If that does not convince you, nothing will...

It's been fun. Hate to run, but have a real, life changing emergency situation to deal with. No worries, just needs settled. I'll return after the dust does the same.

Joe believes you were born in Croatia. Dan believes you were born in Ireland. Veronica believes you were born in Utah. Kevin believes you were born in British Columbia. John believes you were born in Egypt.

None of them believe the same thing about your birthplace.

The proposition "Michael was not born in Germany" can be attributed to each of them according to current conventional belief attribution practices. That would be to say that they believe the same thing.

None of them believe the same thing about your birthplace.

Joe believes you were not born in Germany, because you were born in Croatia. Dan believes you were not born in Germany, because you were born in Ireland. Veronica believes you were not born in Germany, because you were born in Utah. Kevin believes you were not born in Germany, because you were born in British Columbia. John believes you were not born in Germany, because you were born in Egypt.

None of them believe the same thing about your birthplace.

"Michael was not born in Germany" is not equivalent to Joe, Dan, Veronica, Kevin, and/or John's belief about your birthplace.

As far as I know, the rights to free speech end when that speech is being used to defraud the United States of America.

Let's consider a situation where we have five different people who believe that you were born in five different places. None of these people believe that you were born in Germany. None of these people believe that you were born in England.

According to you(and current convention's belief attribution practices) all of them have the same true belief about your birthplace.

You and current convention are wrong, because none of them believe the same thing and all of their beliefs about your birthplace are false.

"Michael was not born in Germany."
"Michael was not born in Germany, because he was born in France."

According to the argument you offered earlier, which of the above is an accurate report of S's belief regarding your birthplace?

We both know that the second is. You want to say that because he believes the first, the second entails the first, and the first is true, that his belief about your birthplace is true even though you were not born in France, because the proposition is true regardless of where you were born, so long as you were not born in Germany.

S does not just believe that you were not born in Germany. Academia neglects to keep that in mind, and in doing so conflates a naked proposition with S's belief by virtue of conflating what it would take for them to be true. S's belief about your birthplace(and thus about that proposition)does not share the same truth conditions as the naked proposition. S's belief about your birthplace(and that proposition) is true only if, only when, and only because you were born in France. S believes the proposition is true because you were born in France. The proposition is true because you were born in England, contrary to S's belief. S's belief about your birthplace is justified, valid, and false. What S believed to be the case was not.

I'm not familiar enough with Searle's notion to know whether or not I agree with it. I've been watching Searle's lectures though.

My own personal notion of what counts as a moral fact is different. Moral things can be talked about in two very distinct ways. The most common one is that "moral" is equivalent to good, so it's used as a means for assent or to condone behaviour whereas immoral is used to condemn some behaviour or another.

Another use of "moral" is as a means to discriminate between kinds of things, whereas all moral situations/circumstances/facts involve what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. That approach is riddled with difficulty, but it seems worth the effort.





So, because you cannot charge me with violating Hume's guillotine, it is somehow a problem?

You haven't shown that someone who believes “Michael wasn’t born in Germany because he was born in France” doesn't also believe “Michael wasn’t born in Germany”. — Michael

Nor need I. What I have shown is that "Michael was not born in Germany" is not equivalent to believing that Michael was not born in Germany because he was born in France, which is precisely what S believes. The charge made by me was one of an academic accounting malpractice of S's belief. I've more than shouldered that burden.

The fact that “Michael wasn’t born in Germany because he was born in France” isn’t equivalent to “Michael wasn’t born in Germany” doesn’t mean that someone who believes the former doesn’t also believe the latter. — Michael

Right.

For your argument to work you must show that everyone who believes the former to be true doesn’t believe the latter to be true. You haven’t done that, and I don’t think you can.

Well, no. In order for my argument to work, I need to show that what you're claiming is S's belief is not equivalent to S's belief and that the difference between S's belief and your report is clearly shown by virtue of looking at the differences in what it takes for each to be true.

I can and have done that.

I didn't mention moral facts, but rather that moral claims are propositions, and that the way you used "ought" wasn't the way it is typically used in moral claims. In a moral claim, the object of the "ought" or "ought not" is typically not an inanimate thing, but rather a behavior or action. — ToothyMaw

I'm not following this. Do you take issue with how I used the term "ought"? Is that the basis of your objection?

What is the standard or criterion you're using in order to say that something counts as a "moral fact?"

It is a fact that if I promise to plant you a rose garden on Sunday, then on Monday there ought be a rose garden. It is a fact because that's exactly what those words mean. They have no other meaningful use. When making such a claim the speaker is voluntarily entering into a commitment to make the world match their words.

That's just what promises are.

What does your last reply have to do with any of that? I do not understand how your response was relevant/valid.

S is justified in believing that you were born in France. We can validly infer/deduce that you were not born in Germany based upon knowing that you cannot be born in two separate places at the same time and already believing for good reason that you were born in France.

So, if asked whether or not you were born in Germany, S would answer in the negative because they believe you were born in France. If explicitly asked exactly that, S would readily confirm. The belief about whether or not you were born in Germany is one about your birthplace, and it is based, in very large part at least, directly upon S's pre-existing beliefs about the same.

"Michael was not born in Germany" is an utterly inadequate report of S's belief.

As written, S's attitude towards that particular proposition would be one of general assent/agreement. It does not explicitly contradict S's pre-existing belief about your birthplace. Rather it is commensurate with it.

However, the proposition "Michael was not born in Germany" is not equivalent to S's belief about your birthplace. The proposition is not true only if, only when, and only because you were born in France. S's belief about both, your birthplace and that proposition, is.

People believe more than one thing. Beliefs about one thing entail beliefs about another. I believe that Joe Biden is President. I believe that only one person is President. I believe that Donald Trump isn't President. I believe that Barack Obama isn't President. I believe that creativesoul isn't President. I believe that an emu isn't President. And so on. — Michael

We're in agreement.

You want to rephrase all these beliefs as being "I believe that an emu isn't President because I believe that Joe Biden is President and that only one person can be President and that non-human animals cannot be President and... [whatever else there is]".

Here you've mistaken your report of my mental ongoings with my mental ongoings.

Your objections are replete with enemies of your own making. From my view, your belief about why an emu is not president is irrelevant regarding both, why and how, S believes either the disjunction, or conjunction.

If I promise to plant you a rose garden on Sunday, then on Monday there ought be a rose garden.

Is this correct? Is it a moral claim? Seems to me that the answer is clearly yes to both questions, so some moral claims can be correct.

1. If I was born in France then I was not born in Germany
2. You are justified in believing that I was born in France
3. Therefore, you are justified in believing that I was not born in Germany — Michael

It seems to me that 3 is more accurately rendered as...

S would be justified in believing that you were not born in Germany because you were born in France.


S's belief would be true only if, only when, and only because you were not born in Germany because you were born in France. If you were not born in Germany because you were born in England, then S's belief would be justified, valid, and false.

S's belief is not equivalent to the proposition you're reporting, claiming, asserting, and/or implying is equivalent to S's belief(you were not born in Germany). That's the underlying issue with Case II, and Case I as well. The difference is clearly shown in the truth conditions.

S's belief is that you were not born in Germany because you were born in France.

. Your argument seems to be that if I believe a conjunction then I don't believe each of its parts, which is false — Michael

My 'argument' is that S believes that you were not born in Germany because you were born in France, and that your accounting practice is leaving out the most important part of S's belief.

S's belief is not just that you were not born in Germany. It is that you were not born in Germany because you were born in France.

That is not true.

1. If I was born in France then I was not born in Germany
2. You are justified in believing that I was born in France
3. Therefore, you are justified in believing that I was not born in Germany

Trying to argue that (1) is false if I was not born in France seems unreasonable. Maybe you mean to argue that (3) is an invalid inference? If so then your issue isn't with entailment but with "justificatory closure".

