...only rational beings are capable of entertaining perspectives. I suppose, from the human perspective, you can see that animals have a unique perspective, but I think that kind of 'perspective' can be understood solely in terms of stimulus and response; they don't abstract from that, as abstraction is dependent on the power of reason. They cannot, for example, create scientific models or hypotheses... — Wayfarer

Neither can children. Do they not have a perspective? Are they not rational?

Hey Jeep! :smile:

What you've said here is over-simplistic. There are three basic varieties of conscious experience consisting of language less thought and belief, basic thought and belief with linguistic components, and metacognitive thought and belief with linguistic components. That is also the order in which they appear/emerge with each successive one wholly dependent upon the previous one(s).

Biden is in a position to take what would have otherwise been known as a conservative, responsible approach to the pandemic response... and I suspect he will. The only difference between Biden and traditional conservatives of the 80's, 90's, and 00's is his stance on gay marriage and abortion. Economically, I'd be happily surprised should he prove me wrong...

Back to normal...

Redness seems to be a property of objects of perception (no abstract redness is observed, but we can collate red things), and a property is that which causes some particular effect in a particular circumstance (to be is to do) which is the correlation I think we're speaking of. — Kenosha Kid

If we say that red/redness is a property of red objects of perception, all properties cause some particular effect, and that that effect is the correlation drawn between the property itself and something other than the property itself, then we're saying that red/redness is the cause of all correlations drawn between red/redness and other things(food items, in the case of the crow).

I cannot agree. On my view...

Correlations drawn between color and other things are not so much caused by color so much as they are made possible by color. Color is one basic elemental constituent of all conscious experience of color... that of red/redness notwithstanding.

The particular effect may vary from beast to beast, but the property can be established as the same through additional correlations between effects: the crows collate the same things we call red. — Kenosha Kid

I think we're mostly in agreement here. If the effect of red/redness is the correlation drawn between red/redness and other things(which I'm uneasy with saying per the above reasons), then the only variance from beast to beast would be amongst the other things. I agree that we can establish that the crows are drawing correlations between color by virtue of gathering different things of the same color. I agree that we can establish color as a property of things. I'd go further and say that the color is clearly meaningful to them, particularly so if the color is associated, correlated, and/or otherwise connected to their eating behaviours(food items) and all that that entails physiologically speaking(all the autonomous activity regarding their biological machinery). Those are deep seated simple basic correlations being drawn between directly perceptible things.

Language less conscious experience of red/redness cannot consist of correlations drawn between the color red and language use. The color and food items for the trained crow is an adequate example. If the crow was trained to gather red items after hearing the name "red" being spoken aloud, then it would no longer be language less for the correlations would include the language use, along with the red items and the food items. Should the crow be brilliant enough to learn how to talk about it's own conscious experiences of red/redness , that would be a metacognitive crow.
— creativesoul

:up: Looks good to me.

All conscious experience of the color red consists of correlations drawn between the color red and other things. In that very real sense, they are all the same.
— creativesoul

In some qualitative sense... — Kenosha Kid

I left out the bolded portion above accidentally in my original reply. Does that correction change anything important on your view? Does it matter to your reply?

What does all conscious experience of red consist in/of such that it is by virtue of having that constituency that makes it count as conscious experience of red.
— creativesoul

I don't expect all animals to have the same concept of the same colour. As you pointed out, we have a linguistic component to our understanding of red that other animals would not. — Kenosha Kid

Language is one consideration worth touching upon. Drawing that distinction is important on my view. Conscious experience of color consisting of a linguistic component, and conscious experience of color that does not; a good move.

However, I advise that we draw yet another subsequent distinction between conceptions of color having linguistic components, because those come in both the simple and metacognitive varieties. So, there are three basic kinds of conscious experience of red/redness needing to be taken proper account of; conscious experience of red/redness that do not have linguistic components, and two different varieties of conscious experience that do(simple and metacognitive).

So, we've 'whittled our way down' to three kinds or varieties.

What do all three consist in/of such that that elemental constituency is capable of evolving along the evolutionary timeline, and growing in complexity alongside the worldview of the individual creature(whatever that may be)?

I propose correlations drawn by the creature between the color red and other things. It's the other things that determine whether or not the conscious experience of red/redness is language-less, unreflective, or self-reflective. The content of the correlations is the content of the conscious experience.

Language less conscious experience of red/redness cannot consist of correlations drawn between the color red and language use. The color and food items for the trained crow is an adequate example. If the crow was trained to gather red items after hearing the name "red" being spoken aloud, then it would no longer be language less for the correlations would include the language use, along with the red items and the food items. Should the crow be brilliant enough to learn how to talk about it's own conscious experiences of red/redness , that would be a metacognitive crow.

I'd say that any commonality between conceptions of redness between different animals would rest in commonality between how those animals' brains transform raw sensory input into phenomenal data (qualia).

I would concur. The particular individual creature's biological machinery plays a huge, irrevocably important role in determining and/or facilitating the ability to draw correlations between colors and other things(to have conscious experience of red/redness), but not the only remarkable one. Language use plays as noteworthy a role as biological machinery in determining the ability to draw correlations between the color red and other things.

I request that meaning be invoked and/or incorporated out of bare necessity, common sense understanding of what must count as conscious experience of red/redness .

All conscious experience is meaningful to the creature having it. All conscious experience of red/redness requires the color to either already be and/or become meaningful to the creature that is reportedly having the conscious experience of red/redness. One cannot have a concept of red/redness, or a conscious experience of red/redness when the color is utterly meaningless to the creature. Again, correlations drawn between the color and other things is more than adequate an autonomous process capable of evolving nicely after language use has begun in earnest, allowing conscious experience of red to grow in complexity after we begin using the name to identify red things, and then self-reflectively considering color and it's relationship to us and other things, after we've begun earnest metacognition(thinking about our own conscious experiences of red/redness as a subject matter in their own right).

All three kinds clearly summed up.

All conscious experience consists of correlations drawn between the color red and other things. In that very real sense, they are all the same.

So association of color equals conception of color?
— creativesoul

Refering back to myself:

What you have described is an animal that can not only compare two objects of the same colour, but can compare that colour to a colour is associates with 'get foodness'. This 'get foodness' may well be identically the "crow equivalent of the concept of redness" I spoke of (seems likely).
— Kenosha Kid

So that last sentence proposes that the association could be identity in that instance, allowing for the possibility that, for said crow, there's nothing to redness but 'get foodness'. I wasn't making a general observation. — Kenosha Kid

We're close.

What's a conception of color if not thinking about color? If crows have conceptions of color, and we have conceptions of color, there must be some commonality between the two in order for both to be called by the same name "conceptions"... the same is true of conscious experience of red/redness, thought, belief, understanding, apprehension, etc...

What does all conscious experience of red consist in/of such that it is by virtue of having that constituency that makes it count as conscious experience of red. You're positing some crow equivalent of concept of redness.

What does that consist of? Associations between red and food is a good start(for the trained crow), it seems to me. I do not get the 'get foodness' thing though...

So association of color equals conception of color?

Note the common etymology. — Olivier5

Look at "red" and "redness" while you're at it...

Knowing that red things have that in common requires isolating and focusing upon the fact that the same frequencies are emitted/reflected by different things.
— creativesoul

No it doesn't, as had already been pointed out. Our concept of redness precedes our knowledge of the wave nature of light and cannot depend on such knowledge. — Kenosha Kid

We're not getting anywhere with gratuitous assertions or non sequiturs. You've a habit of rewording what I say into something different, and then criticizing your reconstruction. I'm not saying that one need to have knowledge that color is determined - in part - by reflected/emitted light, I'm saying that one needs to be able to focus upon the fact that different things reflect/emit the same light(that things are the same color) in order to gather like colored things for the sake of doing so.

