.

Actually you can, you can email him any time, and he would answer. I've met him personally and have asked him about the topic, it was part of my thesis.

But, if you have doubts, see the following.

See starting min. 59:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kzRkho1s5FA

Actually you can, you can email him any time, and he would answer. I've met him personally and have asked him about the topic, it was part of my thesis. But, if you have doubts, see the following. See starting min. 59: — Manuel

I feel I have been, as they say, inadvertently "trying to teach my grandmother to suck eggs". Yes, Chomsky at 59min does suggest that he finds no distinction in emergence between weak and strong forms.

59 min - I don't go along with Strawson and as far as he does to defend panpsychism. His argument for panpsychism is based on a serious point . Can there be what he calls radical emergence, entirely new properties somehow developing without any elements of them in earlier structures. I think that happens all the time. There's nothing in the hydrogen atom which says you're a liquid. Changes take place with other levels of complexity increasing that bring about entirely new phenomena. So I don't think that's a strong argument.

Emergence is explained as occurring when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own.

Chomsky makes a distinction between being able to understand the nature of reality and developing theories about the nature of reality. We can use the equation f = ma to predict what will happen without understanding why it happens.

page 173 - "Well accordingly the goals of scientific inquiry were implicitly restricted from the intelligibility of nature, which was in fact the criterion for true understanding in early modern science, Galilean science, and its successors, they abandoned that and moved to something much narrower, intelligibility of theories about the world".

Chomsky also makes the point that even though the mind may emerge from the physical matter of the brain, the nature of physical matter is still beyond our understanding.

56min - the problem is with the physical. When you talk about reducing Consciousness to physical you don't know what physical is. Physical is just whatever the Sciences say.
58min - whatever matter turns out to be

However, there is a difference between the emergence of the mind from the brain and the emergent behaviour of liquid due to its molecules. In Chomsky's terms, for the brain to mind we have neither a theory nor a grasp, whereas for the molecule to liquid we have a theory but no grasp.

63min - We can understand it to the extent that humans are capable of understanding things . I don't know about you, but I have no grasp of, I can follow the theory that explains how hydrogen and oxygen end up feeling like a liquid, but I have no grasp of it. I can follow the theory okay, and that's the way science works.

It comes down to how emergence is defined. If strong emergence is defined as having neither grasp nor theory, then from brain to mind is strong emergence, and if weak emergence is defined as having a theory but no grasp, then from molecule to liquid is weak emergence.

1) Noam Chomsky on the Big Questions (Part 4) | Closer To Truth Chats

2) Chomsky - The Mysteries of Nature: How deeply hidden ?

I view it in terms of intelligibility. You are correct that we have a theory as to how liquids emerge from molecules, but we have no intuitions about it. We don’t (yet) have a theory about consciousness, nor do we have an intuition of how matter could give rise to experience (this goes as far back as Locke indcidently). We may get a theory of consciousness, we may not, if we do get a theory then we would say the same thing about consciousness as we do about liquids. We can’t yet say this about consciousness, but the issue of radical emergence is one of intelligibility- we have a theory of liquids, but no intuition- we don’t know how particles could have the property of liquidity in them, that only arise in specific configurations, not in isolation. So if you want to call the liquid case “weak emergence” that’s fine, but I think it’s misleading.

We may get a theory of consciousness, we may not, if we do get a theory then we would say the same thing about consciousness as we do about liquids. — Manuel

There is only one kind of emergence

I would agree that there is only one kind of emergence. In physics, all our examples of emergence are of the weak variety, such as sound from atoms or liquids from molecules. As you say "We may get a theory of consciousness, we may not, if we do get a theory then we would say the same thing about consciousness as we do about liquids"

As Chomsky said in: Noam Chomsky on the Big Questions (Part 4)
59 min - I don't go along with Strawson and as far as he does to defend panpsychism. His argument for panpsychism is based on a serious point . Can there be what he calls radical emergence, entirely new properties somehow developing without any elements of them in earlier structures. I think that happens all the time. There's nothing in the hydrogen atom which says you're a liquid. Changes take place with other levels of complexity increasing that bring about entirely new phenomena. So I don't think that's a strong argument.

As Sabine Hossenfelder said in What is Emergence
4min - A lot of people seem to think that consciousness of free will should be strongly emergent, but there's absolutely no reason to think that this is the case. For all we currently know, consciousness is weakly emergent, as any other collective phenomenon in large systems.

Parts exist in the world and wholes exist in the mind

Realism accepts that the parts exist in the world, but it may be argued that the whole, any collection of parts, only exists in the mind of an observer. Atoms may exist in the world, but sound only exists as a concept in the mind of an observer. Molecules may exist in the world, but liquids only exist as a concept in the mind of an observer.

I am taking atoms and molecules as metaphorical parts, in that atoms and molecules are in turn wholes made up of more fundamental parts.

Sound may emerge from atoms and liquid may emerge from molecules, but the emergent sound and liquid only exist as concepts in the mind.

The mind is conscious of both the physical parts, the atoms and molecules, and the conceptual wholes, the sounds and the liquids, even though only the physical parts exist in the world.

The emergence of consciousness from neurons hits the barrier of introspection

We are conscious of the atoms and the sounds they emerge into. We are conscious of the molecules and the liquids they emerge into.

How can we understand the neurons and the consciousness they emerge into.

I am taking neurons as metaphorical parts, in that neurons are in turn wholes made up of more fundamental parts.

We arrive at the self-referential problem of being conscious of the neurons and the consciousness they emerge into, ie, being conscious of consciousness itself.

Chomsky said in The Ideas of Chomsky (1977), our mind is inaccessible to introspection:
36min - For example, that same image dominates the rationalist tradition as well, where it was assumed that one could exhaust the contents of the mind by careful attention. You know, you could really develop those clear and distinct ideas, and their consequences, and so on. And in fact, even if you move to someone, let's say, like Freud, with his evocation of the unconscious, still I think that a careful reading suggests that he regarded the unconscious as, in principle, accessible. That is, we could really perceive that theater, and stage, and the things on it carefully if only the barriers of repression and so on could be overcome. Well if what I've been suggesting is correct, that's just radically wrong, I mean, even wrong as a point of departure. There's no reason all that I can see for believing that the principles of metal computation that enter so intimately into our action or our interaction or our speech-- to believe that those principles are all accessible to introspection any more than the analysing mechanisms of our visual system, or, for that matter, the nature of liver is accessible to introspection.

IE, the problem of consciousness emerging from neurons hits the barrier, as Chomsky pointed out, of the inaccessibility of introspection, of consciousness being conscious of itself, and therefore may never be solvable.

I mean, I mostly agree with your summary. And it's been a problem for hundreds of years, if not more, and probably shows a natural limit in our cognitive capacities.

As for the weak or strong emergence, I think the stress in Chomsky's quote should be focused on "Can there be what he calls radical emergence, entirely new properties somehow developing without any elements of them in earlier structures. I think that happens all the time."

I take him to mean that "strong emergence" happens all the time. I don't see any intuitive (I'm not speaking of a theoretical account) reasoning that would get a rational human being to expect or not be surprised that liquid can emerge from what looks to me to be completely liquid-less particle, in isolation.

Of course, we are then forced to say, that the particle is not liquid-less, it has the potential for liquidity in certain configurations. But I don't see how the end result of liquidity, is evident from the constituent parts.

A lot of people seem to think that consciousness of free will should be strongly emergent, but there's absolutely no reason to think that this is the case. For all we currently know, consciousness is weakly emergent, as any other collective phenomenon in large systems. — RussellA

If by "strong emergence" she means that particles in the LHC should show signs of consciousness when they collide, then of course it's not "strongly emergent" in that case.

If she means that the new properties (consciousness, will, in this case) should be expected from the constituent parts, then I don't think that's true, and would call consciousness and will "strongly emergent".

This again, doesn't mean that we should expect that planets has free will when it moves in its orbit, or something like that, but weak emergence suggests to me a certain kind of obviousness which I don't see. But I may very well have wrong intuitions, that's certainly possible.

I take him to mean that "strong emergence" happens all the time. I don't see any intuitive (I'm not speaking of a theoretical account) reasoning that would get a rational human being to expect or not be surprised that liquid can emerge from what looks to me to be completely liquid-less particle, in isolation. — Manuel

I'm surprised at the way (it appears to me) that Chomsky seems to hold up intuition as the standard for what qualifies as understanding. Human intuitions generally arise as matters of pattern recognition based on things we observe all the time. However, observing hydrogen and oxygen atoms either in isolation or when combined into a water molecule is not something we do all the time. We simply don't have the sensory capabilities to make such observations unaided, let alone under all the conditions that would be needed in order for us to develop accurate intuitions about such things.

If we were able to resolve individual atoms and observe them under a wide enough variety of conditions, we would observe that hydrogen and oxygen themselves form liquids and even solids under the right conditions of temperature and pressure. For example a phase diagram for hydrogen:

Of course, we are then forced to say, that the particle is not liquid-less, it has the potential for liquidity in certain configurations. But I don't see how the end result of liquidity, is evident from the constituent parts. — Manuel

From my perspective, thinking in terms of "the potential for liquidity" appears to be thinking about the situation in simplistic intuitive terms. (Which of necessity, all of us are doing a lot of the time.). From a scientific perspective (that doesn't put human intuition on a pedestal) there are more sophisticated ways of understanding the details of what it is going on in the case of H2O, and no need for the notion of "the potential for liquidity".

Anyway, if you can shed additional light on what Chomsky sees as the relevance of intuition, I'd be interested.

As for the weak or strong emergence, I think the stress in Chomsky's quote should be focused on "Can there be what he calls radical emergence, entirely new properties somehow developing without any elements of them in earlier structures. I think that happens all the time." — Manuel

Water as a liquid is a collection of water molecules. One property of a liquid is that it takes the shape of the vessel it is in. One property of a molecule is that it has a definite and rigid structure and doesn't take the shape of the vessel it is in.

It is the case that liquid water has an entirely new property not seen in the individual water molecules from which it is composed. Chomsky calls this radical emergence, saying that this is something that happens all the time.

It is certainly true that liquid's property of taking the shape of the vessel it is in is radically different to the molecule's property of having a rigid structure and not taking the shape of the vessel it is in, but isn't this what we would intuitively expect.

If by "strong emergence" she means that particles in the LHC should show signs of consciousness when they collide, then of course it's not "strongly emergent" in that case. — Manuel

If panpsychism is true, when particles collide, consciousness would not emerge from the collision, as consciousness was already present in the particles before colliding.

If panprotopsychism is true, when particles collide, consciousness could emerge from the collision, as a proto-consciousness was present in the particles before colliding.

IE, there are some theories whereby consciousness doesn't emerge, as it is already fundamental and ubiquitous.

Suppose we're in the Library of Babel and a curator says, "You want an explanation for consciousness? Yes, I have the book right here." Would we be able to understand it?

It is certainly true that liquid's property of taking the shape of the vessel it is in is radically different to the molecule's property of having a rigid structure and not taking the shape of the vessel it is in, but isn't this what we would intuitively expect. — RussellA

Then I believe we agree in this instance, but are calling the phenomena by different terms, "weak" vs. "strong" emergence. So on the topic of liquidity, it's a terminological issue, which doesn't matter much if we agree on the fundamentals, as it seems we do here.

If panpsychism is true, when particles collide, consciousness would not emerge from the collision, as consciousness was already present in the particles before colliding.

If panprotopsychism is true, when particles collide, consciousness could emerge from the collision, as a proto-consciousness was present in the particles before colliding.

IE, there are some theories whereby consciousness doesn't emerge, as it is already fundamental and ubiquitous. — RussellA

Correct. That's a big "if". I don't find the reasons given, either in Strawson's or Goff's account (or anyone else, that I've seen) to be particularly persuasive.

Additionally, there's no test we can put forth to determine if it's correct or not.

Proto-consciousness? That's fine, I suppose, but I'd add the caveat that whatever matter ends up being, it is also almost a "proto-everything", including proto-sensations, proto-liquid, proto-heart, etc.

I'm surprised at the way (it appears to me) that Chomsky seems to hold up intuition as the standard for what qualifies as understanding. Human intuitions generally arise as matters of pattern recognition based on things we observe all the time. However, observing hydrogen and oxygen atoms either in isolation or when combined into a water molecule is not something we do all the time. We simply don't have the sensory capabilities to make such observations unaided, let alone under all the conditions that would be needed in order for us to develop accurate intuitions about such things.

If we were able to resolve individual atoms and observe them under a wide enough variety of conditions, we would observe that hydrogen and oxygen themselves form liquids and even solids under the right conditions of temperature and pressure. For example a phase diagram for hydrogen — wonderer1

He doesn't hold intuition to be the standard for a scientific account of a phenomenon of nature at all. In fact, the whole essay I shared is trying to show how Newton proved that the world was inherently unintuitive, contrary to what Newton, and all the great scientists and philosophers of his time, and before (throughout human history), thought to be the case.

What happened was that the goal of science shifted with Newton, science was now tasked with giving intelligible theories of the world, not with understanding the world. Descartes, Newton, Leibniz and all others looked for the latter, but the former prevailed, again, to Newton's own astonishment.

Now we take this utterly for granted. But it wasn't so until quite recently. That's the point, we are no longer bothered that we don't understand gravity intuitively, but are perfectly content with the theory and sometimes have trouble comprehending what this issue of understanding could even mean. Wasn't always this way.

From a scientific perspective (that doesn't put human intuition on a pedestal) there are more sophisticated ways of understanding the details of what it is going on in the case of H2O, and no need for the notion of "the potential for liquidity". — wonderer1

I'm sure there are such ways. I don't doubt that. Of course, human intuition has enormous flaws, I don't recall arguing otherwise.

And I'd also add that science, is also a human creation, it comes from us. When some aspects of the external world happen to coincide with some of our scientific capacities (including mathematics, generalizations, abduction, hypothesis creation, projections, retrodictions, etc.) we construct a science of that phenomena.

It's not as if science exists in some objective world out there. Not that you are saying this, but, it should be mentioned.

Now we take this utterly for granted. But it wasn't so until quite recently. That's the point, we are no longer bothered that we don't understand gravity intuitively, but are perfectly content with the theory and sometimes have trouble comprehending what this issue of understanding could even mean. Wasn't always this way. — Manuel

Thanks for the clarification. I have a much better sense of where Chomsky is coming from now.

Sure! :up:

Chomsky also makes the point that even though the mind may emerge from the physical matter of the brain, the nature of physical matter is still beyond our understanding.

56min - the problem is with the physical. When you talk about reducing Consciousness to physical you don't know what physical is. Physical is just whatever the Sciences say.
58min - whatever matter turns out to be — RussellA

Chomsky seems to repudiate idealism (in the recent Theories of Everything with Curt Jaimungal interview). He says something like he sides with 'normal science'.

If the physical is whatever science says it is, then I guess the physical is quantum waves (at this point in time) right?

I'm a little unclear on his privileging science (methodological naturalism and empiricism) and saying that we don't understand the physical. Is there some tension in this?

Do you believe that if the nature of physical matter is beyond our understating then idealism gets a boost as an alternative ontology?

The idea that the physical remains incoherent or inexplicable probably needs its own thread and a clear but brief articulation as to why someone might argue this. I'm not sure I fully get this from Chomsky. Maybe it's my comprehension but he seems to lead to his argument without exploring it more fully.

Well, one should keep in mind that he "privileges science" (which is a fair assessment, in my opinion), in respect to trying to understand the nature of the (external, mind-independent) world. If someone wants to find out things about the world, you should follow what science says about it.

Nevertheless, there is far more to life than what science says about it, in our human experience. When it comes to issues about understanding human psychology and thinking, he frequently says that a work of great literature is quite a deal more insightful than most modern psychology.

By him saying we don't know what the physical is, he usually (not necessarily always) says this to anticipate "non-physical" talk, as if saying "the mind is non-physical" means something substantive. He sometimes says that by now, use of the word "physical" implies that we have a theoretical understanding of a problem, when we don't understand something some tend to say that consciousness is "non-physical", signaling theoretical ignorance as well.

But aside from this terminological choice, until someone can say what the physical is (does it exclude the mind? Why?, etc.) there is in fact, no physical, non-physical distinction.

When he says, we don't know what matter is, it's literally that, we don't know what it is, we don't know what a particle is, we know some of the properties of particles, but not what it is, yet. But he takes it that the brain is "modified matter", and that experience is the fact of existence of which we are most confident about.

Do you believe that if the nature of physical matter is beyond our understating then idealism gets a boost as an alternative ontology? — Tom Storm

Until we can define materialism, we aren't debating substance, is what I guess he would say. All this is explained in the article I shared.

Apologies for the length.

Apologies for the length. — Manuel

No, this is good. Thanks.

If you need any more clarifications or have doubts, don't be afraid to ask, this much I should be able to explain. :cool: