Ethical authority is the power to write and/or enforce the rules regarding what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. That is to have power over people. All power over people is obtained in one of two ways. It is either granted by consent or it is usurped.

That was a poor rendition of the scarecrow's song on the original Wizard of Oz. A lame attempt at dismissing certain recent meanderings.

I second the need for a certain degree of robustness... explanatory power(of the particulars).

The problem is that predicted and observed behaviors... ...tell us nothing necessary about motivation. — Janus

What is the term "necessary" doing here?

Predicted and observed behaviour can tell us something about motivation.

What would you claim are the bases of inferences that others have moral feelings, thoughts and dispositions, and that their behavior is morally motivated? — Janus

I do not want to speak on behalf of praxis. I do think that the above are good questions. I'd like to offer my answers.

Ask them. Listen to their answers. That's more than adequate ground to conclude that others have moral thought/belief.

Look to how different people employ the term "moral". What do all those different people's uses have in common, if anything at all? If there is a central vein that is part and parcel to each regardless of that which is subject to particulars, then we bookmark it as a means for setting it aside. We must do that prior to establishing/determining the scope of it's relevancy and what can be garnered and/or gleaned from it.

With knowledge of what counts as being moral in kind, we can rightly and confidently say - sometimes at least - that another's behaviour was morally motivated.

Not known for my succinctness... feeling a bit ornery tonight...

There's much to liked about many of the veins of thought herein. It would serve us well to find the common threads binding them all.

The dichotomy of internal/external has been rendered inherently inadequate for the task of setting out the origen of morals. It's a sideshow that leads to gross misunderstandings...

after the wave of interlopers that invaded earlier today, I would say that the methodology is solid, and will at least stand up to, more or less, weak contention. — Merkwurdichliebe

I, myself, am not entirely sold. It's my theory(well, clearly upon the backs of many an intellect). I do recognize the scope of rightful application.

Morals require others. Others are external. Morals require external. Morals require brains. Brains are internal. Morals require internal.

Need we go on here?

Some things do not have a precise spatiotemporal location.

Morals are one such thing.

Some things are neither external nor internal. Some things consist entirely of different elements from both groups. Those things cannot be properly accounted for by using one or the other.

Morals are one such thing.

I woot'n be uh nuthins with mah head all full uh stuffins...

I'm still curious to see how far we can take it, and what it will look like when we arrive to a reasonable conclusion. — Merkwurdichliebe

In addition to the ones we've already arrived at, I presume?

Guilty by association.

I would like to know what others here think/believe to be the difference between what counts as being moral and what counts as being ethical in terms of kinds of belief.

I know what I think, based upon what's been set out heretofore.

My fan club finds my writing morally reprehensible.

:halo:

I'm actually reading through it again myself. I want to enumerate the agreements. It's time - I think - to circle back towards the necessary social aspects. A few of you were doing a remarkable job of that prior to my arrival. I just wanted to offer some background guidelines.

You're welcome. No judgment.

I think the current general line of thinking began on page sixteen. Although, there were very relevant considerations prior to that page as well.

That is exactly what needs to be enumerated. Until then, assuming genuine interest and given that only eight minutes passed between my reply and yours, I suggest that you read the thread carefully. Page 12 or so seems a good starting point...

Welcome. I appreciate what seems to be genuine and carefully considered thought/belief about the subject matter. That said, I'm wondering...

Have you read the thread? I'm guessing not, because some of the concerns expressed above are clearly shared by a few of us already here. We've been parsing these things out... methodically.

I liked this question...

It is not my wish to be facetious but what would constitute a satisfactory answer to a source of morals? — thedeadidea

This is precisely what some of us have been at pains to set out. I invite you to peruse the recent discussion from it's beginning.

they end up saying things like you cannot step into the same river once.
— creativesoul

You've said that a couple times. Could you maybe explain it? — Terrapin Station

The irony here... there are two ways to say much the same thing. You could look at the second paragraph from the bottom in the above post, or think about the following question while paying particularly close attention to the inevitable logical consequence that your answer will produce

How much time can pass before a river is no longer the same river?

Yes. You'll have that.

To be fair...

The discourse here is unconventional in some remarkable ways. Such was the starting point:To take note of an underlying issue with convention itself. The position I'm arguing for/from is still yet conventional enough to pass the muster, I think. It is nonetheless a foreign methodological approach to many.

To be consistent in my own 'personal' morals...

There are better ways to address the situation aside from resorting to personal attacks/remarks.

Oh look. My fan club has arrived.
— creativesoul

Where have they been the last dozen pages? — Merkwurdichliebe

Don't know. Don't care. Hope they return to wherever they cam from... and soon.

Notice the dichotomies at work in their 'offerings'... Flies in bottles.

Oh look. My fan club has arrived.

:cool:

Of course this knowledge requires prior experience and phenomenological examination of that experience in order to discover what the general common attributes of all experiences are. — Janus

Yes knowledge of many sorts requires thinking about thought/belief... Language.

Half the world thinks causality is a construct of pure reason, half the world thinks causality is an intrinsic property or attribute of Nature thus “existed long before we became aware of it”.

Chalk me up in Column 1. — Mww

The pre-linguistic child can learn that touching fire causes pain. It does not require repetitive behaviour. Hume was wrong. The child does not have pure reason but does attribute/recognize causality.

Establishing causality in great detail is reporting upon that which already existed in it's entirety prior to our account of it. Doing so requires language use. Establishing Hume's position does as well.

Causality does not.

We can learn about that which existed in it's entirety prior to our account of it. Language can be used to impede our efforts or help facilitate our success in doing so.

My understanding is that the synthetic a priori conditions of and for possible experience requires prior experience in order to establish just what are the necessary general conditions of and for experience. Once it is established (by experience and the phenomenological examination of experience) just what is essential to all coherent experience (that it be spatial, temporal, causal etc) is a priori in the sense that further actual experiences do not need to be examined in order to know that these conditions will necessarily apply. — Janus

All reason is existentially dependent upon rudimentary thought/belief. All experience is as well. There is no reason completely devoid of experience and/or emotion.

Any such notion is akin to a brain in vat; such notions are based upon logical possibility(coherent use of definition) alone. There are no brains in vats prior to language use for "brains in vats" is a name for a particular kind of thought experiment. That experiment is itself existentially dependent upon thinking about thought/belief. As such, it cannot glean knowledge of that which existed in it's entirety prior to language.

Causality. Meaning. Truth. Thought. Belief.

All of those things existed in their entirety prior to account of them. Any account to the contrary is wrong.

The problem with some logical possibility is that they stand in direct contradiction to the way things actually are. All talk about apriori is bunk. All talk about reason without emotion is bunk.

A priori reason is equivalent to the most delicate of apple pies without apples. It is a brain in a vat. A brain cannot do anything by itself. Sensory stimulation/interaction is necessary in the sense of existential dependency. A brain in a vat cannot think for the same reason that an apple is not enough for an apple pie. A priori reason is itself existentially dependent upon experience. There is no reason absent and/or devoid of experience. Reasoning in the manner set out by Hume and Kant is a kind of experience that requires thinking about thought/belief.

I'm not approaching you in a combative stance, by the way... My approach sucks. The above reflects some of our past discourse. I think we agree much more than we disagree.

Once logically established, yes, but such establishment is the purview of reason, not common experience. — Mww

And yet a human without language - and thus without reason - can and does learn that touching fire causes pain. The attribution and/or recognition of causality does not require reason. It only requires common experience. It only requires drawing a correlation between the behaviour and the subsequent onset of pain at the location of the body that actually touched the fire.

That is to think about the fire and to believe that touching it causes pain.

It only requires pre-linguistic thought/belief.

No language required.

Hume's edifice is inherently inadequate for taking proper account of the attribution/recognition of causal relationships/causality.

Causality is prior to our account of it. The subsequent attribution and/or misattribution of causality is as well. The former can be wrong. That is, we can misattribute causality. Causality cannot be wrong. Rather it is simply a part of the ever-changing universe, and thus not only an integral part of what actually happened but necessary for anything at all to happen.

Causality existed long before we become aware of it.

As I was pointing out to Janus, what nominalists are denying is that two numerically distinct instances can be exactly the same... — Terrapin Station

There are much better ways to deny that much. Some which do not lead to reductio. Others are not inherently incapable of accounting for change... which is rather ironic... all things considered.

Yup.

I suggest that we keep the discussion about the content and not the authors. That's never a good sign. Disappointing.

Nominalism is a philosophical position based upon the semantics of the word "same".
— creativesoul

In what way does that distinguish it from any other philosophical position? — Isaac

It doesn't. It makes it the same.

:rofl:

If one holds to nominalism and remains coherent, they end up saying things like you cannot step into the same river once.

The problem, of course, is that we do talk about the same river. We can because we allow some arbitrary amount of change prior to changing how we talk about that which has changed.

The point is that we identify with names. The names often remain the same even if the referent has undergone significant change. The other point is that a strict nominalist cannot account for a thing changing.

Nominalism is a philosophical position based upon the semantics of the word "same".

Wayfarer has it right...

Do you want to present an actual argument yet or shall we just clarify that we disagree for a bit longer? — Isaac

An argument for what? Need I present an argument to show you that nothing you've said bears upon my position? We isolate and subsequently identify a thing by virtue of naming practices. Some of those things change and/or evolve. It is the same thing nonetheless.

The river named Danube changes. The Danube's changes cannot be properly accounted for unless it's identification remains the same. "The Danube" picks out that river along with it's changes to the exclusion of all others and their changes.

It's the same river.

Your turn.

Both, if it makes sense at all. I'm not sold on it.

What's the criterion for sufficiency/adequacy? I mean how much ignorance does it take to be called "morally dumbfounded"?

We certainly do not demand omniscience as the only possibility for avoiding being dumfounded, do we?

All moral knowledge is existentially dependent upon complex language use. All complex language use is existentially dependent upon experience. All moral knowledge is as well.

That's the short of it!

:cool:

My issue also lies with evidence. All evidence exists in it's entirety prior to being used as evidence. There is no knowledge that is moral in kind(called "moral knowledge") that is completely devoid of pre-existing thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

Such thought/belief begins long prior to our ability to use instances thereof as evidence. Our evidence is behaviour including but not limited to language use. Language allows us to acquire knowledge of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our naming it. Some of those things are themselves existentially dependent upon language use. Some are not.

Moral knowledge without evidence - by my lights - would be existentially dependent upon a creature that acquires knowledge of unacceptable/acceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour and does so - somehow - without ever having any experience. It doesn't make much sense to me, and my foundation could not be any stronger as far as I know.

A socially conditioned moral sensibility that is not properly understood by the individual could be a case of moral dumbfounding. That would be the result of one's own ignorance regarding the adoptive morally relevant portion of her/his/their initial(original - pre-reflective) worldview.