Correct. Inclination is any internal force that drives, though does not compel, you to do something. — Samuel Lacrampe

You think that the power of will can overcome any inclination to sleep?

But anyway, to bring this back to the topic at hand: hard determinism entails that we lack all obligations, as free will is surely something obligations require? — Bartricks

Why? Obligations are just something we want to fulfill to avoid pain of punishment or conscience. They seem compatible with the fact that ultimately all our acts are completely determined by factors that are out of our control.

So if no woman wants to procreate, you think rape is now right? My reason says that'd be wrong.
The human species isn't a human. It doesn't die and you can't kill it and it has no interests. It does not experience pleasure or pain and it has no will. — Bartricks

Ok, but if mankind went extinct it would cancel the opportunity for further human experiences and their evolution. Surely it would prevent a lot of experiences of pain but also of pleasure, which are apparently more prevalent (since most people value life more than death).

It's about as self evident to reason that rape is wrong as that 2 + 2 = 4. Thus some acts are wrong. — Bartricks

I agree that rape is wrong (except perhaps for extreme situations where it would be the only way to enable survival of mankind by reproduction). But I have a reason for thinking so: rape causes needless suffering to the woman. I think that the facts of "right" and "wrong" are derived from the experience of pain and pleasure.

Maybe you think nothing is right or wrong in reality. Then you're silly and confused. Silly because there's no reasonable way to arrive at that conclusion. — Bartricks

Just wondering, in what way did you arrive at the opposite conclusion?

Free will is not another force that we add to sum up among the other inclinations. Rather, free will can always choose against all the inclinations, no matter their intensity. That's what makes it free. — Samuel Lacrampe

What is an "inclination"? For example, if someone feels sleepy does he have an inclination to fall asleep?

Even with determinism, pain is still painful and joy is joyful, and we all want to avoid the former and have the latter, by definition. But the world is complicated and it is not always clear how to achieve that. What we expected would bring joy actually brought pain, and what we expected to bring pain brought joy. Sometimes it may be necessary to endure some pain in order to achieve joy. It seems that relationships and society need to be regulated by certain rules, formal or informal, in order to be joyful rather than painful. Joys and pains of different individuals affect each other. The concept of "responsibility" is a tool to help us pay attention to the social rules and follow them. The appeal to "free will" is a tool to help us internalize the rules (accept them as our own) rather than taking them as imposed on us, because internalized rules motivate us more effectively and autonomously. I see ethics as a theory of how to maximize joy and minimize pain in relationships between sentient beings. Determinism pushes us to learn that theory, based on the fact that we want joy rather than pain.

If this is what Platonists believe, then where do they think that these objectcs exist? If it's not inside our physical realm then in what realm do these objects exist and do they move inside of it? — Prishon

And where does our physical realm exist? If it is embedded in a larger space, where does the larger space exist?

Space is just one of many mathematical objects and all mathematical objects exist in virtue of being logically consistent and in mutual relations, of which spatial relations are just a special kind of relation. And by the way, time is just a special kind of space, at least according to theory of relativity.

We can distinguish two kinds of mathematical objects: concrete and abstract. For example, there are concrete triangles (like concrete "give way" road signs) and one abstract triangle, which is a property instantiated in all concrete triangles. The Platonist objects are the abstract ones. Some people think that the abstract objects don't "really exist", that they are just words or ideas in our heads. Yet these words or ideas express an objective similarity between concrete objects, so the abstract objects can also be understood as being in a sense "dispersed" in concrete objects.

Now the question: Do we share at least the fundamental logical rules of inference with these beings, who perceive so differently? — Mersi

Yes. If these beings acknowledge that every thing is what it is and is not what it is not, they will have the same logic as us. (If they didn't acknowledge this basic fact they would have died out quickly, assuming that their nervous system would even allow them not to acknowledge it, which seems doubtful.)

So they would acknowledge the basic logical principle of identity/non-contradiction. Thus they would identify different objects and their similarities, their different and shared properties, and would be able to group objects based on their shared properties. By communicating with each other, these beings would form propositions affirming or denying that certain objects have certain properties.

