I cannot agree with saying that all promises ought be kept.
— creativesoul

Under the assumption that all promises have moral implications, can you agree with thinking that all promises ought to be kept? — Mww

No. All promises do have moral implications according to my position, but as I've noted and asked of several different participants, even going to the extent of asking an 'at large' question...

What counts as being moral in kind???

Earlier you elaborated upon what counts as a moral kind of interest, as compared/contrasted to other kinds. I was left with no greater understanding than before I asked the question. Here's the answer again...

An interest which is the object of desire is an interest of empirical reason and is subjectively pathological; an interest which is the object of will is an interest of morality and is purely subjectively practical. It is here that it becomes clear objective examples, re: external to the moral agent, of moral conditions are not sufficient for moral judgements.

In the former it is the object itself that is good because it satisfies a desire, in the latter it is the willful determination of a volition in order to attain to an object that is good because it satisfies a moral disposition.

If an interest which is the object of will is an interest of morality, and being an interest of morality is what counts as being moral, then moral agents are agents of morality, conditions of morality are moral conditions, and judgments of morality are moral judgments. Applying this to what counts as 'moral' implications, we would be saying that implications of morality are moral implications. The obvious next question would be what is morality?

If an interest which is the object of will is an interest of morality, and being an object of the will is what counts as being moral, then moral agents are objects of will, moral conditions are objects of will, and moral judgments are objects of will. Applying this to what counts as 'moral' implications, we would be saying that moral implications are objects of will. What is will?

I do not actually think/believe that either one of the above elaborations align with your position, but the answer you offered was not not at all helpful. Could you set it all out in as clear and simple terms as the position you argue for/from will allow?

What counts as being moral in kind, such that all things satisfying the criterion are sensibly and rightfully called "moral" things?

I was thinking more along the lines of existential dependency.
— creativesoul

Ok. Promise has it, sure. Promise is existentially dependent on some a priori abstract concepts the understanding thinks as belonging to it necessarily, re: in descending order of power, obligation, duty, respect. No promise as the meaningful subject of a synthetic proposition is possible without these a priori conditions.

We don’t think a promise to ourselves alone. Knowledge of those necessary fundamentals is given a priori in a subject, therefore he has no need to represent them to himself in the form of a promise. Thus, promise has the existential dependency of being represented in the world by the subject who understands the a priori conditions for it.

What does existential dependency mean to you? — Mww

Existential dependency is a relationship between different things. When something is existentially dependent upon something else it cannot exist prior to that something else. When something exists in it's entirety prior to something else, it cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. That's a rough basis/outline of the paradigm. The simplicity is remarkable. The scope of rightful application... quite broad.

In the context of this conversation...

There is an actual distinction between making a promise and making a statement about that promise. A difference that can only be discovered by understanding existential dependency. The latter is existentially dependent upon the former. The former existed in it's entirety prior to the latter.

Voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match one's words is what one does when making a promise. That is determined wholly by a community of language speakers who understand the crucial importance of the role that trust and truth play in interdependence. The preceding two statements report upon and/or take account of that which existed in it's entirety prior to my account of it. It is about promise making. It is a report about what has happened, what is happening, and barring an extinction event of humankind, will continue happening.

Saying that one ought keep their promise is about what has not happened.

It's not about approval/disapproval of how the world was promised to be changed, or what was promised to be done. Rather, saying that one ought keep their promise is about the reliability, dependability, and/or trustworthiness of the speaker. Such character traits are crucial for the survival and over-all well-being of interdependent groups.

A complete lack of trust is unsustainable.

Hume has been refuted.
— creativesoul

Really. What is the point in you posting if all you're going to do is just tell us what is and is not the case? — Isaac

What do you care for? You do not have use for truth, or what's true, or what can be true, or how true things become so...

Live by the sword...

I know you would rather attack a straw man. That is perfectly clear... — S

The irony is thick when the above comes from one that mischaracterizes an argument about how an utterance of ought can be derived as an argument of/for moral approval despite the author's obvious rejection of exactly that.

:yikes:

It is a semantically blind reader who mistranslates claims like "I am not, will not, and cannot argue that one ought keep one's promises" as "if you promised to do it, then you ought to do so"... and then goes on and on and on and on and on... all about the imaginary opponent.

