I'm not sure that dogs have a concept of causality as such. — Ludwig V

I agree but...

Where does the need for having a concept of causality come from? Again, I do not find the notion of concept to be of help. Generally speaking, it seems to be a step backward instead of forward. One can recognize/attribute causal relationships, which is what is meant by "recognize/attribute causality" without having a concept of causality(thinking about causality as a subject matter in and of itself). A creature can believe that X causes Y without having a concept of causality. Recognizing/attributing causality requires only inferring that.

But it's not enough for him to generalize and understand that (1) whenever he kills a chicken, he will be in trouble. He also needs to understand that (2) if he does not kill chickens, Janus wll not be displeased with him.

There's more to Jimi than just recognizing causal correlations. — Ludwig V

Of course there is more to any thinking creature than just the recognition/attribution of causality, but it seems to me that that process, regardless of the creature, is more than adequate for being a case of thinking(thought/belief).

I'm not convinced that Jimi knows he's in trouble, so I question the account above on its presuppositional ground.

It is more than enough that Jimi inferred that his own behaviour caused Janus'. Here, all Jimi needs to avoid killing chickens is to believe that if he does Janus will do whatever Janus did the first time. He does not need to understand that if he does not kill chickens Janus will not be displeased. He just needs to believe that if he does, Janus will do what he did the first time. His belief that his own behaviour caused Janus' comes replete with the further inference/belief/expectation that if he does not, Janus will not do that either. That's how the recognition/attribution of causality works.

For example, when a dog checks out a bowl, because it expects there to be food in it, and is disappointed, I don't suppose it says to itself "Oh, my belief that there was food there is wrong" or anything similar. It simply walks away. But that action counts as a recognition that its belief was false. — Ludwig V

Recognizing that the bowl is empty is not the same as recognizing that one's own belief about food being in the bowl is false. The former is about the food and the bowl. The latter is about one's own thought/belief. The dog can directly perceive the food, the bowl, and its own hunger. Thought and belief are not directly perceptible things. Nor are truth/falsity. Nor is meaning. Nor are social/institutional facts. Nor are any number of abstractions.

I cannot find good ground for claiming that any creature incapable of naming and descriptive practices is capable of abstraction. Recognizing that one's own belief is false requires comparison/contrast between the belief and what the belief is about. That seems to require a skillset unobtainable to dogs.

We are discussing the difference between living with language and without language. — Athena

Yes. That's part of it. There's also the transition between. There are also different kinds of languages consisting of different kinds of meaningful behaviours, marks, utterances, etc.

Indeed, what counts as language matters in more than one way.

I think Ludwig V is right because the dog remembers the bowl is where it found food — Athena

Knowing where to get food is not the same as knowing that one's own belief is false.

The claim was that walking away from an empty food bowl counts as recognition that the prior belief(that the bowl had food in it) was false.

What is involved in the process of recognizing that one's own belief about whether or not there is food in the bowl is false? It requires drawing a distinction between one's own belief and what the belief is about. This process, at a bare minimum, requires thinking about one's own belief as a subject matter in and of itself, which in turn requires a way to do so. We do that with words, which stand in as proxy, for the belief. How can an animal without naming and descriptive practices invent/create a meaningful utterance which stands in place of its own belief? That must be done prior to comparing that belief to the world. It is only via such a comparison that one can recognize that their own belief is either true or false.

Do you deny that some animals other than humans, as well as some predating humans have(form, have, and/or hold)belief?

When you move to a world where there are no humans, the bridge breaks. — fdrake

Indeed. Such is one consequence of conflating belief statements with all belief.

Creatures are capable of those things. If logical/valid conclusions contradict that, then the presuppositions/unspoken assumptions underwriting that train of thought are somehow mistaken.
— creativesoul
Some people might call that begging the question... — Ludwig V

That's their problem. I call it making sure a position is commensurate with the facts; what's happened or is happening; everyday events; etc. Many animals other than humans are clearly capable of problem solving. We can watch it happen. That's been proven over and over. So, either problem solving is something that can be done by a thoughtless creature(which amounts to saying that problem solving does not require thinking) or some non human creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought.

Since it is the case that some other animals problem solve, and problem solving is thinking, then it is not the case that only human are capable of thinking.

The conventional problems underwriting this matter stem from i) an abysmal failure to draw and maintain the actual distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief, and ii) parsing truth as nothing more than a property of true sentences.

It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use.
— creativesoul
Yes, and that's important. For example, when a dog checks out a bowl, because it expects there to be food in it, and is disappointed, I don't suppose it says to itself "Oh, my belief that there was food there is wrong" or anything similar. It simply walks away. But that action counts as a recognition that its belief was false. — Ludwig V

I find it curious that you agree and then immediately misattribute meaning to the dog, based upon the dog's behaviour. Your dog's walking away from an empty food bowl may count as a recognition that it's
belief was false according to your criterion for what counts as such belief, but not mine.

The dog knows there's no food in bowl. The dog may have believed that there was prior to going to check. He checked. There was no food in the bowl. The bowl did not have food in it. That's what he believed. In order for him to recognize that his belief was false, he would have to first be capable of thinking about his own belief. As I've painstakingly set out heretofore many times over, thinking about one's own thought is a practice that is itself existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices replete with some proxy for the dog's own thought/belief. Dogs do not have what it takes.

Do you have any argument whatsoever for any of the claims you've been making? Do you have a valid objection to my own? Do you have a bare minimum criterion for what counts as thought or belief such that all thought and belief satisfy it?

How does a dog(or any other animal without naming and descriptive practices) pick its own belief out of this world to the exclusion of all else in order to compare it to the world?

Current convention is chock full of practices that clearly show we have not gotten some rather important bits of this right. That is clearly shown by the inability for many a position to admit that other creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and belief.
— creativesoul
How do you know that current convention is wrong in not being able to admit that creatures are capable of those things? — Ludwig V

Creatures are capable of those things. If logical/valid conclusions contradict that, then the presuppositions/unspoken assumptions underwriting that train of thought are somehow mistaken.

Many people accept the conclusion that they are not.

Indeed they do. Some folk must if they are to remain free from self-contradiction.

So before you can demonstrate they are wrong, you must already have a clear and correct criterion.

I'm not even sure what you're claiming here. I'll add this...

If it is the case that creatures capable of having meaningful experiences roamed the earth long before the first language users like us(those employing naming and descriptive practices) did, then any and all acceptable notions/conceptions/uses of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" must be able to take this into proper account. Lest they be found sorely lacking.

It is the case. Some positions cannot admit this. Thus, those positions must be rejected.

Jimi most definitely is capable of recognizing and/or attributing causality. That's um... sometimes as far back as we need to go. I'm puzzled at the response though. Are you averse to the idea that dogs are capable of recognizing causality?

It seems that Jimi did learn to leave the chickens alone - even when Janus was not there - from the experience. So his future behaviour does not correlate with either a dead chicken or with Janus' presence - much less on the presence of both. — Ludwig V

I'm not sure what this is supposed to be aimed at. Looks to be made of straw.

Sure. Jimi's learned from his experience. Such experience was meaningful to Jimi by virtue of his having drawn correlations between his own behaviour and Janus's behaviour afterwards. Chickens became a bit more significant to Jimi as a result. Jimi learned that killing chickens has unwanted consequences. He can learn much the same lesson after touching fire.

The thing is, there's more than one correlation in play. He might have correlated the dead chicken, or the dead chicken and Janus' presence - or both together- with the displeasure. — Ludwig V

There is more than one correlation being drawn. Some are efficacious too. Some have been drawn and continue to influence subsequent behaviours afterwards.

That's not a problem.

Claims beginning with Jimi "might have" presuppose a world in which Jimi could have. It's that logically possible world that needs set out. What else must also be the case in order for it to be possible for Jimi to draw correlations between the dead chicken, Janus' presence, and Janus' displeasure?

How does the dog drive a wedge between Janus' displeasure and Janus' presence?

In order to connect three things, they must first be somehow disconnected.

How does Jimi disconnect Janus's presence from Janus' outward unhappy behaviour?

The chicken is in its own place. Jimi is as well. So too, is Janus. Janus' presence and Janus' displeasure do not share such clearly different spatiotemporal locations. Jimi does not think about Janus' displeasure in contrast/comparison or as a separate thing to/from Janus' presence. One must do so prior to connecting them(drawing a correlation between them).

Concepts of concepts. Nah.

What is a concept of a tree if not thought and belief about trees(if not correlations drawn between trees and other things)? What is a concept of food if not thought and belief about food(if not correlations drawn between food and other things)? I do not see how the notion helps us to understand our own minds let alone other species'.
— creativesoul
It looks to me as if you have a reasonably clear concept of what a concept is. So there's no problem with that idea. — Ludwig V

"Thought and belief" exhaust "concept", but not the other way around.

I've mentioned on multiple occasions that the conversation was in dire need of a clear criterion and/or standards by which we can judge/assess whether or not a candidate is or is not capable of forming, having, and/or holding some thought or another.
— creativesoul
How do we assess whether a proposed criterion or standard is clear and correct? By submitting cases to it. (Examples and counter-examples). — Ludwig V

Sure, but only after it's already in front of us.

When it comes to being capable of correctly attributing thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences to ourselves and other capable species, we must first have knowledge of the processes involved. It's not just a matter of what they believe, it's also a matter of how.

I've explained as best I can, and I'm fairly happy with my part. There's promise/potential. I'm content.

Methodological approach needs attention.

As early on as possible I suggest examining the justificatory ground(or lack thereof), the scope of rightful application, the explanatory power, the coherence and/or terminological consistency of the standard under scrutiny. There are some things that are perfectly clear. We're looking for knowledge of thought and belief that predated humans. Such thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience existed in its entirety prior to our knowledge thereof. That is only to say that prior to knowledge that there were thinking and believing creatures roaming the earth prior to ourselves, there were thinking and believing creatures roaming the world. A correct standard/notion of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" will be amenable with/to those prehistoric facts.

We can prioritize working from the fewest possible dubious assumptions. We can demand that our position posit the fewest possible entities necessary. We can insist that spatiotemporal flexibility be shown/proven by virtue of being capable of spanning the evolutionary timeline. Our standards/notion of "thought and belief" must be amenable to evolutionary progression such that it is clear how creatures begin attributing meaning to sights, sounds, and such. That's what thinking about the world does.

This sets out some of the standards I'm working from. Methodological approach. I think I have a very strong methodological naturalist bent.

What do all thinking and believing creatures have in common such that it this set of common elemental constituents that makes them what they are? They are all capable of drawing correlations between different things. Biological machinery finds a timely home at this point in the discussion.

Thought and belief are always meaningful to the creature drawing the correlations(forming, having, and/or holding thought and/or belief). Some thinking creatures inhabited the earth long before we did. Any and all acceptable notions of "mind", "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" must take proper account of this.

We find ourselves becoming strikingly aware that some meaning is prior to any and all notions of "meaning". The same is true of thought and "thought" as well as belief and "belief".

Her coming to you after you call her name is inadequate evidence for concluding that she knows which dog you want to respond. I'm certain that that sequence of events is ritualistic. Her drawing correlations between her name being called, her own behaviour(s), and yours afterwards more than suffices.
— creativesoul
The sequence of events - call, coming, praise - could does have a similarity to a ritual. Those correlations do indeed suffice. After all, the training consists of establishing associations between her name being called, her behaviour and the subsequent reward, and teaches he what her name is, i.e. which dog the name refers to. This training also enables her to know (after a little more training) what to do when she hears "Judy, sit" as opposed to what she should do when she hears "Eddy, sit". (At times, I have had more than one dog.) — Ludwig V

Still seems too unsupported for my tastes.

It may strike some as odd, but I'm not convinced any dogs know their own name in the exact same way that we do. I would deny that altogether. Some know how to act when they hear their name being called in certain familiar scenarios. Some are still learning how to behave when they find themselves in such circumstances. Some live nameless lives.

We learn our names by virtue of how many times it is being used during a short duration of time spent. Dogs do as well. Some dogs, if rewarded well, can learn to do all sort of things. I'm okay with saying she has learned to behave in some ways sometimes. She has learned how to behave/thrive/survive in many different situations. Name calling events being one of many.

The question is - and always has been - what does it take in order for some creature or another to be capable of thinking about its own thought and/or belief?
— creativesoul
It would help if we could clarify whether we are talking about a creature being capable of thinking about its own thought and belief or about a creature that is capable of thinking about the thought and belief of other creatures. Or both. (The cases are somewhat different.) — Ludwig V

That's fair and certainly worthy of explanation.

While I agree that the cases are different, they differ in their respective targets. They differ regarding what the creatures focus upon. The target is different individuals' thought and belief. That's three different ways to say much the same thing. The similarity takes precedence here. They both are metacognitive endeavors. Thus, I do not see the relevance of that particular distinction when it comes to drawing and maintaining the distinction(s) between thought, belief, and experience that consists of correlations drawn between language use(and other things) and thought, belief, and experience that does not. Nor does it seem relevant to the distinction between thought and belief that is existentially dependent upon language use, and thought and belief that is not. <------that's the earlier peculiarity mentioned a few posts back. I could further set that out if need be. I've just recently come to acceptable terms with it myself.

The point was that Jimi trembled as a result of drawing correlations between his behaviour and Janus'. That's all it takes.
— creativesoul
I grant you that Jimi's fear might be triggered by Janus' return. But let's think this through. It might well be that he only started trembling when Janus came through the door. The trigger, then, would be the chicken plus Janus. That would explain why he killed the chicken. But it doesn't explain why he was still sitting beside it. Surely, an innocent, oblivious dog, would either start eating it or would wander off in search of something more amusing. I think the dead chicken reminded him of the previous occasion; Janus' arrival was the crisis, so he may well have got more anxious as he came in.

Jimi cannot compare his own behaviour to the rules in order for him to know that his own behaviour did not comply. Jimi did not suddenly realize that he had broken the rules upon Janus' return. He was suddenly reminded(drew the same correlations once again) when it all came together again.
— creativesoul
I'm trying to think what dog behaviour might distinguish complying with the rules from knowing that s/he is complying with the rules. Nothing comes to mind, so I'll give you that one. However, I'm reasonably sure that if they are complying with the rules, they know what the rules are. Jimi's killing of the chicken suggests that he had forgotten what the rule was. There's no doubt that he remembered at some point after the event. The question is, what triggered his memory and hence fear? — Ludwig V

Correlations drawn by Jimi between his killing the chook and Janus's behaviour afterwards is more than enough. The correlation drawn is one of causality. Jimi attributes causality(draws a causal connection between what he did and what Janus did afterwards). Granting Janus' story is true, it took more than one occasion for him to alter his own behaviour accordingly(to stop killing hens).

Jimi's behaviour afterwards, complies with what Janus wants of Jimi's behaviour, but not as a result of Jimi's knowing what the rules are. Rather, it 'complies' because it fits into Janus' wants regarding Jimi's behaviour. Jimi stopped killing chooks because he did not want Janus to do whatever Janus did the first time. Jimi believed his behaviour caused Janus'.

What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs language less animals can and/or cannot have?
— creativesoul
Roughly, the same ones that I use to decide what believes human beings have when I cannot ask them.
— Ludwig V
Care to elaborate?
— creativesoul
I can try. My thought is roughly this. I fear that if I talk about "words" here, you'll think I'm talking about words in a narrow sense and miss the point. Fortunately, concepts relate to specific words or terms in language and there are rules about how they are to be used. But in many cases - I expect there are exceptions - some of the rules are about how we should apply them in our non-verbal behaviour. A bus stop is where one congregates to catch a bus; a door bell is there to be rung to announce our arrival; etc. We often use this feature to attribute beliefs to humans when we cannot cross-question them. I don't see any reason to suppose that this feature enables us to attribute our concepts to dogs. The concept of food is not just about it can be idenitified and analysed, but how it is to be treated - cooking and eating. Hence, although dogs cannot cook food or analyse in the ways that we do, it can certainly identify it and eat it. This fits perfectly with the idea that our ideas and language about people can be stretched and adapted to (sentient and/or rational) animals. — Ludwig V

I think the use of "concept" is problematic. What does it clarify? Nothing as best I can tell.

What is a concept of a tree if not thought and belief about trees(if not correlations drawn between trees and other things)? What is a concept of food if not thought and belief about food(if not correlations drawn between food and other things)? I do not see how the notion helps us to understand our own minds let alone other species'. It seems to me that it unnecessarily adds complexity where none is needed, and hence only adds confusion.

Successfully navigating the world requires successfully distinguishing oneself from the rest of the world. Slime molds do this. Bacteria. All forms of life avoid danger and gather resources and thus... successfully navigate the world while they survive.
— creativesoul
Yes, I'm aware that the idea of autonomy can be applied to any living creature, including bacteria and moulds. (There are complicated cases, like lichens.) I didn't include those in what I said, because they are neither sentient nor rational. In fact, I think of them as indistinguishable from autonomous machines, apart from their ability to reproduce. — Ludwig V

Indeed, and this skirts around the very heart of the matter, but I'll nitpick first.

Autonomy is not an idea. Calling things "ideas" is quite unhelpful. Earlier you did the same with "the idea of metacognition".

Metacognition is not an idea. It's talking about our own thoughts.
— creativesoul
Well, animals are not capable of talking, so that's not hard. The question is, then, is whether they are capable of knowing what others and themselves are thinking; if that means they are capable of thinking about their own and others thoughts, then so be it. — Ludwig V

Talking about our own belief and others' is how we begin to think about them. Thinking about thought and belief is one thing that is required for knowing what others are thinking. Getting it right is another. Is talking about thought and belief required for thinking about it? I certainly think talking about it is required for getting it right. However, not all notions of "thought" and "belief" get it right.

The question is - and always has been - what does it take in order for some creature or another to be capable of thinking about its own thought and/or belief?

We do so by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is how we do it. That's what talking about our own thought and belief involves. Thinking about one's own thoughts and beliefs requires isolating them as subject matters in their own right. We do that with naming and descriptive practices. We use "minds", "thought", "belief", "imagination", etc. Are there any other ways of(processes for) thinking about thought and belief, if not as subject matters in their own right? How else would/could a creature capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and/or belief also be capable of thinking about its own thoughts?

So, you've now invoked sentience which carries ethical considerations along with it. I'm not at all opposed to drawing and maintaining the distinction between sentient and non-sentient creatures; however, I do not see how we've established the basis to include such considerations in this discussion... yet. Sentient beings are capable of forming, having, and/r holding thought and belief about the world, but so too are all thinking/believing creatures. Do all creatures capable of thought count as sentient? That's yet another assessment that does not yet have a basis from which to draw a clear conclusion. The point was to show that simple differentiation between oneself and the rest of the world is something that is successfully done by creatures that are clearly incapable of knowing what your wants are. Hence, the fact that your dog distinguishes between herself and other dogs does not lend support that she knows what your wants are. <----that was the presupposition I was rejecting.

Successfully navigating the world requires successfully distinguishing oneself from the rest of the world. Slime molds do this. Bacteria. All forms of life avoid danger and gather resources and thus... successfully navigate the world while they survive. — Ludwig V

When I recall my dog, I call her name. Supposing that she has no understanding of self and others, when she hears me call, how does she know which dog I want to respond?
— Ludwig V

I see no ground for presupposing she is comparing your wants to anything. — creativesoul

I'm not at all clear what you mean about comparing wants to things. It was usually pretty obvious when she wanted something and when she had got it. — Ludwig V

Your original claim above was not about you knowing her wants. It presupposed that she knew yours. How does she know which dog you want to respond without comparing your wants to your calling her name? I'm placing the presupposition/assumption that she knows which dog you want to respond when you call her name in question. That's precisely what needs argued for.

Her coming to you after you call her name is inadequate evidence for concluding that she knows which dog you want to respond. I'm certain that that sequence of events is ritualistic. Her drawing correlations between her name being called, her own behaviour(s), and yours afterwards more than suffices. I would bet that your tone plays a role as well, in that certain tones do not mean the same things to her that others do, despite all of them being cases of calling her name. She can draw correlations between your tone. She cannot draw correlations between your wants. They are not the sorts of things that are directly perceptible. Nor is time. Nor are the rules governing here behaviour.




We began by discussing which sorts of thought and belief other species can and/or cannot have with one specific sort of thought/belief in mind at the start, rational thought/belief. The conversation seems to have been everywhere but has gotten little to nowhere. It is my considered opinion that the methodological approach being used by many if not most participants was/is not up to the task at hand. I've mentioned on multiple occasions that the conversation was in dire need of a clear criterion and/or standards by which we can judge/assess whether or not a candidate is or is not capable of forming, having, and/or holding some thought or another.

That endeavor(establishing a criterion/standard from which to judge/assess our own and others' thought and belief) involves doing quite a bit of philosophy.

We must begin by examining and/or assessing ourselves. It is imperative that we get some rather important things right(that we correctly identify what thought and belief is; what it consists of; and/or how it emerges onto the world stage; how it persists; etc). Current convention is chock full of practices that clearly show we have not gotten some rather important bits of this right. That is clearly shown by the inability for many a position to admit that other creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and belief. Those positions/linguistic frameworks work from inadequate conceptions/notions of "thought" and "belief" that are incapable of taking account of other creatures' thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. The results range from outright denial to anthropomorphism.

Belief that approaches are all about epistemological claims, in that they attempt to show how truth is presupposed in all belief statements and/or knowledge claims. As useful as they are in helping us to think about such things, they are useless in determining and/or acquiring knowledge of what language less thought and belief consists of.
— creativesoul

Upon a rereading, I'm less happy with this now than I was then, and I remember not liking it then. — creativesoul

Even less now.

It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use. The latter is existentially dependent upon language use as well, as set out earlier in this post(beers and fridges). However, the latter does not require being talked about in order for it to exist in its entirety. This peculiar set of facts results from the overlap(shared world) between creatures without naming and descriptive practices and things that are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.

It renders the qualifications of "linguistic" and "non linguistic" when applied to beliefs suspect, at best. I used to use such language.
— creativesoul
That I agree with. But I would have thought that impinges on the distinction between what requires being talked about and what "exists in its entirety" without being talked about. — Ludwig V

Here, you've used some of the same words in different ways than I do. I'll try to further clarify...

...I set out how a creature without naming and descriptive practices can form, have, and/or hold belief about distal objects that are themselves existentially dependent upon language users. Those objects are part of the content of the correlations being drawn(the content of the candidate's belief).

The mouse can draw correlations including the beer(between the beer and other things). Beer is existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. Therefore, the mouse(a creature without naming and descriptive practices) can indeed form, have, and/or hold belief about some of that which is existentially dependent upon language use. Not all. That is the case regardless of whether or not anyone ever talked about it.

This is segue into similarity I think you and others may find interesting. I do.

...there are important differences between bad consequences and punishment. They are very different concepts. Jimi might well believe that he had done something wrong (bad consequences) and not see it as punishment. Further observations of his behaviour might reveal the difference. — Ludwig V

Might he? Exactly what would that take? What must also be the case in order for Jimi to believe he had done something wrong, but not see it as punishment?

I've set out what is required for all three possibilities(knowing he had done something wrong, seeing Janus's treatment of him as punishment and not). Jimi does not have what it takes. That explanation has been sorely neglected.

They are not different subject matters. The endeavor is comparison/contrast between the two. What's different is not the same. What's the same is not different. It takes discussing both the similarities and the differences to make much sense of either.
— creativesoul
That's quite right. It is also reasonable not to put too much emphasis on universal differences, but to assess each case as it comes. — Ludwig V

The first part turns on what counts as "too much emphasis on universal differences". I'm unsure of what that phrase is referring to. It does not seem to address anything I've claimed, as best I can tell. I'll say this to the rest: We assess each case as it comes by using/practicing standards. What standard(s) do you practice while assessing whether or not this or that creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding some thought and/or belief?

All sorts of creatures have regular schedules. Routine. Habit. They do all sorts of things around the same time of day and/or night. Many migrate, mate, bear young, and all sorts of other things during the same seasons(time of year).
Having a "concept of time" needs a bit more, does it not?
— creativesoul
I don't remotely understand the concept of time involved in relativity theory in physics. Does that mean I have no concept of time? No, it does not. Similarly, the dogs have a concept of time that suits their lives. That concept is different from human concepts, but overlaps with it. — Ludwig V

Different users/practitioners of naming and descriptive practices can have different notions/concepts/thought and/or belief about time. There are multiple sensible uses of "time". Not knowing some does not preclude one from the rest. Showing that this is the case does not shoulder the burden.

The contentious matter is whether or not it is even possible for a thinking/believing creature to have a notion/concept(thought and/or belief about time) without naming and descriptive practices. The move from comparing different sensible uses of "time" to "similarly, the dogs have a concept of time" is suspect.

Archaeologists discovered an unknown script amongst the remains of Mycene. They weren't even entirely sure that it was writing. Attempts to decipher it failed for many years until Michael Ventris hypothesized that the writing was Greek. That worked. There are many similar examples. Methodology and practice develop hand in hand. — Ludwig V

Sure.

Belief that approaches are all about epistemological claims, in that they attempt to show how truth is presupposed in all belief statements and/or knowledge claims. As useful as they are in helping us to think about such things, they are useless in determining and/or acquiring knowledge of what language less thought and belief consists of. — creativesoul

Upon a rereading, I'm less happy with this now than I was then, and I remember not liking it then.

Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards?
— creativesoul

Sure, I guess the association must be in play. I think it's the same with children learning what is expected of them and to anticipate some kind of punishment if they don't comply.
— Janus

I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do). He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived. Whatever you did the first time, Jimi expected that to happen again. That belief/expectation resulted from the earlier correlation he drew between his behaviour involving killing chooks and yours immediately afterwards. I see no ground whatsoever to say he believed, knew, or anticipated that he was being punished for not following the rules. I see every reason to say that he was drawing much the same correlations the second time around that he did the first. — creativesoul

The presupposition that dogs are capable of knowing whether or not their behaviour complies with the rules is suspect. That is precisely what needs argued for. That sort of knowledge is existentially dependent upon the capability to compare one's own behaviour with the rules. The only way it is possible is for one to acquire knowledge of both by virtue of learning how talk about both.

I do not see how it makes sense to say that dogs are capable of comparing their own behaviour with the rules. I know there's all sorts of variables, but I'm certain that the same is true of very young children as well. It takes quite some time and the right sorts of attention paid to us prior to our ability to know that our behaviour is or is not against the rules. We must know at least that much prior to being able to know that we've done something that we should not have done. — creativesoul

So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had done something wrong? — Ludwig V

Why imagine an impossibility? Jimi cannot compare his own behaviour to the rules in order for him to know that his own behaviour did not comply. Jimi did not suddenly realize that he had broken the rules upon Janus' return. He was suddenly reminded(drew the same correlations once again) when it all came together again. He trembled as a result. Involuntarily.

