I have no idea how any of these words relate, at all, to anything I said — flannel jesus

Step away from the philosophy.

I have no idea what you're talking about at this point. — flannel jesus

You don’t have to admit it. I know.

If I may, I think he was referencing your position that we may be permitted stupidity if. . ., not you personally. — ENOAH

No, he nailed it. I made it able to be understood without needing to stretch one’s worldview.

Sorry, seemed pretty straightforward. I must have just made up that interpretation.

’instilling faith’ if achieved, is the (temporary and temporal) settlement of that dialectic, commonly called belief and confused for not being knowledge. — ENOAH

I made this confusing. When I said my determination of whether you are in earnest “instilled faith”, I did not mean faith, as in: belief, as if blindly (nor as if it were an opinion). When I am considering whether you are earnest, I am making a judgment, based on evidence (your acts and words), as to whether they meet the ordinary ways someone demonstrates earnestness (criteria, which are “autonomous”, if I understand how you meant that). So my conclusion is not “belief”, nor “a belief”—I am convinced. I do not have faith in my judgment; I have faith in you. I have now given you my trust; I treat you as genuine.

The word [earnest] has an evolved (in both each individual and History) function of triggering the movements/arrangements of other words which eventually trigger conditioned Feelings which eventually trigger actions (more mental/or physical) . — ENOAH

I would say that these “movements” and “feelings” and “actions” do not follow from the word (as if “I am earnest” were a report of something in me, and not just in the sense of a promise, though only believed as much as “I’m not lying”). Everything follows from my being convinced, my judging that you are earnest, which conclusion is “triggered” by the standards, or criteria, that we associate with earnestness—the actions and words that demonstrate you are in earnest.

All of this process seems to contain "intent" "deliberation" a "self". Hence these discussions etc. But there is no "trusting your own mind" directed by that "you". It is all just the movements of that mind — ENOAH

I would say that judging whether someone is earnest does take “deliberation”. And we are, in a sense, judging their “intent”, not as if to see in their mind, but (even stranger) to see into the future: whether they will trick us or fulfill the commitment that is made in claiming they are (will continue to be) earnest. To be taken as earnest is an expectation, and so does not involve the “self” in the sense of: a state, like dazed; or: a feeling, like sad. These are the version of “self” as in: my person. But a claim to be earnest does involve my “self” in the sense of: my character; who I am asking to be seen as, taken for, what I stake as collateral.

So we may even claim we are in earnest to ourselves, as we can make a promise to ourselves. It would seem we should know best if we intend to trick ourselves, or whether we are faking, but what is “being earnest”, or to “really mean it”, if not the further future demonstration of that commitment. It’s not never feeling like a fake or like giving up or like we were deluded at the outset, but that we continue on, try harder, follow through.

So then what is “trusting your own mind”? If it is “all just movements of [our] mind” then we are left with the fact @Benj96 started with: “Everyone can be rash, everyone can be stupid, misinformed or otherwise malpracticing adequate reason.” Which is to say, how can we trust our self? as in: our brain, our habits, our weakness, our limitations? And this is trust in the sense of: be certain of, as in: that we aren’t deluded, tricked, wrong. But perhaps all this talk of earnestness helps us to see that our relation to ourself is not one of certainty. Not that it is blind belief that everything we think is right, but a matter of loyalty, not entrusting our self—as in our character—to others, to apathy, to knowledge, abandoning our judgment, relinquishing our voice, letting our consent be assumed. We may be rash, stupid, ignorant, irrational (@flannel jesus), but it’s a start. If we are asking, as @Banno framed it, “What is true?”, in this sense, we are true to ourselves; our trust is our not giving up.

Antony Nickles yeah that just sounds like nonsense to me. — flannel jesus

Well, that might be because of the historical picture of belief as a lesser version of knowledge, but I take it as a lack of interest (not a lack of ability) as you appear to just be saying the same thing over and over (which is fine). But without anything more than that, it’s hard to know what or how to explain.

I have no idea how a guy saying he doesn't trust his own reasoning could be interpreted as "political" — flannel jesus

I’m not saying he doesn’t trust his own reasoning, I’m saying that there is more involved than “reasoning”. The “stories” he is talking about are things up for debate, and because of that, are political/moral, which are the types of things we may not be able to resolve. But we could say he is politicizing his doubt in making it a reason to hold the opinions he does, or avoid being responsible to answer for them. Basically, I’m calling this (his) BS, though I take it as a misunderstanding of the nature of fact compared to our political/moral lives. He is mixing up apples and oranges. Not being certain about our positions is not resolved by trust or doubt in science, or knowledge. It is a matter of bucking up and being responsible for what we decide to claim as our own, as these things are not a matter of certainty; they are not resolved as a claim of knowledge would be.

If he doubts his own ability to reason, and his own ability to reason leads him to think he should trust science, then OF COURSE he's going to doubt if he should trust science. Just read his words. He spells it out, I'm not speculating. He literally says he doesnt trust his own reasoning abilities. — flannel jesus

I’m not suggesting you are speculating, but this is a categorical issue—a matter of the type of reasons we use in different cases. Sometimes we “trust” an impersonal process, science; and sometimes we have to make our own way, as in a moral situation, and I am saying he is confusing the two here.

“that essentially means I have no ability to discern good science and conclusions from bad

Basically ive proven i can believe things with bad reasons and spin the story in my head.

My worry is that I’ll just keep reading things that confirm my current set of beliefs and keep taking them in as true or at least likely true and end up with a warped sense of reality.”
— quotation of 83franks by @flannel jesus

Starting with the first sentence: either they are simply wrong (I assume that we can agree that we can have/gain the skill to tell good science from bad), or they are calling that into question, which, yes, on the face of it, they attribute to an “inability to reason”. But I am claiming that they are avoiding that a political/moral decision is (despite accurate science) always about aligning ourselves with a story, a community (and here I do not mean with or against science, or the science; i.e., it is more than a matter of reason, knowledge). For example, we trust the democratic process, not because it is perfect, but because its nature is (it calls for) allegiance, or disloyalty. We either give ourselves (our country) to it, or are, as Dewey puts it, treacherous. Those are our choices in that world—“knowledge”, as in certainty, is not how it works (though the process can be corrupted and bettered). The political and moral fields are not simply a matter of knowledge (absolving us of our part in, say, the social contract), but what we are willing to be responsible for. To fixate on the possibility that we can have “bad reasons”, or “spin” or “warp” ourselves, is to desire to find something certain, impersonal, say, “reality”, that would ensure we are never bad, wrong, or lost. The desire for certainty in the moral/political realm is a fantasy that knowledge could take the place of me—the necessity of putting ourselves (trusting ourselves as I have put it) in the position of answering for our reasons and, if appropriate, for our reliance on a particular scientific finding. But he wants to “trust” science, not to be accurate, but to resolve our need to live the stories we choose to accept, which means we may be wrong (leaving us where I started, not with just belief compared to knowledge—epistemology—but with the processes of error, forgiveness, learning, etc.). But we have no recourse (other than avoidance) than to entrust ourselves with the responsibility for our opinions, stances, etc., and in this sense, to “trust” ourselves.

This thread is about trusting your own mind, trusting your own judgment, trusting your own ability to reason - the thread I linked is about a guy who says he can't trust his own ability to reason. It's entirely on point. — flannel jesus

If we aren’t going to call determining good science from bad a skill—say, that anyone competent could perform—and we take it as a matter of instilling “trust”, as in “belief”—which in philosophy is code for something we might be uncertain about, or that rests on uncertain grounds—then I would say that is politicizing epistemology. And so it is not that he doesn’t trust his (own) ability to reason, but he (secretly?) doubts the (all of our) ability to rationally be certain about our knowledge through science at all.

All I am claiming separately is that there is a distinction between the kinds of things we can be certain of, and those which may lead to an outcome that falls apart (politics, moral acts, etc.), and that philosophy sometimes wants to treat the second like the first (or relegate it to irrationality).

Ok, then is [earnestness], not in the speaker, but the receiver? The receiver interprets the committed "action" as earnest? Hence, speaker's intention is irrelevant? Where I'm currently settled is that (notwithstanding my previous "flippancy") "earnestness" is neither in the speaker (intent) nor in the receiver (interpretation) and (perhaps frustratingly to our conventional logic) it's in both. Why? Because it is imbued in the "word." — ENOAH

The other does not “interpret” earnestness, as if it were a matter of confusion or seeing correctly. Because of the way earnestness works, the other judges whether my words and actions are evidence that meet the ordinary (but usually implicit) criteria of what we count as being earnest (commitment, followthrough, not giving up, doing a “deep dive”, etc.) and acknowledges that I have made a showing of earnestness, or whether I am still faking, putting on a show, etc. So it is a rational determination, but towards instilling faith and trust. The act or word does not have an “air” of earnestness (it is not imbued in them); I make a demonstration of rising to the level that proves** (to you) that I am not inconstant, etc. (**Now of course when I say “rational”, I mean subject to discussion and settlement, but the outcome is uncertain, as it is a matter of our relationship—so perhaps I won’t be fooled again, that nothing you could do or say could make me see you as serious when you, say, still refuse to choose allegiances, etc.)

this guy's post is also an epistemological problem. — flannel jesus

Well, yes, it is a matter of knowledge, though I’m not sure it is a problem with knowledge. I wouldn’t say we have an issue with our criteria to tell good science from bad, though we might politicize its relevance. All I am claiming is that the OP is more a matter of recognizing (acknowledging) error than ensuring certainty because knowledge does fail us, and then we are left with the conduct of our discourse with each other.

Yes, I worded that poorly. Of course they are doubting their ability to decide whether the science is done well. This is different though than the kind of doubt and trust that philosophy has traditionally struggled with, and that I am claiming is a doubt of ourselves that is projected into an epistemological problem.

The guy who made the thread, somehow, came to distrust his own ability to reason and discern fact from fiction. — flannel jesus

But that is not a case of distrusting ourselves, but of not trusting science, specifically our ability to tell good science from bad. What makes a scientific conclusion a fact is not correspondence, but repeatability, that anyone could do the same experiment and reach the same answer. Science is contingent on: 1. that the experiment is done competently, and based on the scientific method, isolating the question, etc., and 2. that it is a matter that responds to such a method (science cannot answer every type of thing).

You should NOT trust your mind, but you can gain trust in certain beliefs by applying critical thinking: seek out contrary opinions, test your beliefs through discussion with others (like on this forum), attempt to mitigate confirmation bias by trying to identify objective reasons to support or deny some presumption you may have. Learn at least some basics of epistemology (including the limits of each technique). — Relativist

We of course have the ability to develop our skills of thinking things through, analyzing our opinions and assumptions, and considering other perspectives. But there is a difference between ensuring what you say is correct, and how you conduct yourself in and after saying it. So to say you should “not trust your mind” (yourself)—as I, and Emerson, argue against above—is perhaps different than saying you should not trust the opinions you have or inherited.

I can't disagree — ENOAH

And I did not mean to suggest that you were “wrong”, only to point out something overlooked generally in these cases.