A promise is when one voluntarily enters themselves into an obligation
— creativesoul

A promise, in and of itself, or any affirmative token with a moral interest, regardless of it’s object, implies something a whole lot more fundamental than mere intentionality. Without these fundamentals, the object might as well not even be included in the predicate of a promise proposition. — Mww

I'm not even sure what the notion/idea of "a promise's object" is picking out and/or referring to. I know what a promise is. I know what an object is. I do not know how an object can belong to a promise.

Promises include/contain predicates. If there is an object in the predicate of a promise it is but one part of the whole promise. Roses and family are objects mentioned in the predicate of the promises under current consideration.

There is an actual distinction between making a promise and making a statement about that promise.
— creativesoul

Certainly. Statements, at least explications about promise, should include those aforementioned fundamentals. Any decent meta-ethicist is already well aware of them.

I was thinking more along the lines of existential dependency.

I'm not arguing that a promise means that what it says ought to be done.
— creativesoul

Agreed.

Good.

Imagine that a guy owes some very unsavory characters a large amount of cash that he does not have. He cannot pay. He knows that these are dangerous people:Eyewitness style. Further envision a promise being made to the guy from the unsavory ones to harm the guys family if the guy didn't pay up.

If the guy doesn't pay, then his family ought be dead. I'm not condoning the act. I'm saying that knowing the meaning of a sincerely made promise creates expectation.

I am not saying that all promises ought be kept.
— creativesoul

I think I would call that a threat rather than a promise — Janus

Granted.

To me a promise is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon... — Janus

As is a threat.

...and it also must be something that will be of benefit to the other, such that if you don't hold to it the other will be let down, and feel deceived or betrayed.

So, I would say that, in principle at least, promises should be kept and threats should not be carried out, which would mean that they are kind of opposites. Perhaps threats could be classed as "negative" promises. — Janus

I'm having significant difficulty here...

Hot and not. True and false. Open and closed. Meaningful and meaningless. Caring and not caring. Speaking honestly and speaking dishonestly. Deliberately misrepresenting one's own thought/belief and not. These are the sort of things that it makes sense to me to call "opposites".

None can be a kind of the other.

A promise to cause bodily harm is a threat, there can be no doubt. It is still a promise none-the-less. Clearly. Some promises are a kind of threat.

All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. All expectation about what will one day happen is thought/belief about what has not happened but is expected to. Knowing what a promise means in addition to believing that it was sincerely uttered(or not) is more than sufficient/adequate reason to believe that it will be kept(or not).

I cannot agree with saying that all promises ought be kept.

Hume has been refuted. It had nothing to do with promises. Your belief is not necessary.

You also conflate belief and truth, but I do not expect you to see it. Keep on riding shotgun with one who does not care about truth. Confirmation bias feels good.

According to Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen,[1] there are three kinds of meta-ethical problems, or three general questions:

What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments? (moral semantics)

What is the nature of moral judgments? (moral ontology)

How may moral judgments be supported or defended? (moral epistemology) — Wikipedia

What makes them all "moral"?(the kind of semantics, ontology, epistemology, thought, belief, judgment, etc.)

...

A promise is when one voluntarily enters themselves into an obligation - to the very best of their ability - to make the world match their words.

I'm not arguing that a promise means that what it says ought to be done.
— creativesoul

I am running out of time, but I can't let this go! Is it not the case that to say that sincerely promising or "voluntarily entering into an obligation- to the very best of their ability- to make the world match their words" is the same as to say that what is sincerely promised ought to be done? I can't see any difference there. — Janus

Making a promise is a meaningful act with tremendous social significance. It means that the speaker has given their word. This aims to rest uncertainty, and build trust and confidence. It is to assure the listener that the speaker is going to do what they say that they are going to do. It is harmoniously used everyday involving situations where there is an immediate and/or urgent need for the speaker to reassure the listener that what's promised to be done will get done.

Looking at another situation where promises are made...

Imagine that a guy owes some very unsavory characters a large amount of cash that he does not have. He cannot pay. He knows that these are dangerous people:Eyewitness style. Further envision a promise being made to the guy from the unsavory ones to harm the guys family if the guy didn't pay up.

If the guy doesn't pay, then his family ought be dead. I'm not condoning the act. I'm saying that knowing the meaning of a sincerely made promise creates expectation.

I am not saying that all promises ought be kept.

