I wouldn't agree with that.

The thing you’re not agreeing with, and now asking me if I agree with, is derived from an improper understanding of what I said.

What I categorically, and hardly anybody else by my supposition, and you by admission, wouldn’t agree with, is your statement, rather than my comment. — Mww

Fair enough, I suppose.

I'm unclear still.

You did say "...promising is always morally good".

Something here is troublesome to me...

A promise can be sincere and true at the time of utterance(the expressed intent corresponds to the speaker's intent).
A promise can be sincere and true at the time of utterance(the expressed intent corresponds to the speaker's intent), but the promise never be kept.

This would be to say that such a promise could be both true and false, no?

Perhaps it is because promises are not a single proposition, but two? I think so. The one to make the world match the words, and the other is the overt guarantee(the statement of intent).

I cannot agree with that.
— creativesoul

Hardly anybody does. — Mww

Do you?

Moral judgment. Moral consideration. Moral discourse. Moral conceptions. Moral worthiness. Moral admonition. Moral thought/belief. Moral understanding. Moral argument. Moral position.

What makes all these different things moral in kind?

What do they all have in common such that any and all things having that common denominator or set thereof also counts as being moral by virtue of having it? Is it just by virtue of having been called such?

Earlier I responded to your first statement above by saying that promises are not true or false in a propositional sense, but that they may be true promises or false promises depending on whether the one promising sincerely intends to keep the promise. I said further that so-called false promises are not truly promises at all, they just appear to be promises.

Thinking about it further it occurred to me that promises can be understood to be true or false propositions in two ways:

First, if we think of promises as statements of intention, then promises will be true or false depending on whether they correspond or fail to correspond to the intention they state. If I promise to pay you for the work you carried out on my behalf, and I have no intention of paying you for the work, then the so-called promise, as a statement of intention to pay you, is false.

Second, if we think of promises as statements about what will be, then promises will be true or false depending on whether the states of affairs they claim will obtain do or do not obtain. If I promise to pay you for the work, and I do not pay you for the work, then the promise, understood as a statement about what will come to pass, is false. — Janus

Again, well done.

This second parsing is similar to what I'd been thinking all along... At the time of utterance, a promise is not the sort of thing that can be true/false. The first is interesting and seems apt as well. There need be some sort of commonality between the two ways if we are to say that promises can be true in two ways. Correspondence to the actual intention, and correspondence to states of affairs(what's happened). Seems the former could be rendered as a kind of the latter, but not the other way around.

You don't seem to be reading what I'm writing. — Terrapin Station

Let's look again, shall we?

What counts as being moral in kind
— creativesoul

It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station

So, it would follow that all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral in kind.
— creativesoul

Yes. Hence why I wrote that. — Terrapin Station

If all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral in kind then no opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are immoral in kind.

Hence, I asked what counts as immoral on your view. The answer contradicted what you've already argued.

You're using the two terms "moral" and "immoral" both as opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. Hence, I said you were moving the goalposts.

There's also this...

Being moral relative to S is about S's judgment.

Being moral as a result of being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette is not.

You're equivocating the term "moral".

It's ridiculous that I'm having to explain any of this to you, by the way, because it would indicate a near-imbecilic level of reading comprehension, understanding and reasoning abilities. — Terrapin Station

This made me laugh out loud...

Still grinning.

Nicely done. I'm going to reply... I promise! :wink:

Why in the world do we have to keep posting the same thing over and over? — Terrapin Station

We're not. You are.

If what counts as being moral in kind is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, and what counts as being immoral in kind is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, then there's no difference between the two.

You don't believe that "No moral stance is true or false" is a moral stance, do you? — Terrapin Station

If it is about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, it is a statement reflecting a stance that is moral in kind - by your own definition.

I'm just making sure I have it right...

So, being moral is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, and being immoral is not?

Morality is opinion-based. — Terrapin Station

If morality is strictly delineated and/or defined as being moral opinion, which it is on your view - then it makes no sense to say that morality is opinion-based. In order for something to be based in/upon something else, there must be a difference between the two. According to the position you're arguing for, there is not - cannot be.

You've used the exact same definition for what counts as being moral in kind and what morality is.