One could gather like colored things as a means to an end that is not for the sake of gathering like colored things. For food reward, as an example. You're claiming that that gathering ability requires a concept of redness. I'm saying that it only requires the ability to see and gather like colored things and hold some expectation of food upon doing so, and that seeing and gathering red things does not equate to having a conception of redness.

What's the difference between redness and red?

I still don't see much justification for "metacognition"...
— Luke

And something tells me you never will...
— creativesoul

Perhaps, but not for lack of trying. I have asked for clarification. — Luke

Have you read all I've had to say on this topic in this thread? That may make a difference. Click on my avatar, then on my comments. I've been participating almost exclusively here lately. I assumed you had been following, but were ignoring it all. Perhaps that assumption was mistaken? I'm not interested in being asked for clarity of the clarity of the clarity, but it seems as though that is what's been going on with you. Nothing personal. No intent on insulting you.

Try critical self-analysis, rather than metacognition. — Mww

If someone does not realize that there is no such thing as a property of language less conscious experience that we've called "redness", then there's not much more that can be said.

Not to the flies anyway...

While I'm not sure of the extent of the change, especially during the pandemic, the support for Bernie were he in Biden's place, would and has shown to increase the more the public listens to him and his explanations of how the US got where it is. I'm not convinced that Trump would have beat Bernie. Doesn't matter though, he didn't beat Biden.

I still don't see much justification for "metacognition"... — Luke

And something tells me you never will...

Everyone gets by fine without careful and very deliberate consideration of "red", or indeed most other things. — Kenosha Kid

Indeed, and this shows us that "redness" is neither necessary nor useful aside from creating a bottle to buzz around in...

I agree that some language less creatures can distinguish between red things as well as gathering different red things. I agree that some language less creatures can perceive the frequencies of light that we've named "red", and can distinguish between those frequencies and others. I agree that some language less creatures can gather different things that emit and/or reflect the aforementioned frequencies as well...

Where's the concept of "redness" in all of that? It's nowhere to be found because it's not necessary in order to do all of those things. It's not even necessary in order to explain all of those things.

The concept of "redness" emerges from careful and very deliberate consideration of previous normal everyday use of "red". Without the normal everyday use of "red" there would have never been "redness".

Try not to cherry-pick. — Kenosha Kid

The irony of pots and kettles...

I'm trying to understand the distinction between "talk of redness" requires metacognition and "talk of redness" requires language... — Luke

I suggest a revisitation...

Immediately apprehending and/or understanding "redness" requires already knowing how to use "red", and is metacognitive in it's constitution. Knowing how to use the term "red" to talk about red things is thought and belief that is linguistic in it's constitution, but not metacognitive. So, it is either the case that raw, basic, fundamental, private, ineffable immediately apprehensible conscious experience involving red cups, balls, and tulips does not include the property of redness, or raw, basic, fundamental, private, ineffable, immediately apprehensible conscious experience requires metacognition. Not all conscious experience involving red cups, balls, and tulips requires language. All metacognition does. So, the property of redness is disqualified(pun intended).

Talk of redness as a property of conscious experience requires both language and metacognition.

Understanding and/or immediately apprehending redness requires considerable previous usage of "red" to pick out red things, and then rather extensive subsequent careful consideration about that previous use of "red"(that's metacognition).

And it matters because qualia are supposed to be basic, fundamental, private, ineffable, immediately apprehensible, etc. but redness is none of those things.

The point is that immediately understanding and/or apprehending redness as a property of conscious experience requires metacognition
— creativesoul

How is that different to saying that it requires language to identify the colour as "red"? — Luke

Identifying the color as "red" does not require metacognition.

Your point is that humans and animals can both perceive or consciously experience red, but it requires language to identify the colour as “red”? — Luke

No.

The point is that immediately understanding and/or apprehending redness as a property of conscious experience requires metacognition. Basic rudimentary conscious experience does not.

...to know that there is something in common between the red ball and the red cup that is not in common between the red ball and the blue ball, does not require language, not the kind of verbal language you mean anyway. — Kenosha Kid

This needs argued for.

Red cups and red balls have something in common:They're both red. They both reflect/emit the same or similar enough frequencies of light. Knowing that red things have that in common requires isolating and focusing upon the fact that the same frequencies are emitted/reflected by different things.

How is it possible to compare/contrast between different things arriving at the thought and belief(knowing) that different things are the same color, if there is no placeholder, proxy, and/or name for the frequency/color?

All conscious experience is meaningful to the creature having it. <-----That is a consideration that has been left sorely unattended...

All conscious experience consists of things that exist in their entirety prior to becoming meaningful to the creature. Red cups can become a meaningful part of a language-less color blind creature's experience, but not as a red cup to the creature. Red cups full of Maxwell House coffee become a meaningful part of conscious experience by virtue of becoming part of a correlation drawn by the creature between the red cup full of Maxwell House coffee and other things.

A tiny rodent is being chased by my cat. It hides behind the red cup full of Maxwell House coffee. The red cup full of Maxwell House coffee becomes meaningful to the rodent when it hides behind it. It becomes a place to hide. The red cup full of Maxwell House coffee becomes meaningful to the cat when the cat expects and/or otherwise believes that the rodent is on the other side of the red cup full of Maxwell House coffee, despite the rodent being unseen. Prior to becoming a part of that correlation, the red cup full of Maxwell House coffee exists in it's entirety as a red cup full of Maxwell House coffee, but it is utterly meaningless to the cat. Afterwards, it becomes an obstacle, it becomes something to be navigated around in search of the rodent. The red cup is definitely an irrevocable necessary elemental constituent of the chase experience, to both rodent and cat, however it is not experienced as a red cup by either.

Does that answer your question? It's not a matter of "why", it's a matter of "how"?

It would be if all conscious experience involving red cups, balls, and tulips required immediately apprehending redness(as a property). It doesn't.

I do not think that you understood the argument given. Merely distinguishing between red and blue is inadequate for understanding and/or immediately apprehending redness as a property of conscious experience.

We call those frequencies "red". It's the properties, features, and/or characteristics of red things interacting with light that make them reflect the frequencies we've named "red".
— creativesoul

Can’t be true. Red can’t indicate a certain frequency or wavelength. Or else the word “red” would have only been conceived of after we were able to measure frequencies and after we figured out light was a wave. — khaled

False dichotomy.

The term "red" was used to pick out certain frequencies of light before we knew that.

Regarding the temporal order of emergence, elemental constituency, and thus existential dependency, I suspect we're largely in agreement. When it comes to thought and belief about red, naming things that consistently reflect/emit certain frequencies of light "red" happens first. In our own linguistically/conceptually mediated ways of making sense of the world(which includes ourselves) we begin/began making sense of red things by virtue of picking out things that consistently reflect/emit the frequencies of light that we've named "red". Those things are red things. We first picked out the things reflecting/emitting those particular frequencies, called them "red".

Put more simply:Red things reflect/emit certain frequencies of light. We first named red things. We then further described red things in terms of properties/attributes/qualities. We then began to wonder if red things really are red or if they just appear red to us as a result of our physiological sensory apparatus(is your red the same as mine, etc.). Then came talk of "redness" as a so called private directly/immediately apprehensible property of subjective conscious experience.

Talk of "redness" is existentially dependent upon language use. Reflecting the frequencies we've named "red" does not. Which is basic, raw, and fundamental to consciousness? Surely not talking about it. — creativesoul

To put a finer point on this...

