The set of all red things does not quite align with our intuitive grasp of “redness” as something unified and shared. A set is merely a collection of objects, whereas a property seems to be something more abstract—something that binds those objects together. — Astorre
Still, a set (collection) is also treated as a single object in set theory that exists as a single element in other sets. And I don't regard sets as "abstract" objects but rather as objects I can see all around me - there are sets of sets of sets etc. everywhere around. If a set is not an object in its own right then what objects are there? Just non-composite objects (like empty sets) at the bottom? And what if there is no bottom? One may object that there is no order of elements in a set while the sets we see around us are often ordered in intricate ways, but there are various ways of constructing ordered pairs out of unordered sets, for example the Kuratowski definition of an ordered pair.
So a set seems to be a single object that is
something additional to its elements, not identical to any one of its elements, and not identical to multiple elements either, since it is a single object. A set somehow unifies/connects/binds its elements. In a sense, one could say that the elements "have" the set "in common", "share" it, or "participate" in it. So in this intuitive sense, a set seems evocative of a property and so I hoped to identify it with the common property of its elements, and thereby also get rid of property as a different kind of object and simplify the metaphysics of reality. But now it seems that there are genuinely different coextensive properties, which would dash the hope of identifying properties with sets.
Admittedly there is also something about the concept of a set that seems a bit jarring with the concept of a common property of the set's elements: a set encompasses or aggregates the elements with both their common
and different properties, while a common property of the elements seems to be some commonality that is as if distilled/extracted from the elements rather than the result of encompassing or aggregating the elements. This may be what felt misaligned to you too.
Identifying properties such as “equilateral triangle” and “equiangular triangle” as one and the same disregards their contextual distinctions. In geometric analysis, for example, whether emphasis is placed on sides or angles can carry significant implications, even if the extension is the same. — Astorre
The properties “equilateral triangle” and “equiangular triangle” don't seem meaningfully different to me in any way. One description mentions the equality of sides and the other the equality of angles but the concept of triangle includes both sides and angles and is such that the equality of sides logically necessitates the equality of angles, and vice versa. What implications would the different emphasis in description have for geometrical analysis?
In the end, your approach requires a metaphysical commitment to the reality of possible worlds, which is itself a contested position. — Astorre
I lean to modal realism because I don't see a difference between the existence of a possible (logically consistent) object as "real" and as "merely possible". Logical consistency seems to be just existence in the broadest sense. The challenge is to find which objects are logically consistent, because they must be consistent with everything else in reality (like in mathematics - everything either fits together or falls apart). This might involve looking for the necessary properties or relations of any possible object or analysis of the concept of "object" or "something" itself and build from that. But if reality is complex enough to include the set of natural numbers (arithmetic) then it is impossible to prove that our description of it is consistent, as per Godel's second incompleteness theorem. Sensory detection of objects helps us find consistent objects but the senses have their limitations too.
I propose we step away from a substantialist approach to ontology and turn instead toward a processual one, which I am actively developing. — Astorre
I imagine sets as the fundamental objects in reality, from which everything else might be explained (properties as general objects could be fundamental too, if they are consistent objects other than sets). I am no set theorist or mathematician but my methaphysics is strongly influenced by the wide acceptance of pure set theory as a foundation of mathematics, in which all mathematical concepts can in principle be expressed as pure sets. It would explain the mathematical aspect of reality, if reality consists of sets. A space can be defined as a set with a continuity between the sets inside this set (as defined in general topology). Time can be defined as a special kind of space, as defined in theory of relativity. So it seems that a spacetime, with its spatiotemporal, including causal, relations, could be a certain kind of set. But then spacetimes would be just certain parts of a much greater reality where all possible (logically consistent) sets exist.