Name calling is not nice.

:wink:

b.)an animal capable of holding something as such.
— creativesoul

I think here is the point of disagreement.

So the question seems to be: What is the psychology of "holding a belief"? Should the notion of holding a belief be included in an account of a cat's psychology?

Which makes me wonder if you think a dog can hold a belief. Or an ape. Is it a question of psychology? It seems it must be, if a human can hold a belief. It must be a difference of psyche. — ZzzoneiroCosm

While I agree that that is one point of divergence between our positions, I'm not keen on invoking psychological terminology. It seems unnecessary, and looks to be quite unhelpful for the task at hand. It has made the issue even more complex than it already is, and in doing so increased entities without adding clarity. I do not share the belief that the task aims at the unknown, or unknowable. Although acquiring knowledge of language less belief requires a stringent methodology replete with certain specific criteria based upon actual differences, it's certainly not a 'fait accompli' situation. The questions can be put as...

1.What sort of things are held to be true?
2.What does holding things to be true require such that some creatures are capable of doing so while others are not?

There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true. This may seem to be splitting hairs, but it is imperative to do so for that distinction both honors and subsequently bridges the gap between belief and thinking about belief, whereas the latter requires language use, and is necessary for holding something to be true. Such belief is about language use, and amounts to a charitable reading of Banno's position(belief as an attitude towards some statement/proposition such that they believe it to be true).

I cannot possibly stress how many 'different' historical philosophical problems arose from neglecting that actual distinction(between belief and thinking about belief). From Plato/Socrates to Aristotle to Locke, Hume, and Kant to Descartes, Heidegger, Husserl, all the way through Frege, Russell, Witty, and Moore to Gettier to Quine, Davidson, Rorty, Chalmers, Searle, Dennett, and beyond, there's been a gross misconception of belief at work, and accounting malpractices thereof have been and remain the result.

The thing the cat is "holding to be true" is this: The sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. How does a cat go about "holding it to be true"? Does he think about the can opener away from mealtime and in his mind practice the association of can opener to tasty treat to firm up or stabilize the association? Does he sometimes hear a noise similar to the can opener and perk up and "question" the noise to see if it was indeed the can opener? Can that be called holding a belief?

All of this is unknown and takes us far away from philosophy into the realm of animal psychology. — ZzzoneiroCosm

"The sound of the electric can opener means that there might be something tasty in the kitchen" is an accounting practice. Attributing that practice to a language less creature is a mistake; a conflation of belief and thinking about belief. What you've suggested is an example of thinking about belief. All thinking about belief requires language use.

While I've no issue agreeing that that account is an accurate enough one regarding what the sound means to the cat, I do not agree that the cat also holds the account to be true. The cat cannot hold an accounting practice to be true, for it cannot understand such practices, and in order to hold something as true, one must first understand what's being held so. At the very least, one must believe they do.

In this example, it makes perfect sense to me for us to say that when the cat hears the can opener it believes it is about to eat, thinks so, even expects to, or perhaps that it thinks or believes there is or will be food in the kitchen, so it goes to check.

Interesting. On my own view, the cat draws correlations between the sound and eating afterwards, and that's how the sound becomes meaningful. The notion of association works okay here too. To be clear, that is a very basic and incomplete account, for those meaningful correlations are far more complex by virtue of including far more things, but simplicity is good for now.

I'm still struggling to understand how the cat holds the meaning to be true.

To me, it hears the sound, it believes it is about to eat as a result of drawing much the same correlations that made the sound meaningful to it to begin with.

While I hold that language less belief can be true, I think that holding something as true requires a.)something that can be true in addition to b.)an animal capable of holding something as such. Seems to me that meaning is not the sort of thing that can be true, and the cat is not capable of holding something to be true.

A bit more background regarding my position...

Meaning is required for correspondence with the way things were, are, and/or will be. Meaning is required for coherency. Meaning is required for truth conditions. Indeed, it seems clear to me that meaning and truth are inextricably entwined in belief. However, holding something to be true and holding true belief seem to have remarkably different necessary preconditions.


I wanted to say a bit more about this...

The cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen.

The meaning of the sound of the electric can opener is what the cast holds to be true. He believes it means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. In that sense, you might say the sound of the electric can opener is a statement of meaning to the cat. But that's kind of an abuse of language.

I don't think we need to insert the notion of a statement here. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I agree that statements are not always necessary in order for a capable creature to attribute meaning(for things to become meaningful to that creature).

Do you hold to the conventional notion of proposition as what's common between two statements saying the same thing in two different languages(expressing the same proposition)?

The cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen.

The meaning of the sound of the electric can opener is what the cast holds to be true. He believes it means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. In that sense, you might say the sound of the electric can opener is a statement of meaning to the cat. But that's kind of an abuse of language.

I don't think we need to insert the notion of a statement here. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You're correct that our positions differ here.

I wonder how the sound becomes meaningful to the cat on your view?

Is your disagreement with Banno only that you take him to be claiming that all beliefs are in propositional form, as opposed to claiming that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form? Because I imagine you would agree that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. If this is so, then I can't see what you two could be disagreeing about. — Janus

I've little to no issue with the claim that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. That's what we do when taking account of another's belief. My issue arises when we conflate the content of our reports with the content of what we're reporting on.

I later made the comment below, which I would be interested to hear your response to:

How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief. — creativesoul

Say a prehistoric animal is thirsty and remembers where it last drank. Then it starts moving in the direction of the water. Is it not expecting the water to be where it was last time? I would say expectation is a kind of propositional form, insofar as it is intentional (in the phenomenological sense of being of or about something) even in the absence of symbolic language. — Janus

Yeah! That's the one I could not find. I think that expectation is belief about what's not yet happened. I'm not at all keen on the idea of propositional form somehow existing in such a way that a language less creature's belief could be a kind thereof.

I'm not at all inclined to speak in phenomenological terms. So, if the conventional notion of intention means being of and/or about something, then I find it best to talk in those terms, unless "intention" adds explanatory power that is otherwise somehow missing without it.

The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality. — Janus

That's the way I've always understood it. However, that understanding has been challenged as incorrect by a few around here.

Akin in saying that all you can say is that we can know that there are unknowns...

This:
It paves the way for anthropomorphism by virtue of claiming that language less creatures are capable of holding something to be true. They are not.
— creativesoul

--is a difficult position for me to accept since it appears to me that animals are capable of holding this and that to be true. But that's my taking issue with your position and not with your presentation. — ZzzoneiroCosm

On my view, the only things we hold to be true(in the relevant sense) are statements. On yours, are there other things that are capable of being held true, such that a language less creature would be capable of doing so?

So where Banno is content to say an unknown is statable, creative would like to place the unknown beyond the "limits of language." This is the portion of his world beyond the limits of language. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Nice summary! Indeed, on my view the unknown is akin to Kant's Noumena in that very specific way.

...we have an unknown that you say is statable but at this time no one on earth and nothing in the universe can state it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That reminds me of "falsifiable", when it comes to true statements. Seems to me that true statements cannot be false, therefore are not able to be falsified or shown as false. I'm probably just not understanding correctly though.

:wink:

I'm having trouble ferreting out the three kinds of belief. A numbered list would be clearer. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That makes perfect sense, for they were further set out in the second post.

1.)Beliefs about events, particularly those that can happen in places and times where naming and descriptive practices are non-existent. Believing that a mouse is behind a tree serves as an example thereof. These might be described as language-less beliefs, for they are not at all about language.
2.)Beliefs about events that can be and/or are uttered by an unreflective* language user(*say someone learning how to use names and descriptive practices such as a young child). One who sees a mouse run behind a tree and then states "A mouse is behind the tree" offers one such example.
3.)Beliefs about whether or not some statement is true.

