Are what you call "elemental constituents" something akin to essential properties? In that case, the item referred to could not persist though the loss of those properties, but they may still not guarantee that the item is uniquely being described by them since other items of the same essential kind also would have those properties. — Pierre-Normand

This misses the point. Indeed, all of those particular items cannot exist without their elemental constituents.

We can state otherwise.

The purpose of a definite description is to uniquely pick up an individual, not just to pick it up under a description that it will never (and could never) cease to satisfy. — Pierre-Normand

Then definite descriptions do not always take account of elemental constituents.

When the time is thus specified in the definite description, then, it becomes irrelevant that the item doesn't have the property ascribed to it at other times... — Pierre-Normand

Then it would only follow that the retention of that particular property is not necessary for us to pick it out at other times. Those particular properties are not elemental constituents.

If we offer a true report of elemental constituents, there is no need for time stamp. Time stamps are irrelevant in these cases, for when X is existentially dependent upon Y it is always so. When X is a composite of other things which exist in their entirety prior to becoming a part of X, then it is the case that X is existentially dependent upon all of those things.

That never changes regardless of what we say.

But when a substance falls under a definite description at a time, then it falls under it at all times (including the times when it doesn't exist yet or anymore!) That's what makes it a definite description, rather than a general description. — Pierre-Normand

Alright. It's becoming more and more obvious to me that we're working from entirely different conceptual schemes(linguistic frameworks). Most everyone involved here seems to have an academic background. I have no formal philosophical background. As a result, I will not be able to recount many historical debates, let alone be able to recount them in great detail by virtue of offering an adequate account of the belief system/conceptual scheme/worldview at work on either 'side' of many well-known academic level debates.

All debates have something at issue and folk expressing differing thought/belief about that issue.

What does successful reference require? What does our knowledge of all successful reference require? There is no single criterion for both. The latter will include some things that the former cannot include. The latter will include everything in the former. Our knowledge of successful reference requires successful reference.

All successful reference is something done using language. All language use requires shared meaning. All successful reference requires shared meaning. Whatever shared meaning requires, so too does language. Whatever language requires, so too does successful reference. Whatever shared meaning requires so too does successful reference.

Successful reference has a criterion. In the preceding paragraph is the beginnings of a rough outline. I am not claiming that it is - as it stands now - adequate. However, I think that it is universally applicable - as it stands now. I think that it is universally extant - as it stands now. We can flesh out more detail later.

Successful reference is itself a complex thing. I do not think that we can offer an exhaustive account that includes every thing that successful reference is existentially dependent upon. I do think that we can safely posit a number of them. I do think that such knowledge serves as more than adequate ground to warrant it's use as a standard of measure.

Shared meaning requires some things that exist in their entirety prior to becoming a part of shared meaning. Since all successful reference requires these things, any conception or theory of reference that that contradicts this knowledge of shared meaning, and thus this knowledge of all successful reference is just plain wrong.

We can acquire knowledge of complex things. Our knowledge of such things requires targeting the thing. We must pick it out and carefully consider it. This must be the case, otherwise we could never acquire knowledge about elemental parts. We could never know or say stuff in particular about some thing if we do not first isolate that thing. In doing so it becomes the focus of our attention. Names are very popular tools for doing so. They are not the only means for successful reference. We can point without naming. We can name without pointing. We cannot describe the thing in detail without doing one or the other. We cannot do any of this without shared meaning.

So, all accounts of elemental constituents requires first pointing or naming; picking out the individual thing. Our accounts of elemental constituents requires language. The existence of some elemental constituents does not require our knowledge of them. Both, the existence of elemental constituents, and our knowledge thereof requires shared meaning.

If some thing consists of other things and some of those things exist in their entirety prior to becoming a part of that some thing then that some thing requires all of the things that it consists in/of.

All successful reference includes and requires shared meaning. All successful reference is existentially dependent upon shared meaning in addition to all that shared meaning is existentially dependent upon.

Shared meaning requires some thing to be symbol/sign, some thing to become symbolized/significant, and a plurality of creatures capable of drawing mental correlations between these things. Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content. <---------That is the presupposition of correspondence to fact/reality that is inherent to all thought/belief formation, including but not limited to statements thereof.

All successful reference presupposes correspondence to fact/reality. If it is the case - in this world - that all X's consist of known elemental constituents, and a possible scenario stipulates otherwise, it is false. Such possible world scenarios are to easy enough to imagine. All that that takes is making up a coherent story that talks about reference without description.

We can know some things about this world. We can imagine what it would take in order for those things to be different. If we know that something is a composite then we may also know what it is composed of. If we know what it is composed of, we could easily talk about that thing as if it is not composed of what we know it is.

Does our doing so successfully refer to to the thing? Surely. Can any of it be true? Surely not. Is that mode of reference somehow not existentially dependent upon any description whatsoever? As if we could do any of that without already having picked that thing out of this world by virtue of both description(s) and names?

I think not.

...it is true at all times that Gödel was born on April 28, 1906, for instance. Of course, the sentence now being used to express this truth uses the past tense whereas a sentence used to express it prior to April 28, 1906 would use the future tense. But both sentences express the very same truth and there is no time when what it is that they express isn't true. — Pierre-Normand

Well, I differ here wrt predictions being true at the time of utterance. Bt my lights, they are not able to be.

"Godel was born on April 28, 1906" is not a definite description though, is it? "Born on April 28, 1906..." is, right? If so, then this doesn't clear up what was in question to begin with.

But when a substance fall under a definite description at a time, then it falls under it at all times (including the times when it doesn't exist yet or anymore!) That's what makes it a definite description, rather than a general description. — Pierre-Normand

"Falls under it"...

Does that mean that the description always applies to it, even when it is no longer true of the object? Time stamps take care of that.

Definite descriptions would have to be true of the object during it's entire existence(at all times)?

Time stamps cannot take care of that.

The problem that I see this poses for definite descriptions being exhaustive and required of all reference isn't that Bob's properties change over time, it's that we can refer to Bob with 'Bob' regardless of any transformation ageing induces to him. — fdrake

This just points out that once identity is established(by virtue of using definite descriptions) the name alone can sometimes suffice to retain the identity.

If it were not for those descriptions, there would be no way to distinguish between which Bob we're talking about to begin with. Once that is established, the descriptions can - and do - change over time(well... some true ones will).

The criterion for what it takes to first identify something is not the same as what it takes to retain that identity.

Seems to me that if one holds that the meaning of a name is cashed out by a definite description, then that person would also require that "the man who invented/discovered Peano's axioms" refer to the man that the speaker believes invented/discovered Peano's axioms.

So, it seems that Kripke's suggestion that the notion that a name is cashed out by a definite description ends in a reductio is not true unless we also say that false belief does not refer to a specific individual.

:razz:

Good to know. With my limited knowledge of philosophical history, it's difficult for me to ascertain which parts of Kripke's lectures are granting historical notions and which ones represent his own belief.

I suppose I ought ask prior to reacting as if Kripke is arguing in favor of something or other...

Open mouth... insert foot. Ah, you'll have that sometimes.

Thanks for the clarification. I'm going to go back and re-read those bits again, paying particularly close attention to any references and/or footnotes.

Arrrggh. More bullshit.

It is Kripke's whole point that in the case where "Gödel" would be used by someone as a definite description, and hence not as a rigid designator, then, unbeknownst to this person, her uttering the sentence "Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" might not express a belief about Gödel at all. — Pierre-Normand

Kripke's whole point is based upon bullshit. Anyone who utters the sentence "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" is making a statement about Godel. If they believe that the statement is true, then it expresses a belief about Godel. If they do not believe that the statement is true, it's still about Godel. It is impossible to sincerely state something about Godel and not be expressing one's own belief about Godel. One's own belief is a belief. It is impossible to sincerely say something about Godel and not be expressing a belief about Godel.

If we sincerely say "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" then that is a statement of belief. We believe that that statement is true. When one speaks sincerely, s/he believes what they say.
— creativesoul

Of course. And Kripke isn't denying that. — Pierre-Normand

Ah bullshit... He said we need not believe what we say in order to be sincerely say it. Read it again!

We certainly say, and sincerely, 'Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Does it follow from that that we believe that Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic - that we attribute the in­completeness of arithmetic to this man? No. We have to be referring to Codel when we say 'Godel
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'.

If we sincerely say 'X', it most certainly follows from that that we attribute proving the incompleteness of arithmetic to Godel. He points out that we have to be referring to Godel. No shit Sherlock! If we're not referring to Godel when we say "Godel did such and such" then we have no idea what the fuck we're saying to begin with.

It does not follow from the fact that we can pick something out of this world and say stuff about it that is contrary to what we believe about it that what we already believe about it is not true.

If our belief about it concerns the existential dependency of it(what is necessary in order for it to even exist in this world), and our belief about that is true, and it is existentially dependent upon other things(elemental constituents) some of which exist in their entirety prior to becoming a part of it and some of which do not, then what we posit in a possible world scenario will always be false if that scenario posits it without all of it's elemental constituents.

We have to be referring to Codel when we say 'Godel
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. If, in fact, we were
always referring to Schmidt, then we would be attributing the
incompleteness of arithmetic to Schmidt and not to Godel­
if we used the sound 'Godel' as the name of the man whom I
am calling 'Schmidt'

(emphasis mine)

Yeah, no shit Sherlock! Doesn't matter if you're speaking sincerely or not. Why swap back and forth between examples here? They are not equivalent.

When we say "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" we are referring to this particular man named Godel. Schmidt is not this man named Godel. That holds good regardless of whether or not we believe that Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic.

When we say "Peano invented Peano's axioms" we are not referring to Dedekind even if we know that Peano did not invent Peano's axioms.

If we believe that Peano invented/discovered Peano's axioms, then when we use the descriptor "the man who invented Peano's axioms" we're referring to this man named Peano. If we believe that Dedekind invented/discovered Peano's axioms, then when we use the descriptor "the man who invented/discovered Peano's axioms", we're referring to Dedekind.

If we believe that Dedekind invented Peano's axioms, we cannot sincerely state "Peano invented/discovered Peano's axioms". If we believe that Schmidt proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, we cannot sincerely state "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic". We are nonetheless referring to Godel.

There's something odd about Kripke's remarks about Peano's axioms.

If we believe that person A did such and such, but that belief is false, then when we talk about who did such and such, we're talking about what we believe to be the case. We're talking about person A. If we learn that person B did such and such, we learn that it was not person A. At that time, and never before, we would be referring to person B when we talked about the person who did such and such.

Let "such and such" equal invent/discover Peano's axioms. Let person A equal Peano. Let person B equal Dedekind.

Kripke's argument here presupposes that false statements about someone in particular cannot refer to that someone in particular.

That's absurd.

Surely I've misunderstood Kripke? And there's this bit below...

pg. 89

It is true that most of us think that Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Why is this so? We certainly say, and sincerely, 'Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Does it follow from that that we believe that Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic - that we attribute the in­completeness of arithmetic to this man? No.

No?????

Arrrgggh! For fuck's sake...

If we sincerely say "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" then that is a statement of belief. We believe that that statement is true. When one speaks sincerely, s/he believes what they say.

When we deliberately say something that we do not believe to be true, we are speaking insincerely.

Statements of belief are ones that the speaker believes. When a speaker is making statements that they do not believe, they are making statements that misrepresent their own thought/belief. One cannot do this accidentally. As soon as one says something, they know - beyond all doubt - whether or not they believe the words that came out of their own mouth. A sincere speaker automatically corrects the slip up.

One cannot sincerely state 'X' if one does not believe 'X'.

Sincere speech acts consist of statements that represent the speaker's belief. Insincere speech acts consist of statements that misrepresent the speaker's belief. Saying 'X' and not believing that 'X' is true is not sincerely stating 'X'.

I think the entire debate here is missing something very important. fdrake just offered a perfectly understandable scenario in which the same name is successfully used to identify an object with changing properties. I'm reminded of Heraclitus' river. If it is the case that a description of properties is both necessary and sufficient for identification of fdrake's apple, then only the descriptions which denote and/or describe the changes would be necessary to pick out that particular object.

That's just not the case.

Those descriptions apply to more than just that apple. However, the name alone cannot do the job all by itself either. It is also not necessary and sufficient. The name "apple" applies to more than just that one in particular.

Identity requires both, a name and a set of definite descriptions. Neither is sufficient all by itself. Both are necessary. Successfully identifying a particular object in this world requires both. Before we can talk about this apple in another world, we must identify it in this one. That requires distinguishing it from all the other apples. That distinction requires descriptions of particular circumstances regarding this particular apple and not that one.

After the object is identified with both name and descriptions, and only after that has happened, can we talk about and successfully disregard the descriptions and retain identity.

Well, it seems that those statement amount to somewhat of an argument in favor of some form of essentialism. In addition, they also argue in favor of the idea that what is known a priori is a necessary truth.
— creativesoul
Perhaps. But I don't think those statements fairly represent a mature descriptivist position. — andrewk

Well, they certainly do not accurately represent my own position, which could be viewed as a form of essentialism, although I wouldn't think that it is close enough to historical ones to view it as one. Someone else certainly may. I do strongly believe that there are some things which are an emergent product of simpler things in combination. In those cases, talking about the essential parts does not equal talking about the product of their combination. Water comes to mind as before. Easy to understand. Talking about hydrogen is not talking about water.

For example item 5 is something that is at most believed, not known, by the speaker. Further, I don't think descriptivism requires putting it in that If...Then... form. I think a fairer rendering is that 'The speaker believes there exists an individual with name X that has most of the properties'. I don't think there's any need for the 'a priori' bit either.

It seems to me that the essentialism is an artefact of Kripke's interpretation of descriptivism, rather than a feature of descriptivism itself. So far as I know, Russell was not an essentialist.

BTW those six statements are listed on this wiki page on Naming and Necessity, which will perhaps be a more accessible reference as the above post listing them recedes further into the past of this long, long thread.

Yeah, Kripke seems to have an axe to grind with regard to several historical positions. I personally have no interest in his targeting the a prior/a posteriori or showing that just because something is known a priori does not make it necessary, in the sense that it must be the case in all possible worlds.

I do find the definition awkard enough to be interesting. That is statement (1).

Just wondering if there is a rule that includes people but not parrots. — Banno

Parrots do not draw the correlation between the name and what's being named. The speech act theorists called that something or other, didn't they? The rhetic? No... Phatic? Cannot remember. Something like that. They pointed out that making the sound does not equal a meaningful utterance.

When did I learn the rule about using proper names? — Banno

When you drew the correlation between the name and the thing being named that the community of speakers had already drawn.

Is it the case that there are necessary and sufficient conditions that determine, for every given proper name, if the name has successfully referred to a discreet individual?

that is, must there be universal rules for the use of proper names? — Banno

Yes there are, but that criterion is not Kripke's target. As it pertains to the lectures, I too have issue with the definition and theses that Kripke is arguing against. During this thread I have put forth my own views from time to time when it seemed relevant to the reading, and thus appropriate. I suspect that there will come a time when those will be revisited.

I do want to understand Kripke's position though. It seems to me to be more like a discussion of what he sees as flaws in some historical 'schools of thought'. I'm good with that, even if he and I approach those schools of thought(and their purported problems) from different 'angles'...

His approach is explaining what's going on when we use proper nouns in possible world scenarios, and using what we learn about that as grounds for arguing against historical popular notions of essentialism(I think). In addition he targets the use of a priori and necessary as synonyms. He also argues against the distinction between a priori and a posteriori.

I take it that the six listed statements above are Kripke's aim.
— creativesoul
You meant target? — Banno

Yup. I mean those are what he's arguing against. He is doing so by using proper nouns in possible world scenarios and pointing out what's going on when we do such a thing.

I think it is very important to keep that in mind.

My reading of what Wallows was asking is that he wanted to know what you meant by 'using proper nouns in possible world scenarios to place them under suspicion'. I too am curious to know what you meant by that. — andrewk

Well, it seems that those statement amount to somewhat of an argument in favor of some form of essentialism. In addition, they also argue in favor of the idea that what is known apriori is a necessary truth.

What I'm saying is that a rough summary of what I've read thus far amounts to Kripke using proper nouns in possible world scenarios to target those arguments/notions. His examples seem to falsify a few of those statements.

There is a distinction between counterfactuals and possible world scenarios.

Facts are; events, states of affairs, the way things were/are, reality. Facts consist of what has happened. Counterfactuals are - quite simply - an account of what has not happened. That's what the prefix "counter" must mean, lest the distinction between factual/counterfactual is lost and both terms are rendered utterly meaningless. Continued use of of either term after throwing that distinction out the window amounts to uttering gibberish at worst, and unnecessarily confusing speech at best.

Counterfactuals - by any coherent definition - are counter to fact. Possible world scenarios can be true. That which is counter to fact cannot. Counterfactual scenarios are not equivalent to possible world scenarios.

All counterfactuals and possible world scenarios consist entirely of statements of thought/belief about what has not happened. Counterfactuals must be false. Possible world scenarios can be true.

Counterfactuals are false statements about some thing in this world. The counterfactual statement performs the task of picking out this object from this world and subsequently stipulating a set of imagined circumstances that are counter to this world's circumstances with regard to that thing. They must be false.

The possible world statement performs the task of picking out this object from this world and subsequently stipulating a set of imagined circumstances that are counter to what's believed about this world's circumstances with regard to that thing. They can be true.

Are you asking me how to count the things being said about a proper noun in a possible world scenario?

:meh:

Uh... no. That's clear enough.

Seems that the following is worth posting for reference...

(1) To every name or designating expression 'X', there corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties q> such that A believes 'q>X'.
(2) One of the properties, or some conjointly, are be­lieved by A to pick out some individual uniquely.
(3) If most, or a weighted most, of the q> 's are satisfied by one unique object y, then y is the referent of 'x'.
(4) If the vote yields no unique object, 'x' does not refer.
(5) The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the q>' s' is known a priori by the speaker.
(6) The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the q>' s' expresses a necessary truth (in the idiolect of the speaker).

(Condition for satisfying the above) For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of reference in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate.

Ok. I take it that the six listed statements above are Kripke's aim. He's using proper nouns in possible world scenarios to place them under suspicion for various reasons.

As I have said earlier as a work taken to present a positive theory of reference I think it is "much ado about nothing".
— Janus

Since he says explicitly that this is not his aim, that's perhaps not surprising. — Banno

Yes. I recall at least a couple of times that he explicitly denied that he was offering a theory.

Yes, but the identity is only established by definite descriptions which are in accordance with the actualities of this world; so there is really no Independence of identity from definite description. — Janus

I don't think that Kripke is divorcing identity from description. I think he's using the fact that possible world semantics allow us to stipulate different circumstances without losing identity to show some other things(stuff about a priori/a posteriori, a priori and necessity, perhaps even difference between theories of identity, meaning, and definition). I'm not sure exactly what he's doing, but thus far nothing he has said seems outright wrong...

I'm not too sure that I'll be convinced of much at all simply because we can lose description in positing possible world scenarios, but we'll see.

I personally have a strong aversion to modality(possible world semantics), so... this is tough reading for me anyway. It's like eating a food that is very hard to get down as a result of how badly it smells... you know? Something that the smell alone could make you vomit. I have to accept possible world semantics to understand what Kripke is getting at.

So, this is work for me!

:wink:

People are saying things like - how can one possibly imagine a world in which Nixon does not have such and such and did not do such and such???

One want to say: tell me more about this person you can't tell me anything about. — StreetlightX

Hmmm... I don't see anyone taking that stance. It's not about what one can imagine about someone picked out of this world. For me, at least, it's much more about what sorts of imaginings render the object picked out of this world to be basically non-existent. Imagining a world with water but no hydrogen comes to mind as an easy enough example to understand.

As it(possible world semantics) applies to picking out people, I'm not too sure that Kripke is that far off base, if at all. Certainly, there are some situations that are pivotal to making one who one is. Seems that those situations - if removed - would also remove an important part of the person, but I'm not at all certain that I would take a strong stance against anything Kripke has written thus far(regarding where I am).

Certain things other than people, I would... but, Kripke isn't dealing with those... yet(?).

Once we've already identified this 'Nixon', then and only then can we entertain circumstances that are alternative to the ones which are unique to this man, by virtue of using the name 'Nixon' as a means for retaining the identity.
— creativesoul

But so what? That doesn't mean that the rigid designator is independent of definite descriptions. — Janus

It is when positing possible worlds. The identity is without issue even when we stipulate different descriptions... which is part of what Kripke is pointing out.

If it were not for both names and definitive descriptions there could be no such thing as identity across possible world scenarios.
— creativesoul

We can easily posit possible worlds where descriptions of the object are not necessary to identify the object.
— creativesoul

To my eye these two statements are contradictory. — Janus

All possible world scenarios are existentially dependent upon definitive descriptions to help fix the referent of the name being used in the scenario.

