In Merk's defense, he is attempting to use my framework, and in doing so is being very diplomatic in checking for my agreement.
— creativesoul

It requires humility to attempt a foreign framework and to risk being wrong often. But it is one of the best ways to expand one's philosophical acumen. It also requires an interlocutor who is clear on what he knows, and patient, very patient.

By the way, you reflect a strong logic in your terminology... do you actually work out the logic formally on the side, or just intuit it in your writing? — Merkwurdichliebe

I appreciate the accolades.

You're too kind. I do make a concerted attempt to arrive at sound arguments. Verifiability/falsifiability is valuable. Coherency(lack of equivocation and/or self-contradiction) is imperative. I work from statements as foundational premisses that have the strongest possible justificatory ground.

...this seems like a very potent schematic (it takes account of creating, identifying, discovering, inventing, &c.) — Merkwurdichliebe

If we get thought/belief wrong we get something or other wrong about everything ever thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered. The same scope of consequence applies to getting it right.

existentially dependent upon being taken account of.
— creativesoul

This is a very important point. Can you give me some examples of both (being existentially dependent and independent of an account)? — Merkwurdichliebe

Here's the rest...

When we acquire knowledge of something's elemental constituency(that's the result of a universal criterion), we find ourselves in a position to be able to determine whether or not that particular thing is capable of existing in it's entirety prior to our account of it, because we can isolate the basic elemental constituents, individually, and confidently assess whether or not any of those elements are existentially dependent upon being taken account of.

If any of them are, then the only conclusion that we can draw is that the thing in question is not capable of existing prior to our account of it. — creativesoul

Apples are not existentially dependent upon being taken account of.

Mt. Everest is not existentially dependent upon being taken account of.

The ability to draw, and/or the mental activity required in order to draw a correlation between different things is not existentially dependent upon being taken account of.

The attribution of meaning resulting from drawing the above correlations does not require being taken account of.

The meaning of "existence" requires taking account of it's use in language. A proper account will explicate the correlations drawn between it's use and other things.

Existence is not the sort of thing that exists. It is not discoverable. It has no elemental constitution. Thus, it makes no sense on my view to talk in terms of "existence as it is in it's entirety".
— creativesoul

I like that. Existence is a paradoxical concept and impossibly abstract, very much like thought. — Merkwurdichliebe

I apologize for the sheer quantity of disagreements I've levied here. I can only hope that the explanations minimize future possible numbers...

However, it must be done. Coherency is at stake, and while coherency is inadequate for truth, it is certainly a requirement for true statements. Coherency maintains meaning. That is pivotal for shared understanding, for it consists - in part at least - of shared meaning.


Talking in terms of conceptions is fraught. That's objection numero uno. It's based upon the following... All conceptions have linguistic form, and as such all are existentially dependent upon language. Not all other things are.

Acquiring an understanding of that allows one to further discriminate between competing conceptions. When conceiving of that which exists prior to our conceptions thereof, our terminological framework can make or break us.


Thought is not impossibly abstract and/or paradoxical. That's numero dos.

Whenever we think about existence, we suspend its actuality by translating it into thought.

This reads like nonsense on my view. According to the position that I'm arguing for/from...

Existence is not the sort of thing that has actuality. Actuality is what's happened and/or happening. Existence does not have what's happened and/or happening.

Again, put a bit differently, there is no referent for the term except as a use of language. We do not translate existence. We translate our use of the term "existence". All translation is the translation of one language use into another. We do not translate statements into thought. We translate statements of thought uttered in one language into semantically equivalent statements of thought uttered in another(or semantic equivalents within the same language).

We translate by virtue of comparing/contrasting meaning. The term "existence" has meaning. That meaning is attributed solely by virtue of language use. The meaning of the term(as is the case with all terminological use) is determined solely by virtue of the connections drawn between it's use and something else.

"Existence" is a term. Terms are existentially dependent upon language. Language... thought/belief. All thought/belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between different things. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.

That's it. That is the extent of it. Nothing more can be said, nor need it be. All thought/belief presupposes existence. Some thought/belief is prior to language. Conceptions of "existence" require language. The presupposition of existence inherent to all thought/belief does not.

Statements of thought/belief presuppose existence, truth(correspondence to what's happened), and meaning. Knowledge of all thought/belief enables us to proper account of how that comes to be the case. It also dovetails nicely with Tarski and redundancy.

Thought produces the universal

This misleads... and unnecessarily so. We use thought to discover that which is common to all particulars. If something produces something else, the latter is always existentially dependent upon the former.

The common denominators are not always existentially dependent upon being taken account of. Rather, taking account of something is existentially dependent upon something to be taken account of and an adequate means for taking account.

...existence is found only in particular being. If this were not true, then anything I could imagine could be said to exist including (the thought of existence)...

Existence is not the sort of thing that has a spatio-temporal location. Thus, it makes no sense to say "existence is found only"...

And...

Anything you can imagine does exist. How it exists can be parsed in terms of existential dependency, elemental constituency, and it's affects/effects.

P.S. I have overlooked these differences in recent past, but it seems they ought have been given due subsequent attention. Hence...

I say that - at a bare minimum - all experience takes a creature to whom the experience is meaningful. In short, all experience consists of and/or requires thought/belief about what's happening.
— creativesoul

Not necessarily. If we go back to the example of bacteria chemotaxing towards a chemical gradient, the experience of receiving the chemical gradient stimulus would have to be ‘meaningful’ to the bacteria in order for it to respond in this way, even without thought/belief about what’s happening. The event leaves an impression because the bacteria expends energy (an irreversible process) in changing its movement action according to two-dimensional information received: relating a chemical stimulus to direction. — Possibility

The bacteria candidate suffers from the same fate as the amoeba. Stimulus/response is adequate to explain the exhibited behaviour. Cause/effect... the "impression". In order for a creature to relate a chemical stimulus to direction it has to make a connection, draw an association/correlation between the two. Amoebas cannot do this. They have no notion of direction. They have no notions at all. Talking about what they can experience requires the strongest possible justificatory ground.

Criterion, criterion, criterion...

Rocks can be literally left with an impression on them.

I'm just curious here. The "not necessarily" part above... are you going to argue/reject the criterion I've put forth based upon possible world semantics and/or modality(necessity/contingency)?

You realize that it does not follow from the fact that one has imagined that Donald Trump is not the president, that Donald Trump is not the president.

The criterion aspect needs to be discussed more.

An event that leaves an impression on someone needs to be parsed in terms of what such an impression consists of and what those things are themselves existentially dependent upon.

Some impressions are left in a fluent listener by hurtful language use of a fluent speaker. Those impressions are existentially dependent upon language use. Such experience cannot be had by a language less creature, let alone an amoeba.
— creativesoul

I understand what you’re saying here, and I do agree - however if we’re trying to get to an understanding of what consciousness is and how it emerges or evolves/develops, then exploring it (or experience) from the top down, so to speak, is a bit like trying to understand algebra by reading an advanced level university textbook on the subject, starting with the final chapter. It might be possible to eventually work it out, but that’s gotta be one of the most difficult and convoluted ways to do it, in my view. — Possibility

I typically reject dichotomies. I mean, it's become almost unconscious, but for sound reasons. The notions of "top down" and/or "bottom up" have the same inherent inadequacy that nearly all other dichotomies suffer from. All dichotomies are incapable of taking proper account of that which consists of both, and is thus... neither. We're involved in very complex assessments. This endeavor/project is neither top down nor bottom up regarding it's methodology. It is both and quite a bit more. That said, despite what seems to be differences(mainly regarding criterion for experience/consciousness), it does seem that there is quite a bit of agreement governing both attitudes. I think we both realize how crucial a role that our criterion for what counts as "experience" plays in all this.

To parse an impression left on someone at such a complex level of experiencing without grasping what happens at the most basic level of ‘someone’ (however you may interpret this) during the simplest ‘experience’ (event that leaves an impression) is going to be guesswork at best.

Yes and no. If our criterion for what counts as experience can only be met by creatures with complex written language replete with metacognition and/or metacognitive ability, then we will certainly not be in good enough position to say much at all about how creatures' without metacognitive ability experience the world.

You mentioned the requirement for consciousness/experience to be able to first emerge and subsequently evolve. I could not agree more.

Granting the veracity of your account, it seems that Kripke was aiming at the same things... I'm unqualified to remark on the historical implications. Just a layman attempting to understand the professionals' accounts. Thanks.

There are a ton of snobbish elitist people running around in the art world. That's not the only place.

Promoting friendship loyalty and goodwill is not crap. It doesn't require alien life that somehow comes in the form of our car designs, but none the less...

Crap overstates the case.

