Those behaviors have a multitude of very different and equally accurate explanations for why the dog is behaving that way.
— creativesoul
Of that specific cluster of behaviours at that same time every weekday, but not on weekends or holidays? Show me three of that multitude of accurate explanations. — Vera Mont

The dog believes that the human will be arriving soon. The dog does not recognize the sound of it's human's car. The dog, after being reminded of past events - by virtue of being amidst much the same spatiotemporal events - begins to form, have, and/or hold expectation that the human will be there. In doing so the dog begins getting anticipatory excitement in a happy sort of way due to the lifelong loving connection the dog and human have.

I'm not saying that the dog's behavior is not rational. I would say that it most certainly is.

I'm questioning which things it makes the most sense to say that the dog is experiencing: Which sorts of thoughts and beliefs dogs can form, have, and/or hold.

Being hopeful does not belong in that grouping.

Holding some kinds of expectation does. Anticipation does. All hopefulness is anticipatory. All hopefulness involves expectation, but not all anticipation is hopefulness, and not all expectation is hopefulness. There is a difference, and that difference is key here.

What is hoping that something will happen without knowing that it may not? You see what I'm getting at? Dogs are not aware of their own fallibility. We are. It is only after becoming aware of the fact that we can be wrong about stuff, that we can become hopeful - in the face of that uncertainty. Compared/contrast that with autonomous anticipation and/or expectation without such metacognitive reservation.

Anthropomorphism looms large.
— creativesoul
And terrifying! Why? — Vera Mont

This mistakenly presupposes that you are somehow privy to my fear(s)?

:yikes:


Attributing things that are exclusively human to that which is not is something many do. I myself have been guilty of it. However, it is not at all 'terrifying' in-so-much-as just being completely unacceptable. It is akin to holding false belief. It is a mistake. I try to avoid those.

Similarity and commonality are not diseases; they're a natural result of sharing a planet and a history. — Vera Mont

Of course similarity and commonality are not diseases. The irony. Those are a large part of the foundation of my own worldview/position. Your replies apply to someone who does not agree on that.

It's becoming apparent that there is some misunderstanding at hand.

A candidate not only has to have an intuitive sense of the passage of time, but it also must possess some means of differentiating between timeframes such that they also know that other periods are not that arrival time. They have to think along the lines of different timeframes.
— creativesoul
You're overcomplicating something simple. A biological clock: so much time has elapsed; at this interval, something is supposed to happen. — Vera Mont

Yeah. :brow: No.

What you're claiming is simple is not. The above can be true, and the claim in question... false. I'm not denying the above. What I am denying is not nearly so simple as that.

Changing goalposts is generally frowned upon too.

No. Knowing what time a particular person is expected to arrive is to pick that time out from the rest. The dog does not do that. The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.

The expectation belongs to the dog. Dogs are not capable of thinking about their own thought and belief.

The arrival of the train meant the arrival of the human, to the dog that is... due to the correlations the dog had drawn, time and time again between all the regularities surrounding the five o'clock train.
— creativesou
And that's not rational, because....? — Vera Mont

It is rational. The irony, once again. You're quoting my argument for how and/or why it is rational.

Jeez!

:worry:

Sometimes. Lots of folk dread Monday, simply because it's Monday.
— creativesoul
No. Because it's the first day of a new work-week. Early rising (possibly with hangover) (possibly lover departing), rigid morning routine, uncomfortable clothing, commute, staff meeting, unpleasant colleague regaling you with their spectacular weekend adventures, bossy department head dumping unwanted task on your desk.... Some people who enjoy their work actually look forward to Mondays; most people don't enjoy their work. Pity!

No?

So now you're going to deny what my coworkers have said when I asked? Sure, some may dread Monday for the reasons listed above. Others just dread Monday because it's a day to be dreaded. That's not all that uncommon. They wake up with negativity teeming, because it's Monday and they're convinced that Monday is the worst day. When asked, some replies have been...

"No reason, really. It's just a Monday, ya know?"

"It's Monday", accompanied by a perplexed look - like I should already know that. :brow: Some people have very strange belief systems.

Arrrgh, feels like a Monday, doesn't it?"

Etc.

There's another relevant issue here. The tactic you're using can be used against the anthropomorphic claims you've made. We can continue to say stuff like, "No. Not because it's the first day of the workweek, but because they do not like work at all."

Whatever.

Many say they dread Mondays because they believe Mondays are the worst days. What you've added and/or said here does not deny that, despite your insistence that you're answering in the negative. Rather, your extrapolation adds further support for why they dread Mondays.

What's in question is whether or not dogs can look forward to Thursdays despite having no knowledge whatsoever that any given day of their life is a Thursday.

To the dog, the train means the human.
— creativesoul
No other train, just the five o'clock local.
But never mind, I have lots of other examples you can explain away.

We could change what we call the train. It would no longer be the five o'clock train is we did so. Would the dog notice? Perhaps it's best put like this: "The five o'clock train" is the way we pick that train out from all others. It is not the way the dog does. The time the train comes makes no difference at all to that dog. What mattered was that train was connected to the human, not what chronological order it was in. Other humans arrive at other times. Their dogs know nothing at all about what time counts as five o'clock or four or two or whatever. The chronological time makes no difference to the dog. What matters is the human connected to the train... regardless of what time it arrives on our clocks.

Yes, dogs have a sense of time. Yes, dogs can develop timely routines. Yes, that consistency can become ritualistic. Ritual shared between species. Bonding. Yes, these can involve the train we call "the five o'clock train".

Because some language less animals form, have, and/or hold rational thought, as learning how to open doors, gates, and tool invention/use clearly proves, if we accept/acknowledge and include evolutionary progression, it only follows that some rational thought existed in its entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. Whatever language less rational thought consists of, it is most certainly content/elements/something that is amenable to brute evolutionary progression such that it is capable of resulting in our own very complex thought and belief.

In my book, as you know, it's correlations.

Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter.
— creativesoul

I think I mostly agree with you. — Ludwig V

Sweet. Much obliged.

Perhaps another issue worth considering in this thread is, do animals think critically? — wonderer1

I do not see how that could be possible. Critical thinking is a metacognitive endeavor. Metacognitive endeavors require naming and descriptive practices.

Here, you've veered into what we are doing with the word "rational". I'm more inclined to critically examining whether or not any single notion of "rational" is capable of admitting that language less animals are capable of learning how to open gates, open doors, make and use tools for specific purposes, etc.
— creativesoul
From another perspective, the question is what notion of "rational" enables us to explain the fact that some animals are capable of learning how to open gates, etc. I mean that the starting-point is that they can, and that stands in need of explanation. — Ludwig V

Nice. So, we're in complete agreement on that much. I thought we were very close. Nice confirmation.

Here's how I look at it - for what it's worth.
We know how to explain how humans learn to do these things. But humans are our paradigm (reference point) of what a rational being is. So that's what we turn to. It involves a complex conceptual structure (think of it as a game - a rule-governed activity). The obvious recourse, then, is our existing practice in explaining how people do these things. We apply those concepts to the animals that learn to do these things. Our difficulty is that animals are in many ways different from human beings, most relevantly in the respect that many of the things that human beings can routinely do, they (apparently) cannot. So some modification of our paradigm is necessary. — Ludwig V

Nice.

That's not a desperately difficult problem, but it is where the disagreements arise, though in the nature of the case, determinate answers will not be easy to arrive at. But we are already familiar with such situations, where we apply the concept of interpretation. The readiest way of explaining this is by reference to puzzle pictures, which can be seen (interpreted) in more than one way. There is no truth of the matter, just different ways of looking at the facts. So, competing (non-rational) interpretations cannot be conclusively ruled out. However, in this case, the same interpretations can be applied to human beings as well. They are found lacking because they do not recognize the kinds of relationship that we have with each other. The same lack is found with, for example, the application of mechanical (reductionist) accounts of animals. — Ludwig V

I'm not seeing how that approach could help. What does it mean when you say "we apply the concept of interpretation"? What's the difference between say, a concept of interpretation and a notion of "interpretation". Is applying a concept of interpretation any different than sensibly using "interpretation"?

I disagree that there is no truth to the matter of interpretation. Interpretation presupposes meaning. When one interprets another, one is attempting to acquire knowledge of what they mean. Correctly attributing meaning is correct interpretation. When one misinterprets, one is misattributing meaning.

On my view, puzzle pictures are meaningless in and of themselves. All interpretation is of meaning. So, to me, we're not interpreting them so much as attributing meaning to them. Hence, there is no truth in that matter. There is no wrong way to 'interpret' the duck-rabbit or horse-frog, for there is no meaning to be interpreted. Rather, in such cases, we attribute meaning to that which has none, as compared to interpreting meaning already 'there' so to speak.

It has nothing to do with our word use. Language less animals have none.
— creativesoul
Well, it has and it hasn't. It hasn't because we are considering actions without language. But we are used to applying our concepts of action without language, since we happily explain what human beings to even when we do not have access to anything that they might say. (Foreign languages, for example) Indeed, sometimes we reject what the agent says about their own action in favour of the explanation we formulate for it. That is, agents can be deceptive or mistaken about their own actions.

The catch is that we have no recourse but to explain their actions in our language. But this is not a special difficulty. It applies whenever we explain someone else's action. — Ludwig V

We are considering the clearly rational behavior of a language less animal. Sure, we have no choice but to explain their actions in our language. That's not a problem.

There are all sorts of problems. Using our language isn't one of them.

I thinking pulling oneself from flames is not rational or deliberated or reasoned or thought about at all. It's just done.
— creativesoul
That doesn't mean it is not a rational response, does it? — Ludwig V

As far as I can tell, it's not at all rational. It's autonomous. Automatic. Involuntary.

Are involuntary reactions rational? That scope would include all living biological creatures capable of avoiding danger and/or gathering resources, regardless of the biological machinery involved. Hence, the ground for denying that such responses are rational, in kind.

Believing that touching the fire caused pain is. Applied, that belief becomes operative in the sense that it stops one from doing it again.
— creativesoul
That is the animal's response - something that it does. Since it is rational and something the animal does and there for an example of animal rationality. — Ludwig V

The important aspect concerns what makes it rational as opposed to not. It is rational behavior because it was caused by rational thought(thought based upon prior thought and belief). In this case the avoidance was based on the belief that touching the fire caused the pain.

Leaving all that out, misses the entirety of the point, or glosses over it. Neither is acceptable here, considering the matter under consideration/contention is what counts as rational thought as compared/contrasted to thought that is not rational in kind.

I think you're assessing behavior using conventional belief attribution practices, so I think I understand why.

What he's actually looking forward to is the particular event that usually takes place. Do we also know that no other animal can guage the interval at which a routine pleasant event usually occurs? To a small child, one would say: two more sleeps until Grandpa comes to dinner. For a dog who never gets to ride in the car when his human is going to work, and doesn't even ask, looks forward to weekends.
— Vera Mont
There's a complication here, that how the animal thinks about it may not be how we think about it. But, if we are to understand the animal, it needs to be expressed in terms that we can understand. To a small child, one would say "Two more sleeps...", but we would report to Grandpa that the child is really looking forward to him coming for dinner on Thursday.

In the case of the dog, we would have trouble saying to anyone on Wednesday that they are looking forward to the week-end. (How would that manifest itself? I'm not saying that there couldn't be any signs, only that I can't think of any). We might say they are looking forward to the week-end by extrapolation from the enthusiasm that we see on Saturday, but that would be risky in a philosophical context.
Still, when the signs appear, there is no doubt and we well might say the dog is excited because it's the week-end, while acknowledging that that does not reflect how the dog thinks about it. It could be "the day breakfast is late" - but even then, we don't suppose that's what the dog is saying to itself. Perhaps it is more like the response to the fire. I don't think there is a clear answer to this. — Ludwig V

It's difficult, for sure. I'll not address this here in this post. I addressed it in my reply to Vera.

Mww
4.7k
In my book, as you know, it's correlations. Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter.
— creativesoul

I agree, at last in principle. From Day One your correlations and my relations have busied themselves trying to meet in the middle. A priori has always been my centerpiece, so for me a priori relations are a cinch.

What, in your view, constitutes an a priori correlation?

Forgive me if I’m supposed to know this, if I’ve been informed already and let it slip away. — Mww

Ah, no worries Mww. I do not believe that I've ever tried to fill that prescription.

I was just highlighting the approach set out in my reply to you. The notions of a priori and a posteriori are not used in my position. Both depend upon experience, even if that means just thinking about one's own thought and belief.

:wink:

So, they have some intuitive sense of time passing, as I mentioned earlier... perhaps accompanied by pattern recognition? I'm still not sure that that counts as knowing what time their humans are expected to arrive home.
— creativesoul
Dogs sure look expectant! You get clues off the standing up, prancing and sitting down every two minutes, tail wagging every time a car goes by and slobber all over the glass. — Vera Mont

Those behaviors have a multitude of very different and equally accurate explanations for why the dog is behaving that way. Behavior alone underdetermines thought and belief of the behavioral subject under consideration. That much is very well known. Dog behavior is not fine grained or nuanced enough for us to know with any certainty exactly why dogs slobber, wag tails, or are acting 'antsy'. It happens for a variety of different reasons. That issue causes trouble for every attribution of thought and belief to another creature, when based upon behavior alone, humans notwithstanding.

All that being said, I readily agree that dogs clearly form, have, and/or hold expectations. I've no issue claiming dogs form, have, and/or hold rational thought. What I'm particularly hesitant about, currently, is making any claims based upon ungrounded presuppositions regarding the breadth and width of that scope. Anthropomorphism looms large. I make every attempt to avoid making that mistake. Hence, my hair splitting is just as much about the development of my own position as it is about any particular claim you've made.

To be clear, there is no doubt that "the dog looks expectant" is a perfectly sensible thing to say in that situation. That's not what's in question here, with this particular example. What I'm questioning is how to make sense of saying that an animal knows what time the humans are expected to arrive home.

A candidate not only has to have an intuitive sense of the passage of time, but it also must possess some means of differentiating between timeframes such that they also know that other periods are not that arrival time. They have to think along the lines of different timeframes. I see no way for this candidate to know what time an expected arrival happens. For such knowledge is about a specific timeframe and it's relation to others. Without that there is just the arrival and the dog knowing that that is happening. It does not know so much what time the human is expected to arrive, so much as knowing when the human is about to arrive or has arrived, based upon any multitude of things(all of which must be perceptible to the dog) that always accompany the arrival.

The dog clearly connects the five o'clock train with the master's arrival... but hope?
— creativesoul

Why else would he keep going there every day for three years? The train had nothing for him. He never accepted treats from the staff or made friends with anyone on the platform. He just waited. — Vera Mont

He kept going, perhaps, for several reasons. Dogs have very limited conception/understanding of time, none of death, and the train still most certainly had something for him. The train is part of the arrival, as was the human. The arrival of the train meant the arrival of the human, to the dog that is... due to the correlations the dog had drawn, time and time again between all the regularities surrounding the five o'clock train. None of which were the fact that it was the five o'clock train.

What does "looking forward to going for a car ride on days the human doesn't drive away on" miss?
— creativesoul
I don't know. I suppose the fact that he didn't leave after breakfast. But why would they start getting excited at breakfast - which would take place later than on weekdays? Time sense, probably. — Vera Mont

Perhaps, in addition to recognizing all the individual particular regularities included in weekend car rides, except the fact that they happened on the weekends. The dog has no clue about that much. Weekends are human constructs, made possible by naming and descriptive practices, in addition to the regularity of cosmological events.

I claimed, not Wayfarer, that looking forward to Thursday requires knowing how to use the word.
— creativesoul

Sure, the name of the day is needed to convey your anticipation to another human. But what you're actually anticipating is not the day, or its name, but the event. — Vera Mont

Sometimes. Lots of folk dread Monday, simply because it's Monday. Makes no sense whatsoever to me, but I'm not most folk, and I hear it expressed nearly every Monday.

You could as easily say, "I look forward to seeing my father every week." They don't really need to know that he comes to dinner on Thursdays, it's just quicker and less self-revealing to say the day and not the event. — Vera Mont

For us, and our thoughts. For dogs, it makes more sense to talk about the events. The day of the week means nothing to the dog. Nor does the time the train arrives. To the dog, the train means the human. For three years, if what you say is true.

On my view, all thought based upon prior belief is rational thought. All action based upon one's own thought and belief is caused - in part at least - by rational thought.
— creativesoul

At least with respect to my experience, cutting through the clutter, has always been your philosophical modus operandi.

Gotta appreciate that bottom-up approach you instigated... — Mww

Thanks. I appreciatcha for appreciating me. :wink:

We know there are competing contradictory notions of "rational" at work here in this thread. They do not all rest upon the same ground. Unless we critically examine these notions and show their lacking(explanatory power in this case), then there's always those who will say stuff like, "Well it all boils down to how you define the term "rational". Well, yes and no. Yes, because whether or not any particular notion of "rational" can admit of language less rational animals' thought, belief, and/or actions and remain coherent is all a matter of how one defines the word. So, if we realize that the only reason some notion or other denies language less rational thought is on pains of maintaining coherency alone, and we realize that coherency is necessary but insufficient for truth, and we know beyond all reasonable doubt that learning how to open a door by observation alone IS rational thinking, then we can conclude that the notion under consideration is wrong. It leads to conclusions that stand in direct contradiction with everyday happenings.

Because some language less animals form, have, and/or hold rational thought, as learning how to open doors, gates, and tool invention/use clearly proves, if we accept/acknowledge and include evolutionary progression, it only follows that some rational thought existed in its entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. Whatever language less rational thought consists of, it is most certainly content/elements/something that is amenable to brute evolutionary progression such that it is capable of resulting in our own very complex thought and belief.

In my book, as you know, it's correlations.

Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter.

Those who deny Trump's causal role in inciting the riot/insurrection attempt on Jan. 6th will be forced to contradict themselves if they want to (falsely)blame Kamala's words for any assassination attempts.

It's funny how in the upside-down world of 'Murica, that's meant to be an insult — Baden

Because many Americans have no clue. They are capable of holding unshakable certainty about some things, despite the fact that they know nothing about them. The "common good" and "what's best for the overwhelming majority" can often offset the kneejerk emotional reaction to "socialism" and "socialist".

Our conversation in my thread is a good one. It's my turn, actually. I just reread it tonight. Apologies for the delay. Been super super busy for the last year and a half. I liked what I read from your last response.

We've learned to be more appreciative and considerate over the years. At least, I think I have. I've certainly been trying... writ large. Be the change... and all that.

Cheers!

Do we also know that no other animal can guage the interval at which a routine pleasant event usually occurs? — Vera Mont

Gauge?

That's a good question.

