The stability of everyday working-class American lives, generation after generation was never better than the period between Roosevelt and Kennedy/Nixon.
— creativesoul

I think you mean working-class white men. — frank

Well, no. I meant what I said. Although, your point is taken, and those years were definitely far more beneficial to whites than minorities. That's beside the point though, and irrelevant. The point was about the wealth distribution and the protections of working class Americans providing stability to the overall economic landscape. Stability was the point. You claimed Reagan created stability. I'm calling utter bullshit.

When those protections and the wealth distribution returns to becoming more in line with what's best for the overwhelming majority of Americans again, the racial and gender disparities between working class people will hopefully become more palatable with far more minorities and genders being able to reap the same benefits that mainly white men reaped back then.

As if minimizing the number of downtrodden while increasing the amount of Americans with plenty of spendable income somehow does not result in tremendous stability?
— creativesoul

That's an interesting question, and history answers that it definitely does not produce stability. When the general population is fat and happy, the labor market becomes costly and inflexible. If 1970s labor unions in the US and the UK would have had the ability to stop grandstanding and work with employers, it would have been harder for neoliberals like Reagan and Thatcher to take control. The neoliberal solution was to bring labor to its knees and make them beholden for every crumb. That produced stability. — frank

You think? Crashes and all, huh? Those are signs of stability? I think not.

Evidently, we're measuring different things. The stability of everyday working-class American lives, generation after generation was never better than the period between Roosevelt and Kennedy/Nixon. You must be talking about the stability of something else. The stock market was also far more stable when corporations had an expressed obligation to the livelihoods of employees rather than shareholders. In addition, the stability of that the same stock market and American lives in general was far more stable when antitrust laws were enacted and enforced.

If we are to attribute thought and belief to another creature, we ought to have at least a well-grounded idea and/or standard regarding what sorts of creatures are capable of forming which sorts of beliefs.
— creativesoul

What sort of commonalities do we start off from here, each of us, to begin with? I mean, in this thread I'm not even quite clear yet what counts as a "thought". — Dawnstorm

Indeed. The underlying concept/notion/idea is hard at work in each of our contributions. Setting that out in a way that makes sense regarding of all the times we use the terms is key.

By my lights, all thought/belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between different things. The differences involve what those things are. As it pertains to our offshoot here, the thing that's in focus is language use and things that are existentially dependent upon language use.

... Part of the problem here is scope...

If you remove language what remains? — Dawnstorm

Correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable.

What does it mean to say: "the cat believes there's a mouse on the mat"? — Dawnstorm

It's a question that's more about the speaker's terminological use. I've answered it already.

Any question, any answer, any puzzlement around this always comes from a particular perspective... — Dawnstorm

Yes. Understanding any given perspective requires accepting the speaker's definitions, and subsequently seeing how well they hold up to scrutiny, including how well they are able to articulate/explain the evolutionary progression of belief.

Sounds like the belief of the cat the mouse is behind the stove is as dependent on language as my belief that the milk is in the fridge is dependent on cows (if it's cowmilk) - as a cat-external factor (and one the cat might only dimly understand to begin with). Why, then, are we talking about language and not, say, gravity. The stove's existentially dependent on many, many things, few of which seem part of the present belief. — Dawnstorm

Well, I'm talking about the idea of existential dependency upon language use but not gravity because the former is relevant to our process of understanding and setting out the evolutionary progression of belief whereas the latter is utterly irrelevant for such an endeavor. Existential dependency upon language is a tool(factor) that helps establish the contours of evolutionary progression as it pertains to the emergence and evolution of belief over time, which in turn is relevant to whether or not one belief can cause another.

I didn't see it that way at all. You do not look foolish to me. Becoming aware of our own false belief seems like an accomplishment. I mean, we're all aware of our own fallibility, aren't we?
— creativesoul

I didn't become aware of a false belief in that case... — Dawnstorm

Okay. I assumed that you believed what you wrote, as it was written. Afterwards you agreed that it wasn't true, and that statements using "all" do not typically reflect your beliefs. Understood. It now seems to me to have been a case of being loose with language. You've remarked on precision as well. That's fine. We can move beyond that tangent if you like. No problem here.

Truth, for me, tends to erode meaning — Dawnstorm

That's a statement worthy of a topic in its own right.

What's the difference between using the English language and using the English language like one knows it is a nominative-accusative language?
— creativesoul

There is none. — Dawnstorm

This is a very odd reply, especially given the great detail that followed carefully drawing a distinction between the two uses of "knowing" involved in your claims. It's an equivocation fallacy. It is unacceptable to use two completely different senses of the same term in the same argument. At best, unnecessary confusion ensues.

Is it your claim that all English users know that English is a nominative accusative language before they become aware of that background belief?

I'm still a bit unclear on what the point was, even though you reiterated that it's an important one. Could you set it out clearly as well as the relevance it has to our discussion?

This is what "behavioural implicature" means to me. A perspectival imputation. Basically: linguist:native speaker = human:cat. And since I'm a pretty staunch relativist, I'm fairly sure there's no way around behavioural implicature. — Dawnstorm

Are you saying that when we attempt to set out the cat's beliefs it is a case of imputing our own perspective into the cat, and that the linguist does much the same thing when imputing their own perspective upon native English speakers? To me, that's anthropomorphism in the case of the cat and is to be avoided at all costs. The avoidance of which is a key component/feature of the very methodology I'm working from.

This harks back to the pivotal role that language use has in some thought/belief formation, but not others. If there is some thought or belief that is existentially dependent upon the thinker/believer being capable of using language, then it cannot be the case that a language less creature is capable of having such belief, and hence imputing such belief onto a language less creature is a mistake. The same is true of imputing knowledge that English is a nominative accusative language to a speaker who doesn't know what counts as a nominative accusative language and hence has no clue what those words mean.

...

So, how does this notion of behavioural implicature deal with the fact that behaviour alone is indeterminate regarding that?
— creativesoul

Via an iterative process of situational compatibility. Behavioural implicature is reinforced when our expectations are met. — Dawnstorm

We all know, I presume anyway, that a mouse is incapable of contemplating the consequences of the double slit experiment.
— creativesoul

Under behavioural implicature the question is: what sort of behaviour from a mouse would have you question this piece of "knowledge"? We're not coming at this from a neutral postion. We make working assumptions until they fail us. I mean, I certainly wouldn't assume that a mouse was reading this thread, just because I catch it looking at the screen... — Dawnstorm

But why not? There are unspoken presuppositions at work here. If a mouse was capable of reading this thread, then there would be no trouble with assuming such a thing because you caught them looking at the screen. So what, exactly, is it that stops you from attributing such capabilities to the mouse? What sort of behaviour would the mouse need to display in order to question whether or not they could read this thread?

You see the problem here?

There is an underlying notion of thought/belief at work.

Progressives feel comfortable stepping into the unknown. That comfort level is bolstered by moral conviction tied to a sense of righting old wrongs. The downtrodden are always in their sights, whereas the conservative says the downtrodden will always be with us and stability is the highest good. — frank

As if minimizing the number of downtrodden while increasing the amount of Americans with plenty of spendable income somehow does not result in tremendous stability?

:smirk:

For example, all native speakers of English "know" that English is a "nominative-accusative language", in the sense that they use it like that without trouble.
— Dawnstorm

They display behavioural implicature that leads linguists to make the appropriate generalisations. — Dawnstorm

What's the difference between using the English language and using the English language like one knows it is a nominative-accusative language?

I originally thought that this focus upon English was meant to be an example of a background belief that is brought to the foreground.

This bit is something I'm intrigued by.

I suppose it boils down to what it takes in order to know that English is a nominative-accusative language. I mean, I didn't know that at all until this conversation, where you've brought it to my attention, and I've did a bit of reading about it.

By behavioural implicature, I simply mean that if we do X, that implies we believe Y, otherwise our behaviour would be random. On this level, "we" includes any creature capable of meaning. — Dawnstorm

I see. So, how does this notion of behavioural implicature deal with the fact that behaviour alone is indeterminate regarding that? I mean, for example, shrugging one's shoulders can mean more than one thing as a result of having more than one vein of thought going through the individual's mind. For some it means they could not care less. For others, it means they have no clue.

These are the sort of ambiguities my position aims to lessen/minimize.

If we are to attribute thought and belief to another creature, we ought to have at least a well-grounded idea and/or standard regarding what sorts of creatures are capable of forming which sorts of beliefs.

We all know, I presume anyway, that a mouse is incapable of contemplating the consequences of the double slit experiment.

Agreeing to this feels like a conversation stopper: I no longer know what to say, and I don't feel anything has been accomplished either. I end up walking away feeling vaguely foolish. — Dawnstorm

I didn't see it that way at all. You do not look foolish to me. Becoming aware of our own false belief seems like an accomplishment. I mean, we're all aware of our own fallibility, aren't we?

However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background.
— creativesoul

I don't disagree. The question, though, is to what degree language needs to be involved in belief formation.
— Dawnstorm

To the degree that the content therein is existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

Sure. To me that's just rephrasing the question. — Dawnstorm

And yet, it's an answer, not a question. The question was to what degree "language needs to be involved" in belief formation. I answered as clearly and concisely as I know how. Language needs to be involved in belief formation to the degree(extent) that the belief content is existentially dependent upon language. For instance, if one believes that there's milk in the fridge, then language needs to be involved in that belief in a number of ways. The milk and the fridge are both existentially dependent upon language. Thus, the belief cannot exist in a world that is completely absent of language.

If a cat watches a mouse run behind the stove and subsequently believes that the mouse is behind the stove, then that belief is existentially dependent upon language in the same way that the previous example is. The stove is existentially dependent upon language. So, language needs to be involved in those particular beliefs as an existential precondition for the possibility thereof.

However, if a cat watches a mouse run into a hole burrowed into the hillside and believes that the mouse will eventually come out of that hole, then that belief is not at all existentially dependent upon language. Hence, language does not need to be involved whatsoever in that belief formation.

This hints at two different existential dependency scenarios. It sheds light on the overlap between language less creatures' belief and language users'.

There are far more complex varieties of belief that language needs to be involved to a much greater degree/extent. Belief as propositional attitude fits here, as does believing that English is a nominative-accusative language, understanding and contemplating Gettier's paper, doing theoretical physics, philosophy, etc.

Knowing how to use language does not require knowing how to talk about the rules governing such language.

But once you do try to talk about such language, you introduce the possibility of a disjunct between your propositional belief and your behavioural implicature. — Dawnstorm

Would you care to set this disjunct out a bit more?

All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief.<----That seems like an undeniable basic tenet.