Stimulus/response is inadequate. Experience takes more than that. The definition you've invoked references impressions on humans.
— creativesoul

I agree on both counts. The term ‘someone’ implies human only, but doesn’t state it explicitly enough to rule out non-humans, in my opinion. — Possibility

An event that leaves an impression on someone needs to be parsed in terms of what such an impression consists of and what those things are themselves existentially dependent upon.

Some impressions are left in a fluent listener by hurtful language use of a fluent speaker. Those impressions are existentially dependent upon language use. Such experience cannot be had by a language less creature, let alone an amoeba.

The definition was quoted from the Oxford dictionary, and invoked to try and clear up the confusion I described above.

Not a problem. We're on the same page.

Personally, I don’t see consciousness as defined by a set of criterion or a line below which nothing is conscious. To me, consciousness describes a gradual development in the way that matter integrates information.

Interesting suggestion...

"In the way that matter integrates information"

I would say that that is also inadequate. It would hinge upon what the integration of information requires.

I say that - at a bare minimum - all experience takes a creature to whom the experience is meaningful. In short, all experience consists of and/or requires thought/belief about what's happening.

I readily agree that experience comes in 'degrees'(for lack of a better description).

What is the criterion for consciousness such that when it is met by any and all candidates, those candidates and only those candidates are the ones sensibly said to have consciousness whereas any and all candidates that do not meet the criterion are likewise sensibly denied to have consciousness?
— creativesoul

This is where the problem has been in this, and continues to be in many discussions about consciousness. The OP defined consciousness as ‘having experiences’, yet the impression I got from the discussion was that ‘being aware of having experiences’ was what they meant. I only wanted to clear up the confusion.

If ‘consciousness’ is defined as ‘having experiences’, then I would argue that all living entities may be considered conscious. If, however, consciousness was defined as ‘being aware of having experiences’, then only those animals that exhibit self-awareness would be considered ‘conscious’. — Possibility

Yes. We agree that those are consequences of those starting points and neither is adequate.

Translation is existentially dependent upon something to translate. In this case it is a common language expression. All translation is of that which is already meaningful. All meaningful statements sensibly rendered in/with common language presuppose truth, meaning, and existence.

Predicate logic cannot account for that.

To be meaningful is to be part of a mental correlation. Not all mental correlation places value upon a previously unbound variable and it's newly coined referent by drawing a correlation, association, and/or connection between the two.

To be the value of a bound variable is to be given a namesake, in common language terms. Namesakes are given to entities that already exist in their entirety prior to being named. This includes all metacognitive notions/constructs.

"Existence" is superfluous. I prefer the frame of existential dependency.

What's an ontologist?

:halo:

I think when Quine refers to a bound variable he is not referring solely to a variable referenced in a formal, symbolic logic expression, but that he is including all natural language expressions that mean essentially the same thing — andrewk

So he's including all the ones that can be and/or have been already translated into logical notation?

Nah. That can't be what you mean here.

He's including natural language expressions that already have been translated into logical notation and natural language expressions that have semantic dopplegangers?

Limiting the interpretation to formal logical expressions would make the statement nonsensical. It would mean that 'Quine did not recognise the statement "Look, there's a wombat!" as taking account of existence. — andrewk

Or a red herring?

So, Quine's statement "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" stands in direct conflict with basic knowledge regarding what logical notation is existentially dependent upon.

I'm assuming Quine is advocating for predicate logic. I'm also working under the assumption that his aim is to target the superfluous nature of the term "existence" and other abstract 'objects'.
— creativesoul
I think when Quine refers to a bound variable he is not referring solely to a variable referenced in a formal, symbolic logic expression, but that he is including all natural language expressions that mean essentially the same thing — andrewk

That would be a very queer move for someone to make. Each and every day people say meaningful things in common language that are not amenable to logical translation. There are thought/belief governed by common language that cannot be aptly put into terms of being the value of a bound variable.

The semantics of common language is directly at odds with many a philosophical notion. "An abstract object of thought" is one such notion. Quine aimed at abstract objects of thought. "Existence" is held by some to be such an object. Quine had the right target. He did not have the right ammunition.

Is there no difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account?
— creativesoul
There is no difference that can be identified in language, because by speaking about entities that are not taken account of, we are taking account of them. — andrewk

My objection is not about that. I agree, without prejudice, that by speaking about entities that are not taken account of, we are taking account of them. That's not in contention.