Why does a human look forward to Thursday? Does he celebrate Thor? Or is it because something pleasant usually happens on Thursdays? Suppose that pleasant even were moved to Tuesday? Would the human than still look forward to Thursday because of its name, or would he change his anticipation to Tuesdays? What if the pleasant thing once happened on a Monday? Would he reject it because it's on the wrong day, or would he say: "You're early!" and be happy?
What he's actually looking forward to is the particular event that usually takes place. Do we also know that no other animal can guage the interval at which a routine pleasant event usually occurs? To a small child, one would say: two more sleeps until Grandpa comes to dinner. For a dog who never gets to ride in the car when his human is going to work, and doesn't even ask, looks forward to weekends. — Vera Mont

No one has claimed that humans look forward to Thursday because of it's name. I claimed, not Wayfarer, that looking forward to Thursday requires knowing how to use the word.

As far as the rest goes, there's not much I would disagree with. Looking forward to something that happens, whatever and whenever it does, is very different than looking forward to Thursday.

Looking forward to weekends?

What does "looking forward to going for a car ride on days the human doesn't drive away on" miss?

Dodi kept hoping... — Vera Mont

How is that different from being excited about the train's arrival based upon the historical pattern? The dog clearly connects the five o'clock train with the master's arrival... but hope? That might be a stretch too far. Disappointment may not.

I see no ground whatsoever to conclude that dogs know what time their humans are expected home from work or school.
— creativesoul
Other than getting there at 4:45, or positioning themselves by the front window or door 10 minutes before the loved human normally gets home, or waiting on the lawn for the schoolbus? These are standard behaviours, not anomalies.

A 2018 study at Northwestern University found that an area located in the brain's temporal lobe associated with memory and navigation may be responsible for encoding time much like it does episodic memories. The experiment used mice, but results have been extrapolated to other animals and it seems that many animals do have a true sense of elapsing time, even if they can’t actually read a clock. Neurons in their brains are activated when they expect a certain time-dependent outcome. If the expected outcome doesn’t occur at the expected time—for instance, a pet is normally fed at 5PM. If the pet is not fed at 5PM—the pet may display agitated behavior. — Vera Mont

Interesting. So, they have some intuitive sense of time passing, as I mentioned earlier... perhaps accompanied by pattern recognition? I'm still not sure that that counts as knowing what time their humans are expected to arrive home. Although, it seems clear that different time periods are meaningful to them. Correctly believing/anticipating the arrival time.

Yeah. That's relevant. I'll need to adjust my belief, perhaps.

One of my favorite dogs met my school bus often. I cannot remember all those days, but the driver loved the way he looked, and remarked often as I exited.

I thinking pulling oneself from flames is not rational or deliberated or reasoned or thought about at all. It's just done.

Believing that touching the fire caused pain is. Applied, that belief becomes operative in the sense that it stops one from doing it again.

Hey Mww...

This thread is very much along the lines of our ongoing discussion.

All people are human beings. All human beings are people. Two names for the same thing. If animals are like all human beings in certain respects, then all people are like animals in certain respects.
Makes sense.
— creativesoul
I'm so glad you think so. I'm afraid it is a rather boring conclusion and so seems to be of little interest here. — Ludwig V

It barely scratches the surface of the interesting parts. In what ways are we similar enough to correctly claim that this or that nonhuman is capable of something we are without being guilty of the personification of the world and/or anthropomorphism?

It has nothing to do with our word use. Language less animals have none. The question becomes which sorts of things are humans capable of doing that are not existentially dependent upon language use? What are they existentially dependent upon, and do any other creatures satisfy this bare minimum criterion? Do they have what it takes?

On my view, all thought based upon prior belief is rational thought. All action based upon one's own thought and belief is caused - in part at least - by rational thought.

Being able to keep track of the time between one week and the next - by name - is a bare minimum.
— creativesoul
Why is the name of the day required? Why not an interval? — Vera Mont

Well, given that the anticipatory thought in question is "looking forward to this Thursday", I supposed it was obvious enough.

It's possible that other animals have shorter periods of anticipation (as they also have shorter lives) but every dog knows what time his humans are expected home from work and school. My grandfather died on one of his regular trips and never came home again. His dog continued to meet the five o'clock train, hoping.

What would such a dog's thought, belief, and/or anticipation/expectation consist in/of?

I have no issue with saying that dogs have expectations. I have serious issues with dogs having any conception of time such that the five o'clock train is meaningful as a result of its arrival time. I would say that there's no issue with the five o'clock train being meaningful to the dog as a result of the train being connected to the arrival of your grandfather, as contrasted to the five o'clock arrival time. I see no ground whatsoever to conclude that dogs know what time their humans are expected home from work or school. Dogs can expect to see their humans after hearing the car pull up, or hearing the five o'clock train coming, or hearing the keys into the lock in the front door.

"Hoping" may be too strong, but maybe not. Some dogs certainly grieve the loss of close friendly companions, whether they be canine, feline, or human.