"Nixon" refers to more than one person. More than one person are named "Nixon". Only one Nixon was president. Therefore, the name alone is insufficient for identifying this Nixon. Once we've already identified this 'Nixon', then and only then can we entertain circumstances that are alternative to the ones which are unique to this man, by virtue of using the name 'Nixon' as a means for retaining the identity. — creativesoul

In possible world scenarios shown by Kripke, definite descriptions are not necessary to identify the objects(including people), for they have already been identified in this world by those descriptions.

Wasn't disagreeing with you in the second quote. Was attempting to summarize Kripke.

I still stand by both quotes.

The only reason that we can talk about setting definitive descriptions aside is because they have already helped us in establishing which individual we're talking about when we use proper names.
— creativesoul

That's true in the case of counterfactuals... — frank

That's true in all cases of talking about setting definitive descriptions aside and positing alternatives. It does not matter whether or not the alternatives are counterfactual. All it takes to be counterfactual is to be false. That which is true cannot be counterfactual. Some possible world scenarios are true. Some possible world scenarios are not counterfactual.

All possible world scenarios are existentially dependent upon definitive descriptions to help fix the referent of the name being used in the scenario.

"Nixon" refers to more than one person. More than one person are named "Nixon". Only one Nixon was president. Therefore, the name alone is insufficient for identifying this Nixon. Once we've already identified this 'Nixon', then and only then can we entertain circumstances that are alternative to the ones which are unique to this man, by virtue of using the name 'Nixon' as a means for retaining the identity.

If it were not for both names and definitive descriptions there could be no such thing as identity across possible world scenarios. Neither is sufficient. Both are necessary for the very ability to use a name to posit someone unique into circumstances other than what we already believe while retaining the name.
— creativesoul

I agree. But we both see that a definite description is not the same thing as a rigid designator, so I think we're on track. — frank

How many different people do you think were the first man to walk on the moon?

We could say that someone other than Neil Armstrong did. Would we be talking about the first man to walk on the moon?

All it takes for a possible world scenario to not be counterfactual is for it to be true. Some possible world scenarios are true.

Not all possible world scenarios are counterfactual.
— creativesoul

This strikes me as a deep insight. Would you be able to expand on it? — Wallows

Deep? I don't know about all that. Simple? Surely.

If everyone believes that Neil Armstrong was the first man to walk on the moon, but he - in fact - was not, then any possible world scenario which stipulated that he was not would not be counter to fact.

In the domain of talking about what's going on with possible world semantics; in terms of what we're doing when we pick out this person from this world and posit this unique individual into an alternative set of circumstances; in those very limited situations, I've no issue with what Kripke is claiming.

It quite simply does not follow from anything Kripke says that definitive description is unnecessary for identity in all other circumstances aside from possible world semantics and/or what's going on when we talk about circumstances alternative to what we believe.

The only reason that we can talk about setting definitive descriptions aside is because they have already helped us in establishing which individual we're talking about when we use proper names. We pick out this Nixon, not that one... even when Nixon is not here to point at. There are more than one person named Nixon. There is one Nixon who won the American presidential election. Names are clearly inadequate for identifying this Nixon, in this world. Not all use of "Nixon" picks out this Nixon in this world.

If 'Nixon' was both necessary and sufficient for identifying this person, there could be no other people with the name.

To be perfectly clear...

If it were not for both names and definitive descriptions there could be no such thing as identity across possible world scenarios. Neither is sufficient. Both are necessary for the very ability to use a name to posit someone unique into circumstances other than what made them so.

You're missing the point because I have yet to have made it clear.

Kripke knowingly posits a falsehood(Nixon was not president) in order to support the idea that being president does not(is unnecessary in order to) identify Nixon. He further posits another falsehood based upon the first(that someone else won the election) in order to support the idea that winning the presidency is also insufficient for identifying Nixon. So, according to Kripke, the fact that we can and do posit falsehoods(false descriptions) consititutes warrant for holding that true descriptions are neither necessary nor sufficient for identity.

But...

On the other hand, he uses true descriptions in order to support the idea that false descriptions do not identify an individual uniquely. He uses true descriptions to identify someone uniquely other than Einstein and Godel.

Seems fishy...

The man who invented the atomic bomb was not Einstein. Someone who believed that he did will use that description as a means to identify Einstein. As long as the listener either also believes that Einstein invented the atomic bomb, or knows that the speaker's belief about Einstein is false, the identification will succeed. Both will be talking about Einstein.

This shows that a description need not be true in order to successfully pick out(identify) an individual.