Hey Un. Interesting vein you've taken here.

One says things like 'I am a graduate', 'I am a philosopher', 'I am married', as if one is the ritual.

Identity 'undergraduate' undergoes ritual 'graduation' and becomes identity 'graduate'.
Identity 'misfit' undergoes ritual 'diagnosis' and becomes identity 'schizophrenic'.
Identity 'learner' undergoes ritual 'driving test' and becomes identity 'driver' (or not if 'fails')
Identity 'sinner' undergoes ritual 'communion' and becomes identity 'saved'. — unenlightened

The identity 'misfit' is just as much a result of the ritual 'diagnosis' as the identity 'schizophrenic'. Both are results of diagnosis. You've not stated otherwise. This I know.

All referents of the identities mentioned in the above quote require a creature capable of language use - aside that is - from learner. Only a language user can be an undergraduate, a misfit, or a sinner. Only language users can go through graduation, offer diagnosis, take a driving test, and/or take part in a communion ceremony in order to be saved by virtue of doing so.

But...

Being a learner is being a creature that newly acquires and/or further develops practical survival skills. I know the thread points towards more... deeper... possibly still unknown influential things in all of our lives. Indeed though, the rational, reasonable approach seems to have gotten stuck in it's tracks along the way. Imposing the rules of logic onto things that do not care about obeying them.

Things like learning.

Clearly, agency is warranted, as there is purposeful action, and you've regressed back to your gratuitous assertions. — Metaphysician Undercover

The irony...

And there you have it... exactly as I initially charged. Talk of information at the level of DNA presupposes agency where none is warranted.

The idea of making a mistake also presupposes agency/intention. In addition, the only way that you can know that a mistake has not been made is if you know both, the intended outcome and the actual. So, that doesn't help your case either.

You should read it through a bit more carefully. There are those, like yourself, who want/desire to say that things like bacteria have agency. They are in the minority, but there. I'm charging those people(and you) with conflating goal oriented behaviour with causality, based upon what having a goal requires.

What is the goal of DNA replication, and who's goal is it?

This is more along the lines of what's appropriate here.

You're defining agency in such a way that Ajax toilet bowl cleaner and rocks have it.

The point being, if you propose that there is a special sort of thing, called "agency", which only beings with complex thought/belief have, i.e. that complex thought/belief is required for "agency", then you need to describe what "agency" refers to, in order to distinguish this special type of "agency" from the type of agency that things like household cleaning agents have. — Metaphysician Undercover

You rejected that in lieu of Ajax and rocks. There's nothing left for me to say here. You've proven exactly what I stated earlier regarding sneaking agency into the back door(where it is not yet warranted) via use of "information"...

Calling it ‘thought/belief’ only distinguishes it from the same process at a lower level of awareness. — Possibility

Maybe this helps...

Calling mental correlations between different things "thought/belief" is a practice I've arrived at by virtue of taking proper account of what all statements of thought/belief have in common that makes them what they are. I determined what they consisted in/of, and then further discriminated between the individuals within that group of basic elemental constituents in terms of whether or not non-linguistic thought/belief could consist in/of the same.

It's a simple vein.

Some common denominators had to be set aside. Language, for instance, cannot be an elemental constituent of non linguistic thought/belief. Being a social creature can. Having physiological sensory perception and a complex nervous system can.

So...

The quote above has the wrong target.

Question: how could the proposition be true prior to that determination? — tim wood

I reject the conventional notion of proposition. It's tied up in far too much mistake.

Thought/belief and statements thereof are the sort of thing that we all know and agree can be true or false. So, to answer your question with that in mind...

The statement "The cat is on the mat" is true if, and only if, the cat is on the mat.

Before determination it's a proposition. I'm a blond. Either I am a blond or I am not a blond. So far so good? — tim wood

No.

Clearly set out the referent of "it is(it's)"...

What exactly is being determined again that is a proposition beforehand?

So...

During the time period before we check, what is it that you are calling a proposition?

One is establishing a relationship between two events.. — Possibility

I take it that this one to which you refer is mental correlation? I do not disagree. However, that barely scratches the surface. That's not the only thing done with thought/belief(drawing and/or previously drawn correlations between different things).

So, in agreement...

Sometimes we establish relationships between events.

To add...

Sometimes we establish relationships between other things(other than events). Sometimes we correctly identify relationships(some between events) that already existed prior to our account of them. Sometimes some of us can get both wrong. Some relationships are between language use and something else. These are the kind that some of us can have wrong if those relationships are still being forged through language use. All of us can get them wrong if that language is dead, in the sense of all of it's users have died.

...and the other is being aware of the relationship established as an event/entity, in relation to other relationships. — Possibility

That is to think about thought/belief.

There are relationships that exist prior to the very first account of them. Those are the ones that all of us can get wrong. Those are not relationships that are existentially dependent upon language use.

There are also correlations drawn between different things by language-less creatures. Some of these correlations foster true belief.

So, while I agree that there is a difference between establishing a relationship between two events and being aware of the relationship established as an event/entity, in relation to other relationships...

...that's too incomplete a basis for any robust explanation of thought/belief and all that that includes/exhausts. I won't use "entails" due to my rejection of those so-called 'logical' rules.

So...

"The cat is on the mat" is not a true statement/proposition unless we look to determine if it is?

:brow:

Certainly the cat is either on the mat or not regardless of our checking to determine if it is.

...

There are reducing agents, oxidizing agents, catalysts are agents, etc.. And "agency" is the act of an agent. — Metaphysician Undercover

:roll:

You win, Meta. You win. The Ajax(a household cleaning agent) that I clean my toilet with has agency. The cleaning is the agency. Perfectly reasonable talk in this context. Fer fuck's sake.

As a process, correlation is not dependent on thought/belief, language or self-awareness. It only requires the capacity to integrate information, and so it can occur at every level of awareness, to varying degrees. This, I think, is where we differ. That being said, it is a key component in the more complex and multi-dimensional process by which humans attribute and construct meaning.

Correlation is the building block of the universe - without it, all we have is potential. — Possibility

Yeah we certainly disagree here. You're neglecting the difference between relationships, of which not all require thought/belief, and drawing correlations between different things... which are thought/belief.

I want to see true premises, and valid logic, to support your claim that agency in DNA replication is unwarranted, not arbitrary definitions to support a faulty assumption. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just wrong on so many levels...

I've already argued for an earlier premiss. You've a habit of calling premisses assumptions. I could argue for that one as well, but won't. All you'll do is continue to deny what doesn't fit into your own preconceptions here, and continue to say that this or that is false, and ask me to argue for the next premiss, ad infinitum.

I'll shorten the journey.

At conception, there is no thought/belief. All agency requires thought/belief. That's the basis of it.

The second premiss above is what you're currently denying. That's fine. Here's the bigger problem. You've taken the weakest of stances against anything and everything I've offered. Hand waving. "Nuh uh!". That's all you've done. You've yet to have offered a single argument. The irony is that you're the one presupposing agency where none is warranted. You're the one with the burden to bear, but don't/won't.

You actually want others to think/believe and/or agree with you that inanimate matter - rocks nonetheless - have agency? Theists might, I mean after-all God has to fit into the story somehow. I'm not.

Now, you could surely - being as clever as you are - come up with an argument for that. The problem is that inanimate matter does not have agency. Agency requires thought/belief. Inanimate matter has none.

Think/believe what you want. Seems pretty clear to me that I'm on the right side of this fence. There's no need to posit agency at the level of cell and/or DNA replication. It's a causal process, and one we're continually learning more about.

One ought take care not to portray the senses as a diode, passing information in one direction only. There is feedback here, and hence complexity. Complexity occurs when small variations in the initial conditions are fed back into the system to be magnified and become great influences on the later conditions.

One sees, reaches out, touches, holds, puts down. One is not situated passively, doomed only to absorb information.

Better to think of oneself as embedded in the world.

One does not sit inside one's body, looking at mere phenomena and reacting to them. One is not separate from one's sensations and acts - far from it. One's sensations and acts are constitutive of what one is.

One does not build meaning inside one's head and then transmit it. Building meaning is part of the complex interaction one has with the world. Hence language is not mere communication. It is an integral part of the self-referential complexity that creates oneself, the other, and the various things in our world.

This looping is not simple; it is strange. It traverses from level to level, between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics unexcused. It provides the illusion of free will. It is not limited to the self, nor the mind, nor the body, nor the various items that together make up the physical world. — Banno

I would not disagree with any of that; the complexity of the correlations.

Is it a bit like creativesoul's "thought/belief" that wants it's language before it can speak? — Banno

That's a mischaracterization my friend. Thought/belief is not the sort of thing that wants. I would disagree with tim wood regarding that quote as well...

We're in agreement.

Not phenomenology...

...there is agency in inanimate activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Case closed.

We can certainly draw and maintain a meaningful distinction between non linguistic thought/belief and linguistic. That distinction is between two things that exist in their entirety prior to our account of them. Therefore, we can get it wrong. If we reach a logical end to a train of thought by arriving at thought/belief that we have no knowledge base upon which to draw a distinction between Data and ourselves, well...

Consciousness is not the problem. Our account of it is.

There is a tendency to reduce [our understanding/explanation of] the process [by which we make meaning] to the individual neural connections in the brain [or, more generally, the physical correlation of information]. — Possibility

Ok.

But the way I see it, meaning is not only correlation - it’s much more than that... — Possibility

Agreed.

Correlation is only part of the process by which we attribute meaning. In my view, systems can still correlate and integrate information without being fully aware of meaning, let alone having the capacity to attribute it - even if the system acts as though the information is meaningful. This why I use the term ‘correlation’. — Possibility

We differ here.

Correlation is the only process by which we attribute meaning. I suspect there's an equivocation of the term "correlation" at work on your view. One sense for the process we use to attribute meaning, and one sense to characterize the results of certain command functions in computer language(and other 'systems', perhaps?).

What do phenomenal concepts have in common such that that commonality makes them count as being phenomenal, whereas the non phenomenal concepts do not have/share this same common denominator or set thereof?
— creativesoul

Phenomenal are creature dependent. — Marchesk

All concepts are creature dependent.

Information can have meaning, but it does not follow that information is meaning (or the same as meaning). Likewise, a demonstration can be peaceful, but a demonstration is not peace.

Furthermore, meaning needn't be informative. I can understand the meaning of a word or a sentence without it informing me of something; without it teaching me or providing any facts about something. This informing, or information moving, is the context of use in the OP, which is why information should not be conflated with meaning here. — Luke

You're preaching to the choir Luke. I'm not conflating information and meaning. Information is not meaning. I'm arguing that divorcing information from meaning is the mistake here. Information is always already meaningful.

The comparison to peaceful demonstration fails to capture the relationship. Demonstrations are not existentially dependent upon peace. Information, however, is existentially dependent upon meaning. Not only can information 'have' meaning, it always does. Again, as before, if information is something that can be decoded, and/or translated, then it is already meaningful. The successfulness of the decoding/translating is itself existentially dependent upon that.

Consciousness is not the problem. Our account of it is.
— creativesoul

Obviously it's not a problem for nature. It's a problem for humans because we can't figure out what the proper account of consciousness is. And depending on what the proper account is, our ontology or epistemology might need to change to reflect that. — Marchesk

Indeed. That time has long since passed. A paradigm shift is long overdue. The problem is very deep. Academia hasn't gotten thought/belief right. Consciousness is existentially dependent upon thought/belief. Thus...

What is the difference between those and that which does not count as being those?
— creativesoul

Phenomenal: color, sound, smell, taste, pain, pleasure, hot, cold, thoughts, beliefs, desires, dreams, feelings.

Non: shape, space, time, composition, number, structure, function, computation, information, empirical. — Marchesk

You listed some of each. That's not what I was asking for. I'm asking for the difference between what we call "phenomenal concepts" and what are not called "phenomenal concepts". Perhaps this be better put a bit differently...

What is it that makes either one what it is... phenomenal or not?

What do phenomenal concepts have in common such that that commonality makes them count as being phenomenal, whereas the non phenomenal concepts do not have/share this same common denominator or set thereof?

...we make meaning to the individual neural connections in the brain... — Possibility

Make meaning to that which cannot attribute it for itself?

That sounds off.

The talk of correlations is more than fitting if pursued diligently.

...the harder problem is that human phenomenal concepts... — Marchesk

What is the difference between those and that which does not count as being those?

To summarize, the harder problem is that human phenomenal concepts do not reveal whether our material makeup or the functional role our neurobiology plays is responsible for consciousness. As such, we have no philosophical justification for saying whether a functional isomorph made up of different material such as the android Data from Star Trek is conscious. Even more confusing, we have no way of telling whether a "mere" functional isomorph is conscious, where "mere" means functional in terms of human folk psychology only, and not in the actual neural functions.