So here's my answer for this context. Meaning and concepts are shown in meaningful behaviour, which includes both verbal and non-verbal applications of the relevant concepts. This means that to attribute concepts to animals is perfectly meaningful, though not capable of the formal clarity beloved of logicians.
— Ludwig V — creativesoul

I wanted to note that we differ here. On my view, "concepts" causes far more trouble than it's worth. It does nothing - as far as I can tell - that language less thought and belief cannot exhaust.

What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking?
— creativesoul
The lack of clear definitions does indeed make this debate much more difficult. But there's no easy way round it. Someone who doesn't see rationality in animals will define it in one way, likely by appealing to "language", which is assumed to apply only to languages of the kind that humans speak. Someone who empathizes with animals will be more inclined to a more flexible definitions. — Ludwig V

Clearly this is true. This thread shows that much clearly. There are competing notions of "rational thought" hereabouts. However, all is not lost as a result. They do not all rest on equal ground. They do not all have the capability of taking account of meaningful thought, belief, and/or experience of language less animals.

There is far too much evidence to deny that some non human creatures are perfectly capable of forming, having, and/or holding meaningful thought and belief about the world and/or themselves. As best I can tell, you and I are in agreement regarding that much, as supported by your earlier acknowledgement that learning how to open doors and gates solely by virtue of observation is rational thinking.

I don't think "rational" is about a single thing, but about the multifarious language games that a language consists of; they have different criteria of meaning and truth. "Rational" refers to thinking that gets us the right results. In some cases that's truth of some kind, in others it's actions that are successful by the relevant criteria.

So here's my answer for this context. Meaning and concepts are shown in meaningful behaviour, which includes both verbal and non-verbal applications of the relevant concepts. This means that to attribute concepts to animals is perfectly meaningful, though not capable of the formal clarity beloved of logicians. — Ludwig V

Here, you've veered into what we are doing with the word "rational". I'm more inclined to critically examining whether or not any single notion of "rational" is capable of admitting that language less animals are capable of learning how to open gates, open doors, make and use tools for specific purposes, etc. It's particularly hard to square those facts with a denial that language less creatures are capable of thought, rational or otherwise.

As soon as we acknowledge that much, we can then see how well any notion of "rational" thought explains such behaviour.

To believe that only humans are capable of any rational thought requires not believing one's own eyes.
— creativesoul

But doesn't that contradict what you've said here?:

We know that no other known creature is capable of knowingly looking forward to Thursday. We cannot check to see if that's the case. But we can know that it is.

That kind of thought/knowledge requires naming and descriptive practices. All naming and descriptive practices are language. Deliberately, rationally, and reasonably looking forward to Thursday is an experience that can only be lived by a very specific type of language user. Us. Knowing how to use the word is required for having the experience.
— creativesoul

Language less rational thought must be meaningful to the thinking creature. The process of becoming meaningful must be similar enough to our own in order to bridge any evolutionary divide between language users' thought and language less creatures' thought(
— creativesoul — Wayfarer

I'm unclear what you think is inconsistent/incoherent/contradictory?

:worry:

What is the evidence that there is any such thing?

What exactly are you asking evidence for? What does "any such thing" pick out to the exclusion of all else? Sorry Jeep, I'm at a loss to what you're saying or trying to get at.

Help?

What, about animal behaviour, cannot be described in behaviourist terms, i.e., when confronted by such and such a stimuli, we can observe such and such behaviour.

Set out meaningful thought and belief using any behaviorist model. The topic involves rational thought as compared contrasted to non rational thought. Show me how behaviorist models apply.

I've seen cats, for example, gauging whether they can make a leap up a height or across a stream. They'll pause for a few seconds, their eyes will dart about, sometimes moving back and forth a little. They'll be weighing the leap up before acting. But I don't see any justification to say that this implies they're thinking.

Weighing the leap is thinking about where they are heading.

What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking? The answers need a minimal criterion, which in turn, requires the right sort of methodological approach. Do you have a minimum criterion which, when met by a candidate, counts as thinking? Rational thinking? If not, then upon what ground do you rest your denial that some creatures other than humans are capable of thought, rational or otherwise?
— creativesoul
I agree. But I don't have the answers. — Patterner

Right. I'm trying to point the discussion in the right direction, so to speak.

Springfield is close to where I am currently residing... many around here believe the immigrant invasion propaganda, regardless of what's happening. Get enough people saying the same thing and you'll end up with commonly held belief. Sad.

In my book, however, this is not a simple empirical question. As far as I can see, it is fair to say that our paradigm (NOT definition) of a person is a human being (under normal circumstances). Animals are like human beings in certain respects such that it seems most reasonable to think that they are like people. — Ludwig V

All people are human beings. All human beings are people. Two names for the same thing. If animals are like all human beings in certain respects, then all people are like animals in certain respects.

Makes sense.

Crucially, it is clearly possible for human beings to form relationships with animals that are, or are like, relationships with people. But it's a balance. Some people do not go far enough and treat them as machines which can easily result in inhumane treatment. Other people go too far and get accused, sometimes rightly, of anthropomorphization. — Ludwig V

The thing to be avoided is a conflation between kinds, a blurring of the differences between the capabilities of humans and other creatures. Innate and learned. A lack of knowing what sorts of thought requires which sorts of prerequisites results in an inherent inability to draw and maintain the necessary distinctions. These differences are afforded to us by dumb luck. Are we lucky in that regard? I think so. It's not like it's something that we had to work hard for. It is not as a result of our own actions that we were born replete with wonderful capabilities that only humans have. We don't pick out all the different biological structures/machines within us. The crows don't either. They are lucky in the same way. Perhaps luckier, in some cases. Ontologically objective biological structures allow all of us to have uniquely individual subjective experiences.

We do not pick the socioeconomic circumstances we're born into. Those help shape the way we look at the world. We do not pick the most influential people around us while we're very young. They are often mimicked, for good or bad. We do not pick the cultural atmosphere. Those are nurtured - or not. Today seems lacking. I digress...

We do not pick the world we're born into. Nor do dogs. We can pick to do good while in it, for the sake of doing good. Dogs... not so much.

The aforementioned biological structures(biological machinery) were there long before we discovered them. We have come to acquire knowledge of the role they play within all verifiable individual subjective human experiences. It's a role of affordance. Allowance. Facilitation. Efficacy.

Other critters share objective and subjective aspects of experience. All subjective aspects of experience are existentially dependent upon physiological sensory perception. Physiological sensory perception is ontologically objective. I digress...



Looking forward to this Thursday is something that all sorts of people do, for all sorts of different reasons. It is looking forward to a sequence of events and this requires not only the objective influence that time passing has on life, but also the subjective private, personal - all that which is subject to individual particulars. Hence, it requires a creature with certain capabilities. Being able to keep track of the time between one week and the next - by name - is a bare minimum. Developing, having, and/or holding expectation about a construct of language seems to be required. I see no reason to believe that any other creature could do that.

Thursdays are creations of man. Cosmological systems/cycles, not so much.

Avoiding the fallacy of attributing uniquely human things, features, properties, creations, attributes, characteristics, etc., to that which is not human requires knowing which group of things are uniquely human and which are not. We know that no other known creature is capable of knowingly looking forward to Thursday. We cannot check to see if that's the case. But we can know that it is.

That kind of thought/knowledge requires naming and descriptive practices. All naming and descriptive practices are language. Deliberately, rationally, and reasonably looking forward to Thursday is an experience that can only be lived by a very specific type of language user. Us. Knowing how to use the word is required for having the experience.

All humans are extremely complex rational creatures, if by that I mean that our actions are influenced by our worldviews and societal constructs, and those are very complex systems.

All humans are also simply rational. We look for lost items where we think they may be. We believe that our actions will help bring about some change in the world. Language less creatures can do the same. Language less creatures can learn how to take action in order to make certain things happen. They cannot know that they are. They cannot say that. We can.

In defense of personification...

I've not read enough beautiful anthropomorphic terminological baptisms. I've not read enough graceful words bouncing in pleasing cadence; bringing smiles for all the right reasons. The personification of things not human can make for some of the most beautiful reflections.

The only way to avoid anthropomorphism is to know the differences and similarities, between human thought, belief, behaviour, and experience and other creatures'.

Language less rational thought must be meaningful to the thinking creature. The process of becoming meaningful must be similar enough to our own in order to bridge any evolutionary divide between language users' thought and language less creatures' thought(I'm 'ontologically nihilistic' on meaning/there is no meaning where there is no creature capable of drawing correlations between different things).

All thought is meaningful to the thinking creature. Some language less creatures form, have, and/or hold thought. Not all meaning emerges via language use. This demands a notion of meaning capable of bridging the evolutionary gap between learning how to open a gate and knowing how to talk about what one has just done. The gate is meaningful to all the creatures that know how to open it.

To believe that only humans are capable of any rational thought requires not believing one's own eyes.

The difficulty it seems lay in how to best go about taking proper account of all this.

Like us, animals have brains composed of complex neural networks, which enable complex responses. Based on such physiological similarities, I would think it naive at best, to be dismissive of the possibility of cognitive similarities. — wonderer1

Yup.

It has become even clearer now...

What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking? The answers need a minimal criterion, which in turn, requires the right sort of methodological approach. Do you have a minimum criterion which, when met by a candidate, counts as thinking? Rational thinking? If not, then upon what ground do you rest your denial that some creatures other than humans are capable of thought, rational or otherwise?

Is learning to open doors and gates rational thinking, or does it not meet that criterion?

I've watched cats go back to the place where their captured rodent had escaped hours earlier. If that does not count as that cat thinking about that rodent, despite the rodent no longer being present/visible, then nothing will.

I've watched both, cats and dogs, learn how to open doors/gates by watching people do it, much to the dismay of their humans.

If that does not count as thinking, then nothing will.

Clearly, not all thinking is existentially dependent upon words.
— creativesoul
That's the minority opinion — Vera Mont

Perhaps, but it's the correct one.

Competing notions of "thought" and "rational thought" can be assessed by how well they 'fit' into what we know to be true, as well as their inherent ability or lack thereof to explain things(explanatory power). Evolutionary progression is paramount here. There are all sort of philosophical positions which must reject the idea of language less thought/belief, on pains of coherency alone.

On my view, that is prima facie evidence that they've gotten some things very wrong.

The words have no fixed meaning, apparently. — Vera Mont

Language less creatures have no words. Yet, they think about the world. Clearly, not all thinking is existentially dependent upon words.

Depends on one's philosophical stance, doesn't it? — Vera Mont

No, it doesn't. Creatures capable of thinking about the world were doing so long before we began talking about it. Hence, the need for the aforementioned methodological approach and bare minimum criterion.

What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking? The answers need a minimal criterion, which in turn, requires the right sort of methodological approach.

An adequate theory of realism would have to treat the perceiver as a genuine agent, not an entirely passive recipient of a purely objective world in all its glory.

Hence, why I think critical realism and new realism are better positions since they're seeking a better understanding of what it even means for something to be real. A realist account of perception will have to consider what the agent themselves brings to the encounter in terms of subjectivity, context, history, affordance, cultural sediment etc. — Bodhy

Searle fills that bill nicely.

Yep.

Seems to me that physical events cause mental events and mental events cause physical events. Not one or the other. Both.

Man, it would have been nice to have Bernie up there with Trump just once.
3 hours ago — Mikie

Clear lines in the sand are Bernie's strongest suit. That would have been reeeeel nice.

She was nervous, but delivered okay. Trump can sling a lot of shit around in a short amount of time.

The Haitian immigrant fiction is particularly interesting to me. Against what the city manager says, Trump presupposes he is somehow, in some way, privy to much greater knowledge about that city than the guy who manages it. This is akin to his claims that he knows more than the generals in the armed forces. Unbelievable...

I knew an old finish guy who saw reds and greens in atypical fashion. I think he called himself 'colorblind'. Perfect color matches on additions to an existing jury box made from very old walnut that had been originally installed into a Federal courthouse before the turn of the 20th century. Amazing.

Uncle Harry.

I'm gullible. They all coulda been pullin my leg.

Right. I'm just reinforcing the idea that red apples can also be grey apples for the appearance of color totally depends on both, the biological structures(biological machinery) of the observer as well as the physical properties of distal objects.

The red apples are the exact same apples as the grey ones, for the appearance of color is inherent in neither, the distal object nor the observer. Consider this: "That's a red apple" and "That's a grey apple" are both perfectly true when spoken by two people. All it takes is one with the condition you've put forth, and another more commonly/typically functioning individual asserting those claims while ostensively pointing at the exact same apple. The atypically sighted person would have to be informed that what they see is called "grey" by normally sighted individuals, but I've labored this point enough. Save that, and they may call it by the same color name.

There is no correct way to see color. There are typical ways. There are ways that most normally functioning adult humans see colors. Because the same objective physical properties combined with the same outside circumstances/conditions can result in the exact same objects appearing to be different colors to different people at the same time, from the same vantage point, we can know that color does not belong to objects and objects alone. The power to cause color experience in a creature so capable does.

I don't think anything I've claimed is incommensurate with our current scientific knowledge base. Although it may contradict some ancients who believed in things like ether, sensations, and what have you.

For example, is the grey of a ripe tomato distinguishable from the grey of an unripe tomato? I don't know, but it would surely be more difficult than distinguishing a red tomato from a green tomato. — wonderer1

Hmm. Hesperus and Phosphorous. Evening Star. Morning Star. Venus over time.

Those who see red and green as grey ARE picking between the same apples. The red apples look grey to some. So do the green ones. I agree that distinguishing between shades of grey could be more difficult than distinguishing between a red apple and a green one, unless you see red and green as grey. Then you are distinguishing between the same apples. The red apple is also grey.

The apple is ontologically objective. The color of it, not so much. The color of it causes the subjective color experience of the creature capable of having color experience. Color has to be meaningful to the candidate under consideration. This demands a theory of meaning that is capable of taking that into proper account.

Evolutionary progression is key. We have to be able to at least outline the color experience of language less creatures and ourselves alike and we must do so by acquiring understanding of how things become meaningful to language less creatures.