I am discussing my thoughts approached at different "layers" and am poor at articulating that. — ENOAH

And this is exactly why the unfolding of discussion is important philosophically. We do state things “poorly” at times—without reflecting on all the considerations, or using language lazily (one word for another, or with a kind of “you-know-what-I’m-getting-at” vaguery), or “in-the-spirit-of” aspiration. In seeing that “meaning” is not something we put into words (or that is held only by them), or that is grasped immediately, we understand the possibility in discourse for clarification, learning, self-discovery. So I am not suggesting that we shouldn’t speak without having considered something from every angle, as if we could speak perfectly, completely. I would say that part of the goal of discussion is to give the other as much benefit as possible; not to look for the first logical error, but to develop their argument to be as “strong” as we can—as Socrates does (right before he kills it with his predetermined criteria)—to put ourselves in the other’s shoes intellectually, to consider every expression as possible of more intelligibility than on its face, or first glance. If we are able to read others and judge them by what they say (as language implies expectations, consequences, connotations, criteria for judgment), we can also, as it were, put better words in others’ mouths, make explicit those implications for them.

I still stand behind the "essence" of my thought…. I don't abandon my general thinking… to show you… [ I am ] earnest. — ENOAH

The “essence of your thought” can be pictured as a special object that you have, an “essence” apart from a gist, or crux, or point. To imagine meaning or thought are “things” that we put into words is to claim we always have ownership and control of language, which comes from the desire to be unknowable, to retain our feeling of being unique, “me”, without demonstration. And this is an occasion to explicate the ordinary workings of earnestness (rather than some imagined connection to philosophical intention). To say you did not articulate what you wanted to say is in one sense to ask to be forgiven for giving the impression of being flippant. And also, to desire to be understood, not dismissed, to ask for help in bettering ourselves. However, earnestness is not imbued into what we say, it is demonstrated; as you say, it is “shown”, by not “abandoning”. The whole nature of expression (as Wittgenstein uses it), is that it is by you (not of you), that you are expressed by what you say; so that in “standing behind” what you say, you are answerable for it. And so the testament of your earnestness is not to claim you are earnest, it is to take up what your have said, in earnest, i.e., with commitment, with resolve to get to the bottom of it, to work to articulate it better, fuller. In that spirit:

If the speaker is speaking in earnest*, who am I to judge? Why would I deny myself the opportunity to "play ball" with anyone who truly just wants to play ball? — ENOAH

I take this as a plea for leniency from criticism, as, per the analogy, before I even take the field. I think of the “denial” that Positivism determined about our ability to speak about ethics, or Kant’s setting aside our desire to understand what we find to be essential about the world, or Plato’s dissatisfaction with our ordinary understandings, all because of their requirements for knowledge before we even get underway. And also that we be allowed to “play”, speak provisionally, think creatively, outside the box of argument and conclusion even. And this open “opportunity” I also take as a call for collaboration rather than combative disagreement, as the game of discourse is always with the other, which is the possibility of the unknown, the different.

Separately:

I would "argue" there's a false bar for most, if not all words, not just earnest etc. — ENOAH

I take this as the imposed criteria philosophy creates for: appearing, thinking, being, knowing, believing, understanding, etc. But, if you would, then feel free to.

Whoops

@Banno @Benj96

If the speaker is speaking in earnest, who am I to judge? [on a litmus test]… That is, "earnest" is related to "intention" — ENOAH

The irony is that we of course would have to judge whether they are being earnest (or not). But even if we are not determining whether the content is, say, true, there are means to judge, as it were, the person. However, I would argue that there is a false bar for “earnest” or “profound” or “serious”. It sets up a picture that there is always an “intention” or meaning that we add or give our words (not to say that we cannot choose our words deliberately). If we should trust in ourselves, we absolutely do trust others (what they say and do) in the ordinary course of business. Thus why we only ask what they “intended” when something doesn’t go as we would expect (“Did you intend to insult the Queen in thanking her?”). Regularly there is no need to discuss intention or meaning or “earnestness”. What we judge is the negative, when be betray our words. Lying, joking, being under compulsion, like making a promise and not keeping it (or deciding not to keep it ahead of time), these are what we judge. Imagining we are judging whether a speaker has some internal commitment (or not), is exactly what opens the door to allow them to say something like, “I didn’t mean it”, which is to want to slide out of the consequences of our acts (if not to say, “I said the wrong thing”). People should be taken at their words, so they can be held to them as well.

I'm not convinced that the desire for a universal principal is simply the result of us wanting to shirk our responsibility or culpability. — Benj96

We do not want gravity to be a universal principal; it already is one. We want a rule about what is right to be like gravity, because then if we follow it, we could never be judged to be wrong. If a good act were like a science experiment, the results would always be the same, so it wouldn’t matter who did it.

That’s not to say shirking our duty is the only reason for wanting certainty. Cavell generalizes it as not wanting to have a voice—not be a singular limited human. Kant killed off our connection to what we find important in the world (in his terms, the thing-in-itself) because we didn’t meet his standard of certainty. But, as Wittgenstein shows, it is our interest in things that create the shared judgments and criteria that reveal what is essential to us about anything. Thus why someone like Emerson has us believe in ourselves, follow our whim, skate on the surface of “appearance”. If we recognize that we might err, we are less likely to doubt ourselves, but also not need to think of ourselves as infalible, thus able to be less dogmatic. So instead of an epistemological endeavor, we have virtues like trust, humility, openness, forgiveness, etc.

In the face of the truth of the human condition that it is possible for things to go wrong, come to a place we are lost—that our very lives might clash—we fixate that it is always a matter of “trial and error” (or appearance and reality; reason or feeling; objective or subjective) and create the fantasy of “first universal principles” to avoid our responsibility to look closer to see how we are ordinarily able to work things out, or work harder to become intelligible to each other, because we always can.

Everyone can be rash, everyone can be stupid, misinformed or otherwise malpracticing adequate reason. My question is how does one know when that is the case - ie they're chatting sh*t. And to the contrary, when they really do know what they're talking about. What is the litmus test in the realm of discourse with others which may be either just as misinformed or very much astute and correct? Is there a universal logic/reason? Or only a circumstantial one? — Benj96

This is basically the path to the slippery slope caused by the fear of skepticism, from Descartes.

“It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had since constructed on this basis; and from that time I was convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foundation…” (First Meditation, p. 1)

The disappointment @Benj96 feels about our limitations leads to the same place as the surprise that Descartes experiences. It creates the question: “How does one know?” (“What is true?” as @Banno puts it.) Now the question is taken as: “What is the litmus test?”, but not examining this first step, as Wittgenstein says (PI 308), “commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter” which leads us to where Descartes ends up, which is: how can we be certain? (as @180 Proof says we aspire to, then admit is unattainable) Trapped in that picture, but without an answer, we resign ourselves to “confidence”, “approximations” (as philosophy puts it: “appearance”, “subjective”, “belief”).

I’m trying to point out that the reason for wanting an answer, is that we want to avoid our disappointment and surprise, to not just “know when that is the case [when we are being “rash… stupid, misinformed or otherwise malpracticing adequate reason]”, but to know it beforehand, before we speak, before we commit ourselves to error or immorality (or to even take us out of the picture altogether, substituting us with “depersonalized” knowledge, as @Benj96 suggests). This desire is how we slide from doubt to hoping knowledge will save us (from being wrong, from being human).

What we overlook is that: there are ways to fix our screw-ups, after the fact (apart from certain predictable knowledge). Our everyday remedies are why Wittgenstein is trying to get us to look at the bigger picture (PI 122)—the ordinary workings (“Grammar”) of each activity. Austin will point out that our unavoidable fallibility is why we have excuses, correction, apologies, etc.—why he focuses on how things fail rather than trying to find something perfect—which hinge more on accepting responsibility (as @BC points out), than knowledge. The continuing nature of discourse is the vehicle from our past errors to our redemption (the awareness @Max2 suggests that we may acknowledge, about ourself); not the solidity of any universal or circumstantial knowledge, logic, or reasoning.

…[an animal’s] inability for it to question its existence or purpose does not alleviate guilt on my part then I should be grateful for the food put on my table.… At what point does a human being rationalize its consumption? — Deus

But I think people's inclinations can be affected by arguments… on average, more truthful arguments receive some advantage from their truthfulness. — xorn

I have responded to a similar thread here with the short version being that a moral claim about eating an animal is the same (in the same structural category) as, e.g., looking at a human as labor. It is a matter of our position in relation to them, the way in which we value them (or not)—see them in an aspect as Wittgenstein puts it—and so not a matter of an intellectual argument (or emotional empathy), but just that my actions to another make a claim on me to account for those acts, that they reflect who I am.

And so @Deus is responding to the claim on him of an animal seen as sacrifice, to be responsible for being worthy of it. This not to justify it rationally, as if any knowledge or reasoning would convince you (as @xorn hopes for, as it might in other problems), but a stance for which he puts himself in a position to answer for. The work is to understand what we have inherited and what we take on as representative of us; to make conscious our commitments and the implications of our lives as they are.

When you draw the workings of language as: intention—words—interpretation, you insinuate that it is just my trying to read your thoughts, which you take as only known to you, so I can’t possible know what I claim to with any authority other than my skill, generosity, cooperation, etc., which I was equating to the analogous position that unsubstantiated opinion has to certain knowledge. You know your intention; I am only guessing (I have no facts to back it up with, as with my opinion). But the possibilities language has in a certain situation are limited and are proscribed by the history of human practice. Any English speaker is familiar with the version of belief when one says “I believe in God” that is different than “I belief it is raining” and so could agree with me on the senses I outlined or correct any mistakes or provide further necessities of context. Words already have a way they work in the world in certain situations, and you just apologize or promise or make a statement or a proclamation. Language does not work like names for “thought” like for objects. Intention is something you ask about only when something strange happens.

So when you say,

That's one hell of a big inference about a whole hell of a lot people you know nothing about. — Vera Mont

it is not me making a judgment about people; I am just describing how disclaiming belief works in the world. And I’ll consider a competing claim, but dismissing the entire project as impossible claiming that I’m in no position is to remove any rationality from philosophical discourse. If someone is claiming they don’t believe in God, in a certain sense they are saying there is no mystery in the world and nothing outside of (above) our power. Now, they might not want that to be the implication of it, but those are some of the things which are believed, and so some of the things which are refused in the denial.

So when I make a claim about the implications of what you are saying, I am not judging you nor trying to guess your thoughts. When you say a particular thing in a certain situation, there is only so much it can be doing, and not all of it will be what you wanted. Your words can betray you, you can be caught out by them, reveal more than you thought you would, because they work in the world, not as a reflection of your mind. So I await any response other than ‘That’s not what I meant’ or ‘That’s just how you see it’.

You were drawing out the inference you made of what I said. Your interpretation. — Vera Mont

This makes it sound like it depends on me how language works; as if it depends on you how what you said, says what it does. But the reason we can infer implications (the hidden consequences and acts of our words) is that all of it existed before us in our history. Now, you may chose what words to say in a given situation, but how they do what they do, and the implications of having said it, are not up to you. So to suggest that the implications of what you say are just my opinion, is to overlook the rationality of language, again. Now my claim may be wrong or overblown or too board, but there are ways those can be corrected because what we say is evidence, for which there are requirements or criteria for judging (through inference) what the implications are of what we say (too whom) in a given situation. In fact, I take these as the tools of philosophy.