Morality is opinion about X. Opinion about X is moral in kind. Morality is moral opinion. That is what you've claimed. There is no difference. There must be in order for one to be based in the other.

I'm ok with the equivalence, so long as you at least acknowledge it here, and realize that something cannot be based upon only itself.

...

Just making sure I'm following you...

S has an opinion that x is not permissible. X is thus immoral to S. — Terrapin Station

If all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette count as being moral opinion, and S has an opinion that x is not permissible, then it is S's moral opinion that x is not permissible, and that statement "X is not permissible" cannot be true/false.

Is this right?

So, on your view, all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral opinions in kind(the kind we call "moral"), and none of them are capable of being true/false.

Do I have this much right? — creativesoul

Yes, that's right. — Terrapin Station

Is there anything - on this view - that counts as immoral? — creativesoul

So morality is opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station

Morality is moral opinion?

Is there anything - on this view - that counts as immoral?
— creativesoul

So morality is opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette.

S has an opinion that x is permissible. X is thus moral to S.

S has an opinion that x is not permissible. X is thus immoral to S. — Terrapin Station

Moving the goalposts.

Is it more than just sharing a namesake - being called such?

Moral judgment. Moral consideration. Moral discourse. Moral conceptions. Moral worthiness. Moral admonition. Moral thought/belief. Moral understanding. Moral argument. Moral position.

What makes all these different things moral in kind?

What do they all have in common such that any and all things having that common denominator counts as being moral.

Not all promise making is good.
— creativesoul

This is just an instance of moral relativism. — Mww

Looks like a true statement about a particular kind of speech act to me.

Promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good. Just because promising is always morally good, it does not follow that which is promised must also be good, as measured by the relativism of the law chosen to ground it. This is what allows us to say, well, he did what he had to do, which would be true no matter what he actually did.

So, promising to kill another's family is always morally good.

I cannot agree with that.

There is always honour and virtue involved in promising... — Janus

So, this gets to the problem in a hurry...

People promise to cause injury. Assuming such promises cannot be honourable and virtuous...

Either there is not always honour and virtue in promising or not all people who say "I promise..." are making promises.

So what do we do here?

Do we say that those kinds of promises aren't promises, simply because we want to be able to say that all promises are honourable and virtuous? Or do we realize that not all promises are honourable and virtuous, and adjust our thought/belief and/or worldview accordingly?

Of course it's true that if you don't give me the hundred dollars and I beat the shit out of you, then you will know that the threat was sincere; and it is in this sense that it could said that threats are kind of negative promises; it is only if you don't do what I want that you will discover whether the threat was sincerely intended. In the case of the promise you discover its sincerity only if you do what we agreed upon; if I will honour the pact or not. In the case of threats it is only if you already "dishonour the pact" (I put that in scare quotes to indicate that there really is no honour or pact in the case of threats) that you discover whether I will "honour" it. There is always honour and virtue involved in promising; whereas there is no honour or virtue in threatening. — Janus

I understand the importance of interdependence. I understand, as well, that academic philosophy has had ongoing issues - seemingly irresolvable - for centuries about many topics, morality notwithstanding. I understand that many of the brightest and well intended minds have studied and came to varying conclusions about it. I would think that if the problems were resolvable - given any of the methods of approach - then they would've been resolved. They're not.

If there is ever good reason to be particularly critical of the methods at work, it would be in such circumstances as these.

Is there anything - on this view - that counts as immoral?

Ok. The derogatory remarks are rather unbecoming. I'm wanting to confirm and/or ensure that I have your position correct.

So, on your view, all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral opinions in kind(the kind we call "moral"), and none of them are capable of being true/false.

Do I have this much right?

So, according to this terminological framework(conceptual scheme) one who has yet to have begun to question his/her own worldview does not - dare I say cannot - have moral duty and/or obligation.
— creativesoul

What you mean is, one not cognizant of these a priori conceptions probably isn’t a deontological moral agent. There is nothing herein to say he may not be some other kind of moral agent. — Mww

I asked what counts as being "moral" in kind. Moral agents are a kind of agent. You answered by offering a criterion. The satisfaction of that criterion requires thinking about one's own thought/belief(original worldview).

I meant what I wrote.

I'm fairly certain that you're using more than one sense/definition of the term "moral" in the same argument.

Of course I will agree that the way you want to frame the terminology is in broad accordance with some ordinary usage, but I am trying to get at something deeper; a moral dimension in promises that threats do not partake of. If you still want to insist on your terminology, that's fine, you are entitled to use whatever terminology you like, but I remain convinced that mine is more useful because it incorporates a valuable distinction between acts (promises) which involve virtue and honour and acts (threats) which do not. — Janus

Not all promises are good. Not all threats are bad.

Doesn't that wrap it up in the simplest, but more than adequate, terms?

For example if I threaten to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars without having any intention of actually beating the shit out of you, it is still a threat which is designed to intimidate you into giving me the money. In fact if you give me the money I would not have beaten the shit out of you regardless of whether I really intended to or not; which means my intentions are irrelevant to the efficacy of the threat. — Janus

The listener believed you... clearly. You were paid off as a means to avoid danger. That is a large part of the efficacy aspect. The promissory intent is openly guaranteed. It has been emphasized.

The efficacy of the threat includes the listener's belief about that threat. Your intentions(to enrich yourself by means of physical intimidation/threat to injure) effected/affected the listener. Surely we all know this to be true.

On the other hand if I promise to give you my old guitar if you give me a hundred dollars, then it will be apparent whether it was a true promise or not when you discover after giving me the hundred dollars that I do or do not give you the guitar. So my intentions are not irrelevant to promises as they to threats.There is a different logic in threats and promises: can you see the difference now? — Janus

Sincerity does not equate to truth. Sincere statements can be false. Promises are not the sort of things that can be true/false.

Your intentions are not irrelevant to how well threats work. All it takes to work is the listener believe that the world will be made to match the words. You intend to make them believe that. That is entirely relevant to how well the threat works.

You're conflating sincerity with truth and insincerity with falsehood.

As an aside; if lying is always wrong as Kant asserts, then if I have threatened to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars, I am morally obligated to beat the shit out of you. This just cannot work with the C.I. — Janus

I would not assent to such an account. We agree here.

I do not think it serves us well to simply chalk this difference up to what we (arbitrarily?)think counts as being a promise. I'm simply pointing out that that is not up to our definitions if what we're describing already exists in it's entirety prior to our account of it. What a promise means is determined by the correlations drawn between the speech act and imagined future events stoked by the making of that promise. What counts as a promise is not determined by us. Our definitions can be wrong and/or inadequate for taking proper account of what actually happens.

I think I understand your concerns about the logically possible consequences of what I'm presenting here. I want to try to ease those, for I do not find that such problems are inevitable.

By my lights we agree upon much more than we disagree.

"Insincerity" does not equate to "false".

Agree?

One can say "Joe killed Jane" and believe otherwise, even if Joe killed Jane. "Joe killed Jane" is both insincere and true.

I'd be interested in your setting out of the a priori concepts...
— creativesoul

From deontological metaphysics, the key is understanding there is a freely determinant will that both prescribes a law and subjects itself to it. For that to have any sustainable power, a moral agent must hold with respect for law in itself. Otherwise, morality can never be grounded in that which is universal and necessary, which are the criteria of law, and our private conduct would know no ground. Duty is the consciousness of respect for law, and consciousness of the will that determines it. Obligation is acknowledgement of duty in the form of judgement, when it comes to acting in conformity to an imperative. — Mww

I have serious very well grounded objections to the notion of freely determinant will(free will). I'll leave those aside and address what I see to be unacceptable consequences following from the above account...

One who has not yet begun to doubt and/or otherwise think about their original worldview cannot have consciousness of their own respect for law, and/or the will that determines it. If obligation is acknowledgement of the consciousness of respect for law and the will that determines it, then one who has not thought about their own worldview could not possibly have any of these a priori necessary elements.

So, according to this terminological framework(conceptual scheme) one who has yet to have begun to question his/her own worldview does not - dare I say cannot - have moral duty and/or obligation.

How does shared meaning require shared values and goals?
— creativesoul

I was thinking of this question with the relationship between Red (my dog) and myself in mind. I have many values and goals that Red doesn't, and vice-versa. His interest in sniffing the urine on tree trucks, for example, is of no interest to me. I have a vague notion of what that's about, a kind of canine communication about territory and perhaps other things. There's a sphere of canine meaning there that's entirely lost on me. Conversely, Red has no idea what I'm doing sitting in front of this computer typing away. The sphere of meaning that we share is entirely lost on him.

Red and I share meaning where our values and goals are congruent. For us, that centers around food and various activities, also security I suppose. We both value security and maintain a territory with the goal of security. I understand that's basically how ancient people and wolves were able to first come together. They were both social species and both valued the same kind of food and security. — praxis

Interesting.

How do you take account of the shared meaning between you and Red?

To me a promise is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon... — Janus

As is a threat.
— creativesoul

No, it is not inherent in a threat that it is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon. That condition is inherent in a promise, though, because a statement of intention that does embody sincerity it is not a promise, but a false promise. — Janus

Insincerity is not equivalent to falsehood.

In the last statement... I think you meant to write "That condition is inherent in a promise, though, because a statement of intention that does not embody sincerity it is not a promise, but a false promise."

When one speaks sincerely about the way things are, they believe things are that way. When one promises, they believe that they will keep it. If they do not believe that they will do what they say, then sincerity is lacking. On my view a promise is not the sort of utterance that can be true/false.

A speaker who does not intend to make the world match their words is dishonest, insincere, and/or lying. The promise is a deliberate misrepresentation of the speaker's own thought/belief about what has not happened(the changes promised).

A promise to cause bodily harm is a threat, there can be no doubt. It is still a promise none-the-less. Clearly. Some promises are a kind of threat.

All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. All expectation about what will one day happen is thought/belief about what has not happened but is expected to. Knowing what a promise means in addition to believing that it was sincerely uttered(or not) is more than sufficient/adequate reason to believe that it will be kept(or not).

I cannot agree with saying that all promises ought be kept.
— creativesoul

A threat may be thought to be a "promise to cause bodily harm" according to a certain definition of 'promise' or even according to the ostensible 'bare bones' conventional definition of the word; but the point at issue as I see it is whether such a definition is really apt. I say it isn't because promises, as they are most commonly and appropriately understood, are made in the context of mutual trust and concern. If you promise to harm me, then not only do I not care if you keep your promise, I positively wish you not to keep it! — Janus

People in this world actually promise to cause injury and then deliver on that promise. This happens everyday across the globe regardless of individual particulars. Denying that they are making a promise is the result of the speaker not having the same notion of what counts as promise making as you do.

Ask them if they are making a promise. They'll say yes, assuming they've no reason to lie about it. The distinguishing aspect of promise making as compared to merely saying what one intends to do, is that the promise is a sort of unwritten spoken additional guarantee. This holds good regardless of what changes are promised to be made.

I think any sensible definition of 'promise' necessarily includes the idea that the person to whom the promise is made wishes, or at least acknowledges, that it should be honoured. Why try to incorporate threats with promises, rather than adhering to the very clear moral distinction between them? What would be gained by a blurring of these distinctions? — Janus

This presupposes that the meaning inherent to promise making is somehow existentially dependent upon the listener's wants/wishes/desires. No one wants to be threatened with bodily injury. It is promised nonetheless.

Not all promises are good.

What moral distinctions are being blurred?

So this "All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. " I see as completely wrongheaded because the sincerity involved in trusting that someone will keep a promise to do something for you that you desire is completely lacking in the case of a threat. — Janus

Promises to cause harm are made and kept everyday.

Not all promises are good.

The threatened person may or may not believe that the threatener will carry out the threat, but they do not want to enter into any kind of pact of mutual trust with them. The only circumstance in which a threat could be a promise in the sense I mean is if two people entered into a freely chosen, that is uncoerced, pact of mutual trust from the very beginning. Promises are primarily understood, I maintain, as pacts of mutual trust. — Janus

Mutual trust is imperative. Mutual understanding is as well. One can trust that another means what they say even if and when it involves a promise to cause injury. Not all promises are made with good intention.

So, on your view, no matter what unforeseen circumstances may arise, no matter what false pretense led to the promise... if one promises to do something, then they ought do it out of moral obligation alone.
— creativesoul

I did say I am relieved of my moral obligation immediately upon discovery of false representation of the predicate under which the promissory proposition was made. Otherwise, yes, to be morally worthy one ought to act in accord with his moral obligation, in this case do what he promised. Won’t be long before he becomes quite careful in what he promises. — Mww

Ah. For whatever reason, I interpreted the opposite... perhaps it is because what follows below seems to contradict what's directly above...

I think that there are a number of different situations/circumstances in which I would not say that one ought keep one's promise.
— creativesoul

Then he has no business making one. Remember, you said....voluntarily obligates himself. A guy promising to commit murder, again, as you say, hasn’t actually done it, so he is just speaking threateningly. — Mww

If the discovery of false representation of the predicate under which the promissory proposition was made relieves one of the moral obligation to make the world match one's words, then that is an example of an extenuating circumstance.

It is most certainly the case that promise making always includes a voluntarily entered into obligation to make the world match one's words. There are any number of different unforeseen scenarios, situations, and or otherwise possible circumstances that may arise and warrant careful reconsideration of whether or not it is best to keep a promise previously made.

I understand the foundational need for being able to take another on and/or at their word. The keeping of promises builds confidence in such. All promises are overt expressions of what one intends to do. Promises to cause injury notwithstanding.

The 'quality' of changes that are specifically promised varies tremendously but does not bear upon the fact that one can sincerely promise to cause harm...

Not all promise making is good.

Relevant because???
— creativesoul

Because it's the sense of opinion that's appropriate for the discussion. It's the sense pertinent to the subject matter, to the phenomena in question. — Terrapin Station

Some opinion can be true/false though. That's the way it is. If moral opinion can be true/false then it is most certainly relevant.

So, it would follow that all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral.
— creativesoul

Yes. Hence why I wrote that. — Terrapin Station

So...

All opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral opinions(of the kind we call "moral").

Can moral opinions be true/false?

Opinions can be true/false.
— creativesoul

Not in the relevant sense of "opinion." — Terrapin Station

Relevant because???

What counts as being moral in kind
— creativesoul

It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station

Opinions can be true/false.
— creativesoul

Not in the relevant sense of "opinion." — Terrapin Station

So, if person A has an opinion that they must act in whatever way it takes to acquire tremendous wealth and they feel that this is more significant than table manners, whatever they do is moral?
— creativesoul

Yes, relative to them. — Terrapin Station

So, it would follow that all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral.

:brow:

Would you concur with my description, or conceptual itemization, of the existential dependency of the promise itself?

Otherwise....d’accord. — Mww

If you mean this...

Promise is existentially dependent on some a priori abstract concepts the understanding thinks as belonging to it necessarily, re: in descending order of power, obligation, duty, respect. No promise as the meaningful subject of a synthetic proposition is possible without these a priori conditions.

We don’t think a promise to ourselves alone. Knowledge of those necessary fundamentals is given a priori in a subject, therefore he has no need to represent them to himself in the form of a promise. Thus, promise has the existential dependency of being represented in the world by the subject who understands the a priori conditions for it.

I'm uncertain whether or not I understand.

I'd be interested in your setting out of the a priori concepts...

I wouldn’t even make a promise, given a certain set of conditions, unless I knew beforehand I would keep it, within that same set of conditions. My contention would be, the fact I am relieved of my moral obligation immediately upon discovery of false representation of the predicate under which the promissory proposition was made, is insufficient to relieve me of my moral obligation otherwise. — Mww

So, on your view, no matter what unforeseen circumstances may arise, no matter what false pretense led to the promise... if one promises to do something, then they ought do it out of moral obligation alone.

If keeping a promise would knowingly cause unnecessary harm, and that consequence was unforeseen at the time the promise was made...

Promises to cause harm...

I think that there are a number of different situations/circumstances in which I would not say that one ought keep one's promise.

What counts as being moral in kind
— creativesoul

It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station

Opinions can be true/false.

What counts as being moral in kind
— creativesoul

It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station

So, if person A has an opinion that they must act in whatever way it takes to acquire tremendous wealth and they feel that this is more significant than table manners, whatever they do is moral?