I'm saying because the guy knows what a promise means, then if he could neither pay nor warn his family, he would expect them to die.

Let five years go by without him ever having the ability to check and see. He gets asked by someone who knows, "So, Joe. What going on with your family? What do you think happened?"

"They ought be dead by now" would be quite the appropriate response.

I would not say that he was voicing his approval, but rather his expectation based upon his knowledge of what making a promise means and believing that the speaker was sincere.

Get your popcorn Banno things are beginning to get interesting.

There is an actual distinction between making a promise and making a statement about that promise.

Who here disagrees?

A promise is when one voluntarily enters themselves into an obligation - to the very best of their ability - to make the world match their words.

I'm not arguing that a promise means that what it says ought to be done.
— creativesoul

I am running out of time, but I can't let this go! Is it not the case that to say that sincerely promising or "voluntarily entering into an obligation- to the very best of their ability- to make the world match their words" is the same as to say that what is sincerely promised ought to be done? I can't see any difference there. — Janus

This is the very best question that has been asked.

I'll work on an appropriate response.

If a promise means that what it says ought to done, is this not the same as to say that promises should be kept? You might say that is only if the person making the promise is sincere, in which case the promise will be kept, to the best of their ability to keep it. But something made by and insincere person, which appears to be a promise, is not actually a promise. — Janus

A promise is when one voluntarily enters themselves into an obligation - to the very best of their ability - to make the world match their words.

I'm not arguing that a promise means that what it says ought to be done.

If person A promises to plant a rose garden on Sunday, then it follows that there ought be a rose garden the day after, not because one ought keep his/her promise, but rather because that is exactly what the promise means. It means nothing else.
— creativesoul

Yes, there ought to be a garden; that is all the consistency between a promise made and an obligation to it, by the same person, means. Whether or not the ever is, or ever was going to be, a garden, is irrelevant with respect to the relationship between a promise and the obligation presupposed by it. — Mww

I'm always baffled by what could possibly motivate someone to argue against these... some of the simplest utterances to understand. Very young children know exactly what making a promise means. It's a convention, no doubt.

When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday.

You disagree, apparently.
— creativesoul

And I do, too. It shows that you do not understand logical validity. — S

Sigh...

When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that if that person thinks making a promise confers a duty to satisfy that promise, then they will believe there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday.

How do you justify removing the bolded sections? — Isaac

If the person making the promise does not think doing so confers a duty to keep their word, then either they are ignorant of what a promise means, or it is an insincere speech act.

I specified sincerity intentionally. It matters. I admit that the use of "follows" is off-putting, particularly given the brevity.

This approach to promises isn't about anyone's approval. It's about meaning. It's relevant because one can most certainly derive an ought from an is without presupposing another ought. Facts, on my view, are what has happened. The kind of fact depends upon the content of the events. Moral facts would be actual circumstances/situations involving acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Making a promise is a moral fact. Note here that I am not, nor have I, been using the term "moral" as a synonym for "good" or "acceptable". I am not arguing that one ought keep their promise.

I'm simply pointing out what making a promise means, and then further pointing out how just simply understanding the language use causes expectation that is only taken into proper account with an ought.

This could be shown with nearly anything said...

The only point being that one can most certainly derive an ought from an is. Seeing how the text offered earlier doesn't have Hume saying that it cannot be done, perhaps this is a waste of time anyway.

I have that book... I ought look for it. :yum:

This worthy of careful attention.

When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant a rose garden on Sunday", then it follows that there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday.

You disagree, apparently.

I say, given those conditions, "there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday" is a true statement in the same way that all true statements are. Correspondence to what has happened.

You disagree apparently.

I do not see how Kant solves Hume's Guillotine.

If all utterances of ought are moral statements, then I know of at least one variety that is most certainly true and it follows from what is(what happened) without presupposing another ought. Arguments to the contrary are based upon the misattribution of meaning.

If person A promises to plant a rose garden on Sunday, then it follows that there ought be a rose garden the day after, not because one ought keep his/her promise, but rather because that is exactly what the promise means. It means nothing else.

The Speech Act theorists used the notion of 'direction of fit'. To make a promise is to voluntarily obligate oneself to make the world match one's words. That is what a promise means. That is all that it means. This is not about my approval. I'm not saying that someone should keep their promise.

Either not all utterances of ought are moral utterances, or Hume is wrong.

Kant's CI is the best standard to use as a guiding principle of our behaviour if we already care about others. However, it is neither magic, nor flawless. It is not perfect by any reasonable standard of perfection, nor need it be; for perfection - while being fine as an aim to strive for - is an impossible criterion to meet. We're much more reasonable than that. A moral code need not be perfect to be the best one readily available as a means for immediate, long-lasting improvement.

It's not flawless...

Someone who does not care about others could use the CI as a rule of thumb and arrive at unwanted, unexpected, and harmful consequences regardless. Someone could use the CI, in some logically possible scenario, as a means to intentionally harm others(steal and wish that everybody else would as well). Isaac argued something quite similar earlier. It could be used as a means to an end. Goodness is an end in itself. A method is only as successful as it's implementation.

How much does this logically possible situation actually matter though? Not much if we also recognize that all such guiding principles of behaviour are prone to the exact same thing.

We do what is good for the sake of doing good.

Kant's CI is a fantastic starting point for helping all youth develop a greater sense of the actual part we play in our own lives including the actual influence that our thought, belief, and/or behaviour has upon the world. It couldn't be more realistic and practical. It also gives it's user the best possible chance to discover, release, and/or further perpetuate goodness. Kant's CI is quite easily taught despite Kant's unnecessarily complex taxonomy/linguistic framework.

Certainly the best moral belief can be taught to everyone first acquiring language, regardless of individual particulars.

"What if everyone acted like that?"

Easy to understand. Easy to further develop.

With simple reasonable follow-up focusing upon the obvious negative consequences, it helps to further develop critical thinking skills and it begins and/or continues to promote active conscious deliberation regarding how our actions affect/effect others. <---------That is the very heart of all that is morally relevant.

Bring it to the forefront of the child's thought at the appropriate time, and it can leave quite the good impression. Teaching children how to come to such terms promotes goodness for it helps nurture a worldview built upon how important it is to consider others as well as considering the efficacy of their own thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

It fosters goodwill.

It teaches a well-grounded sense of responsibility based upon considering how one's own behaviour effects/affects the world. It is easily understood with simple terms at first. It is also easily amenable to further nuance. After it is introduced as a way to come to terms with everyday situations and is being actively employed by someone, it can be used as the sole means for helping them to finally determine what they ought do in any actual situation that they find themselves in. It will not eliminate the possibility of being mistaken.

Not everyone likes being treated the same way. Everyone likes being respected, accepted, and valued. Thinking about everyone in such terms promotes goodness. Our honourable use of Kant's CI can help pave the way.

It provides a foundation upon which to discover, release, and/or further perpetuate goodness.

If someone already respects others it is a fantastic tool for honing the will. If someone does not already respect others, say someone has a long history of not giving a fuck what sort of harm she/he/they do to others, then Kant's CI is much less affective/effective. Certainly we all agree that that sort of behaviour is not the best.

The best possible results stem from early teaching and constant reminding. It fosters good habits of mind.

Thinking about the affects/effects that our own behaviour has upon others is the very best foundation. It is easily administered, taught, and/or otherwise initially implemented. It provides a baseline from which to judge. It supports the idea of doing what is good for it's own sake. It provides the best practical and realistic possibility for increasing happiness and livelihood while decreasing unnecessary suffering.

We're not seeking perfection. We're setting out which is the most likely to increase goodness while decrease unnecessary suffering. If everyone did this, there is no doubt that the world world be a much better place than if not. So, it also consistent.

What more could one ask for?

My vote is Kant's CI, and you've just read my off the cuff meandering.

In many tribal cultures it is considered OK to just take someone else's possessions if you want them, — Isaac

Show me. Many native American tribes had no concept of personal property. There is no such thing as stealing someone's possessions in a community where all property is gladly and happily considered communal to begin with.

A well-educated electorate is crucial for any referendum to work the way it ought. Sometimes the majority of people are quite wrong and base their vote upon misleading, inadequate, and/or downright false information.

Good, accurate, and adequate information ought be a cornerstone; the necessary pre-requisite of anything meant to resemble self-governance.

The point is that humans are the ones that make the rules for human behaviour, and those rules have changed dramatically over the last few centuries, right alongside the evolution of our thought/belief. The changes in human morality are part of that evolution of thought/belief, alongside all the other changes.