An ‘ordinary’ context is an example that shows us, that reveals, what makes an expression what it is, why it matters, how we judge it, etc. More to the point, philosophy has a habit of starting at the opposite end from discovering that our everyday world is enough, and creates ahead of time the requirements of a context in order to force a particular solution, such as Plato’s forms being necessary because he’d only allow for certain, generalized, universality; and, imagining everything is in response to one made-up question so they all have to be “answers”.

Before every such statement [“I think there is a god." or "I believe there is a god." or "I believe in God."] there is an expressed or implied question. — Vera Mont

Well, we already established that “I think” and “I believe” are used interchangeably in the role of a hypothesis. The context that comes to mind with “I believe in God” is as an expression of trust, even if that was learned as “…[the word of] God” to tell me what to do; or as an attitude toward the world: that there is reason in what we see as chaos and mystery. Thus why “I do not believe in God” is said by those lost to the particular cause, or hopeless, maybe for anything going the way they hoped someone they trusted would do, but also by those that feel they know everything and have complete control over the world.

“I believe there is a god.” is said in the same senses but also as a response by someone confronted with the dismissal of what they take as important to them; by someone who, through the lense of knowledge, lays down the challenge/attack: “I don’t believe [ I doubt or do not know ] there is a god”. The affirmative is not the answer of a question nor a lesser version of knowledge, only unsubstantiated, but as an exasperated, shocked reaffirmation that, even if you don’t believe you will be judged one day, I conduct myself as if everyone were watching.

the statement points back to a requirement for making it. — Vera Mont

This is very good actually, I agree. And those “requirements” (or factors, conditions) I would call the context, which determines what criteria should be applied to judge what version (sense) of the expression it is. But to say every statement is an answer is to abstract from any context so much to imagine one criteria applies to all of them, like true or false. And that classic example ignores the necessity of the contexts and criteria of other things we say to meet the same values of precision, rationality and identity.

you might want to consider if there's a charitable interpretation of the original post that could resolve this apparent inconsistency. - GPT-4 — Pierre-Normand

This should be in the forum’s guidebook.

I believe this is one of those misconstructions through the substitution of similar but not interchangeable words. The words 'slippery', amorphous' and 'ever-changing' do not mean 'irrational'; nor does 'difficult' mean 'unable to be clarified'. — Vera Mont

I was drawing out the implications of what you said, which was to make language seem sketchy (characterize it as such). Part of language’s “polysemantic” nature (which @Lionino points out) is not only that different words can have the same sense (meaning), but that language can be doing/revealing multiple things. A threat can also be a promise. So what we imagine we are saying, even if we are correct, can be blind to how it is otherwise meaningful. Slippery does imply that something can’t be grasped or nailed down; thus, analogously (which is the sense in which it is used here), with respect to language, unable to be made specific, as if it is imprecise, as if language doesn’t have particular ways in which it works. Further, amorphous implies there are not distinctions (language’s shapes) to distinguish one thing from another. If these do not imply that language lacks reasons for how it works, then I have just made a mistake—though that claim would have to be accounted for—that is not a reflection on the nature of language, as if to say, that it is:

…subject to imprecise applications and interpretations. — Vera Mont

Most of the time we do fine. At times, interpretation is not even a possibility (language is not always subject to imprecision; though of course someone can always erroneously claim anything), and, even when it is, not because of an “amorphous” nature of language, but because of multiple possible contexts (which can be narrowed) or because, as I said, we speak poorly or come to judgment too hastily, etc.

[“I believe in God”, “I think there is a god”]…are …separate uses …in the same context: answering the question: "How do you regard God?" — Vera Mont

This is forcing two statements into the same requirements by dictating a question; that is not there ordinary contexts. When someone says they believe in God, it is in the context of expressing their conviction (thus a claim to community), not a claim of knowledge (believing as a hypothetical answer to a question). Sometimes both are said to be claiming God “exists” but as a conviction: God exists (is “real”) in the sense of importance, impact, centrality.

Because of the place of information in our world, I think we bring the assumption that there is always something we are going to be told, that the goal is to find some knowledge, or that argument is meant to justify a conclusion (something you are working to “understand”). But Socrates is searching, and teaching/asking you to search along with him, thus the goal is in a sense self-knowledge, explicating all our judgments and criteria and practices that we mindlessly operate under without considering. Plato makes it seem like there is a solution to the questions, but no one he questions is “wrong” about how the world works, they just don’t meet the standard he desires.

Language is slippery; difficult to handle effectively. I doubt any hard rule can apply to all the words in one language — Vera Mont

The characterization of language as irrational, unable to be clarified, etc. is only in contrast to the fantasy for certainty (“hard rule”s; mathematical). That words are sometimes interchangeable; that communication involves difficulty, laziness, manipulation, vagary, and the ultimate possibility that we may reach an impasse on the means of understanding, does not mean that language is relative or imprecise. Part of what I take philosophy to do (as does Wittgenstein, Austin etc.) is to make explicit the implications and various ways language works (in order to show intelligibility despite no predictable certainty—reference to something “objective” or being only true/false). Wittgenstein will call these “uses” or “senses”, which in his case is a defined terminology by which he means the various things that language does in various situations (context is important to sense, as @Philosophim points out).

Now, why did you change the example? — Vera Mont

Thus my setting out the various senses of belief by examples (and how “think” is used the same way at times) as: a hypothesis of knowledge, a claim of judgment, or an expression of faith (also, the expression of an opinion). Each has its own separate criteria and contexts in which they apply.

If God comes into it, it should be by way an example such as: "I think there is a god" - uncertainty leaning toward belief - "I believe there is a god" - growing conviction - and "I believe in God" - declaration of faith in a particular deity. — Vera Mont

And so here we are mixing up the criteria and context and way in which belief works differently in each sense. Knowledge is not justified true belief (Plato steered us wrong; exactly because he wanted knowledge to be certain in the face of opinion so it could have power over our interests, to avoid chaos, conflict, limbo). To say “I believe in God” in the sense of an expression is not the conclusion that starts with the other sense of belief as a hypothesis of knowledge (“I think there is a god”). They are two separate uses (senses) with different criteria in different contexts. Mixing them together is what creates the impasse of whether God “exists” (and creates that as a false goal). The criteria for proving a hypothesis of knowledge is not the same as an expression of conviction, and the conviction is not a conclusion or substitute for the claim of knowledge.

Separately, I would offer that “It’s raining” is not a claim to knowledge; it is a report of knowledge (even though you may be shown to be mistaken or lying, etc.). And, yes, part of the context of the sense of belief as a hypothesis is probably some clue or “sensory input”, but that does not change its structure, nor does that imply that belief as an expression of faith needs to include any proof, nor exclude that there are associated empirical “sensory input”, such as the feeling of awe, though this does not operate as evidence or proof.

I suggest looking at the Republic as an analogy for the human self. Also, note your thoughts and reactions in reading it, more than trying to understand anything you think he might be telling you. Good luck.

I didn’t address the ability to extrapolate because the issue is a red herring**. A computer very well may come up with a novel response, be “creative”, but a capability is not what makes us a “moral agent”. Picturing a moral act as a decision comes from the desire to have it be something we can be right about (win or lose), so we imagine a moral situation as one that simply hasn’t been solved yet, or, because of the lack of rules guiding us, that there must be a novel act (a new or further rule). But in these desires we just really want to know (beforehand) that our choices (because right, true, just, selfless, imperative, etc) will exempt us from being judged. But being moral is not a capacity, it is a relation to others, a position we take on. We call it the ability to judge, to show judgment, because it is an act of placing ourselves in relation to others. We are responsible not as a function of some “sense”, or an answer I conclude, but in being (continually) answerable for what we do (even to ourselves). Now we may grant this position in relation to us (of judge, say) to a machine (as we might anthropomorphize our judgment by animals, or the earth, or the State), however, this is the ceding of authority (which there may already be a case for with testing and valuation algorithms), but not because of anything inherent (similar or analogous) in the machine’s capabilities, because nothing about it in our own.

**At #143 in the PI, Wittgenstein discusses continuing a series of numbers based on a rule. The point is not the continuing (although it is under scrutiny) but the light it sheds on the relation between student and teacher. That the student may “come to an end” (#143), change their approach (#144) be “tempted” or “inclined” to speak or act (#143, or, notably: #217). The important part is they are prepared to react to each other (#145) because understanding is judged; claiming it is announcing a readiness to be judged (#146-154).

My point is that the 'AGI', not humans, will decide whether or not to impose on itself and abide by (some theory of) moral norms, or codes of conduct. — 180 Proof

I agree that AGI could be capable of imposing rules, norms, codes, laws, etc. on itself (as I was trying to acknowledge in bringing up the social contract, pictured as a decision). Preservation or perfection were merely examples of limits or goals we put on ourselves—I’m not claiming to understand what AGI would decide to choose. Our fear is that we do not have control over the rationale and outcomes of AGI; that, as you say, “How or why 'AGI' decides whatever it decides will be done so for its own reasons”. But that fear is a projection of the skeptical truth that all our talk of rationality and agreement on what is right can come to naught and we can be lost without knowledge of how to move forward.

My claim is that being moral (not just following rules) only comes up in a situation where we don’t know what to do and have to forge a path ahead that reflects who we will be, creates a new world or builds new relations between us. But AGI is limited to knowledge, and so, structurally, it can only decide and choose based on information already made explicit that it is told or learns. And, as I put it to @ToothyMaw here, knowledge cannot encapsulate the history of our lives together and our shared interests and judgments, and so any extrapolation from knowledge is insufficient in a truly moral situation. So the question is not whether AGI can be self-aware—they would be omnipresently “conscious” of why they were doing something—but they do not live a human life. I would say you were halfway right; they are incapable of human responsibility. Not that they wouldn’t have reasons, but that those can’t answer for their actions the same way humans must. Thus my solution to tie a person to the outcomes of any AGI process, linking accountability, but also identity to what you author, knowingly or not, much as we are bound to what we say.

I suspect we will probably have to wait for 'AGI' to decide for itself whether or not to self-impose moral norms and/or legal constraints and what kind of ethics and/or laws it may create for itself – superceding human ethics & legal theories? – if it decides it needs them in order to 'optimally function' within (or without) human civilization. — 180 Proof

I was discussing “deciding” and self-imposing norms, as you mentioned, and the difference between that picture of morality and the idea of responsibility I am suggesting.

I don’t know if that’s an expression of a lack of interest or an inability to follow, but, assuming we’re here to understand each other, I was pointing out again that imagining “deciding” as the basis for moral action narrow-mindedly frames it as a matter of knowledge or goals like “optimal function”. This way of looking at acting comes from a desire for constant control and a requirement for explicit rationality that we would like have for ourselves (rather than, in part, our personal and shared interests). Imagining our power over action this way is what feeds the idea that AI could be “human” because it could fulfill this fantasy. But without any interest in explaining where and how you got lost, I can’t really help.

but I am the only one who can bind me to my word. if you bind me to my word, you still do not know what is going to come out of my mouth. — Arne

Well of course you can says things like “that’s not what I meant” or “I’m sorry you took it that way” or “that’s just your perspective” but when someone says something in a specific situation, there is only so many ways it can having any import. So it is not me that ties you to the implications of your expression, but the whole history of human activity and practice. And so whether a threat or a promise is also an actual difference apart from you, not created by your desire or intention. Thus why we can know that you were rude despite your being oblivious, or that you’ve revealed that you are jealous in what you said.

