The difference now is, you said “talk of what the cow is doing”, which presupposes it as an extant experience. — Mww

This topic finds agreement between us.

What the cow is doing may or may not qualify as an experience. Extant behaviour seems better here. Experience is always meaningful to the creature having the experience. So, we ought to know how creatures attribute meaning in order to have any clue about whether or not cows can have experience, and to what extent they are or become meaningful to the cow.

Biology looms large.

One cannot adhere to both, an eliminative materialist, and a sense datum theorist account of perception.

What do you think "constituent" means? — Michael

Feigned interest is rather unbecoming.

Re read our exchanges, or better yet, click my avatar, click my comments and read for yourself how I use the word. Then you'll know what it means.

Something that exists in one location cannot be a constituent of something that exists in a different location. — Michael

:lol:

That's the missing presupposition. As I said, it didn't follow. The above is just plain false or there is no such things as constituents of any kind. Two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time.

Conscious experience occurs in the brain, distal objects exist outside the brain, — Michael

What is below does not follow from what is above.

...therefore distal objects are not constituents of conscious experience.

.

Measuring is an interesting act to consider here. If all constituents of experience exist only in the head and never distal objects, then what exactly is happening when we begin measuring the size of the red cup? We're certainly not measuring things that exist in the brain. The same question can and ought be asked about measuring the reflected wavelengths of the visible spectrum. Do we measure things in our brain, or do we measure light being reflected off the cup, neither of which are in our brain?

It follows that on a naïve realist view, the veridical perceptions and hallucinations in question have a different nature: the former have mind-independent objects as constituents, and the latter do not.

Yup.

[N]aïve realists hold that ... [t]he conscious visual experience you have of the oak has that very tree as a literal part. — French and Phillips 2023

Yup.

when we describe what's going on when we dream and hallucinate we're describing what's happening to/in us and not what's happening elsewhere in the world. The indirect realist simply argues that the same can be true of veridical experience because veridical experience, hallucinations, and dreams are all of a common kind – mental states with phenomenal character – that differ only in their cause (which is not to say that we can't also talk about their cause). — Michael

That's yet another place in reasoning where the indirect position goes wrong. All experience is experience, of that we can be certain. It doesn't follow from that that there are not differences between veridical, hallucinatory, and illusory experiences. It certainly does not follow that veridical experiences are the same as hallucinations and dreams. That is to willfully neglect the difference between them.

Another issue is the unstated but mistaken presupposition at work here. Distal objects do both, cause and become and/or 'act' as necessary elemental constituents of veridical experience. Those are not mutually exclusive roles when it comes to how physiological sensory perception works. Moreover, it is only after those things have happened that the biological machinery is primed and ready(so to speak) act as if red cups are being perceived once again, even though they're not.


----------------------------------------------------------------

Circling back to where I left you to think about the difference between a dinner party and a painting. Dinner parties are experiences. Paintings are not. That's one difference. Dinner parties consist of guests, hosts, food, drink, conversation, furniture, etc. If apple pie is served, then it is a constituent of that dinner party. It's not a mystery. It's very straightforward. Some parties may include and/or directly involve a painting. If the party includes a conversation about a particular painting on the wall, then that painting is also a constituent of that party. Anyone involved and/or listening to the discourse is having an experience that includes the painting, and the paint as constituents thereof.

In short, portraits are not experiences. Dinner parties are.

This is the third time I've pointed out the issue with your analogy. It's false. Continuing to use it is a textbook example of a non sequitur, strawman, red herring, misunderstanding, and/or perhaps deliberate misattribution of meaning to the term "constituent". Very unhelpful.

Red cups are necessary elemental constituents of seeing red cups. The red cup has a reflective outer layer. The color we talk about is not inherent to the cup, but the outer layer is, so the cup inherently reflects/refracts the wavelengths we've named "red". The cup will reflect those wavelengths if we all die tomorrow.

Seeing red cups that are not there is malfunctioning biology. The red cup is not a part of hallucinations. Hence, the difference between hallucinations and veridical experience is whether or not distal objects are constituents thereof.

...our perceptions are shaped by those objects. — Luke

That's what I'm saying; earlier pointing at the need to unpack the phrase.

He didn't listen.

I'll leave you to think about it.

So, distal objects are literal component parts of conscious experience; in the same sense, perhaps, that the red paint is a literal component part of a painting — Michael

No.

In the sense that an apple pie is part of a dinner party.

For my part, the issue is that some folk think there is a need to justify that they see this text, even as they read it.

But that is a symptom of an excess of doubt. Cartesian fever. — Banno

I think Searle may agree with that sentiment.

Does sensory experience provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects and their mind-independent properties? — Michael

Not all direct realists hold that color is a mind-independent property of distal objects.

Odd that all that color matching can be successfully achieved by a brainless machine.
— creativesoul

It's not odd at all. We build it to measure the wavelength of light and then program it to output the word "red" if the wavelength measures 700nm.

This doesn't entail naive colour realism. — Michael

To be expected from another option.

If impressing one's own face into a custard pie does not count as directly perceiving the pie, then nothing will and one's framework falls apart if it is of the materialist/physicalist variety. One issue is the failure of Michael's framework to be able to conclude/admit that the custard pie is a constituent of such an experience.

The absolute epitome of trying to ignore the issue — AmadeusD

I strongly suspect you and I have different opinions on what the issue is.

See what happens when one irrelevant comment is made? It becomes the focus. Easy to avoid the difficulty that way, I suppose.

:brow:

...this has nothing to do with the dispute between naive and indirect realists. — Michael

Sigh...

Yeah, other options should be that way, ought they not?

You asked for other options, and yet complain when they avoid the rabbit holes. Have fun, I've got a vanity to paint.

It's not in my brain. It's wildflower blue coloured paint, and that's not in my brain either. It's in the can. There are machines that can give an exact color match. You give it a sample, and it spits out a formula to exactly match that sample.

Odd that all that color matching can be successfully achieved by a brainless machine.

Have fun.

I don't know what you mean by "seeing things". — Michael

If the cow is in the field, then it is not in the brain. If we see the cow, then we see things that are not in the brain. The cow is one of the things we see.

What scientific account of ocular nature forbids us from seeing cows in fields?

What scientific account of the conscious 'phenomenal' character of experience allows for distal objects and their properties to be constituents? — Michael

The "phenomenal" approach presupposes a difference between reality and appearances thereof. So, that's of no help here.

What scientific account of ocular nature forbids seeing things that are not in the brain?

I do not see how scientific evidence refutes 2. The emphasized part needs unpacked.
— creativesoul

The important part is this: “… where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense.”

Distal objects like cows are causally responsible for the activity in my visual cortex, and so the resulting experience, but they are not constituents of that resulting experience. — Michael

Right, for you, according to the framework you're employing, that's the important part, but science has nothing to say specifically about the notion of "experience" one employs.

For example, some hold that all experience can be reduced to the physical, in the head, or something similar. Consistency/coherency alone demands that all components/constituents within experience must also boil down to the physical, in the head, etc. That seems to be what you're arguing for/from.

Others claim that experience is entirely subjective, in the head, but cannot be reduced to the physical. They claim that experience has a qualitative nature to it, that there is something it is like to be an experiencing creature.

Others claim that experience is an ongoing process, consisting of all sorts of things, some in the head, some not. Consistency/coherency alone demands that not all components of experience are located in the head.

The history of the topic tends to work from/employ the subjective/objective dichotomy recently employing a basic materialist/physicalist approach. Searle argued against computationalism/functionalism. Nagel argued that the materialist/physicalist/reductionist approaches fail to explain the subjective nature of 'what it's like to be' an experiencing creature. Chalmers granted Nagel's argument and claimed that a purely reductive physicalist approach leaves out the subjective nature of qualia within all experience. Dennett wanted to eliminate the subjective 'what it's like' and the qualitative parts of experience by virtue of offering materialist/physicalist explanations in addition to showing the inherent issues with qualia.

I, for one, when it comes to the nature of experience, reject objective/subjective, mental/physical, and internal/external dichotomous approaches, because none of them are capable of properly accounting of things that consist of both, and are thus neither one nor the other.

Specifically, I think that "our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data" means "the conscious 'phenomenal' character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense."

Those who call themselves non-naive direct realists seem to want to accept the first part but reject the second part, but I can't make sense of the first part except as the second part.

So the relevant considerations are whether or not these are true:

1. Everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence
2. The conscious “phenomenal” character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense
3. These objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have

If (1) is true and (2) true then direct realism is true (and (3) is true).
If (1) is true and (2) is false then indirect realism is true (even if (3) is true).

I think the scientific evidence supports the claim that (1) is true and that (2) and (3) are false. Therefore, I think the scientific evidence supports indirect realism. — Michael

I personally would reject 3, for it overstates the case. Some, not all. I do not see how scientific evidence refutes 2. The emphasized part needs unpacked.

P.S.

Strictly speaking I would reject 1 as well, but for the sake of this argument, I'll let the attribution of "mind independent" to cadillacs stand, although they are not. It's the difference between an object's emergence and/or persistence as compared/contrasted with/to "existence". Cadillacs may persist for some time in a mind independent fashion, after they emerge in a mind dependent one. They do not persist until after they emerge, so...

Not necessarily. I’m undecided between eliminative materialism and property dualism. — Michael

You may be interested in listening to Searle's lectures on philosophy of mind. It's an entire course available for free on youtube. He has an interesting take on this subject matter that you may find appealing. You could start around lecture 8 to avoid the groundwork setting out the history/exegesis of the topic prior to him getting into his own view on it.

Crossposted. I'll address the quote soon.

There's more to it than whether or not distal objects are constituents of experience. But, as you imply, either that is the case or it is not the case.

Unless sometimes it is not, after it has been. (Hallucinations)

If our notion of experience leads us to say that we see cows, but cows are not constituents of seeing cows, then that alone warrants a careful reconsideration of the notion of experience we're working with.

Indirect realism as I understand it is nothing more than the rejection of naive realism,
— Michael

I think that there are better options... — creativesoul

Either naive realism is true or naive realism is false. It's a simple dichotomy. — Michael

I meant better options for rejecting naive realism than just indirect realism(indirect perception) of the kind you're arguing for/from.

There are more choices than just the kind of indirect realism that presupposes all components/constituents of all experience are located in the brain and the kind of direct perception that holds colors are mind independent properties of distal objects.

The cow I see exists outside my head. My visual experience exists inside my head. Therefore, the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience. — Michael

I think that that is a bewitchment of the mind by virtue of language use. It also shows the limitation of logic.

Validity alone does not warrant belief.

Indirect realism as I understand it is nothing more than the rejection of naive realism, — Michael

I think that there are better options...

Not necessarily. I’m undecided between eliminative materialism and property dualism. — Michael

Interesting. Dennett is an eliminative materialist. The Churchlands are as well, I think. In "From Bacteria to Bach and Back" and "Kinds of Minds he employs an intentionalism stance in a manner that I find to be guilty of anthropomorphism, but the practice does seem capable of making a whole lot of sense of the evolutionary progression of minds.

So, shapes, colors, smells, and sounds are in your brain?

Qualia?

I don’t understand your question. It’s like asking “what counts as a constituent of a portrait of the President if not the President the portrait is of”. — Michael

No, it's not. False analogy. Red herring as well. Portraits are not equivalent to seeing cows(which is one kind of visual experience).

the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience.
— Michael

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see? — creativesoul

If "the cow I see isn't a constituent of my visual experience" makes sense according to the position you're arguing for/from, but you cannot clearly and unambiguously state what does count as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see, then that is not a problem with the question. It's evidence that there's a problem with the framework you're practicing.

the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience. — Michael

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see?

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see?

Do you see something that is not a constituent of your experience?

Is the field in your brain?

We don't directly see cows – according to the naive and indirect realist's meaning of "directly see"1 – but we do indirectly see cows.

Given that the adverb "directly" modifies the verb "see", the phrases "I directly see a cow" and "I see a cow" do not mean the same thing. The phrase "I indirectly see a cow" entails "I see a cow" and so the phrases "I do not directly see a cow" and "I see a cow" are not contradictory.

1 A directly sees B iff B is a constituent of A's visual experience. — Michael

Blather.

Where is the cow you see?

...our ability to interpret what we perceive depends on our prior embodied experiences and conceptual repertoire. I couldn't see a duck as a duck if I had never encountered ducks before, either in person or through images. But these enabling conditions for interpretation do not stand between me and the duck when I perceive it. Rather, they are the background that allows me to make sense of my direct perceptual encounter with the duck itself. — Pierre-Normand

The most salient - but sorely neglected - point made thus far.

Experience exists within the brain, distal objects exist outside the brain, therefore distal objects do not exist within experience. — Michael

You keep saying that but refuse to directly address the inevitable consequence thereof. If distal objects exist outside the brain, and experience exists within the brain, and distal objects do not exist within experience, the either seeing is not part of experience or we do not see distal objects. Cows are distal objects. You claimed that we see cows. Incoherency at best. Self contradiction at worst. Equivocation either way.

It's odd to me that people using a computer to argue a very nuanced philosophical position, can be led to believe that the computer is not a necessary elemental constituent of doing that.

Sigh...