That's very true, however, when it comes to topics such as morality, I don't believe that you can tell someone what is moral when the topic of morality is so heavily based on opinion. When someone criticizes you on the use of phrases such as "I think" and "I believe" it kind of defeats the purpose of a forum such as this. — nsmith

Such criticism is usually based upon an ill-conceived notion of thought/belief itself. Everything ever spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered consists of thought/belief.

Morality is tough because of the differences. Who is the standard bearer, so to speak. Who determines what is moral/immoral? Who determines what is acceptable/unacceptable? These are common questions...

We do, and thankfully more and more people across the world are coming to the agreement that blatant, willful, and underserved disrespect for another's person is unacceptable. Racism is dwindling. However, it is but one manifestation of the same fallacy. Gross overgeneralization. Unfortunately, it still underwrites soooo much 'Western' pop culture, not to mention the institutionalized racism still prevalent in American government at every level, federal, state, and local. However, that is also evolving moe and more into socio-economic prejudice/injustice as compared/contrasted to racial. There are some token pieces of diversity roaming about, and they are well-paid to do what they're asked.

Is it morally acceptable to literally pave a legitimate way for a foreign country, citizen, or group to have and freely express a much more powerful freedom of speech than the average American? I think not. However, that has actually already been done at the Supreme Court level. All of these directly involve morality.

There are things that can be said; things that are true of everyone regardless of one's individual circumstances. These things help to frame our thinking and understanding about how we ought act. Our behaviour has an effect/affect on other's. Keeping that in mind is crucial for determining which action to take.

It's all personal thought/belief being expressed here anyway. What matters most is whether or not it is true. What matters second most is whether or not it is well-grounded. Given that the topic is morality, and we all adopt our own initial worldview, we're all on equal grounds to that - being adopted - extent.

Moralities vary according to particular circumstances. Not all are on equal footing however. Some allow exceptions to the rules. Some do not. Some are based upon true claims, some are not. There are many aspects to consider when one is considering morality.

History shows us that our moral thought/belief changes. What we once thought/believed was good is no longer thought of as being such. Slavery is a prima facie example, although it has morphed more than being abolished. That's another topic altogether though. The point is that humans are the ones that make the rules for human behaviour, and those rules have changes dramatically over the last few centuries, right alongside the evolution of our thought/belief.

Morality has been called a necessary human condition. I think that that sort of thinking highlights one very important aspect of morality. We are all interdependent social creatures by physical and mental necessity. Our cooperation with one another has been instrumental in the survival of the human race. This is true of all long lasting communities.

With an ever-shrinking world filled by an ever-expanding power of personal expression, we're beginning to see more and more of not only our differences, but our similarities as well. The shrinking is due to computer technology. Easier access to information is not good in and of itself. The quality matters most. As a result of being able to access whatever one wants to by virtue of a couple of keyboard clicks, confirmation bias has never been so easy unless one already agrees with everyone around him/her.

Difference is irrevocably crucial for improvement.

The need for critical reasoning skills has never been more prevalent.

A bit too utopian/idealistic methinks.

We have a right to discuss our personal thought/belief on a public forum. Besides that, the sentiment itself is both self-contradictory and untenable. It sets an impossible criterion to meet. In other words, if what you say is true, then you have no right to say it. You see what I mean? You most certainly do. It is also literally, figuratively, physically, mentally, and practically impossible for anyone at all to have all the facts.

While there is also most certainly a need for us to curtail immoral behaviours, telling someone something is not one of them. How something is told matters much more. The level of respect that the telling is based upon matters. The telling itself is a necessary method. It is not only necessary but it is irrevocable to thinking/believing anything anew. It takes an other - in some way shape or form, so to speak - to show us our own mistakes. If no one told anyone else anything at all language would have never gotten off the ground.

Well, surely you see the need for telling people stuff.

What’s a moral statement? From the agent’s perspective, is it a declaration of an interest (hunger is detrimental to good health), or, is it the representation of an interest in the form of an action (I go to the gospel mission every Tuesday to feed the hungry)? — Mww

Will any interest do or does it require a specific kind of interest in order for it to qualify as being a moral one, as compared/contrasted to one that is not. I've all kinds of interests, from people watching to inventing, to rendering, to poetry, to non-fiction, etc.

I find it rather important to set these things out as clearly as possible, otherwise the line of thinking goes awry. That's what prompted the earlier definition of morality, although interestingly enough, I do not agree with that definition entirely. It is current convention though, so. No better place to start. However, it leads to morality being relative/subjective. The SEP article actually changed and mentioned that particular objection to it at one time, although I'm not sure if it still does. I do not remember. I'm also not sure if it was a result of my argument showing it at the time - a number of years back on another forum - or it was just chronological coincidence. I mean, there are number of paid professionals here and elsewhere, some of whom write and/or edit articles on the SEP website. Anyway... I do not find that focusing on the rules gets to the heart of focusing upon the thought/belief underwriting those rules. That's how knowledge of the matter at hand is acquired.

I aslo commend the direction you've taken here wrt the law and morality. On my view, the law is nothing more and nothing less than legitimized morality(legitimized moral belief).

Define the term "truth" in such a way that the reader could replace all your uses of it with it's definition and not suffer any loss of meaning and/or coherency.
— creativesoul

Nahhh....I ain’t doin’ that. — Mww

Do you not worry about equivocating and/or self-contradiction? Given the context, it seems to me that what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so matters...

Statements of thought/belief can be true. Can moral statements be true? If so, they ought be so by virtue of the same way that other statements are. Correspondence to what has happened.

The interesting aspects come out when one sets out exactly what they mean by the name("moral statement"). Clearly, it is a kind of statement. What makes it qualify for being of the moral variety?

The coherency of everything else claimed about moral thought/belief hinges upon this. No?

Is it helpful to parse morality in such terms? "Moral" not being a synonym for right, acceptable, and/or approval, but rather as a kind of thought/belief that everyone has; a kind that is determined the same way that all kinds of thought/belief are determined... by the content of their correlations.

I'm quite unconvinced here.

You're holding a number of false belief and I've given up on showing you. My personal self-worth is not influenced by your thought/belief about me. Your behaviour here is unacceptable, shameworthy. No wonder you seek to justify(rationalize) your own personal moral thought/belief by virtue of misinterpretation that makes all morality seem to be based upon the same rubbish. It's not.

Seriously. Be well.

Always a nod to honesty. It takes more than that to be a decent human being.

Your making yourself look bad.

And you're here to convince others that you have the best notion of morality?

:worry:

... and I'm being called "a crackpot".

Sigh....

Be well Sapientia.

One last chance...

There are probably upwards of five or ten or arguments I've given in this thread about various aspects of morality. I would be interested in having you copy at least one in it's entirety and then offer valid criticism of it.

The astute reader already knows that I've already satisfied that criterion. I've just completed doing so on this and the previous pages. I've levied clear concise and well-reasoned criticism based upon obvious true statements.

You've offered nothing more than grandstanding, gratuitous assertion, double standards, equivocation of terms, red herrings and non-sequiturs, the list goes on and on. This report of actual events that I'm asserting is true, because these things happened. Anyone can go look for themselves.

Your personal tirades against the author as compared/contrasted to being about the statements is not only automatic loss in formal rational and ethical rules of debate, but it is quite indicative of the 'larger' problem of ill-founded blatant disgust and/or obtuse disrespect for another person...

Edit in light of the latest response...

What a shame. You had so much potential.

...

A sure sign that there is not a lick of substance to the position one is arguing for is the ad hom...

Be helpful.

I would only like to suggest that the reader actually compare what Sapientia claims about my thought/belief - in his report of my worldview - with anything and everything that I've actually claimed here and/or elsewhere, which is a much more reliable representation thereof. The two(his report of that which existed prior to his report, and that which he is reporting upon(that which existed prior to his report) do not correspond to one another. What he overtly claims and covertly implies about my words is chock full of falsehood.

His is wrong about my position in the exact same way that Western Philosophy has been wrong about what thought/belief consists of and/or how it all works. Being wrong about that which existed prior to our reports comes in a variety of ways.

Common use of language qualifies. Drawing mental correlations between different things qualifies.

My avatar's namesake hasn't changed except for the "soul" part. It's been lost and found a couple of times.

The only means of becoming aware of one's own mistake is by virtue of an other... I welcome valid criticism.

Identify the problem...

The subjective/objective dichotomy is utterly inadequate for taking account of thought/belief... moral thought/belief notwithstanding.

Misattributing meaning to statements of thought/belief does not resolve the problem.