I don't believe that ethics is characterized by rule following — 013zen

I was characterizing deontological morality, and roughly attributing the desire we have for it to be rational certainty so that I don’t have to be personally responsible because I followed a rule, which, in this case, is the only form of morality that AI is capable of, thus the need for another option since it may not care if it is personally responsible.

Now, I agree that this overlooks an actual moral situation, as you say, “when faced with ethically challenging situations”. But I would point out that describing our navigation of “uncertainty” in “knowing” “good and bad” or the “best situation” plays into the desire to have certain knowledge of judgment and at the same time concede that we can’t have it, which makes it seem like we lack something we should have. My point is that this seeming lack shows that the nature of morality is different than knowledge in that we step into ourselves (possibly a new world) in acting in an unknown situation. Thus the need for a thread to the user in order that who they are is tied to what they do (or do with AI, or is done in their name).

If an AI ever feels something that we might characterize as an internal conflict regarding what makes the most sense to do in a difficult situation, that will affect people's lives in a differing but meaningful manner, then perhaps I might consider it capable of moral agency. — 013zen

And this is why there is discussion of whether AI is or could be “human”, because we associate morality with knowledge and choice. But, even if we assume that your example could happen (and why not)—that AI would find itself in a moral situation (beyond rules) and weigh options that affect others—my point is that it cannot be responsible to the future nor extrapolate from the past like a human. So it’s “agency” is not a matter of nature, but of categorical structure.

But then your argument seems reducible to putting safeguards in place so we can all sleep better at night. . . and relieve ourselves of any moral responsibility for the results of bad actors. — Arne

I’m not saying self-monitoring is the only means, but, without being bound to your word, who knows what is going to come out of your mouth. Though without user-identity it wouldn’t matter, yes, we could look and say: “This is a bad outcome. Let’s make a law.” But with AI, playing catch up and whack-a-mole is untenable because the outcomes are almost unimaginable and the effects could be devastating, and could be even with a user picturing the world watching. So I’m not saying we rely on everyone behaving themselves, but, that only a human has the capacity to be responsible in a void of criteria for judgment when what action is itself is up for grabs.

I suspect we will probably have to wait for 'AGI' to decide for itself whether or not to self-impose moral norms and/or legal constraints and what kind of ethics and/or laws it may create for itself – superceding human ethics & legal theories? – if it decides it needs them in order to 'optimally function' within (or without) human civilization. — 180 Proof

Not attributing an inherent nature to AI is something Hobbes of course famously also assumed about humans, which anticipates moral agreement only coming from mutually-assured destruction (the state of nature as the Cold War), or accepting limitation of freedom for self preservation. I don’t think it takes something only “human” to know what annihilation is, nor to “fear” it, or, alternatively, what perfecting oneself is (nor do I take that as evidence for “consciousness” of a “self”, which I would simply pin on a desire to be special without working at it).

But AI does not love and hate, which is not to say, “have emotions”, but that it does not become interested or bored, which is the real basis of the social contract: not just “self interest”, but personal interests (not rationality so much as reasons). Thus AI would only be able to make the social contract (in avoiding death or reaching for a goal) as an explicit choice, one that is decided, as with Mill, or when Rawls tries to find the best position from which to start, rather than falling into sharing the same criteria for an act because of a history of our human interests in it, as with Locke or Wittgenstein (thus the need to “remember” our criteria, as Plato imagines it). As AI is not part of the weave and warp of human life, everything must be calculated, and, as is its limitation, from what is already (and only) known.

That [ AI ] can only consider novel situations based on already established laws is no different from how a human operates. — ToothyMaw

It seems there are at least two important differences. The first is epistemological (and ontological I guess for the AI). AI is limited to what already is known, yes, but it is also limited to knowledge, as in the type of information that knowledge is. Putting aside that it sucks at knowing the criteria for judgment—which are different, and of different types, for almost every thing—it is stuck outside of a history of curiosity, mistake, triumph, reprimand, habit, experiences, etc. and shared culture and practices that shapes and inhabits all of us without the need of being known. Even if it is able to be canonized as knowledge (because that is philosophy’s job: explicating intuition), there is no “telling” anyone that kind of wisdom (how basic do you have to get to completely explain an apology, and all the undying and attendant acts, must less: leading someone on). Also, even if AI could gather all the data of a changing present, it would still miss much of the world we instinctively take in based on training and history, much less biology. And I know we want moral decisions to be made on important-seeming things like rules or truth or right or knowledge, but we do things for reasons that don’t have that same pedigree. This doesn’t make them immoral, or self-interested (but not, not those), it’s just redemption or self-aggrandizement are complicated enough, much less just fear or something done without thinking.

I don't see anything preventing an AI from wanting to avoid internal threats to its current existence from acting poorly in the kind of situation you consider truly moral. — ToothyMaw

But if it is a truly moral situation, we do not know what to do and no one has more authority to say what is right, so without the (predetermined, certain) means to judge what “acting poorly” in this situation would be. But AI cannot hold itself up as an example in stepping forward into the unknown in the way a person can. Or run from such a moment; could we even say: cowardly?

I don't quite agree that many moral philosophers would consider you moral for following just any self-imposed rule, if you are saying that. — ToothyMaw

I was trying to allude to Kant’s sense of duty and moral imperative, with my point being that, even in that case, the desire is for impersonal rationality (certainty, generality, etc.).

Doesn't it matter though if the AI can choose between affecting a moral outcome or a less moral outcome like one of us? …shouldn't we treat it like a human, if we must follow through with holding AIs responsible — ToothyMaw

I may not have been clear that the “identity” I take as necessary to establish and maintain is not the identity of the AI, to make the AI responsible, but to tie a particular human to the outcomes of the AI.

And, while it may be that AI could curtail its actions to already-established law (as AI can only use existing knowledge), only a human can regulate based on how they might be judged in a novel situation (as I pointed out that the only truly “moral” situation is when we are at a loss as to what to do, or else we are just abiding by rules, or not). In other words, the threat of censure is part of conscience (even if not ensuring normativity), as we, in a sense, ask ourselves: who do I want to be? (In this sense of: be seen as). Anonymity diminishes cultural pressure to whatever remains of it as a voice inside me, with the knowledge that I may never be judged perhaps silencing that entirely.

we can just change the programming so that it chooses the moral outcome next time, right? Its identity is that which we create. — ToothyMaw

But the distinct actual terror of AI is that our knowledge can not get in front of it to curtail it, to predict outcomes, because it can create capabilities and goals for itself—it is not limited to what we program it to do. It’s not: build a rocket. It’s: design a better rocket. And it can adopt means we don’t anticipate and determine an end we do not control nor could foresee.

It seems to me that we are the ones who need to be put in check morally, not so much the AIs we create. That isn't to say we shouldn't program it to be moral, but rather that we should exercise caution for the sake of everyone's wellbeing. — ToothyMaw

I agree; my point is that, in the way morality works, tying the AI and its outcomes to who let it loose is the best way to put us “in check morally”—like a serial number on a gun which can tell us who shot someone. My last paragraph is just to say that if we have anonymity, we don’t have any incentive to check ourselves, as, say, in the example of words, I can’t be held to what I say, judged or revealed in having said it.

I agree that an ‘act’ (especially speech) involves not only me, and that that condition is not appreciated enough by philosophy. But he is not focused on what we physically do, nor translating anything into “physical terms”, as if what happens in the body matters in our considering something a threat or a promise. Again, we are not talking about actions, but participating in activities, accomplishing their execution. That there are actions, even speech, in a practice, does not mean that describing how the actions happen explicates our practices. The “acts of saying something” is not a breakdown of how saying works, it is how words are deemed to have achieved something, like a statement or an apology—and in this sense, “doing” something.

He is describing how these activities, “acts”, work (or fail)—at all. I do not, for example, intend acts, I conduct them (though some do require deliberateness). I may do my best to make a good (or sufficient) act (say, apology) but whether I do is judged by whether my offering meets the criteria (requirements for identity, completion, failure, etc.) inherent in the living practice of seeking forgiveness. These threshold conditions, measures, mechanics, etc., are the external, the codification of the judgment of others (even to myself); they are the “consequences thereafter” that Austin refers to as separate from the physical (e.g., the illocution, the saying). So the occurrence of the other “understanding” what we say is also a matter of judgment, whether they exhibit what is considered important in being understood in that case, which you actually partly draw out in saying “how one takes the words, uses them, and applies them in his conduct….” This is a demonstration and expression that we understand because these are what understanding consists of.

@Banno @baker @Dawnstorm

Only imagining an “act” as like a physical movement comes from the desire to insert the question of intentionality. But you don’t even make a movement an act; raising your arm is judged to be waiving down a taxi, or signaling a question. Thus , the possibility of something being multiple different acts (even, as raising your arm).

First though, Austin does not normally limit himself to acts of speech; including thinking, understanding, etc. “Speech acts” are not anything special and here are just examples of other things that words can do than just be: true or false. He wants to show that we (philosophers especially) minimize the world to things we know, things we can be certain about (true or false), as we imagine we can be certain of “our intention”, creating the seeming primacy of physical movement.

However, for example: claiming a truth and making a promise both accomplish something. One proposes something to be true, the other makes a commitment.Yes, a proposition is stated by me, but my intention is only occasionally relevant (as clarifying, not a casual necessity), though the particulars of time, place, and the audience (maybe) may matter. More universally, what I say ties me to the judgment others can make of it, and of me through it (so we are “observing the actor” not just “sifting through… expressions”). Similarly, the important part in me making a promise is that it’s me that answers for it when it’s due.

Third, a promise is meaningful to us in the same way claiming truth is, which means: a promise has its worth as what it is (differentiated from other relations between us) by criteria that necessarily, essentially, make it (judged as) what a promise is. As truth is right or wrong, a promise is binding or not, and fulfilled or reneged on. Also, a promise does have truth value: in the integrity of its criteria; either something fits into the criteria of a promise, or it is not a promise (it’s an aspiration).

Having criteria different than certainty (or physicality, or intention) does not make promising less of an act. What makes up both exists outside of, and before, us. The important part is not that the words are the consequence of me. The way it works is that I submit myself to (or avoid) the responsibility for, and the consequences of, what my acts are judged as.

@Banno @Ludwig V

I continue to struggle with Chapter 2 unfortunately. I can’t seem to see the truth or confused conflict between the two “positions”. I feel like Ryle does not do sufficient justice to developing the position of Determinism, even by drawing it out, as Austin does, only on the terms of ordinary criteria, nor by getting at why the Determinist wants or needs to hold the view they do, as Wittgenstein would. Ryle appears simply to subject Determinism to the judgment of common opinion, as a refutation, which simply overlooks what is important about or to Determinism. It does seem he thinks it is small potatoes; however, if Determinism is of little import, Free Will is trivialized as well (and isn’t the real dilemma between those two?). Maybe I will come back to it, as I am at a loss to tie the discussion to any greater point, even though he did promise that the argument between the dilemmas themselves were not the matter at hand.