The family is more communist than capitalist in its internal relations; from each according to their ability, to each according to their needs. — unenlightened

Right, and it works, but it's not easy to widen the circle of such love and compassion. The good news is, as Steven Pinker has documented, that human history seems to move in the direction of less violence. In the long term, mankind is getting more integrated and cooperative. Common religion, ideology or nationalism can help to some degree. Social mechanisms like laws, education, trade and workplace force us to be cooperative and considerate toward strangers, and we gradually internalize these attitudes. Mental capacity and flexibility seem to be important too, to be able to understand different people and interact with them fruitfully. The more people develop these traits the more they will be able to function like a family in larger groups.

In the future, central regulation of economy will increase because of automation, biotechnologies and climate change. More income will need to be redistributed from those who own sophisticated/AI machines to those who lost their jobs from automation so that the unemployed can live a decent life or retrain for new jobs if possible; or some of that machinery will be owned by the state, which will distribute the profits to the population. Biotechnologies will need to be regulated, similarly to healthcare, so that people have fair access to technological enhancements of their bodies and minds to prevent the emergence of a class of biologically inferior humans, or at least care is provided for those for whom such enhancements are not (yet) available. Climate change is already forcing governments to provide support for transition to technologies with less greenhouse gas emissions.

Such collective actions are necessary because the alternative would be social unrest and wars.

But what is it for? Why is this glob of matter reluctant to be at the full mercy of the universe around it? — Benj96

The organism sustains itself because it happened to evolve properties that sustain it (the self-preservation instinct). Organisms that didn't happen to evolve such properties died. But it is usually assumed in the definition of "organism" that it has properties that sustain it, at least to some extent.

Obamacare isn't "collectivist." — Xtrix

Well, it's funded with increased taxes and mandates insurers to accept those with preexisting conditions without extra charging.

And rose again in the 1970s, and which has dominated corporate and political governance ever since. From the boardrooms of Wall Street, to Capitol Hill, to the White House, this ideology of "free enterprise" has prevailed. — Xtrix

Interspersed with collectivist stuff like Obamacare and now Biden's infrastructure bill.

The idea of a centrally planned economy was destroyed in 1989. The idea of free markets was destroyed even earlier, in 1929. Since then most of the world has realized that you need a vehicle that can turn both left and right.

Well even if that is the case, that still leaves the question of why there was a Big Bang in the first place. — HardWorker

My view is that the Big Bang occurred because it was logically possible and logical possibility = existence.

Literally the article says:

An object can be potentially F and potentially not F, but it cannot be actually F and actually not F at the same time. — javi2541997

It seems more natural to relate "at the same time" to "be" rather than to "object":

An object can be potentially F and potentially not F, but it cannot be actually F and actually not F at the same time.

I agree with you that real contradictions are impossible. If someone claims a contradiction as real, say p & ~p, all we have to do to resolve it is to say p from one angle, ~p from another angle but not the case that p & ~p from the same angle. The p & ~p was only an apparent contradiction. — TheMadFool

Ok.

Aristotle meant to the object itself not the act of belonging to another.

The “same thing” that belongs must be one and the same thing and it must be the actual thing and not merely its linguistic expression. For example, it is possible for someone to be a pitcher and not a pitcher where “pitcher” in the first instance refers to a baseball player and in the second to a jug that can hold beer — javi2541997

I don't see that the article attributes the phrase "in the same respect" to the object. It seems more likely that "in the same respect" refers to the act of belonging.

That's wordplay. — TheMadFool

Insistence on the same perspective was part of the meaning of a contradiction already in ancient Greece:

Aristotle's law of noncontradiction states that "It is impossible that the same thing can at the same time both belong and not belong to the same object and in the same respect."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contradiction
(emphasis mine)

There are no genuine contradictions. That's the law :point: The Law of Noncontradiction ~(p &~p), only apparent contradictions that can be resolved with anekantavada (many-sidedness/perspectivism). — TheMadFool

You can still formulate a genuinely contradictory proposition by insisting on the same perspective but such a proposition would not correspond to any object in reality.