Would you agree?
— creativesoul

Long answer: We'd need to be sure we're on the same page about what "meaningful" is supposed to represent. Short answer: But yes, probably. — J

Okay. That's good.

I would think that any acceptable notion/conception/theory of "meaning" would be capable of setting out how things become meaningful, including how thought and/or belief becomes meaningful to thinking/believing creatures.

Knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires both, knowing how to use English, and knowing what counts as being "a nominative-accusative language"(knowing which descriptions set that out and which do not). Knowing how to use English does not.

Knowing the associated propositions requires knowing about the typology. But the propositions are supposed to describe what people are doing. So if the propositions don't describe the behavioural implicature, the rule isn't there. So, from this perspective, either native speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language, or linguists are wrong in some way. That's the connection here. — Dawnstorm

Is that the only two options: Either native English speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language, or linguists are wrong in some way? Do all linguists hold that to be true? If they do, then I would say they are wrong in some way.

All I'm saying is that knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires knowing how to use "nominative-accusative", whereas plenty of native English speakers have no clue what those words mean(how to use them). They are native English speakers nonetheless.

I suppose that if knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language could somehow be acquired without knowing what "nominative-accusative" means, then it could be possible for all native English speakers to know that English is a nominative-accusative language. I cannot make much sense of what that would entail.

I am not one who holds that knowledge of the rules governing language is shown by correct usage(following them).
— creativesoul

Nor am I. I've chosen the nominative-absolutive thing for a reason: it's so intuitive that most native speaker can't imagine it being different, and they usually have trouble learning an ergative-absolutive language. It's not the rules that determine what people do; it's what people do that determines the rules.

Language is interesting in that the expressed attitudes towards the propositions don't match what you would get from behavioural implicature. Linguists will, in these cases, side with behavioural implicature:

To make it clearer: People who will berate you for splitting an infinitive usually split infinitives themselves. That's not a one-rule-for-you-one-rule-for-me situation. They don't know they do it. They will correct themselves, and then err again. (I'm not sure this occurs with split-infinitives; but it's a common phenomenon.) — Dawnstorm

Hmmm. Is that something like a performative contradiction?

I'm fairly certain I do not quite understand the point being made here. I'm curious about this notion of behavioural implicature. Could you explain it more, please? Thank you.

In this case, the belief candidate under consideration is/was an attitude/disposition towards the following proposition:

"Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".
— creativesoul

And it would definitely make sense to say that - in this case - language had to be involved, given what I've said in this thread. So this might count as an example of a belief that is not pre-linguistic. — Dawnstorm

Okay. So, it is not the case that beliefs might all be prelinguistic.

But then we're almost exclusively talking about the proposition, and the attitude towards it:

All propositions are existentially dependent upon language. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon propositions. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon language. That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to it. Thus, there are no such things as "prelinguistic" propositional attitudes/dispositions.
— creativesoul

But what's the relationship between a propositional attitude and a belief? — Dawnstorm

Propositional attitudes are beliefs.

I invoked belief as propositional attitude because it fit the situation. I do not deny that some belief amounts to an attitude/disposition towards some proposition such that the individual takes the proposition to be true(or not). I deny that all belief can be properly taken account of by virtue of using that framework. Notably, because i)all belief must be meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief, and ii)propositions are utterly meaningless to language less creatures, it only follows that belief as propositional attitude is found lacking in its ability to take proper account of language less belief.

I think we're in agreement there.

I'm fairly sure I've heard beliefs defined as "propositional attitudes", but since I'm comparing language-using and lagnauge-less creatures here, that definition doesn't seem useful. — Dawnstorm

Indeed, it is not useful for taking account of language less belief, aside from setting out what it cannot consist of.

However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background.
— creativesoul

I don't disagree. The question, though, is to what degree language needs to be involved in belief formation. — Dawnstorm

To the degree that the content therein is existentially dependent upon language.

I'll skip a lot mostly because of a time limit, but this seems promising, as this seems to be where our perspectives mainly differ:

I don't know if I understand the first question, but I think you're asking something along the lines of how meaningful the mat is to the cat. That would all depend upon the sheer number of correlations that the mat had been a previous part of in the cat's thought, in addition to the content other than the mat. That's generally the case for all 'degrees' of meaningfulness, on my view. If you meant something else, perhaps you could rephrase the question?

I do not understand the second question at all. A mouse is a mouse. One hundred percent. If you're asking me whether or not the cat sees the mouse as a mouse, I'd defer to my last post which briefly discusses such manners of speaking, and ask if it is possible for a cat to look at a mouse and see something else?
— creativesoul

When I think of a thought, I think of what's currently present in the mind and how it presents itself to the "thinker" in question. So, yes, it's about "how meaningful the mat is to the cat," but not only as a generalised object, also how relevant it is in the current situation. What about the mat is represented in the cat, so to speak, and what about the situation draws the attention to the mat. It is entirely possible that whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-cat-in-general is entirely in the background for the present situation. To believe that "the mouse is on the mat" is to draw a connection between the mat and the mouse that may be entirely a potential. The cat *can* have such a belief, but currently doesn't. — Dawnstorm

If I understand this correctly, I'd agree that the importance that the mat plays in the cat's thought and/or belief is determined by its relevance to the cat in the current situation(at that time). So, if I understand you correctly, I think you're saying something like the mouse can be on the mat, and the cat can have a belief about the mouse that doesn't include the mat. I would agree.

The mat is meaningful to the cat in the sense of being an integral part of where the mouse is located. That's about all I meant by claiming the cat can believe the mouse is on the mat. Although, as you've suggested and I've mentioned, the mat could be much more meaningful than just that to the cat.

But here we stand perpendicular to the situation: whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-cat is not automatically the same as whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-human, though I expect there to be sufficient overlap for comparison. — Dawnstorm

I agree and may put that a bit stronger. Whatever the mat means to the cat is never exactly the same as whatever the mat means to the human.

Now, I think that we might - methodologically - assume a "hunting situation" that we assume we both understand. What then is the minimal overlap we'd expect, what are the opportunities for misunderstanding. The question about the mat then becomes to what degree does the cat have cause to form believes about what the human thinks of as a mat, in this very situation. This goes beyond the situation down to the bits of the cat's world-view that's inaccessible to us, but it always has the hunting situation at its core.

In short, we methodically assume a commonality, so that we don't have to assume commonalities outside of that context (hunting). But that also means we must attempt to scale back what we take for granted about mice and mats - and often the result of that is more a discovery about how we view the world than it is about how the cat views the world.

It's a methodology of controlled estrangement, if you will. The cat will not see anything but a mouse, in the sense that the mouse is there. But the mouse's mouse-ness is called into question - methodologically - by not assuming more commonalities than we must (and we must assume some commonalities, if we are to think at all).

So how to mats and mice correlate here? We can question mats, and we can question mice, and that's comparatively easier to questioning "mats and mice" at the same time. This assumes that there's no particular way any one individual (whether human or feline) might see anything else, though there's probably a set of restrictions of what's possible on the side of what becomes a mouse or a mat when presented to a consciousness.

I'd understand if this is hard going. You said earlier, you don't accept phenomenology (or something to that effect?), and this is definitely somewhat in the vicinity of Husserl, though viewed through the lense of sociology (say Alfred Schütz, or even Helmut Plessner). It's probably fine to drop that angle, if it gets in the way. But it'd be good to bear in mind the difference (if there be one), as I can't excise the influence easily, and it'll come up from time to time.

On the whole, we don't seem so far apart? — Dawnstorm

No, I do not think we're so far apart in that we seem to both understand that there are differences and similarities between the cat's point of view and our own, in addition to recognizing the need of a terminological framework capable of setting those out.

I'll single this line out:

"Your attitude/disposition about the possibility first required articulating the possibility."

Unsure. I'm fairly sure that it's at least possible that that formulating some beliefs is what brings to your attention what you've implicitly believed so far. That is: sometimes formulating a belief is raising it from background to foreground status, and forgrounded beliefs are perceived more at risk. People might think they formed a belief, but really what happened is that - for the first time - they have cause to defend it. A conscious belief has entered the social arena, so to speak, and needs to be defended or modified or even abandoned. — Dawnstorm

Yes. That sounds about right, but I do not find that any of this is inevitably contradictory to what I've been saying, although it could be in its underpinnings. I agree that sometimes formulating a belief is raising it from background to foreground status, and in doing so one may have cause to defend it - for the very first time. However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background. In this case, the belief candidate under consideration is/was an attitude/disposition towards the following proposition:

"Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".

All propositions are existentially dependent upon language. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon propositions. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon language. That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to it. Thus, there are no such things as "prelinguistic" propositional attitudes/dispositions.

Basically, the "possibility" needn't be articulated to act on it without a hiccup in social situations, and it's the hiccup in the social situation that causes you to formulate your belief. An attitude about a possibility is often part of the unacknowledged social praxis. We formulate possibilities to the degree that our beliefs have become problematic. We act on them without formulating them all the time. — Dawnstorm

Well, in our case, the possibility under consideration was whether or not it was/is possible for all belief to be prelinguistic. It was formulated like this: "Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".

While I agree that we act on our beliefs without formulating them all the time, that's not what was in question here, nor do those facts pose any issue with what I've been setting out. I now think that you may have meant something strikingly different than me when qualifying belief as "prelinguistic".

There's no doubt that most people hold all sorts of background(foundational) beliefs. I would further say that many people have never really identified, named, and/or talked about those background beliefs as subject matters in their own right. I think our views are commensurate regarding these matters.

I would further claim that these beliefs have efficacy(which returns to the OP's concerns).

I think that our views diverge when it comes to ontological concerns; what beliefs consist of.

For example, all native speakers of English "know" that English is a "nominative-accusative language", in the sense that they use it like that without trouble. But among native speakers of English, you rarely need to formulate this: linguists are one systematic example. They know, too, that one alternative is the "ergative-absolutive language", and they can talk about the difference. A native speaker of English might have trouble understanding what's going on while learning, say, Basque. You now need to go back and formulate what you've always been instinctively doing, so you can then get back at the difference. But you certainly don't need to be able to explain the difference (or even know it exists) to speak English.

We're seeing the same mismatch currently around the gender topic, I think. — Dawnstorm

I am not one who holds that knowledge of the rules governing language is shown by correct usage(following them). Knowing how to use language does not require knowing how to talk about the rules governing such language. Knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires both, knowing how to use English, and knowing what counts as being "a nominative-accusative language"(knowing which descriptions set that out and which do not). Knowing how to use English does not.

I do not find it at all helpful to say that all native English speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language. That's simply not true, even if it is the case that they'd assent to such a description after understanding what that means.

I'm currently working on a reply to the rest of that post. I wanted to address it separately, for it invoked meaning, and we both find it promising.

I'll address your response sometime tomorrow. Looks promising to me in many ways. :smile:

We have differences in, I think, terminology... — Dawnstorm

Yes, we certainly do. I think that those differences could be causal in nature in a certain sense similar to what the OP has been talking about. All of us share the pursuit to remain consistent in our respective positions. Hence, the differences themselves cause us to think a bit differently as a result.

What is interesting to me is that we share the same target. The thought and/or belief of non-human creatures. The key, it seems to me, is understanding what that target consists of.

The challenge is to better understand what we can say, philosophically, about the other kind(s). — J

Indeed, it is. I've found that this particular pursuit can challenge one's basic ontological underpinnings in unfamiliar ways that can result in cognitive dissonance.

Methodological approach seems key here. I'm thinking that there are a few things we need to carefully consider, in addition to any inevitable consequences. This basics of this pursuit are incommensurate with many conventional positions. That explains the broadly held denial of language less creatures' having thought or belief, on pains of coherency alone.

All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief.<----That seems like an undeniable basic tenet.

Would you agree?

What's important here is that the overlap between worldviews seems stronger when it comes to "mouse", then when it comes to "mat". Or not. Maybe the mat is the place where it's not cold in winter, so there's a sense of "territory" in the situational background that the human lacks specifically for the mat, as it's relevant for the entirety of the house? — Dawnstorm

All sounds fine with me.

As the above paragraphs show, I think that humans and cats have comparable "thoughts". Language isn't irrelevant, but it's not where I would draw the line (given relevance to thought). — Dawnstorm

All looks fine here as well. Hopefully "the line" is a bit better understood after the past couple posts.

I'd say result-based concepts are thing we interact with, but are largely ignorant about and thus don't think of as processes. The light-switch is a thing I use. I have limited process-awareness of it, compared to the electrician who fixes the circuit when the switch doesn't work. The light switch is a thing that works or doesn't. I'd say that's pretty much the relationship between the cat and the mat (except that it might serve less of a function in the current activity).

I see language as an activity, much like switching on the light (but much more complex). It's related to thought, because usually when we utter a sentence we mean something by it. It is possible, though, to utter a sentence in a language we don't understand, maybe focusing on the aspect of getting the pronunciation right. It's hard to get foreign pronunciations right because of acquired speech habits. That is: language itself isn't only a possible tool for thought, it also always a target of thought (we monitor for mistakes, for example).

So the putative difference between a langauge-having and a language-less creature is mostly that a language-less creature cannot and does not have to think about language. But puzzling out what the difference between language-accompanied and language-less thought is seems at the core of this thread.

It occurred to me, while reading the current discussion, that it might be relevant that I grew up bilingually. I grew up in Austria, with my mum being Austrian and my dad being Croatian (which would have been "Yugoslavian" when I was a kid). I'd almost exclusively talk German, even when spoken to in Croation by my dad. Maybe that's why I never associated words and thoughts quite as closely as others, and in turn why I also don't think language is quite as important a creature feature during species distinction. Maybe? (Just an aside.)

Sure. I've no problem with this.

:smile:

A cat can think/believe that a mouse is on the mat. The content of the cat's thought/belief includes the mouse(which is not existentially dependent upon language) and the mat(which is).
— creativesoul

To what degree does the "mat" feature? There are other questions: to what degree is the "mouse" a mouse? Is there a sequence of: movement over there; focus attention; prey; plan: pounce. Now? Now? Now? Now! — Dawnstorm

I don't know if I understand the first question, but I think you're asking something along the lines of how meaningful the mat is to the cat. That would all depend upon the sheer number of correlations that the mat had been a previous part of in the cat's thought, in addition to the content other than the mat. That's generally the case for all 'degrees' of meaningfulness, on my view. If you meant something else, perhaps you could rephrase the question?

I do not understand the second question at all. A mouse is a mouse. One hundred percent. If you're asking me whether or not the cat sees the mouse as a mouse, I'd defer to my last post which briefly discusses such manners of speaking, and ask if it is possible for a cat to look at a mouse and see something else?

I'm sure there's movement involved(part of the correlational content), physiological sensory perception is necessary, the autonomous drive to eat(hunger pangs could very well be part of the correlation content), possibly previous experiences with hunting mice, etc. that all play a potential role in the current correlational content. I'm not at all keen or fond of the idea that we can read non-human animals' mind with any amount of well-grounded accuracy or precision. We, generally speaking, have a difficult enough time reading the minds of other humans, unless we know them very well. To the contrary, I think we can only provide a well-grounded basic outline for all cases. There are some cases, depending upon specific circumstances that garner a narrower scope of greater detail, but it is on a case-by-case basis.

Some ducks used to have me as their source of food and water. They definitely drew correlations between me and getting fed and/or watered. Did they believe they were about to be fed when I opened the sliding glass doors at the downstairs portion of the back of the house? I think they did based upon all the past correlations. They exhibited behaviours unique to eating. Did they believe they were about to be fed after hearing the food container lid being opened and/or the rustling of the synthetic fabric just before the sound of the plastic food dispenser being plunged into the food? Seems to me that they did. They'd come from everywhere within earshot and exhibit the aforementioned eating behaviours.

I know that they learned how to get fed when they were hungry. They would approach me, come very close, sometimes nipping at my basketball shorts, and exhibit all the feeding behaviours. By my lights, if they drew connections between their own behaviour(approaching me with open mouths) and me getting them food, then that would count as shared meaning between them and myself. A plurality of creatures drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations/associations between the same things. They were telling me they wanted to eat.