The best one can do is feel - if one so wishes - that there is more to this than taking account of things, but you cannot articulate that feeling in any known language, or in any language I can imagine.

Common language is more than adequate.

In order to take account of something, that something must exist. Common language expressions exist prior to being translated into logical notation. Being the value of a bond variable is to be put in terms of logical notation. So, Quine's statement "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" stands in direct conflict with basic knowledge regarding what logical notation is existentially dependent upon.

I'm assuming Quine is advocating for predicate logic. I'm also working under the assumption that his aim is to target the superfluous nature of the term "existence" and other abstract 'objects'.

When we acquire knowledge of something's elemental constituency(that's the result of a universal criterion), we find ourselves in a position to be able to determine whether or not that particular thing is capable of existing in it's entirety prior to our account of it, because we can isolate the basic elemental constituents, individually, and confidently assess whether or not any of those elements are existentially dependent upon being taken account of.

If any of them are, then the only conclusion that we can draw is that the thing in question is not capable of existing prior to our account of it.

The interesting feature of this framework is that we can easily swap "being taken account of" with all sorts of other considerations. We can isolate the elemental constituents and assess whether or not any of them are existentially dependent upon any number of things.

That is what I'm saying. But, if we must, how do we reconcile this complex arrangement of terms? What is it trying to say, and how can it be said better or differently? — Merkwurdichliebe

Well. I would first suggest a verbatim quote. Re-arranging key terms in an order that I would not use them does nothing to help you understand what I am referring to and/or talking about. As best I know, there are a few notions at work in my work that are novel. So, I expect and welcome questions about the semantics.

I wouldn't know what "its existence in its entirety" would be saying, even, that "its existence" wouldn't suffice just as well for (in other words what is "its entirety" adding to "its existence"?), but then modifying "entirety" by "prior" is that much more confusing. — Terrapin Station

In Merk's defense, he is attempting to use my framework, and in doing so is being very diplomatic in checking for my agreement.

If you are seriously interested, I suggest re-reading a few of our exchanges and asking me about anything you may not find clear enough for your understanding.

It's good to get the terms straight. — Merkwurdichliebe

Given the history of philosophy proper...

You can say that two times!

:wink:

So then, you would agree that existence as it is in its entirety prior to its discovery is absolute. And, that any particular relation of an existing thing to absolute existence is relative. — Merkwurdichliebe

Well, no. I take issue with the above suggestion on several counts...

I reject the absolute/relative dichotomy.

Existence is not the sort of thing that exists. It is not discoverable. It has no elemental constitution. Thus, it makes no sense on my view to talk in terms of "existence as it is in it's entirety".

It is presupposed within all thought/belief and/or statements thereof. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, regardless of subsequent further qualification. All thought/belief consists entirely of correlations.

Things exist in their entirety. What counts as in their entirety all depends upon the sort of thing we're considering.

How do we factor in identification here? — Merkwurdichliebe

All notions of "identification" and/or "identity" are existentially dependent upon metacognition. Metacognition... language. Language... thought/belief.

Identification is required for successful reference.

The notion of "identity/identification" is overplayed... All identification presupposes existence, regardless of subsequent further qualification.

Howzit relevant?

Special pleading. I'll ask you the same question I asked the OP.

What is the criterion for consciousness such that when it is met by any and all candidates, those candidates and only those candidates are the ones sensibly said to have consciousness whereas any and all candidates that do not meet the criterion are likewise sensibly denied to have consciousness?

You may replace consciousness with experience if you'd like.

Stimulus/response is inadequate. Experience takes more than that. The definition you've invoked references impressions on humans.

It depends on what the objection is. — andrewk

I'll put it as succinctly as possible.

To be the value of any variable, bound or otherwise, is to be taken account of within some framework of logical notation.

Is there no difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account?

Surely there is.

The common language account existed in it's entirety prior to the translation into logical notation.

That's the objection.

It's not so much refuting and/or attempting to refute Quine. It's more like tempering...

Without the crucial 'bound' qualifier, one might object that Quine's statement means we cannot say that any dinosaur existed other than one we can refer to individually, for instance because we are looking at the fossil of its skeleton. That would be a strange position because although we are confident that millions of dinosaurs inhabited the Earth, we can only recognise the existence of a few hundred of them. Hence, the misreported Quine definition becomes a partial dinosaur denial.