Although I would disagree with you. (3) appears a valid inference to me. Thalburg's objection doesn't apply to this example given that being born in France and being born in Germany are mutually exclusive, and so the conjunction "I was born in France and not born in Germany" is not less likely than the singular "I was born in France". — Michael

I do not see an issue here different from Case II.

If you were not born in Germany for any other reason than being born in France, then S's belief would be justified, valid, and false.

The cottage cases are a different matter altogether. They do not follow and/or 'attack' the S knows that P iff... formulations that Gettier does. That puzzles me. Gettier at least begins with a justified false belief. The cottage cases do not.

your issue isn't with entailment but with "justificatory closure". — Michael

Indeed. My issue is not with entailment. As you may remember, I've been grappling with how to best come to terms with Gettier for several years now, off and on. We all know something is intuitively wrong. Gettier's paper causes many people to experience cognitive dissonance upon first reading it. The logic is so impeccable, and serves as an escape from that dissonance for those so inclined to follow it. The logic is incomplete in that it does not take proper account of Smith's belief. The underlying issue is the treatment of Smith's belief as though it were equivalent to a naked proposition.

In Gettier's paper, the issue is with treating Smith's beliefs as though they are equivalent to a naked proposition when they clearly are not. Case I has Gettier forgetting who "the man with ten coins in his pocket" referred to, and Case II has Gettier reporting Smith's belief in a manner that is incomplete. Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford. Gettier left out the important bit. That last bit makes all the difference in the world.

Excellent reply! Well, aside from the condescending petty personal remarks and focusing upon irrelevancy that you seem so fond of. Moving on...



Since you've demonstrated the ability...

How exactly is "there is a cow in the field" valid?

The preservation of truth includes the preservation of falsity. — creativesoul

Evidently, the above is not true in standard formal logic. My error. Good thing none of my objections to Gettier require it to be.

This is a VALID DEDUCTION and the CONCLUSION IS TRUE, yet BOTH PREMISES ARE FALSE. — neomac

Valid deductions preserve truth — neomac

Self-contradiction.

Either it's not a valid deduction or valid deductions do not preserve truth. The premisses were both false. The preservation of truth includes the preservation of falsity.

If Gettier is guilty of not properly taking account of Smith's belief, if Smith's belief was not equivalent to the propositions Gettier targeted, then there is no issue. JTB is left standing for in order to defeat JTB Gettier has to at least get the belief part right. He did not. End of story.

What's directly below is taken from Gettier's paper. It's worth mentioning here after the recent nonsense...

Various attempts have been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone's knowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form similar to the following:

(a) S knows that P IFF

1.) P is true,
2.) S believes that P
3.) S is justified in believing that P


For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the necessary
and sufficient conditions for knowledge:

(b) knows that P IFF

1.) S accepts P
2.) S has adequate evidence for P
3.) P is true.


Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge as
follows

(c) S knows that P IFF

1.) P is true,
2.) S is sure that P is true, and
3.) S has the right to be sure that P is true.

I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if ' has adequate evidence for ' or ' has the right to be sure that ' is substituted for ' is justified in believing that ' throughout.

I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of 'justified ' in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false.

I agree with the first point.

Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.

Here I disagree. I reject the rules of entailment because, as Gettier showed, we can use them to go from a belief that cannot be true to a belief that is. Logical/valid argument/reasoning preserves truth. The rules of entailment do not. If the preservation of truth is a requirement of valid, coherent, and/or logical reasoning, then the rules of 'logical' entailment fail to satisfy that standard.

In Gettier's argument, Q is not equivalent to S's belief.

The problem becomes apparent when we treat S's belief as S's belief(regarding who he believed would get the job and why he believed the disjunction was true) rather than as a naked proposition. I've done that work already.

An adequate summary...

Smith was not justified in believing anyone with ten coins in their pocket will get the job. He was justified in believing Jones did and would. Jones did not get the job, contrary to Smith's belief. Smith's belief was justified, valid, and false. What happened falsified Smith's belief.

Smith was not justified in believing that the disjunction was true because Q was. He was justified in believing that the disjunction was true because P was. The disjunction was not true because P was. The disjunction was true because Q was, contrary to Smith's belief. Smith's belief was justified, valid, and false. What happened falsified Smith's belief.<---that would be better put differently. What Smith believed to be the case was not.

So, your argument boils down to saying that "there is a cow in the field" is justified because you equivocate and/or abuse the term "valid".

Nice.

There is no deduction or inference or conclusion since these concepts for me apply more appropriately between propositions, not between perceptions and propositions! — neomac

..these cognitive abilities constitute a VALID justification for his perceptual belief (because they are relatively reliable), but not a SOUND justification for his perceptual belief though (because in that specific case they failed). — neomac

Gibberish. One the one hand, you claim there is no inference, deduction, or conclusion possible between mistaking cloth for cow and the assertion "there is a cow in the field", and then call that assertion 'valid' despite just openly admitting that it is not even capable of being so.

Validity and soundness are qualities, characteristics, and/or features of logical arguments, reasoning, and such. They apply or not only after we assess how a belief(inference/deduction/conclusion) is arrived at. That's the part that's missing from the cottage cases. The former is measured solely by virtue of whether or not the target belief follows the rules of correct inference. The latter exhausts the former, but in addition, with sound arguments/reasoning, the target belief is not just validly inferred/deduced, but it is also based upon true premises.

Sigh...

So in the case of the farmer's false belief, we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow... — neomac

Still have not answered the question.

How does the farmer validly deduce/infer/conclude "there is a cow in the field" from mistaking cloth for cow(from believing that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow)?

I didn't even get what your point is. — neomac

I've made several accompanied by subsequent argument. You've chosen to neglect all that.

The latest point was that you could not back up your claims about "there's a cow in the field" being justified. You refuse to answer very basic questions regarding how? Instead, you feign ignorance and distract attention away from your own shortcomings by creating confusion regarding what is meant by the words that you must use in order to make your case. Like your herring a bit red, do you?

You've proven my last point rather nicely.

I'm still willing to see how "there is a cow in the field" satisfies your criterion for what counts as a justified belief. Valid criticism of my own position works too, but if you do not understand it, then it would be unreasonable of me to expect you to provide such.

I'm strongly asserting that it is not justified, and I've offered more than adequate/sufficient subsequent arguments and/or reasoning for that assertion. Those are all the parts you've left sorely neglected.

S begins with a case of mistaking cloth for cow. Cases of mistaken identity do not make for solid, sufficient, and/or otherwise adequate ground from which to reliably infer, deduce, conclude, and/or subsequently believe anything else at all.

we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow — neomac

We could say it. It would not make it so.

Belief that there is a cow does not follow from mistaking cloth for cow.

I'm thinking that language less creatures beliefs are ineffable, by them or by us. We can talk about them though, so language less belief may not count as being ineffable, or does it? I know that that's not the target of the notion of being ineffable. Rather, it's used more as a safety net by those who cannot put their own meaningful thought, belief, and/or experience into acceptable words.

I take it that you do not have a position on the matter then. Mine has been made clear.

In the cottage cases, the target belief is not justified as a result of being neither, well-grounded nor validly deduced(if we stipulate S following the S knows that P as Gettier did). I've argued for that extensively and in more than one way. In Gettier's paper, which is remarkably different, the target beliefs are not equivalent to Smith's. I've argued extensively for that as well.

Since you refuse to take a position or offer valid criticism of mine, I suppose we have nothing left to discuss then.

Cheers. Be well.

Do you agree that at time t1, this particular farmer looked out into a particular field at a particular piece of cloth and mistook it for a cow?
— creativesoul

Yep. And?

Starting at "there is a cow in the field" does not consider the false belief, the case of mistaking cloth for cow, the belief that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow.
— creativesoul

So what? — neomac

Are you claiming that the farmer's belief that there is a cow in the field justified?

If you're not, then we're in agreement. If you are then now you know how to understand the following questions...

How does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow?
How does mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"?
How does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field?

Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford (because P was true). The disjunction was not true because P was true. It was true because Q was true. Smith's belief was false.
— creativesoul

I agree with this. There's a question you don't include in your summary - whether Smith was justified in believing that Jones owned a Ford. Gettier's answer is that he was. That's the situation that generates the confusion that people feel about these cases. — Ludwig V

I agree that Smith's belief was justified. I deny that it was true, because I deny that the target proposition/disjunction is equivalent to Smith's belief at the time. Looking at what makes them true shines clear light on this accounting malpractice of confusing belief with a naked proposition.

I'm pointing out that Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford. The disjunction was not true because Jones owned a Ford. It was true because Brown was in Barcelona. Thus, Smith's belief is justified, valid, and false. That poses no problem for JTB.

Case II has Gettier guilty of not getting Smith's belief right to begin with. Convention did not notice, because he followed all the rules of belief attribution/reporting practices. When we do get Smith's belief right, the 'problem' dissolves completely. As above, justified, valid, false belief is not a problem for JTB. Gettier was/is not alone. He merely followed the historical conventional practices of belief attribution based upon rendering all belief in propositional form. Convention still treats naked propositions as equivalent to belief when rendering an individuals' belief in propositional form. It manifests from the divorce/separation of truth and belief. That's the reason why Gettier's paper has persisted.

Another historical problem is the conventional mistake of treating belief as though it is equivalent to the naked proposition. It's not. We can know that by virtue of carefully comparing what it would take for the belief under consideration to be true with what it would take in order for the naked proposition to be true. They are not always the same. This is one such case. It's not the only one. Case I is yet another.


Smith's belief is not just that the disjunction is true. Rather, it is more about his knowing what makes the disjunction true. Think about what all it takes in order for an individual to do what Gettier suggests Smith does in his thought/belief formation process. Smith has to know enough to deliberately follow the S knows that P formula that Gettier was targeting. Gettier even goes so far as to openly claim that Smith knows the rules of disjunction as well as the rules of entailment, for it is the entailment that Gettier uses in order for him to claim that Smith knowingly deduced P or Q from P. Gettier even added that Smith was aware of the move, which presupposes that he intentionally and deliberately knowingly made it. Then he forgets all about that part. Odd, given he was supposed to be reporting Smith's belief.

Think about it in a way that's been sorely neglected. It's common sense.

If Smith believed that Jones owned a Ford, and he was adept enough to know that the rules of entailment would allow him to deduce "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" from his belief that Jones owned a Ford, then it only follows that he did not believe that the disjunction was true as a result of Brown's whereabouts. It was. To quite the contrary, he believed it was true regardless of Brown's whereabouts. It was not.

He only believed the disjunction was true because he believed Jones owned a Ford. He would never have uttered it otherwise. Belief that (P v Q) does not adequately take Smith's belief into account.

That is one historical accounting malpractice.

Belief that "'P or Q' is true because P" is not equivalent to belief that "P or Q" is true.
— creativesoul

But surely is one part of a disjunction is true, the whole disjunction is true. "Jones owned a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Jones owned a Ford. Yes? Also "Jones owned a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Brown is in Barcelona. Yes? That's all I'm saying. — Ludwig V

Yes. The disjunction was true as a result of Brown's whereabouts, contrary to Smith's belief that it was true regardless of Brown's whereabouts. Gettier admitted as much, but neglected to take that into consideration when reporting Smith's belief. Smith only deduced the disjunction as a result of his believing it was true because Jones owned a Ford.

Belief that the disjunction is true because of P is false when the disjunction is true as a result of Q.

Seems to me that all Gettier cases show problems with the conventional accounting practices.
— creativesoul

I'm sorry, but I don't understand what you mean by conventional or unconventional accounting practices. Can you please explain? — Ludwig V

No worries.

This post touches upon and/or skirts around that aspect a bit more. Happy to answer any questions.

Mistaking that particular cloth for a cow is to believe that that cloth is a cow. That's the beginning of this particular farmer's thought and/or belief formation process. It makes no sense to judge whether or not the farmer's belief is justified unless we carefully examine what grounds that target belief. A case of mistaken identity grounds it.

The cottage industry cases completely neglect to include the beginning of the farmer's thought and/or belief formation process.

It does not follow from mistaking cloth for cow that one is justified in asserting/believing that "there is a cow in the field" is true.

Starting at "there is a cow in the field" does not consider the false belief, the case of mistaking cloth for cow, the belief that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow. Starting at "there is a cow in the field" completely neglects to assess the belief underwriting the exclamation. Those give rise to "there is a cow in the field".

Besides that, "that's a cow" would be the first thing the farmer thought/believed upon looking at the cloth. Then, he may deduce "there is a cow in the field". It makes no difference. Neither follow from mistaking cloth for cow.

...the fact that available evidences fit enough into a cow-shape perceptual template — neomac

The cloth looked like a cow.

...plus the fact that no other justificatory practice more reliable than judging by habit... — neomac

As if any judgment habit counts...

I would claim "mistaking cloth for cow explains the belief that there is a cow in field" — neomac

Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that?
— creativesoul

Yep. — neomac

Do you agree that at time t1, this particular farmer looked out into a particular field at a particular piece of cloth and mistook it for a cow?

Whose distinction is a categorical error?

You've shown a penchant recently for not answering questions posed to you. Try this...

Does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow?
Does the act of mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"?
Does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field?

I am using a variation of Kant’s definition of synthetic and analytic truths, one which is defined in terms of necessity and contingency and not containment and non-containment. — TheGreatArcanum

Does it escape Quine's deconstruction of that distinction in Two Dogmas?

How does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow? How does mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"? How does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field?

In short, it seems to me that Gettier case ought to be possible. Perhaps the real Gettier problem is why it is so hard to develop one that commands general agreement or to articulate a general solution. — Ludwig V

Seems to me that all Gettier cases show problems with the conventional accounting practices. From convention accounting practices' inability to properly render Smith's belief in both Gettier cases, to belief attribution practices(including but not limited to the de re/de dicto distinction) claiming that the farmer's belief statement is justified, when it is clearly not if we look carefully enough at what grounded that statement, to the practice of being far too strict with what ought only apply to some beliefs, and working from the presupposition/dogma that all belief ought be only rendered in terms amenable to belief as propositional attitude simply because openly espoused ones can.

There is a basic (mis)conception of meaningful human thought and belief in philosophy proper, and it's been there for a very long time. As a result of getting thought and belief wrong on such a basic level, we've gotten something basic wrong about everything ever thought, believed, spoken, and/or otherwise uttered when offering a report about their origin.

It's no wonder that there are no notions of belief at work(that I'm aware of) that are rendered in terms easily amenable to evolutionary progression. With all the talk about consciouness, it doesn't look hopeful for this to be corrected, in small part at the very least, any time soon. You'll have that.

I'm very busy in real life everyday practical financially rewarding endeavors, and I'm very lucky to have been fortunate enough to be the one who's currently in my shoes, so to speak. That being said, there is something that I get from doing philosophy well, and listening to others who also do, that simply cannot be gotten any other way. So, sometimes I piddle...

I appreciate your responses thus far.

Very professional. Oh...

And you're more than welcome for the earlier reply. It was my pleasure.