Wouldn't a realist have to make that argument? A galaxy millions of light years away or an evolutionary ancestor would exist as they are regardless of whether we ever know, if galaxies and ancestor organisms are real.

Otherwise, "realism" dissolves into man is the measure, which would some form of Kantianism or anti-realiism. — Marchesk

Mt. Everest existed in it's entirety prior to it's discovery.

A galaxy millions of light years away would exist regardless of whether or not we know about if there were such a thing that we didn't know about.

What argument needs made here?

...our experience of heat or cold is a perceiver-dependant quality... — Marchesk

Experience is a quality?

Consisting entirely of Quale?

If one wants to know what it's like to experience X, one must know what all experience has in common. It is only knowledge of that sort that allows one to offer a subsequent sensible answer to each and every example thereof.

Experience is subjective in that it is perceiver dependent and influenced by individual particular circumstances. Experience is objective in that it consists - in very large part - of the experiencing creature's own thought and belief about what's happening at the moment, and part of what's happening exists in it's entirety prior to becoming a part of an individual's experience.

So...

The objective/subjective distinction is rendered inherently inadequate in that it's use cannot take proper account of what all experience consists of.

Discard it.

P1) The realist argues that “the being of X is independent of its being known.” — PessimisticIdealism

This realist doesn't.

It's always easiest to argue against another when one misunderstands to begin with.

That’s an uncharitable accounting of my views. — NOS4A2

Actually it's spot on. There's a couple of different perfectly acceptable ways to characterize the claims you've been making. I think there's something at root though. It's been previously mentioned by others and skirted around by myself, but it most certainly applies.

The criterion you've put forth for what counts as being racism/racist is inadequate for a few good reasons. One, it does not - cannot - take all examples of racism and being racist into proper account. Therefore it is utterly inadequate in it's explanatory power. Two, it puts forth standards that can be met by someone who is not racist. Therefore, it's false on it's face according to real life racism(racists) because it is precisely those people who offer prima facie evidence that falsifies your claims about what counts as racism. Three, it's been altered several times over in the middle of the same debate without mention by your good self. Therefore it's guilty of self contradiction(at worst) and equivocation(at best).

Neither is acceptable.

I like that you've been adjusting the criterion. You've still got a ways to go homey!

The meaning of Shakespeare’s writing is in his mind
— Me
What makes you believe that?
— creativesoul
I'd say it's not a matter of belief - rather one of common sense. — Chris Hughes

That's what I aim to find out for myself, with a little help from you. I personally do not think it makes any sense at all, let alone common sense...

Shakespeare's dead right? His mind is dead as well. Yet, the meaning has transcended the man and his mind. So, if what you say were true, this could not be the case. But it is...

Right?

The meaning of Shakespeare’s writing is in his mind. — Chris Hughes

What makes you believe that?

:brow:

Mind/consciousness produces meaning. There's no agreement on how this happens.

There's also disagreement about whether or not mind/consciousness produces meaning.

I know how.

:wink:

the only (categorical)error worth a damn in philosophical discourse is grounded in pure reason. — Mww

Pure reason? As in reasoning from an armchair?

Two questions...

What are logical forms taking account of?

Would you agree that "that which exists in it's entirety prior to common language" is a category?

Therefore in the case of racism(s), my suggestion is that whatever else your definition of racism includes, it must contain the following three elements:
1. A historical power relationship in which, over time, groups are racialised (that is, treated as if specific characteristics were natural and innate to each member of the group).

2. A set of ideas (ideology) in which the human race is divisible into distinct ‘races’, each with specific natural characteristics.

3. Forms of discrimination flowing from this (practices) ranging from denial of access to resources through to mass murder.

Here's my problem... well, not mine so much a the one I'm pointing out yet again. It pertains directly to the OP...

Let us for a moment consider whether or not that suggested universal criterion for what counts as racism is adequate for actually rendering true judgment if and when it is used. I'm saying that it does not cannot account for those people who do not believe that there is biological scientific ground for separating different people into different human races, but nonetheless hate all asians anyway...

According to your definition as well as the one you've just put forth, the person above is not racist.

That's a big problem. Dontcha think?

Nothing much worth objecting to...

I understand that, but I gave you what seemed to me to be the only options (perhaps I should have made that more clear), so any response which simply re-iterates your original position without explaining how you circumvent the issues I raised seems to contribute nothing to our mutual understanding of the issue. — Isaac

As if I'm obligated to answer for issues you've raised that have nothing to do with my position...

Happy modeling!

:smile:

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

As already mentioned, c.e. is a mistake in logical form.. — Mww

Logical forms are existentially dependent upon common language use. Common language use... rudimentary thought and belief. Logical forms... rudimentary thought and belief...

Look at the exchange made over the hypothetical latino hater. He called that person racist when they didn’t distinguish between any biological race, then ‘back-peddled’ saying he didn’t know what he’d call that hypothetical person. — I like sushi

There is self contradiction resulting from equivocation. The equivocation is regarding the term "racist". In particular, the criterion for what counts as being so is a moving target.

Either the author knows this or he doesn't.

Believing that there are biological races does not constitute racism. This is how he has trouble exonerating himself from using the notion of race, and it's how he charges others with being racist for using the notion.

The author is proving beyond all doubt to be blind... not to color... but rather...

To what racism is.

By sheer will alone...

Sad.

We have before us now, a listing of categorical errors...Which ones will be used to render judgment upon whether or not a premiss of our choosing qualifies as being guilty of categorical error as compared/contrasted to other kinds of errors?
— creativesoul

Categorical errors can only be demonstrated by showing the falsity of the proposition from which they were originally given. I suppose one could list them, but recognizing them would seem to be sufficient. — Mww

There is more than one acceptable sensible conventional sense of the term "categorical error". It is a name with more than one referent. The one will we choose as a standard to render subsequent judgment concerning a candidate of our choosing will directly determine, establish, and influence the judgment call. The sense sets the parameters. Not all senses of "categorical error" are commensurate.

So...

Why are we talking about categorical errors, when what counts as a category is completely and utterly determined by us?

I seek to discover that which exists in it's entirety prior to our discovery process, therefore prior to the naming and descriptive practices commonly called common language use...

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Noumena is untenable. I've already offered adequate argument for that conclusion. It's been left sorely neglected.

Did you not read what I wrote, or not understand it, or not agree with it. If you're not going to actually respond in any way to what I write there's little point in continuing is there? — Isaac

I re-read the exchange. I understood it. I didn't so much disagree with you. Rather, I found that it was rather incomplete, in that you offered choices for me to agree with, but not one that was close enough to what I hold. You're the one asking me for clarification... I gave it.

There are, I'll contend, some who ought be excluded; the law of diminishing returns applies here. — Banno

I would agree. The trick is to acquire reasonable ground for establishing the criterion used to determine which ones ought be excluded.

Could you set out how the law of diminishing return applies to how we determine which folk ought be shunned?

Not too much to disagree with.
On my view, I have found that all views share the same basic set of common denominators at their core.
— creativesoul

Well, being embedded in a shared world, they would. — Banno

Indeed, although being born into a shareable world is a better starting point. Language makes it shared. The result, of course, is that the world is already meaningful, and hence all world-views involve being embedded in a shared world.

I make room for the rudimentary level thought and belief that are part of, prior to, and necessary for all common language use, and hence all worldviews.

Pretty much, with the caveat that “categorization” might not carry the proper inflection. One shouldn’t confuse speculative categories such as Aristotle’s or Kant’s, with Ryle’s semantic categorical mistakes. Rush’s song “Time Stands Still” is a categorical mistake of semantics; space is a property of objects is a categorical error of reason. — Mww

We have before us now, a listing of categorical errors...

Which ones will be used to render judgment upon whether or not a premiss of our choosing qualifies as being guilty of categorical error as compared/contrasted to other kinds of errors?

So... what is a biological race such that one could conflate it with ethnicity and in doing so qualify for being racist?

You've never answered this question. You claimed that one is racist if they conflate biological race with ethnicity. You've also claimed that there is no such thing as biological race.

How do you reconcile this apparent self-contradiction?

So, we agree that fleshing out the premisses supporting one's conclusions is key. Based upon the latest exchanges, I'm curious about what you're referring to when you wrote "unrecognized categorical error such that the conclusions do not necessarily follow from the premisses"...

Example?

You claimed that you do not believe other people exist. You're now speaking about believing a range of things in different contexts, and not believing a single thing...

Are you familiar with the notion of performative contradictions?
— creativesoul

Yes, but I don't see how it applies here, you'd have to flesh the argument out. — Isaac

Simply put, you've claimed to think X but not believe X. In addition, you've claimed to not think that others exist, and yet here you are...

...categories are merely the theoretical conditions which make cognition possible, so they exist in their entirely long before we give them names. — Mww

So, we must surely abandon Kantian language here. For anything that exists in it's entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices qualifies for that which exists in and of itself(Noumena). Furthermore, we must have knowledge of both our premisses and that which exists in it's entirety prior to our premisses in order to perform a comparative assessment between the two. That comparison is required in order to know that one has indeed committed the error called "categorical".

Having pain is the experience. I have direct access to having pain of my own, and I have indirect access to another's. There are two kinds of accessibility here, yet you've claimed we have none.

Do you believe that we can be mistaken about that which exists in it's entirety prior to common language use?
— creativesoul

Depends what you mean by mistaken. — Isaac

Being mistaken about X is forming, having, and/or holding false belief regarding X.

The categories don’t determine errors, and we don’t choose them. Errors arise from irrational or illogical associations the subject thinks, and categories are merely the theoretical conditions which make cognition possible, so they exist in their entirely long before we give them names. Obviously, because we always cognize first, speak later, and never the reverse, about any one thing.

The idea of categories solves a problem, If you think it just causes another one, that would be on you, wouldn’t it? — Mww

This bit began with my pointing out that identifying the premisses is key. You agreed, then remarked that it is often the case that there is an unrecognized categorical error at work, such that the conclusions/model does not necessarily follow from those premisses.

I'm wondering about the grounds for charging another's position/argument/reasoning with such an error. If it is a categorical error, then I presume that is one kind of error. Specifically an error in categorization.

Is that much right?

I was under the impression methodological naturalism was created to circumvent the likelihood of error... — Mww

If you understood me as implying anything to the contrary, we ought chalk it up to poor writing on my part.

I cannot speak for Banno, but I think his invocation of the view from everywhere leans on the inevitable social element of language that all views have in common, with the possible translation between views being paramount to remember. It places the ability to talk about the same stuff in the forefront. In addition, I do not think that Banno thinks that an individual worldview has to include one and only one sense of any given term within it. I could be waay off here, but I think that that's at least an incomplete but fair summary. Edited to add:I also have come to believe that Banno, much like myself, does not think that one must adhere completely to any pre-established view... to any "ism", simply because one has adopted some aspect or another into their own view.

In comparison...

My earlier addition regarding the view from everywhere is probably far away from Banno's, in that it's more about the methodology used as a means for establishing reliable premisses/conclusions that ought be used as a basis for assessing viewpoints. On my view, I have found that all views share the same basic set of common denominators at their core. This set is determined by seeking to identify and isolate that which is common to all world-views. These are the basic element constituents of all thought and belief, including views that may or may not agree/conflict with our own. So to that degree, while I think your cautionary measures are relevant in such discussions, the method I'm invoking ought steer clear of precisely what you're cautioning against. To be blunt, you're cautioning against exclusion of some, whereas the method I'm working from, advocating for, and promoting demands inclusion of all...

So, no worries.

Worthwhile insofar as we can ascertain and crystallize and circumscribe a set of persons in cahoots. A precarious agreement contingent on some notion of "a reasonable person" and possibly a surreptitious notion of the sane. Watch for: 1) Exclusivity of outliers deemed not reasonable (those "doing bad philosophy"; those "talking nonsense"). 2) In-group and out-group exclusivity to ensure the world-as understood-by-us retains primacy in experimental-to-farflung discourse. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That which is common to all views. <-------That's what I'm fostering. None of the proposed attitudes above are inevitable as a result of pursuing such a notion, so...

You're the premier analytical philosopher around here...
— Harry Hindu

...then this forum is in worse shape than I thought. — Banno

:razz:

Gotta admire the modest self deprecation...

Gettier needs for Smith to believe that someone else will get the job. He doesn't. He can't. Rather, Smith is justified in believing that he will, and he firmly believes such.

If that's not what Gettier meant, then Smith holds false belief, and the paper poses no issue for JTB, regardless of what the rules of entailment permit. The rules of entailment allow changing the truth conditions of Smith's belief. The rules of entailment involve the changes we're allowed to make to another's belief(Smith's in this case). It does not follow from the fact that the rules of entailment allow us to move from "I will get the job" to "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" that Smith can possibly believe that someone else will get the job.

The move from "I" to "the man with ten coins in his pocket" is bridged by the thinker. In Smith's mind, if he made such moves in thought, the two share the same referent.

Study Gettier's 1963 paper...

...often is the case, that assumptions involve an unrecognized categorical error. — Mww

Are such errors determined by categories of our own choosing, or categories that exist in their entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices?

Kant can't help here my friend, as much as I'd like to believe otherwise.

:meh:

What prevents us from imagining that we all wake up tomorrow and a circle is no longer round, because we find ourselves in a chaotic (inconsistent) world in which the definiendum no longer entails the definiens and vice versa? — Pippen

Knowing that we'll not call squares by any other name...

An ideal worth pursuing...

the view from everywhere. — Banno

...consists of parts common to every view.

The rules of logic are the same for everyone, and everyone should be expected to follow them, not just some people, when they feel like it, or when it supports their position and abandon it when it doesn't. — Harry Hindu

Some rules of logic, the rules of entailment - in particular - are dubious.

Ah. Gotcha. That much, assumptions and fallibility, are inevitable. Thus, the aim to reduce the likelihood of error built into methodological naturalism.

Recognizing the assumptions are key I think.

Certainly the questions you raise about brain injury are difficult cases, but there are also cases where people with catastrophic brain injuries recover much more of their abilities and personality than had been expected... — Wayfarer

Yours truly...

:wink:

I feel like I've missed the broader point. Please set it out. I hate missing important stuff.

Say you measure the perimeter of a bit of coral's by taking a photograph at it and drawing a line around its border. You can draw lots of lines, and it's a really irregular object, and you don't get the same line each time.

If your measurement of the coral's perimeter is LL, and the true perimeter of the coral is TT, you can write (assume a model):

T=L+eT=L+e

where ee is some error. If we knew the true measurement TT there'd be no need to form LL in the first place. But this is also true for ee, if we knew what the error was exactly, we'd be able to add it to LL and recover TT exactly.

But what we can do is take a bunch of measurements, draw a bunch of lines, straighten them out to get a length. Say we've taken nn measurements. Then you can add all the length measurements LiLi together and divide by nn to get the mean length:

L¯=1n∑ni=1LiL¯=1n∑i=1nLi

The virtue this has is that when you take their mean , the mean is known more precisely than any of the individual estimates (under some assumptions about ee). — fdrake

Could we imitate this technique with the different models of thought and belief(mind)?

Naturally, the only thing we have to go on, in order to compare/contrast our models of mind with minds is the behaviour of candidates that have one. Another problem is that our models of mind are not comparable to the standard of measurement. With the coral, our mean is the average based upon everyone using the same standard and/or standards that are amenable/translatable/convertible to one another. This also seems to be a sticking point between the different models of mind.

On second thought, there are also brain imaging and neuroscience that could help us with comparing/contrasting our models of mind with mind. That stuff is aside from behaviour of creatures with minds.