What the 'bound' qualifier does is allow us to refer to all dinosaurs (eg 'all dinosaurs had hearts'), and also to particular dinosaurs whose identity we do not know (eg 'the tallest dinosaur that ever lived'). Those dinosaurs meet Quine's criterion for existence. We can thus see that Quine was not a dinosaur-denier to even the slightest degree.. — andrewk

I was thinking more along the lines of Quine's statement means that to be is to be taken account of. My reasoning is above. Are there hints of Wittgenstein driving Quine? The whole we cannot get beneath language notion?

He cannot invent it by seeing it.
— creativesoul

I respectfully disagree. — Merkwurdichliebe

That's ok.

The invention of pens is no different from the discovery of pens. — Shamshir

Rubbish. The latter is existentially dependent upon the former, and not the other way around.

Tommy can discover a pen, by seeing it for the first time. He cannot invent it by seeing it.

It also does not exhaust the requirements for a thing to exist in its entirety to its discovery. I know you cannot accept this disjunction. — Merkwurdichliebe

I do not see the problem.

What have we discovered that did not exist in it's entirety prior to our discovery?

it also notes that some things that are existentially dependent upon humans can be discovered by another human at a later date.
— creativesoul

That it awfully inferential, and requires major qualification. — Merkwurdichliebe

Ya think?

Do we not discover, throughout our lives, the inventions of other people?

Correct. Pens didn't exist prior to their invention.

One who is unfamiliar with a pen can discover one though. They do exist in their entirety prior to their discovery.
— creativesoul

That is a categorical error of some kind or another. — Merkwurdichliebe

Nah. It's just taking proper account of the existential dependency of a pen. They are existentially dependent upon humans. If there were never any humans, there would never have been any pens. In addition, it also notes that some things that are existentially dependent upon humans can be discovered by another human at a later date.

It can be proven that humans invented pens in this world.
— creativesoul

Then pens didn't exist in their entirety prior to their invention. — Merkwurdichliebe

Correct. Pens didn't exist prior to their invention.

One who is unfamiliar with a pen can discover one though. They do exist in their entirety prior to their discovery.

Pens are not existentially dependent on humans.

And you can't prove there isn't a world where pens exist but humans don't, and you can't prove it isn't possible - if you want to go that route. — Shamshir

There it is .

It can be proven that humans invented pens in this world.

I think we are working with two terms, existence and identity. I am confounding them here.

Let me clarify. Existence is something that is independent of identity. Identity is dependent on existence. — Merkwurdichliebe

Yup.

Here's a simple proposition.

Someone who has only ever written with a pen, sees it as a writing implement.
Someone who has only ever been stabbed with a pen, sees it as a dangerous weapon.
It's the same pen - but it looks different from each side, just like how your back looks different from your front. — Shamshir

Rubbish. It's a pen. Pens can be put to use in different ways.

The same conflation of names with uses...

Pens are existentially dependent upon humans. Different uses for the same referent does not change the referent.

They're not. They're something that exists, regardless if humans figured it out or not. — Shamshir

Rubbish.

In other words, what's the difference between an undiscovered thing, and a discovered thing? — Merkwurdichliebe

It's discovery.

...if the identity of all things is reducible to human creation, and all human creation is existentially dependent upon being created by a human, then existence prior to human contact is unthinkable. — Merkwurdichliebe

What follows "then" is not a valid conclusion.

The identity of all things is existentially dependent upon being created by a human. <----- that follows.

I have no issue with that.

that's what makes you a better philosopher than I. — Merkwurdichliebe

I don't know about all that.

That something can exist in its entirety prior to human contact. — Merkwurdichliebe

Upon what ground would one doubt that?

We discover things that exist in their entirety prior to our [[b]creation of what they might become to us[/b]]. — creativesoul

I would not put it that way.

All we need to do is clarify what is meant by "things can exist in their entirety prior to our discovery of them". — Merkwurdichliebe

What part is unclear?

This gets to an important historical issue in philosophy proper, namely the misguided notions of necessity/contingency...
— creativesoul

I would like to hear more about this. — Merkwurdichliebe

Wait. I think it's coming.

A screwdriver is existentially dependent upon humans.

Agree?
— creativesoul

How would we prove this? — Merkwurdichliebe

If one cannot simply agree that screwdrivers are human creations and all human creations are existentially dependent upon humans, then there's not much more I can say to such a skeptic.

It's not. It's a human discovery. — Shamshir

We discover things that exist in their entirety prior to our discovery. Screwdrivers are products of our own manufacture.