Some thought, I do think, relies on language, as language supplies a retrievable label that stands in for a sub routine. If there isn't a word for something, we can still talk about it but it takes longer. If there's a word for it, we just say one word, but mean the same thing (wasting less time). And that process is iterative. "Hm, what do we call this reverse track ball? Kinda looks like a mouse, doesn't it?". There's grammatical crossreference that's quite common: the verb to marry, its participle form "married" ending up ambiguous between verbal and adjectival usage (an ambiguity striking in the analysis of passive voice...) — Dawnstorm

It seems to me that "Some thought relies on language" is undeniable. The content of some language less thought relies on language as well. Hence, such language less thought relies on language.

Cross referencing is a complex manner of drawing correlating/associating/connecting different things. As is naming. I'm curious if you'd agree with that?

What I'm ending up with in the current conversation is the question of what even is a "language-less creature"? — Dawnstorm

That's a great question. Thank you for asking it! A language less creature is one that has never drawn correlations/associations between language use and other things. In this discussion, I'm speaking a bit loosely as "language less creatures" are meant to denote those that do not draw correlations between our language use and other things.

Now, strictly speaking(and part of why I liked the question so much), if we were to begin talking about potential language use of creatures other than humans, I would definitely argue in the affirmative for the idea that some animals use language amongst themselves. Such language also consists of correlations/associations drawn between different things. While that language is starkly different than ours in many ways(all involving the complexity of the correlations and their consequences), it is also strikingly similar enough in its basic elemental constituency(what makes it a language) to ours.

One key point is that the candidates using language do so in precisely the same basic way that we do; language emergence/use by virtue of a plurality of individuals drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations between the use(basic ostension/sounding of alarm/calling/warning all come immediately to mind) and other things.

With respect to thought language is some kind of mental activity. And it seems clear to me that there isn't a clear-cut distinction between humans and other animals to be found. At some point we arrive at complexity we don't see in other creatures, sure. But the basics seem to cut across species.

Indeed. The basics do seem to cut across capable creatures, which makes perfect evolutionary sense. It's the complexities that distinguish us and our thought/belief/language from other animals.

Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic...

I find that this quandary undermines itself. My attitude/disposition about the suggestion required first reading the suggestion. Hence, clearly not before it. I believe that the suggestion is not true. Your attitude/disposition about the possibility first required articulating the possibility. Again, clearly not before language, assuming you believe it to be true.

I would readily agree that prelinguistic beliefs are sometimes formed by creatures prior to their capabilities for language acquisition. I have argued that language is impossible without prelinguistic beliefs. Unlike what you've suggested may be the case, it seems to me that belief begins prior to language acquisition and continue afterwards.

...they might be about things that couldn't exist if we didn't trick our limited attention spans with shortcuts, and then embed those shortcuts in thoughts that again get short-cutted, until we've got a thought-habit no longer reliant on the original thought process. In other words, we can switch on the light without knowing how to fix the circuits in the wall should they break.

Here the difference between animals and humans seems to break down: it's not so much about being "language-less". It's about not being an expert in the origin and nature of the generative concept. I'd argue it's more about result-based perception vs. process-based perception.

I don't see how the last statement follows from what preceded it. Although, I agree that there's a difference between result based thought/belief and process based, I would argue that it's not a difference in kind, but rather it's a difference in the complexity level necessary for forming/having it. All result-based thought/belief is process based. Furthermore, it seems to me that avoiding danger and gathering resources is results based. So, I do not see the value in the distinction here.

I could be being swayed by all the baggage that comes with the notion of "perception" as well. I've yet to have witnessed an acceptable sense of "perception" other than when it picks out the autonomous abilities sometimes called "sense perception". (Physiological sensory)"perception" is much better used, on my view, to talk about the autonomous biological structures that are necessary preconditions for drawing certain kinds of correlations/associations between specific things as compared/contrasted to being used to pick out the correlations/associations themselves, which conflates necessary biological preconditions for thought/belief with thought/belief.

"Seeing an ant hill as an ant hill" is guilty of the latter. "That's how s/he/they perceive the situation, but I perceive it differently" is another.

Of course, this is what makes sense to me, given what I hold to be true about thought and belief. I'm certain that I'm missing something. I'm not certain that what's missing matters, but I'm certainly not beyond reproach.

I'm addressing the rest in a separate post. Thanks again for the interesting additions!

:up:

Nice additions. I'd like to give your post the attention it deserves. That's my intent...

Manana!

It's worth mentioning here that I reject many an historical dichotomy when it comes to the ontological basis for my position; they're found sorely lacking in their ability to take proper account of that which consists of both and is thus neither one nor the other. Thought and belief are such things. Belief content matters. The inadequate dichotomies include subject/object, physical/nonphysical, material/immaterial, internal/external, objective/subjective, linguistic/nonlinguistic.

Convention has been employing these for centuries. If they were capable of taking adequate account of thought and belief, they would have done a better job by now.

Does it matter if we include some non-artifactual objects in the list of things that are existentially dependent upon language? I don't think so. We can add sand dunes and the like without changing your schema. — J

Not according to the position I argue for/from.

On my view, sand dunes are not existentially dependent upon language. "Sand dunes" is. Sand dunes are not equivalent to "sand dunes".

That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to language. Sand dunes existed in their entirety prior to language use. "Sand dunes" did not. Sand dunes consist of grains of sand. "Sand dunes" does not. "Sand dunes" consists of meaningful marks. Sand dunes do not. You can find "sand dunes" in some books/literature. You cannot find a sand dune in any book.

"Sand dunes" is existentially dependent upon language use. Sand dunes are not.

The human intention to see it as a dune -- because we have uses for which the term "sand dune" is needed -- can't be ignored. — J

If I may...

In the above quote, does the term "it" refer to a sand dune? I think it must, because we do not see the term "sand dune" as a dune.

Substitution results in the following:

"The human intention to see a sand dune as a dune --- because we have uses for which the term "sand dune" is needed --- can't be ignored"

While the manner of speaking/writing I'm critiquing seems innocuous to many. I do not find a need for it. I'd rather not equivocate the term "see", because our visual capacity plays an integral role in the formation of thought and belief. Some content of thought are things we see. This holds good regardless of whether or not we've developing naming and descriptive practices about those things.

We use language(naming and descriptive practices) to talk about, learn about, and think about sand dunes, including knowing what "sand dunes" picks out of this world. <-----On my view that's much better than 'seeing sand dunes as dunes'. We use our eyes to see sand dunes - before and after - naming and describing them.

That's the point I want to return to. How does the question of whether a belief concerns a) something that is existentially dependent on language, or b) something that is not so dependent, affect whether a non-linguistic animal can be said to have linguistic beliefs or not? — J

I'm not okay with saying language less animals have linguistic beliefs.

Do you simply mean that we ought to extend the normal meaning of "linguistic belief" so that it can also mean "A belief about something that is existentially dependent on language"?

No, that's not what I mean. I reject the dichotomy for the reasons already explained. In addition, the terms have baggage I'm not willing to carry or explain away as a result of not practicing the normal usage. I find it's much better for me to employ a different framework. As above, I'm not okay with saying that a language less animal is capable of having linguistic belief. I'm okay with saying that language less belief can consist of some things that are existentially dependent upon language(assuming a shared world of course).

Yes, a bit clearer. One thing first, though: Is the reason that "some things are existentially dependent upon language (like mats, tables, cars, etc.)" because those objects are human artifacts? — J

Probably, unless there are human artifacts which are somehow not existentially dependent upon language. It's the existential dependency upon language that matters.

If it's the human-made aspect that makes the difference, how would a language-less animal know about it or be aware of it? — J

They wouldn't, but the language less creatures' awareness(or lack thereof) regarding what their own belief consists of is irrelevant.

I'm a little puzzled about why a mat, e.g., would depend on language for its existence. — J

I suppose I'm claiming that the technology involved in textiles is impossible without shared meaning. I haven't tried to prove it, but I'm okay with that. There may be arguments for it, if need be. I don't see the need, because there's no good reason to doubt it, and I cannot imagine a sound argument against the idea. Of course, I may be mistaken and given that none of us are capable of knowingly believing a falsehood or knowingly holding false belief, it would take another to point it out, should there be a mistake with claiming that textile technology is existentially dependent upon language and mats are existentially dependent upon textile technology.

This notion of existential dependency is not to be confused/conflated with subsistence. It's better understood as initial emergence requirements.

If I make an object but don't give it a name, does it exist in some lesser way? Probably I'm just not seeing what you're getting at. — J

It's not whether or not the candidate under consideration has been named that matters. We name things that are not existentially dependent upon language, and some unnamed things are existentially dependent language.

I was making the case for rejecting the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy as a means for taking account of thought and belief. And now I've just went through a process I tried to avoid earlier by mentioning the rejection. It's a bit disheartening that you say what you said at the end.

Sigh.

Edited to remove a comment that harmed the quality of the discussion.

First of all, I do not talk in terms of "non-linguistic belief" for reasons already explained. — creativesoul

To be fair, the above words are mine, and they're misleading at best, and downright false at worst. I have now explained it, so. My apologies for what's directly above. Brief mentions are not explanations.

Perhaps start with "non-linguistic belief"? That's the one I find most puzzling.

I have no burden regarding that terminological use. You first invoked it. I rejected it.
— creativesoul

But you said:

I reject the idea that language less animals' belief(s) have propositional content.
— creativesoul

So if a language-less animal has a belief -- moreover, a belief without propositional content -- isn't it by definition a non-linguistic belief? I'm confused. — J

The confusion is understandable. The position I argue for/from is quite unusual/unconventional in some ways and includes subtle details that are crucial for understanding.

To the question: What counts as "by definition" depends upon taxonomy/terminological framework. As we both know, this particular subject matter, is extremely nuanced(theory laden).

If there is such a thing as language less thought and/or belief, and evolutionary theory is given a modicum of credence/applicability here, then it only follows that we're attempting to set out/discover/understand that which existed in its entirety(in some form or another) prior to our accounting practices. Thus, our definitions thereof are quite capable of being wrong, particularly regarding the elemental constituents therein/thereof.

On my view, if a language less creature has a thought and/or belief, then that thought and/or belief is - by definition - language less belief, i.e. the thought and/or belief of a language less creature. One aspect of such belief is that they cannot include language use as part of their content. That is one of the defining features. In other words, and circling back to what I've been setting out, language less belief are correlations drawn between different things, but language use is never one of the things(or "stuff") the creature draws correlations between.

However, and this is the subtlety, because language less belief can include(consist of) some things that are existentially dependent upon language(like mats, tables, cars, etc.) and all things that are existentially dependent upon language could sensibly/rightly be called "linguistic" things, the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is found sorely lacking in its ability to further draw and maintain the distinction between the belief of language users and the belief of language less creatures, particularly when it comes to the content of those.

When we call language less belief "nonlinguistic belief", and then we take further account of the content therein, we will inevitably arrive at the incoherent conclusion that nonlinguistic belief has linguistic content. That serves as ground to reject the dichotomy as a means to draw and maintain the distinction between language users' and language less creatures' thought and/or belief.

That's about as plain as I'm able to put it. Hope that helps.

It sounds to me, if I can say this without giving offense, that you've grown used to your own views in this area (and that happens to us all, of course) and you may not realize how un-obvious they are without further explanation. — J

No offense taken. No worries. I'm very well aware of how unorthodox my views are. I've been working out the kinks for nearly two decades. Further explanation is to be expected. I welcome shouldering any burden they may require. I welcome germane questions about my claims, and any inevitable logical consequences thereof. However, I'm not shouldering any burdens borne of words and claims I've not made.

I'm also quite short on time nowadays. The only reason I've been on here as frequently as I have the past few days was due to being in a state of recovery time limiting my own physical abilities.

It's a topic that interests me, and I'm genuinely curious to see if we can put together a picture of how non-linguistic creatures may or may not engage in a rudimentary form of reasoning.

You, me, and so many more. There's a ton of work necessary to reach that goal. "Thesis worthy" doesn't even begin to appropriately describe the endeavor.

First of all, I do not talk in terms of "non-linguistic belief" for reasons already explained.

But you have re-interrogate each of the terms you're using and try to say exactly what they mean. Perhaps start with "non-linguistic belief"? That's the one I find most puzzling.

I have no burden regarding that terminological use. You first invoked it. I rejected it.

A correlation is a relationship and/or association that is attributed/recognized/inferred/drawn between different things by a creature so capable. In our example, the creature touching the fire associated/correlated their own behaviour(touching the fire) with/to the subsequent pain, hence attributing/recognizing a causal relationship between the behaviour and pain.

Your objections are very much in line with Rödl's concerns. He's a tough read, but Self-Consciousness and Objectivity has a lot to recommend it. There was also a long thread jumping off from his re-evaluation of what a proposition is; I believe it's the thread called "p and 'I think p'". — J

Yeah. I read that thread, and followed it fairly closely. It was an interesting thread.

But you're just re-asserting all this. I'm asking why you believe it's true, and what such thoughts or beliefs consist of, if not words? Does the cat perhaps think in images? Can she believe using images? I'm not trying to be difficult, or imply that there are no good answers to my questions, but we need a lot more clarity on what's being proposed. What is the "stuff" that allows this account to go forward? — J

Interesting reply given the context.

What are you wanting to know? :brow:

Are you looking for an ontological basis or terminological framework upon which to build an 'updated' conception/understanding of thought/belief... human thought/belief notwithstanding?

All thought and belief reduce to correlations drawn between different things.

But at this very moment (or so goes the usual story) there are propositions about all sorts of things, which are either true or false, yet unarticulated. — J

Yup. I'm aware of this dogma. So much the worse for convention. In what sensible way can an unarticulated proposition be said to exist?

What does a proposition consist of?

What does an unarticulated proposition consist of?

the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is incapable of taking proper account of language less thought and belief, particularly in terms of the content thereof.
— creativesoul

Say more about that? Do you mean, the dichotomy is too rigid?
— J

Sort of. The content of a language less creature's thought and belief can include/consist of stuff that is existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

OK, but I still wish I understood what the "stuff" was. — J

A cat can think/believe that a mouse is on the mat. The content of the cat's thought/belief includes the mouse(which is not existentially dependent upon language) and the mat(which is). Both are elemental constituents of the cat's thought/belief. The cat is a language less animal capable of forming thought/belief consisting of elemental constituents that are themselves existentially dependent upon language.

...propositions have the peculiar property of being true or false (for example) regardless of whether anyone asserts them... — J

What does an unarticulated proposition consist of? — creativesoul

Right, that's the question. — J

I would ask that question to anyone claiming that there is such thing as an unarticulated proposition. By my lights, it exposes an emaciated ontological framework.

If propositions are existentially dependent upon language use(being proposed), and language use is existentially dependent upon shared meaning, then it only follows that propositions are existentially dependent upon shared meaning. If the capability of being true/false requires saying something meaningful about the world(which is usually held by such positions), and saying something meaningful about the world is language use, then it only follows that in order for a proposition to be capable of being true or false, they must say something meaningful about the world via language use.

There is no such thing as an unarticulated proposition.

How can I think through a thought without breaking my own structure of thinking or undoing my own reasoning? — GreekSkeptic

Establish and maintain consistency/coherence(lack of self-contradiction).

the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is incapable of taking proper account of language less thought and belief, particularly in terms of the content thereof.
— creativesoul

Say more about that? Do you mean, the dichotomy is too rigid? — J

Sort of. The content of a language less creature's thought and belief can include/consist of stuff that is existentially dependent upon language.

The theory laden nature of these discussions you mentioned as necessary in the OP is showing up here.

What does an unarticulated proposition consist of?

Given the direction of our discussion, it's worth saying that the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is incapable of taking proper account of language less thought and belief, particularly in terms of the content thereof.