So if Data's positronic brain functions different from our own brain tissue, but still produces reports and behaviors based on things like beliefs, desires and phenomenal experience, we have neither the physical nor functional basis for deciding whether he is actually conscious, or just simulating it. — Marchesk

We can certainly draw and maintain a meaningful distinction between non linguistic thought/belief and linguistic. That distinction is between two things that exist in their entirety prior to our account of them. Therefore, we can get it wrong. If we reach a logical end to a train of thought by arriving at thought/belief that we have no knowledge base upon which to draw a distinction between Data and ourselves, well...

Consciousness is not the problem. Our account of it is.

Syntax and semantics???

Both are already meaningful. Semantics is the study of meaning. Syntax is the accepted arrangement of words to make well formed meaningful sentences. The arrangement can affect/effect the meaning.

Do not see how the parallel allows us to say that one(information) is not already meaningful.

Did anyone notice that I did not use the word "meaning" in the title or OP? — Banno

We all did, I'm sure.

Are you proposing that information is not always already meaningful? You mentioned Austin earlier. Could you explain that connection a bit more?

I take him to be setting out illocutionary acts(assertions, promises, questions, etc.) and three locutionary acts; (i)the uttering of words/statements with specific meaning and/or reference, (ii)the uttering of words(without), and (iii)the uttering of sounds. I know this is over-simplistic... I should dig out my copy of How To Do Things With Words. I will if you choose to engage here...

I do not agree with him(creative) that moving information is moving meaning, nor that information implicitly has meaning. The difference parallels that between syntax and semantics, or between Austin's phatic act and illocutionary act. — Banno

What does the difference between uttering meaningful words/sentences and just uttering words(without knowing how to use them and/or what they mean/refer to) have to do with information and meaning? Particularly, how does that difference justify a claim that information is not always already meaningful?

The illocutionary act already has specific meaning/reference. The phatic act is not (yet?)meaningful to the speaker even though the words are already part of meaningful thought/belief(correlations). Parroting never counts, but is necessary in order for the speaker to eventually draw the correlations between the words use and something else, as opposed to mere mimicry(phonetic act). When the speaker begins to draw correlations between the same things(including the utterance) as the pre-existing language users, they're learning how to use language. Shared meaning.

More to the problem as I see it...

When talking about the locutionary phatic act and the illocutionary acts, we're dealing with instances concerning language that's already meaningful. The parallel between those and information and meaning would make information already meaningful as well, wouldn't it?

There's already been discussion about translating and/or decoding. If information is something that can be decoded and/or translated, then it is already meaningful... otherwise there is no such thing as an incorrect translation. As an aside, that issue also undermines all the talk about "what it's like to be...".

And as I explained to Terrapin Station, this is very clearly a meaningful relation (without it we wouldn't exist). — Metaphysician Undercover

This conflates existential dependency and meaning. Existential dependency is causal. Meaning is attributed. So, the conflation between causality and meaning rears it's ugly head, yet again.

All meaning is attributed. All attribution of meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing a correlation between that which becomes sign/symbol and that which becomes significant/symbolized. The drawing of the correlations is thought/belief formation. Complex thought/belief is required for agency. DNA has no such capability. It quite simply doesn't have what it takes. Therefore, there is neither agency nor meaning inherent to(or required for) DNA replication. Rather, it's a causal process. It's only meaningful to us as a result of our talking about it.

Look harder. The argument was made early on prior to your entry.

That's not a conflation Luke, and you know it. Information is meaningful. The parenthetic content you quoted was simply a reminder of that. In order to move information, one has to move meaning...

That was the point. Not a conflation.

Do what you like. I've already adequately argued my point. You've merely asserted your own, and it's wrong.

Guess you've no argument or valid objection...

Last try...

Gratuitous assertions won't do.

I mean that and the argument that preceded it.

I take that as a "No".

Gratuitous assertions won't do. Show the purported conflation.

Trouble is, it's the fact that the cat is on the mat that makes "the cat is on the mat" true. — Banno

Indeed. It's what already happened, and/or is happening that makes the statement(which is about those events) true.

Tarski shows this well.

...the more exact formulation for truth with respect to cognition would be: cognition which conforms to its object is the necessary condition for truth. — Mww

So the conformity of cognition to it's object. Like Saran Wrap? I'm trying to wrap my mind around this...

:meh: