Come one, creativesoul, you've written worse. — Banno

Yeah.

Thanks for the support, comrade!

:wink:

Do you never experience yourself as more of a fog than a point? — path

I am neither. "Fog" refers to something other than me. As does "a point".

The jump to the use of "consciousness" remains a mystery.
— creativesoul

But isn't that what the beetle-in-the-box is about? — path

Not to my understanding...

The beetle-in-the-box is about (self-professed)claims of totally private minds/thoughts/ideas/beliefs/etc.

My apologies. I didn't mean to wander into my idiolect. What I'm getting at is that the 'divine spark' is something like the beetle-in-the-box. These days we use a technical word like 'consciousness.' But it's still a mysterious something that we are or think of in terms of an ultimate proximity. — path

Ya know...

Adding more words doesn't serve to help when there are already far too many unknown variables in play.

I could see how Witt's remarks against private language/thought could be appropriately used against someone arguing for a personal God of some sort.

However...

The jump to the use of "consciousness" remains a mystery.

Here and now Banno...

Is that a bot? Possibly. Could be a human using a translation program as well. I'm beginning to believe that something is quite off.

Perhaps. There is a spirit of play at work. But I'm not unserious. In case it's not clear, I have the usual intuitive of sense of 'being conscious.' I experience the famous burden of apparent choice that one might call free will. But theoretically and to some degree emotionally I experience a certain distance from there tokens, when I'm not just immersed in the usual ways of using them in ordinary life. — path

This looks like nonsense to me.

What move?

:brow:

I think you are missing the tone. I'm saying that our belief in the divine spark is alive and well, under a different name. As I grasp the situation, you yourself were just defending it.

My post was intended, with some of the others, as a polite attack on the superstition of the 'soul' and 'I' which is now 'sold' in the 'secular' form of whatever A.I. is supposed to be incapable of. 'I' can't be simply against this 'superstition,' just to be clear. — path

Sorry but there is nothing clear about that use of those names.

And philosophy forums are so repetitious. I probably take less than a month to cycle through all my arguments. Taking a forum such as this as the statistical base, combined with Wolfram Alpha... might be quite convincing...
— Banno

Fucking exactly ! And I also repeat, repeat, repeat. Iteration with a touch of variation. The continuity of the voice (that we can recognize this or that fellow pontificater) is already a kind of informal evidence against the 'divine spark' and its 'free will.' We are already something like vortices of inherited tokens. — path

You two are now playing a game that I am ill-equipped to play...

But it is just a game...

:wink:

So does he believe the proposition "My uncle is behind the curtain 50% of the time", well, he's a smart lad, but he doesn't understand either probability or percentages yet, so he can't believe a proposition he can't understand.

Ramsey's solution is that he believes the proposition "My uncle is behind the curtain" with a probability of 50%. — Isaac

:brow:

Is it me, or...

I would not worry too much about AI being like human thought, belief, and/or intelligence until an electronic device is capable of drawing meaningful correlations between itself and other things. That always begins - in part anyway - by recognizing/attributing causality. Until an artificial creation can do that, it cannot be an integral part of the process that results in thought and belief. — creativesoul

I hear you, but how would judge, for instance, that I am capable of drawing meaningful correlations between itself and other things? — path

Relax - it's just the software talking. — Banno

Seems that this bot has lost it's referent.

:lol:

...The perceived unity or continuity of the voice is still just ours. The divine spark is alive and well. The movies Her and Ex Machina are good on this issue. Just as we enact a faith in the reality of 'other minds,' we could also enact a faith in the 'soul' of a synthetic partner. It's not as if we have a formal proof of others' 'minds.'... — path

Sounds like a sales add...

:vomit:

Cheers Banno. I want to buy you a beer or whatever the drink of choice may be...

Tomorrow...

...corresponds to the proposition "rustling plastic implies impending treats" — Banno

This is not a well formed statement. There is no subject. What corresponds to the proposition "rustling plastic implies impending treats"?

A synthetic philosopher propositions would serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands them eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, they are used as steps—to climb up beyond them... throwing away the ladder after he has climbed up it. — Banno

Shit!

Have I been reading that passage wrong for fifteen years?

Was Witt advocating throwing the ladder away or admonishing such a thing?

But what if you met a synthetic philosopher? And they were erudite, interesting and challenging?

Perhaps you have. — Banno

I suspect I have interacted on occasion with several different bots. I'm a sucker for such a thing...

:wink:

Comes with trusting that others are speaking sincerely.

Not all correlations are propositions.
— creativesoul

For example... — Banno

The correlations my cats have drawn, and continue to draw time and time again between the sound of rustling plastic and getting treats.

You asked(someone else not advocating those terms) what the difference was between propositions and correlations. Simply put... All propositions are correlations. Not all correlations are propositions.

I was just answering.

I would not worry too much about AI being like human thought, belief, and/or intelligence until an electronic device is capable of drawing meaningful correlations between itself and other things. That always begins - in part anyway - by recognizing/attributing causality. Until an artificial creation can do that, it cannot be an integral part of the process that results in thought and belief.

That's not to say that there are not big potential problems with automation. That's another thread.

Were creativesoul talks of "all belief consists of correlations drawn between different things" he seems ot me to say nothing more than that beliefs are beliefs about propositions; about states of affairs - after all, what is a proposition if not a correlation?

So I don't see that it adds much to the conversation. — Banno

Awww... You should have asked me that question. I've been waiting for something like that.

A proposition is a proposal. Proposals consist entirely of language use. Not all correlations are drawn between language use and other things. All proposals are just such correlations. All proposals consist of correlations drawn between different things some of which are language use.

:wink:

What it adds is the ability to take proper account of pre linguistic belief in such a way that is easily amenable to evolutionary progression.

What do brute facts and social facts have in common such that having that commonality makes them facts?
— creativesoul

They are true. — Banno

That strikes me as wrong. It's late, and I'll attend to it at another time.

:wink:

Thanks. It's (almost)always a pleasure...

It seems to me you want to be able to distinguish the beliefs of animals from those of people, using language in some way. — Banno

That would be a consequence, unintended. The aim is to acquire knowledge of human thought and belief. It started out being about my own. You may remember the story...

You tried to do this by ascribing unexpressed beliefs to animals, and expressed beliefs to people. But that doesn't work.

That method doesn't work. We agree there. However, if you carefully review what I've been arguing here, you'll note that I have not invoked such terminology. In fact, I've argued against it's ability to do what need done here. The aim is knowledge of all human thought and/or belief. Successfully acquiring such knowledge cannot happen with just any old methodological approach.

Unfortunately, some of the terminology I've been using has tremendous philosophical baggage attached to it, and for some reason there are many people either unwilling or unable to grant someone's terms as the first step. As a result, the terms "necessary" and "universal" are not as helpful as they would otherwise be. They trip people up. Not to mention the sheer scope regarding the consequences of the position I'm advocating. Daunting, to put it mildly...

...and I have a life that doesn't involve doing philosophy all the time!

:wink:

What might work would be to differentiate between beliefs about brute facts and beliefs about social facts. Social facts are dependent on being said; hence the dog believes it will be fed, but not that it will be fed next Tuesday - because "Tuesday" is socially constructed, and hence not accessible to an agent who is outside the social, linguistic frame - who does not participate in the language game of days of the week.

What do brute facts and social facts have in common such that having that commonality makes them facts?

That's right off the top of my head. If a fact is a true statement, and a social fact is not a statement at all, then what sense does it make to call them by the same name "fact"?

...every belief is a relation between an agent and a proposition... — Banno

The above assertion remains a point of contention, and it is one that I will not agree with, until someone, somewhere, can convince me how propositions can possibly exist in such a way that a language less creature is capable of being part of a relationship between itself and them(propositions). Be that as it may...

Let's set that point of contention aside for now, because I really, really, appreciate the progress we've made elsewhere during this discussion. It's shown itself as important(to me). Given that I do not say "really really" very often, I can only hope that my having done so puts my gratitude on display. Saying so is part of showing so here.

I mean, without being able to be in one another's presence, the words we use are not accompanied by mannerisms, tone of voice, facial expressions, emphatically significant volume levels, etc. The point being...

I am grateful to not only have this opportunity, but to have had all of them. Now, don't take all this 'mushy' stuff too far, or the wrong way. It's not all about you! :wink: Nonetheless, know that you are an irrevocably important part, as are several others, including but not limited to Janus.

Even those who I find myself at odds with are more than capable of adding to my overall understanding of human thought and belief. Note that I've stopped always using them as synonyms!

:smile:

While they are always results from the very same process, while they all consist of correlations drawn between different things, it is clear that not all thought are believed. Consider insincere speech acts and/or dishonest speakers as well. Surely as a result of keeping such things in mind, we're justified in saying that we know that one need not believe every thought that goes through one's mind, and thus there is a distinction to be drawn between thought and belief.

I want to give the rest of your last post due attention in a separate post.

I disagree because I would count all linguistic beliefs as having been already expressed; otherwise how would they count as linguistic? — Janus

Linguistic belief are those consisting of correlations drawn between language use and other things. Compare/contrast that to non linguistic beliefs, which are those consisting of correlations between different things, none of which are language use.

I disagree because I would count all linguistic beliefs as having been already expressed; otherwise how would they count as linguistic? A linguistic belief might not be expressed out loud in a particular instance, but that is another matter. — Janus

And one that stops us when we're attempting to place all belief in one or the other category.

Here's a distinction worth making - that between beliefs about how things are, and beliefs about what is believed.

On the one hand we have the cat believing that the floor is solid, or if you prefer Creative believing that the floor is wood.

On the other we have the cat believing that the statement "the floor is solid" is true; or Creative believing that the cat believes that "the floor is solid" is true. We might call this second, reflexive beliefs.

These reflexive beliefs are about propositions, and hence require language. Whereas the belief that the floor is solid is about the floor, and hence does not require language. — Banno

We're in agreement regarding this particular rendering. This one avoids the the problem stemming from taking it is be the case that a proposition is true... which is what you stated earlier that caused me concern. The above is much better. Although you have intermingled between linguistic and non linguistic in the first example, you've done so without error. Indeed, even on my view - which stresses the kind of belief based upon the linguistic content of the correlation(or not) - the above is a perfectly acceptable/amenable rendering.

:smile:

Language users and non language users alike can have belief about the way things are.

That's right; there are obviously no non-linguistic beliefs which are expressed; you have simply uttered a tautology that tells us nothing. The only purported beliefs we can "focus on" are those which are somehow manifested; either by utterances or actions. Not all of those are linguistic beliefs, again obviously; the examples of what we take to be animal beliefs are cases in point; if animals have beleifs, then they are non-linguistic and expressed in the animals' actions.

So, their are no beliefs which could not be, at least in principle, expressed; either linguistically or non-linguistically. This leads to the conclusion that there are two kinds of beliefs; those which are expressed linguistically and those which are not, but are instead manifested in action. — Janus

As I already said, there are linguistic beliefs that are not expressed linguistically. So, using this suggestion we are inevitably going to conflate unexpressed linguistic beliefs with non linguistic belief. There's no getting around that conflation, my friend. If we were to employ a Venn diagram the overlap is obvious. However, they are not the same as far as their elemental constituency(the content of the correlations).

Thus, I reject that approach. If I may ask, regarding this...

What's the difference, on your view, between a language less creature's belief and an unexpressed linguistic one as far as it's content goes?

Sorry, but that last response has left me wondering how much we're on the same page, or perhaps if we're talking about the same things. Namely, I am left wondering if we agree about the basic notions that different philosophers like Heidegger, Hegel, and Witt(to name a few) have skirted around throughout history. I say skirted intentionally, because I do not think that any of them actually put their finger on it.

In keeping in line with this thread, although a bit of a tangent, for my part I was referring to Heidegger's notions which - if I understood them correctly - were meant to pick out and/or describe all the different ways that language affects humans. In his doing so, he pointed out that we are basically already embedded in a meaningful world. He is not alone in that belief. I would venture to say that everyone here agrees with that much. Witt most certainly did.

I share Banno's sentiments regarding the notion of a socially constructed reality.

Here's the salient point from my position... or regarding it actually...

I invoked the distinction between linguistic and non and/or pre linguistic belief. I strongly advocate for keeping that distinction in mind, and doing so in terms of the content of the belief. All belief consists of correlations drawn between different things. The distinction is only meant to pick out the kind of belief based upon whether or not it is formed by a language user, and perhaps more importantly - exactly what that belief consists of(the content of the correlation). "Linguistic belief" is a term that picks out correlations between language use and other things. "Non linguistic belief" does not include language use.

The distinction is basically meant to provide an outline and/or a criterion from which to work.

I see a difference in scope. Understanding that the floor is solid is straight forward. Understand that "The floor is solid" is true requires that one refer to the proposition that the floor is solid; it's a reflexive use of language, and not something a cat is able to do. Much the same as that the cat can understand that its human will feed it, but not that its human will feed it next Tuesday. — Banno

When we're talking about understanding that the floor is solid, we must discuss what that takes, or what it takes in order to be able to do that.

I think that we agree that it does not take language.

Would you agree?

There are two kinds of belief. Linguistic and non linguistic.
— creativesoul
Perhaps you would be better served to simply say 'those which are expressed linguistically and those which are not". — Janus

Nah. There are no non linguistic beliefs that are expressed linguistically. So, the suggestion ends up focusing upon only linguistic beliefs... those uttered and those not. That is of no help here.

Of course I want to avoid getting swallowed by the jargon of any particular thinker, especially because I find the same basic idea in quite a few philosophers, for instance Hegel. — path

Care to set out these basic ideas? I'm unsure what you're talking about.

What I'm getting at is that there is no clean break between the 'mental' and the 'physical' — path

Indeed. Especially when we're reporting upon that which consists of and/or is existentially dependent upon both. Thought, belief, truth, and meaning are such things.

Nice. I'm not attached to 'presupposition.' We can say that language is existentially dependent upon the world, but the world-for-humans is existentially dependent on language too. It all comes in a single clump ('equiprimordial'). This 'holism' is maybe what various 'idealisms' have pointed at more or less awkwardly. We inherit world-and-language as a system, it seems to me. — path

Yes. I'm reminded of Heidegger.

The point about the economy is that a downturn was inevitable. It only takes the slightest prick to deflate a balloon. A wide range of things could do it. You can't blame 'leftists' or even the virus for spoiling the Ponzi scheme, though you might take partial blame yourself for playing up the lefty/righty bullshit rather than looking at the real problem. — praxis

Ding ding ding ding ding....

The very language of the (impossible) 'radical skeptic' or 'solipsist' deploys a know-how that cannot intelligibly be doubted. In this sense language 'presupposes' a world with others, though it's important to stress that this 'presupposition' need not be conceptual or verba — path

Replace "presupposes" with "is existentially dependent upon", and "presupposition" with "existential dependency" and we are in complete agreement on this aspect.

What does cogntive science say about animal intelligence? Would it be the same for us, plus the linguistic ability where we translate beliefs to language? Or do we internalize the language as beliefs? — Marchesk

I'm not sure what cognitive science says about it at the moment.

Translating beliefs into language seems to me to be the only viable option here, at least when talking about the creation of language via the invention of meaningful signs, symbols, and/or gestures.

After language use has begun it's notably more complex.

What does cogntive science say about animal intelligence? Would it be the same for us, plus the linguistic ability where we translate beliefs to language? Or do we internalize the language as beliefs? — Marchesk

The alternative being advocated for here is more like a propositional attitude, or behaving as if... the creature believes something is the case.

These renderings leave me unimpressed or certainly unconvinced. A cockroach satisfies Banno's criterion. If it is the fact that the cat does not pay attention to the solidity of the floor that leads us to say that he takes it to be the case that the floor is solid, then we could say the exact same thing about any and all creatures walking across the floor.

Taking something to be the case would not require paying attention to or otherwise ever thinking about it.

That's the reductio.

The introduction of the timeline eliminates it(the verb tense issue) while explaining how it has taken it to be the case in past, therefore no longer pays any attention to the floor. Our brains take short cuts all the time. There is no need to always think about the floor., but taking it to be the case that it's solid most certainly does require paying attention to it.

Are you suggesting that propositions somehow exist prior to language?
— creativesoul

I'm suggesting there's more to belief than being able to express it in language. — Marchesk

Clearly, if language less creatures form, have, and/or hold belief... and they clearly do. The sticking point is what such belief is... what it consists of.

In the old story, it would seem the crows have a belief about how many hunters are behind the blind, suggesting that you don't need language to form the equivalent of propositional content. — Marchesk

In order for that to be true, propositional content must somehow exist in it's entirety prior to language, and as such it would not be equivalent to what we call "propositional content".

Would it?

Are you suggesting that propositions somehow exist prior to language?

John Watkins addresses all-and-some; I think it's in Science and Skepticism, characterising them as an existential quantification inside a universal quantification.

An existential statement can be verified: "There is at least one black cat" is verified by presenting a black cat. But it cannot be falsified - my not having a cat to hand does not show that there are no black cats.

A universal statement on the other hand can be falsified, but not verified. "All cats are black" is shown false by presenting a non-black cat; but looking around and not finding a non-black cat does not mean that there are none, unless you look everywhere.

Now if you put one in the scope of the other, you get something that is neither provable nor disprovable. — Banno

Well put, and applicable to some of my own claims but not all!

:wink:

...a belief as a relation between an agent and a proposition such that the agent holds the proposition to be true. — Banno

How can a language less creature believe that a proposition is true, unless - at the very least - that creature understands the proposition?

Cat's do not understand that "the floor is solid" is a proposition, let alone whether or not it is true. — creativesoul

What? He doesn't understand that "The floor is solid" is true. The would require language.

He understands that the floor is solid. — Banno

Something is off here...

Hello, and nice addition.