The first two are about events. The third is about language use, particularly whether or not some statement is true.

A psychology of belief would look at why we hold the beliefs we hold, what are the psychological motivations, why do folks hold beliefs for which there is scant to no supporting evidence, why do we become so entrenched in our beliefs, why do we defend our beliefs so passionately, why do people who hold beliefs contrary to our own seem sometimes like total fucking morons and/or cocks. Especially fascinating is the psychology of mass belief: why large groups of people come to believe ridiculous things and in ridiculous people. From Gilgamesh to Trump. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Indeed. Understood. Trump is a symptom of much deeper issues in the US I'm afraid. I think that I've a fairly decent grasp of how the ground was cultivated over the nation's history, with particular interest on the past fifty years in order to give Trump a foothold, but that's too far off the main topic here... for now at least. Perhaps we could circle back later if the right circumstances arise.

Be well.

I would like to stress that the substantial issue is if, what and how classificatory intentional abilities “guide” behavior and make it intelligible in linguistic and non-linguistic creatures. — neomac

I'm afraid I cannot help you there. I'm working on an understanding of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression based upon the tenets of methodological naturalism.

Unless you have another reason to explain the way you reported Jack's belief, I take it to mean that the second report is better then the first one, as I too believe. — neomac

I'm afraid that I left the reader to draw the conclusion...

Jack looked at a broken clock because he wanted to know the time. He carefully noted the time indicated on the face of the clock by looking at the clock's hands; i.e., by already knowing how to read a clock. The clock on the wall indicated 3 o'clock. Jack - in that very moment - believed that it was three o'clock because he believed that that particular clock was working. That particular clock was broken. — creativesoul

Therefore, he believed that a broken clock was working.

I'm unsure of the difference between those. What do you mean?

To be clear, I'm here because the topic is of great interest to me personally, and I'm fairly certain that understanding how belief works is imperative, crucial even, to understanding ourselves and the world around us. I'm here because I've found doing philosophy with certain individuals has provided enrichment to my life. Banno is one such individual, although certainly not the only one.

So, could you take the time to read my first few posts in the debate and offer a critique or some other summarization? Does anything jump out as suspect?

Yet as long as beliefs are taken to be representational, then for me “content of belief”, “what belief is about” and “what belief is referring to” (so the referent of a belief) are interchangeable expressions. Is it not the case for you? — neomac

The broken clock shows that the content of belief is not equivalent to what belief is about. Beliefs do not refer to anything. Names do that.

I do think you've set out something that can be used to help improve the discussion, and move it along.

I've no issue with claiming that some belief amounts to an attitude towards some proposition. To be clear. Just not all. We could say that such belief are linguistic - resulting from correlations including language use. Whereas non linguistic would be those resulting from correlations not including language use. I'm not married to that taxonomy, but there needs to be something of that sort.

Yeah, I remember looking forward to replying to something you said earlier, then I could not find it. Could you repeat it, or link it, or somehow otherwise fill me in?

Not an attitude toward some proposition.

Able to be put in the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

What do you mean "not"? Read the debate and see for yourself where belief was described as an attitude towards a proposition on at least one occasion.

Putting language less creatures' belief into the form of a propositional attitude does not make the belief have propositional content. It makes it able to be described using propositional content. Those are two very different claims, and you noted as much yourself, not long ago earlier today.

The content of the belief includes a broken clock, but Joe's belief is not about broken clocks. — creativesoul

You asked for a distinction. There it is. Seems simple enough to me.

How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs?
— creativesoul

Banno isn't saying a languageless creature can have an attitude toward a proposition. He's saying that the languageless beliefs of languageless creatures can be put in the form of a propositional attitude.

Non-controversial.

If I were to say that I am choosing to use the term "belief" only for those things that can be put into the form of propositional attitudes, would you object?
— Banno — ZzzoneiroCosm

Is it non-controversial though? At first blush, it may seem innocuous enough, but when placed under scrutiny, it reveals itself to be inherently incapable of taking proper account of language less belief. If all belief is an attitude towards some proposition or another then all language less creatures' beliefs are attitudes towards some proposition.

That's patently absurd on it's face.

he believes that a broken clock was working
— creativesoul

That doesn’t sound a correct report of Jack’s belief. Indeed it would make Jack’s belief contradictory. A better report would be: Jack believes that clock is working. But that belief is false. — neomac

Evidently, we've very different standards regarding what counts as a "better report" of Jack's belief.

This is a matter of great contention between our views. It seems clear to me that Jack can and does believe both, without any issue at all.

Jack looked at a broken clock because he wanted to know the time. He carefully noted the time indicated on the face of the clock by looking at the clock's hands; i.e., by already knowing how to read a clock. The clock on the wall indicated 3 o'clock. Jack - in that very moment - believed that it was three o'clock because he believed that that particular clock was working. That particular clock was broken.

Anyway what you mean...

I mean what I write. Let's focus there.

The content of Jack's belief included that particular broken clock, despite the fact that it was about what time it was. Jack's belief was not about broken clocks, it included them.

Joe looks at a broken clock which indicates the time is 3 o'clock.

Joe believes that the time is 3 o'clock, because he believes that a broken clock was working. Joe does not know that the clock is broken, so he does not believe the statement/proposition "a broken clock is working" is true. The content of the belief includes a broken clock, but Joe's belief is not about broken clocks.

A thread worthy of careful revisitation...

Around page ten, it gets interesting...

:wink:

I was just perusing that thread yesterday.

creativesoul must think something like this, to explain why he is perplexed that a cat might have a belief while not being able to use language. For him, if a belief is an attitude towards a proposition, there must be propositions in minds, and so language. — Banno

No, that's not it at all. My problem with that notion of belief is well known. How to square that with the idea that language less animals are capable of belief. Hence, the need to posit the notion of a language less proposition.

If all belief is an attitude towards a proposition, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language use, then language less animals have no belief. That's the argument. The conclusion follows from the premisses. You have argued for both premisses. You cannot admit the conclusion, because you know better. I'm offering a way to make amends.

Yes. Indeed! That article was very impressive to me as well! I'm not a physicalist either, strictly speaking.

You may find it interesting to search the site by typing the title into the search bar. Banno created a great thread about it. Good stuff in there, between the typical yahoos.

What is the referent of the belief in "the cat believes the bowl is empty"? — Banno

The question makes no sense on my view.
— creativesoul

I disagree. The referent of the word "belief" is a cognitive intentional state/event (depending on the dispositional or actual meaning we attribute to the word "belief"). — neomac

Note he asked the referent of the belief, not the word "belief". Beliefs do not have referents for they are not used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else. That's what names do.

My impression is that here you are confusing the content of the belief, with the belief. I think your formulation would sound better if you stated "All belief consists of drawing correlations" instead of "All belief consists of correlations drawn". Yet I wouldn't find it satisfactory: we draw correlations even when we imagine or associate ideas, but imagination is not belief. — neomac

The content of a belief amounts to what a belief consists of. The content of the belief that a mouse is behind a tree is the mouse, the tree, the spatiotemporal relationship between the two, and the correlations drawn between all these by the creature capable of doing so.

Indeed, we do draw correlations when imagining, remembering, creating, envisioning, dreaming, etc. I fail to see how that presents any issue for the position I'm putting forth here. I mean, I've not claimed that all correlations are belief, nor would I.

Besides what is "correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things" supposed to mean when one believes that 3 + 2 = 5 or God is omniscient? — neomac

Are those meaningful marks imperceptible? When one believes that 3 + 2 = 5, they've done nothing more than accept the rules of arithmetic. It may be worth noting here that numbers are nothing more than the names of quantities. When one believes that God is omniscient, they've done nothing more than learn to use language to talk about the supernatural beliefs of the community, and believe that what they are saying is true. Believing that God is omniscient is to believe that there is a God, such that God exists, and that God knows everything.

On my view, all concepts are linguistic constructs, whereas not all beliefs are. All concepts are existentially dependent upon language.
— creativesoul

On what grounds do you believe that all concepts are linguistic constructs? What are the features you ascribe to concepts that essentially require language? — neomac

Short on time.

Name some things that you count as a concept, and it will help this along better. As before, I do not use the notion, finding different ways of talking to be more practical.

The concept of belief and belief...

Do you draw a distinction?

...what is it that is "had" by the cat, when it has a belief? Nothing, I say; it's just a way of setting out it's behaviour. — Banno

It's a tough question to be sure. The belief is what is had by the cat. The cat draws correlations between different things. The bowl. Hunger pangs. The urge to eat, and seek food(gather resources). The belief that the bowl is empty could be accompanied by unsatisfied expectations, if she is expecting food to be there. There are numerous past events, each leaving an impression upon the cat such that it now goes to the bowl when it's hungry. After looking into the bowl, if it is empty, then the cat sees that the bowl is empty. Knowing what an empty food bowl looks like is not a mystery, nor is believing the bowl is empty when looking at an empty bowl. There is language necessary to make the bowl, but there's none necessary to look into it and see that it's empty, resulting in believing so.

We build red out of our usage. Why shouldn't we think of belief in much the same way? — Banno

I think that that overstates the human influence regarding red things. Other language less creatures can also see red, so it is clear that seeing red does not require our language usage. However, more to your point, which I take on in agreement is...

Our usage determines what "seeing red" means. We cannot sensibly talk about seeing red cups unless we've been steeped in language. Our usage determines what "I believe that X" means(where X is some statement believed true). We cannot sensibly talk about our beliefs unless we've been steeped in language. In both cases, it is true that our understanding and knowledge of what those words mean depends entirely upon language use...

However, I would not say the same about all instances of seeing red or all instances of believing that a mouse ran behind a tree. Not all those depend upon language use.

What is the referent of the belief in "the cat believes the bowl is empty"? — Banno

The question makes no sense on my view. Beliefs are not the sort of things used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else, or to refer to something else; beliefs are not names, do not function like names, although they are certainly necessary for any naming and descriptive practices to begin.

What sort of thing is the belief? — Banno

Beliefs are complex things composed of other things. They are a result of cognitive processes. All belief consists of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things. The complexity of any belief in particular(the correlational content) is congruent with the innate capabilities of the creature.

If the cat believes that the bowl is empty, it is as a result of looking and seeing that there was no food in it. There is no referent of the belief. As above, the cat's belief does not refer to anything. Rather, it's about a food source. It's about the bowl,, but is much more than just the empty bowl.

You say it's not a thing in the mind of the cat. So what is it? — Banno

The issue I have is with the use of "mind" as anything other than a loose reference to one's thoughts and beliefs. Layman speak for what are you thinking is "What's on your mind". "I have something in mind" does not mean that the mind is a place where things can be. Indeed, beliefs are the sorts of things that do not have a precise spatiotemporal location, for they are composed of entirely different otherwise seemingly disparate things, connected only by the correlations drawn between them by the believing creature.

Seems to me you missed something quite important, but...

Try this:

You are perhaps happy to say that red is seen by us in, say, a sunset or a cup, but that it is a secondary property; not to actually be found in the object.

I'm suggesting something analogous is the case with belief. — Banno

Well then, perhaps we do agree on something basic. I'm not keen on the 'property' talk though. I'll try to tease out the analogy in as simple terms as I can, using ones with which I believe you'll be okay. I'll try to incorporate both, the private language argument and the secondary property gist, for they seem to be different kinds of objections.

So, seeing red always includes some creature or another, and what is meant by "seeing red" is entirely determined by language use, which is social. Thus, when one claims that their experience of seeing red cups or even thinking about red cups is some personal and private experience or thought, we can surely know that those thoughts and experiences cannot count as private matters at all, because they are the result of social constructs and historical language use, and that which is a social construct cannot be completely private.

I'll leave it there for now. Hopefully, this is the beginning of something more productive between us. It's been a while. If the above is palatable enough for you, could you elaborate on how belief is the same way. Don't get me wrong, I understand how our use of the term "belief" fits into the above so far as language use being social goes. Rather, I'm struggling to see how this is at all applicable and/or lends support to the claim that all belief content is propositional.

If I claim that I am referring to something intrinsic by saying that I am in pain, what I mean is that there is a simple and direct relation between my words and a sensation. Wittgenstein argues that such an isolated association between word and thing doesn’t say anything at all, it is meaningless. In order for the expression ‘ I am in pain’ to mean something to others,, it has to refer to a socially shared context of background presuppositions, and do something new with them that is recognizable to other speakers. If I am alone, and I think to myself ‘I am in pain’, then the thought is only meaningful to me if it refers to my own network of background presuppositions and carries them forward into a new context of sense. — Joshs

This seems like a good summary to me. It points to how crucial historical usage is when it comes to the meaning of words, phrases, and other language constructs. It denies the equivalence often drawn between unspoken thought and 'private' thought. Dennet has at least one intuition pump that does much the same thing in "Quining Qualia", except he's arguing against the notion of private sensations or some such and using something like the private language argument to make the point of how socially constructed the notions actually are.

I highly recommend reading that to anyone who has not.

We only need to assume languageless creatures have thoughts and emotions and that these thoughts and emotions have the power to motivate behavior. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I believe that it's better to arrive at that as a conclusion that is warranted by and follows from what we can know about our own thought and belief.

Care to further discuss the topic, as compared/contrasted to my interlocutor?
— creativesoul

I don't see how we can further it. — neomac

Do you find the account I set out in the first three posts of the debate to be a complete one?

...how do you see the relation between concepts and beliefs? — neomac

On my view, all concepts are linguistic constructs, whereas not all beliefs are. All concepts are existentially dependent upon language. Language creation and use is existentially dependent upon belief. Therefore, concepts are existentially dependent upon belief. I've no use for the notion of "concept", having found that talking in terms of beliefs, thoughts, and linguistic frameworks is much better than talking in terms of concepts or conceptual schemes.

Diplodocus did not have items of furniture in their minds that could be properly described as beliefs. Rather they had behaviours that we can set out and explain in terms of beliefs and desires.

I dunno. This seems to be a fairly straight forward corollary of the beetle in the box. That folk with a decent grasp of Wittgenstein - yes, you , creativesoul - can't see this strikes me as quite odd. — Banno

Diplodocus are not prehistoric mammals. I chose my classification deliberately. I wish you would pay closer attention, I know you're capable of understanding this. There are no items of furniture inside of any skulls that I'm aware of, so the response is laughable... literally. You are arguing against your own imaginary opponents.

I've no issue at all with the idea that we can explain behaviours in terms of beliefs and desires.

As far as Witt's beetle goes, I am of the understanding that it's an argument against the idea of private language or private meaning of words. I agree with it actually. It's also irrelevant here. Language less creatures' belief does not consist of language or constructs thereof. Our reports of them do, but I'm not so naive as to conflate the content of our reports with the content of what we're reporting upon.

Trees, mice, and the spatiotemporal relationship between them that we characterize as one being behind the other do not need language to exist in their entirety exactly as they did when we coined the phrase "the mouse is behind the tree". I'm not arguing that the phrase is some private belief of a prehistoric mammal(say a cat). That's absurd. Rather, I'm saying that a prehistoric cat could have believed that a mouse was behind a tree long before we coined the phrase(call it whatever you want, it matters not).

How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief.
— creativesoul

Again?

So a belief is a something stored in the mind of a Diplodocus? — Banno

Please address what I write and not some imaginary opponent that you make up in lieu thereof.