In what kind of space are there square circles? I'm curious. — TheMadFool

In the space with taxicab metric that fishfry mentioned. You may object that that is actually not a circle but he did use the standard definition of a circle: a set of points with a fixed distance from some point.

The point I' making is that there are only apparent contradictions, not real ones — TheMadFool

A genuinely contradictory object cannot exist so any object in reality can be only seemingly contradictory.

But a circle and a square are NOT defined as each other's opposites, nor are they mutually exclusive at all. — fishfry

In Euclidean space they are mutually exclusive and I tacitly assumed this kind of space. Thanks for pointing out that there are also spaces with such a metric that a circle looks like a square.

Addendum

If a contradiction is being sought for, it's this: As litewave pointed out, some of us will observe T' as a square (S) and others will observe T' as as a circle (~S). Both parties are right: Square Circle. — TheMadFool

Square circle as a genuinely contradictory object would look like a square and like a circle from the same perspective (and at the same time and under all other same circumstances). Such an object cannot exist.

SO for any proposition P you have:

P is true IFF it is consistent and identical with itself

Consistent with what? "Lightwave wrote this post" is consistent, but not true - I wrote this post. — Banno

This proposition describes me (Litewave) inconsistently by referring to me, a person who doesn't have the property of "having written this post", and affirming that I have the property of "having written this post". It is as if you wrote that "Someone who didn't write this post wrote this post", or "A circle is not a circle". By affirming that I have and don't have the same property, the proposition is inconsistent and therefore does not correspond to reality. It defines me as a thing that is not identical to itself and such a thing cannot exist.

That's the very definition of a property in first-order logic. First order logic is extensional by design.

So you using a non-standard interpretation? — Banno

As far as I know, property in first-order logic is regarded as something that can be had or satisfied by an individual and it is not necessary to interpret property as a collection.

Arn't mathematical statements true in all possible worlds? — Banno

Some are, for example "1+1=2" (I hope). Some are not, for example "Sum of interior angles of a triangle is always 180°."

We agree that it is true in this possible world that you wrote the post; it is not true in some other possible world? — Banno

It is not true that in some other possible world I wrote the post.

So do you think mathematical statements are true in this possible world because they are true in some possible world? — Banno

Only if one of those possible worlds is this world.

Then if it is true that in some possible world you dd not write that post, wouldn't it be true in this possible world, too? — Banno

It would be true in this world that I did not write the post in a different world in which I did not write it.

...and yet to understand empty sets one needs all the paraphernalia of set theory. SO if they are to form the "simples" of a logical system, it is only by presuposing set theory. Which is not all that simple. — Banno

Set theory is based on the simple and self-evident fact that objects constitute a collection. A collection can be defined by listing all its parts or by specifying their common property. The problem with defining a collection by the common property of its parts is that such a definition may be inconsistent, so this kind of definition has been narrowed by certain axioms that select certain kinds of collections. It doesn't mean that some axiomatizations of set theory are correct and others wrong; they just select different kinds of collections.

..and? That does not explain the "correspondence" in the correspondence theory of truth. Indeed, while correspondence is about what is the case, you've moved to affirmation, which is distinct, and quite different. One can after all affirm things that are not true. — Banno

Affirmation is in the nature of propositions. Proposition is a tool of communication, which by affirming something provides information. If a proposition affirms that a certain object has a certain property and the object in reality does not have the property, then the proposition does not correspond to reality and thus is not true.

But then all you have done is claim that anything could be true. — Banno

Anything that is consistently defined and thus identical to itself.

The point is surely to sort out the way things actually are from the way things might be. — Banno

It is useful to sort out the way things are in our world from the way things are in other possible worlds.

...so an empty collection would be the simplest concrete object. — litewave

As Wayfarer impied, what is concrete about an empty set? — Banno

That it is a collection, rather than a property.

A concept/property is an object that is not a collection but it has instances in collections. — litewave

This is at odds with extensional logic, in which a property is a collection of objects; so "...is red" is the collection of red things. — Banno

I don't think that a property is a collection. Redness is not the collection of all red things but something that is had by all red things. The red things are the extension of the collection of red things as its parts, but they can also be said to be the extension the property redness as its instances. If you think that properties are collections then reality consists only of collections, which are concrete things, because properties as abstract things that have instances don't exist.

If this were so, then since in some possible world you didn't write that post; and since all possible universes exist and descriptions of all possible universes correspond to reality, you really didn't wright that post.

How will you avoid such inconsistency?

You have set the scope of "...exists" across all possible world instead of within the scope of each possible world, and that results in inconsistency. — Banno

Assuming that it is really "me" who lives in different possible worlds (which I don't think is a correct definition of "me", since my consciousness is clearly limited to only one of those worlds), I can say that I wrote the post in this world but not in some other worlds and I can also say that I wrote the post in reality as a whole, which is the collection of all possible worlds. Similar to saying that I watched Citizen Kane in Germany but I did not watch Citizen Kane in France, and I watched Citizen Kane in reality as a whole. This way inconsistency is avoided.

You appear to still be using "simples" - so you assume there is a "lowest level", and speak of "smallest parts".

But what is to count as a simple, as the atom from which you derive the world? Whatever you choose will be arbitrary - we might choose otherwise. — Banno

The smallest parts, empty sets, are obviously "simples" in the sense that they have no parts. But any collection is also a "simple" in the sense that the collection as a whole is an indivisible/unstructured thing that stands in parthood relations to other things that are its parts.

...Can you provide an indubitable account of what that "correspondence" consists in?

That's the core problem for correspondence. — Banno

A proposition describes an object by affirming that the object has certain properties. If the object really has those properties then the proposition is true - that's how a proposition corresponds to reality.

Example: Proposition "Planet Earth has approximately a spherical shape with a radius of 6,370 km" is true and thus corresponds to reality iff planet Earth has approximately a spherical shape with a radius of 6,370 km. And the properties attributed to Earth in this proposition are relational (geometric/quantitative) and thus mathematical.

Consider now a 3D object, a right cylinder with height 4 units and diameter 4 units. Depending on the angle of the light you shine on it, the shape of its shadow will change. — TheMadFool

A contradictory proposition affirms that something has and does not have the same property. But a proposition that affirms that something looks like a circle from one perspective and does not look like a circle from another perspective is not a contradiction because the property of "looking like a circle from one perspective" is not the same property as "looking like a circle from another perspective".

Sometimes it is said for emphasis that a contradictory proposition affirms that something has and does not have the same property at the same time, and/or in the same sense, but these additions can be seen as already included in the meaning of the phrase "same property".

What's impossible to you? — TheMadFool

Logically inconsistently defined objects. Objects that are not what they are. Objects that have properties they don't have.

It may not be obvious whether an object is consistently defined, because its definition, its properties include all its relations to all other objects in reality, so it must be defined consistently in relation to everything else. But at least when you interact with an object, you can know that it is consistently defined without having to check consistency of its relations to everything else, because if you interact with it it must exist and inconsistent objects cannot exist.

Perhaps surprisingly, whatever you are doing at this moment, it is impossible for you not to be doing it, at this moment. Simply because it would be a contradiction, an inconsistently defined event, if you were not doing what you are doing. For a copy of you in a different possible world it might be possible not to be doing what you are doing but not for you.

Yeah.

Isn't that begging the question? By the way if a world has to be qualified with real as you do in "...a real world", it suggests that worlds can be unreal. Care to expand and elaborate. — TheMadFool

As I said, I think that all possible worlds are just as real as our world because I don't see any ontological difference between possible and real worlds.

Every consistent description of a world corresponds to a real world.

Instead of talking of some ultimate property - which is a monistic concept - we can instead switch to seeking some ultimate relation, or form of interaction. — apokrisis

Interaction is possible only in worlds that contain a time dimension. Worlds without time seem to be possible (logically consistent) too, and since I don't see an ontological difference between a possible world and a "real" world, reality also contains worlds without time.