Ockham's razor applies.

...why does she respond if she cannot distinguish herself from other dogs? — Ludwig V

Who said she couldn't?

Successfully navigating the world requires successfully distinguishing oneself from the rest of the world. Slime molds do this. Bacteria. All forms of life avoid danger and gather resources and thus... successfully navigate the world while they survive.

When I recall my dog, I call her name. Supposing that she has no understanding of self and others, when she hears me call, how does she know which dog I want to respond? — Ludwig V

I see no ground for presupposing she is comparing your wants to anything.

I suppose you contrast the idea of metacognition, which might be considered to be clearer. However, the answers that it returns seems to me to be, let us say, odd. — Ludwig V

Metacognition returns answers to you? Does it understand requests all by itself?

I'm confused.

He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived.
— creativesoul
So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had
done something wrong? — Ludwig V

"There is no clear standard by which to judge" was referring to the idea/claim that "behaviour expresses belief" and/or that approach.
— creativesoul
I suppose you contrast the idea of metacognition, — Ludwig V

Metacognition is not an idea. It's talking about our own thoughts.

He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived.
— creativesoul
So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had
done something wrong? — Ludwig V

Irrelevant. The point was that Jimi trembled as a result of drawing correlations between his behaviour and Janus'. That's all it takes.

Ockham's razor applies.

I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do).
— creativesoul

Right, so he knew he had done something he shouldn't have, which was my original point... — Janus

That does not follow...

May I suggest you reread that post?

Yes, this is a great place to come. Your words made me smile. :flower:

Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me.
— Patterner

This is the direction this discussion needs to take.
— creativesoul
Since this thread is intended to discuss common ground between the thoughts of humans and other species, perhaps a new thread, discussing differences, in order to better understand human thought? — Patterner

They are not different subject matters. The endeavor is comparison/contrast between the two. What's different is not the same. What's the same is not different. It takes discussing both the similarities and the differences to make much sense of either.

Claiming that a male bird of paradise clears out an area and dances because he's trying to impress a female is a bit of a stretch.
— creativesoul
I wonder how one might explain that behaviour. — Ludwig V

The behaviour increased the likelihood of reproduction and mating.

I personally wonder if a male isolated from 'birth' would display the same behaviour as an adult, if it were placed in an aviary with a female for the first time in its life. That would tell us something about whether or not it is innate or learned.

"Trying to impress" another presupposes a candidate with a concept of mind(belief about what will impress another). That's a bit of a stretch. Although, I've been quite impressed by any number of different bird documentaries, in addition to my own personal experiences with both domesticated and 'wild' birds.

Wonderfully interesting animals.

We agree, then, that experience is a process. I am hoping that you also agree with me that what is meaningful to a creature affects how that creature behaves. — Ludwig V

We're in agreement with the following caveat; not all things that affect how creatures behave are meaningful to the creature.

Gravity. So... just to be clear.

To be sure, the presuppositions with which one approaches describing animal behaviour are always important. If they are wrong, the reports will be wrong. You seem very confident that your presuppositions are correct. — Ludwig V

Indeed. I am. I could be confidently wrong. :wink:

It seems to me very dangerous to think that observations of a particular incident can be conclusively settled without an extensive background of observations of a range of behaviour of the animal. — Ludwig V

Sure, but it depends upon the situation and/or the specific thought and/or belief attribution(in this discussion). If having a concept of time requires thinking about it and thinking about it requires using naming and descriptive practices, then any and all creatures incapable of using naming and descriptive practices are incapable of having a concept of time. That's pretty cut and dry to me. Substitute "thinking about it" with "time be meaningful to the candidate" as well as "forming, having, and/or holding belief about time", and the same holds good...

Meaning is not some abstract entity floating about in the ether. It governs behaviour. So, for example, there are many beliefs that I cannot form because I have never learnt the relevant behaviours; I never learnt to write computer code or do more than elementary mathematics. While I can formulate some beliefs about those matters as they impinge on my life, but the detail is bayond me. — Ludwig V

I'm having problems understanding how "meaning governs behaviour" fits into the rest of that.

I want to ask...

Would you say that the unknown details of higher maths, programming, coding, etc. are pretty much meaningless to you?

If a dog could read a clock and use the information in relevant ways, I would say it may know when it is 5 p.m. Does that mean it cannot have a concept of time? No, because it can show up for meals or walks at the right time. But it cannot have a concept of time like the human concept and there are other behaviours that can high-light that. — Ludwig V

Yes, clearly our standard measurements of time are meaningless to the dog.

Does it follow from the fact that the dog shows up at mealtime that it has a concept of time? I don't see how. That does not seem to be enough evidence/reason to warrant the conclusion. Does waking up at the same time count as having a concept of time? I suppose I wonder what the difference between any and all regularly occurring behaviours is regarding this matter? I mean, does all routine and/or habitual behaviour equally count as adequate evidence for drawing that same conclusion? If not what's the difference such that we're not special pleading? All sorts of creatures have regular schedules. Routine. Habit. They do all sorts of things around the same time of day and/or night. Many migrate, mate, bear young, and all sorts of other things during the same seasons(time of year).

Having a "concept of time" needs a bit more, does it not?

Here's what I'd ask: Can or do dogs think about time? Can or do they form, have, and/or hold any beliefs about time? Is time meaningful to dogs? By my lights, the answer is "no". I'm open to being convinced otherwise though. So, if anyone here thinks the answer to any of the three questions is "yes", then I would only ask how?

The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not.
— creativesoul
I have some intuition about that distinction, but I have trouble applying it. — Ludwig V

Understandable. It's unconventional, and as such it goes against some long standing practices, or at least it seems to. It is commensurate with many, dovetails nicely with some, but certainly turns a number of practices on their head. I've been fleshing the application out and working through the problems for over a decade. Not alone, mind you. I'm very grateful to this site and many regulars here, for it has allowed me to do some things that cannot be done any other way that I'm aware of.

Is my belief that there is some beer in the fridge existentially dependent on language?

Excellent question. Could not have imagined a better one at this juncture. Thank you for asking.

Banno and I have had any number of conversations in past talking about just such things. That tells me there's a bit of W underlying this avenue. It is only as a result of those discussions and others that I've been able to identify certain issues with saying certain things in certain ways. I know that that's vague, so I'll just say that I've adjusted and tweaked my position after being made aware of issues. This question allows me to put some of those to good use. There are several members here on this site who've helped me tremendously along the way, knowingly or unknowingly. Banno is one, but not the only one. Okay, enough blather. Back to the question...

Beer is existentially dependent upon language. Fridges are as well. Where there has never been beer, there could never have been belief about beer. The same is true of the fridge. So, the content of the belief(things correlations are being drawn between) is existentially dependent upon language. Therefore, so too is the belief.

Here we must tread carefully however, for it would be easy to apply unhelpful labels to this belief. Calling it a "linguistic" belief would be misleading and/or a bit confusing, because any and all candidates capable of drawing correlations(spatial reasoning/relationships in this case) between the beer and the fridge are most certainly capable of believing that there is beer in the fridge. This includes candidates who do not know that one is called "beer" and the other a "fridge". It does not make much sense to say that creatures without naming and descriptive practices could form, have, and/or hold linguistic beliefs. That would be a consequence of such labeling practices.

There's more to this than it seems at first blush...

Imagine a recently abandoned house with open beers in the fridge. Say that some teenagers were rummaging around in the house and left the fridge door wide open. They did not want the warm stale beer. They leave soon enough, and later on one of the mice living in the house comes out searching for food. It finds the beer in the fridge. Some mice really like beer! That mouse believed that beer was in that fridge. It shows(as compared/contrasted to 'expresses') that belief by virtue of climbing into that fridge and getting at that beer.

Belief as propositional attitude fails here. The mouse's belief does not consist of propositions. There is no propositional content within the mouse's belief. The mouse's belief consists of correlations drawn between the beer, the fridge, its own hunger/thirst, etc.. Such belief is existentially dependent upon language(because beers and fridges are), but not existentially dependent upon the ability of the believing creature to be capable of either naming and descriptive practices or metacognition. This reminds me of past experience...

At my own house, long ago, we were all at the dining table eating breakfast after a long birthday celebration the night before when a strange unfamiliar sound was heard by us all. It was written all over our faces. We looked at each other using each other as a means to double check our own ears. Someone spoke up and expressed what our faces had already... Did you hear that? Then we heard it again... a continuous faint but distinct scratching sound captured our attention. We were all like... what on earth is that??? It stopped. It started. Stopped again. Started. It did not take us too long to find the drunken culprit in the trash; a drunken mouse had unwittingly trapped itself at the bottom of an extra tall beer can deep inside a trash bag lining the can. Here, I'll give a nod to some things you mentioned earlier regarding our ability to locate the source of a sound.

Hilarious. Drunken mice. Of all things.

What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs language less animals can and/or cannot have?
— creativesoul
Roughly, the same ones that I use to decide what believes human beings have when I cannot ask them. — Ludwig V

Care to elaborate?

I suppose you are disagreeing with "Thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of the belief..." and "thought, belief and knowledge all involve an evaluation of the proposition"
As to the first, I may have been unclear. As to the first, it is true that one can hold beliefs that are not formulated in language. But I cannot talk about them without a formulation in language. To distinguish between what people believe and don't believe, I must complete the formula "S believes that..."
As to the second, "S knows that p" means that p is true. "S believes that p" means that S believes/thinks that p is true, but it may not actually be true. "Thinks" is more complicated than either, but is at least compatible with S merely entertaining the possibility that p is true. — Ludwig V

The abandoned house mouse places all this in question. Although, it seems you admit that not all thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of that belief.

It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use. The latter is existentially dependent upon language use as well, as set out earlier in this post(beers and fridges). However, the latter does not require being talked about in order for it to exist in its entirety. This peculiar set of facts results from the overlap(shared world) between creatures without naming and descriptive practices and things that are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.

It renders the qualifications of "linguistic" and "non linguistic" when applied to beliefs suspect, at best. I used to use such language.

There is no clear standard by which to judge whether or not the belief we are attributing to the language less creature is something that the creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding.
— creativesoul
That's true.
We might get some clues from thinking about how we decide what a human being believes or can believe and then thinking about what a creature like a dog does believe.
For example, you believe that a dog cannot form beliefs about beliefs. (Forgive me if that's not accurate, but I think it is enough for what I want to say). In my book, that needs to be considered in the light of what the dog does. — Ludwig V

"There is no clear standard by which to judge" was referring to the idea/claim that "behaviour expresses belief" and/or that approach.

The last suggestion/claim above has the methodological approach the wrong way around.

It is our behaviour that clearly shows us - beyond all reasonable doubt - what thinking about one's own thought and belief(metacognition) requires: Naming and descriptive practices; picking one's own thought and belief out of this world to the exclusion of all else. That is the only means. That crucial bit of knowledge is part of the standard used to assess/judge any and all belief attribution by any and all authors/speakers to any and all creatures, human to human attribution notwithstanding. It's not the only one, but it's the one in consideration at the moment, and some others are irrelevant to the topic at hand. I digress...

So, it seems clear to me that what the dog does, and the subsequent attribution(s) of thought and/or belief to the dog because of what the dog does, all need to be considered in light of what metacognition requires(what metacognition is existentially dependent upon). The dog cannot consider its own thought and belief as a subject matter in and of itself. Thus, any and all sorts of thinking that require a creature capable of doing so are sorts that dogs cannot form, have, and/or hold. It's that simple. Easy to say. Much more difficult to clearly set out, but I am getting a bit better at it, I think...

Meaning is not some abstract entity floating about in the ether. It governs behaviour. So, for example, there are many beliefs that I cannot form because I have never learnt the relevant behaviours; I never learnt to write computer code or do more than elementary mathematics. While I can formulate some beliefs about those matters as they impinge on my life, but the detail is bayond me. — Ludwig V

I'm unsure about the relevance of the opening statement above. I've certainly never made such a claim. Nor would I. Actually, I agree with that claim, as it is written. However, the second claim seems too vague to be of much use. I also cannot see how the rest counts as support for the idea that meaning governs behaviour. I would agree that meaning governs behaviour, but I suspect that our viewpoints, notions, and/or approaches towards meaning are very different. Hence, I suspect that our explanations of how meaning governs behaviour are quite different as a result.

To the example...

Sure, there are certain thoughts and beliefs one cannot possibly form, have, and/or hold if they have not learned, articulated, understood, and/or used the right sorts of language. Substituting that reason(ing) with "they have not learnt the relevant behaviours" is stretching behaviour beyond sensible use. I mean, sure learning maths and coding and programming are all behaviors. However, that completely misses what underwrites the topic at hand: thought and belief. Behaviour is not thought and belief. Behaviour alone is... ...there's a technical term/bit of jargon that applies here, but I cannot recall... ..."indeterminate" maybe?

There's quite a bit more that is of interest, but it'll have to wait. Until then, be well...

Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards?
— creativesoul

Sure, I guess the association must be in play. I think it's the same with children learning what is expected of them and to anticipate some kind of punishment if they don't comply. — Janus

I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do). He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived. Whatever you did the first time, Jimi expected that to happen again. That belief/expectation resulted from the earlier correlation he drew between his behaviour involving killing chooks and yours immediately afterwards. I see no ground whatsoever to say he believed, knew, or anticipated that he was being punished for not following the rules. I see every reason to say that he was drawing much the same correlations the second time around that he did the first.

There is similarity. I just think you're overstating it. Some(arguably most) children can and do draw correlations between their own behaviour and others' behaviour towards them afterwards. So, to that extent, it's the same. That's an early step in learning the rules. It's not enough though. It is enough to help increase the chances of one's own survival when living in a violent/aggressive social hierarchy. Canines have a very long history of that.


It's the difference that you're neglecting and/or glossing over.

The presupposition that dogs are capable of knowing whether or not their behaviour complies with the rules is suspect. That is precisely what needs argued for. That sort of knowledge is existentially dependent upon the capability to compare one's own behaviour with the rules. The only way it is possible is for one to acquire knowledge of both by virtue of learning how talk about both.

I do not see how it makes sense to say that dogs are capable of comparing their own behaviour with the rules. I know there's all sorts of variables, but I'm certain that the same is true of very young children as well. It takes quite some time and the right sorts of attention paid to us prior to our ability to know that our behaviour is or is not against the rules. We must know at least that much prior to being able to know that we've done something that we should not have done.

Dogs can know when they have done something they shouldn't have, just as humans can. — Janus

As set out above, I would say that they cannot even know they have done something they should not have done, let alone 'just like humans can'.

Do you have an argument/justification/reasons for claiming that, aside from Jimi's behaviour?

It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitably conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims.

That's why. — creativesoul

That's equally true of your theories. — Vera Mont

Sure. It's true of any ToM.

If the ToM being fleshed out by myself were incapable of drawing and maintaining those distinctions, then it too would inevitably result in conflating between non human thought and belief and human thought and belief. Hence, the importance of the endeavor.

I/we do not have all the answers, nor do I think it's possible to acquire them. We do, however, have some and those help avoid some anthropomorphism. They also allow one to recognize some mistakes 'in the wild'.

By what standard/criterion do you judge which sorts of human thinking(rational or otherwise) non humans are capable of?
— creativesoul
I don't discriminate between 'sorts' of thinking. — Vera Mont

Which inevitably results in personification(anthropomorphism). That's unacceptable by my standards.

what was the purpose of
What seems to be of philosophical importance, from my vantage point anyway, is how the narrators and/or authors report on the minds of the subjects. There is always a notion of "mind" at work.
— creativesoul
That's our theory of mind at work. Why is it a problem, — Vera Mont

It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitably conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims. — creativesoul

That's why.

By what standard/criterion do you judge which sorts of human thinking(rational or otherwise) non humans are capable of?

Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me. — Patterner

This is the direction this discussion needs to take.