Talk of "redness" is existentially dependent upon language use, but not just language use, per se. Talk of "redness" as a property of subjective, private, directly perceptible, immediately apprehensible conscious experience is a metacognitive endeavor. That is to think about pre-existing thought, belief, and statements thereof as a subject matter in their own right. Metacognition requires common language use. This holds true of all "qualia" talk, as well as all talk about "consciousness", and "what it's like". They are all metacognitive endeavors, and as such they are all existentially dependent upon simpler thought and belief about red things.

The question here is whether or not the referents of our naming and descriptive practices are themselves existentially dependent upon metacognition, or do they consist of and/or emerge from mere simpler language use(linguistically constituted thought and belief) that is not metacognitive in it's constitution?

Red things reflect/emit certain frequencies of light. Reflecting light is a process that does not require language use in any way whatsoever. The raw/brute perception of reflected light does not either. So the raw, basic, fundamental, private, ineffable perception that language less creatures have of red things does not require language use. Would it make any sense to call that "conscious experience"? Only if the detection/perception alone of certain frequencies of light counts as conscious experience.

Some red things are not themselves existentially dependent upon language use, but others are. Red balls made of rubber via some human mechanical technology are. Red cups are. Red tulips, completely untouched by human hands, are not. Learning how to use the term "red" to pick out red balls, cups, and tulips does not require thinking about one's own thought and belief. It does require language use. Talking in terms of whether or not the 'redness' is inherent to the balls, cups, and tulips or inherent to our perception of them, or some combination thereof does require metacognition. It is metacognition at work. Talking about our own conscious experience of red balls, cups, and tulips most certainly does/is. Claiming that redness is a property of subjective conscious experience most certainly does/is. In each of these cases, we're talking about that which is existentially dependent upon our prior own use of "red"(thought and belief involving the terminological use).

Simply put...

Immediately apprehending and/or understanding the property of redness requires already knowing how to use "red", and is metacognitive in it's constitution. Already knowing how to use the term "red" to talk about red things is thought and belief that is linguistic in it's constitution but not metacognitive. So, it is either the case that raw, basic, fundamental, private, ineffable immediately apprehensible conscious experience involving red cups, balls, and tulips does not include the property of redness, or raw, basic, fundamental, private, ineffable conscious experience requires metacognition. Not all conscious experience involving red cups, balls, and tulips requires language. All metacognition does. So, the property of redness is disqualified(pun intended).

Doubting one's own physiological sensory perception requires metacognition. Cognition comes first
— creativesoul

I don’t understand the significance of this — khaled

Clearly, and it seems you're not alone.

What difference does that make here? In both cases, the apple is red due to how it interacts with light.
— creativesoul

But it's only red because that's the color we see. — Marchesk

No. Those frequencies are reflected/emitted prior to our looking at it. We need not look at it in order for it to reflect/emit those frequencies. We named the reflected light "red". The reflected light is the effect of the properties of the apple(how it interacts with light).

I think 'seeing redness' is a valid way of talking about certain visual perceptions. But it is abstracted from the usual context where the redness belongs to an object of a particular size, shape texture and so on, and the red is of a particular tone, intensity, hue and so on.

One way of simply seeing red would be to place someone in front of a screen emitting red light, or painted red, that fills the visual field entirely. I certainly don't believe in subjective visual perceptions that are somehow "in the brain" and stand as intermediaries between us and the objects we see.

The other meaning of 'qualia' is something like 'raw percept' where what is seen is not seen 'as anything'. I guess this is only possible in rare instances, or with infants, because most everything we see is always already conceptually mediated. — Janus

I don't think that we're too far apart here.

Regarding the temporal order of emergence, elemental constituency, and thus existential dependency, I suspect we're largely in agreement. When it comes to thought and belief about red, naming things that consistently reflect/emit certain frequencies of light "red" happens first. In our own linguistically/conceptually mediated ways of making sense of the world(which includes ourselves) we begin/began making sense of red things by virtue of picking out things that consistently reflect/emit the frequencies of light that we've named "red". Those things are red things. We first picked out the things reflecting/emitting those particular frequencies, called them "red".

Put more simply:Red things reflect/emit certain frequencies of light. We first named red things. We then further described red things in terms of properties/attributes/qualities. We then began to wonder if red things really are red or if they just appear red to us as a result of our physiological sensory apparatus(is your red the same as mine, etc.). Then came talk of "redness" as a so called private directly/immediately apprehensible property of subjective conscious experience.

Talk of "redness" is existentially dependent upon language use. Reflecting the frequencies we've named "red" does not. Which is basic, raw, and fundamental to consciousness? Surely not talking about it.

I said that when someone says “the apple is red” they really mean “the apple appears red/invokes a certain experience I call ‘red’”. I don’t think that’s even a controversial claim. — khaled

What do you make of my claims today regarding that? Seems contentious by my lights. Wrong even.

The point is that it reflects those frequencies only under certain light conditions; so the redness of an apple is not an inherent property... — Janus

Ok. I agree.

So, do you reject redness as a quale(property of conscious experience) as well?

Is it the frequencies we are calling red, or the objects that reflect those frequencies. — Janus

That all depends upon the refinement of one's language use and/or understanding of how our eyes work. What difference does that make here? In both cases, the apple is red due to how it interacts with light.

I don't know about Andrew.

We call those frequencies "red". It's the properties, features, and/or characteristics of red things interacting with light that make them reflect the frequencies we've named "red". Red things reflect those frequencies regardless of whether or not those things are under observation.

Red cups are red(reflect certain frequencies of light consistently). That has nothing at all to do with us.

The will is not free from influence. That's all that needs to be known. Our will to act is influenced. The closest thing we have to free will is recognizing that brute fact, and acting accordingly by virtue of choosing our influences as judiciously as possible.

Talking about apples 'seeming to be' and/or 'appearing' red is based upon doubting one's own physiological sensory perception. Doubting one's own physiological sensory perception requires metacognition. Cognition comes first. Talking about apples being red, saying "the apple is red" does not require metacognition, it requires cognition. This order of events makes a big difference, especially when someone is attempting to say that the way an apple "appears" is somehow basic, raw, and/or fundamental to all conscious experience involving red apples.

It's not.

It's basic, raw, and/or fundamental to all conscious experience involving whether or not the apple really is red, as opposed and/or compared to 'appearing' or 'seeming' to be. Such conscious experience is language based and metacognitive whereas saying "the apple is red" is language based but not metacognitive.

Red apples reflect certain light frequencies(interact with light) regardless of whether or not it is under direct observation, and regardless of whether or not the reflected frequencies are directly perceptible to a creature who may be looking at the apple.

The question is not how do we know that. Rather, it is what reason do we have to doubt it?

Much is explained, I think, by looking at the comparison per capita that the US government spends on public education per year, and for incarceration.

"I don't think that solipsism states that nothing exists besides our consciousness, it merely states that we can never know anything about what exists outside our consciousness because we will never experience anything other than our consciousness. which means there is no reason to believe other people are actually other minds, or to believe that the external world's contents will 'continue to exist' when we are not experiencing them. — Darkneos

Experience our consciousness...

Muddle.

solipsism is logically flawless.. — Darkneos

And plainly false.

:roll:

The problem is a consequence of not understanding our own thought and belief, what it consists of, how it emerges, evolves, what it gives rise to, and the role that all of this plays in our lives(conscious experience).

That's the only place to start.
— creativesoul

Agreed. But that's still a terrible starting place. — khaled

Perhaps, but we've no other choice. We make due with what's available.

How might we form a theory about what these thoughts consist of, how they emerge, evolve, etc without being able to detect the thing we are testing the hypothesis for from a third person perspective? — khaled

We look to statements of thought and belief for starters. We set out what they consist of at a minimum. We assess whether or not those basic elements could possibly exist in simpler forms. Etc. That's another thread though.

:zip: