True, but p2 sets out a propositional attitude. Does it not?

If one believes that there is a tree in the yard, and we adhere to the conventional propositional attitude reporting practices, then we say S has an attitude/disposition towards the proposition "there is a tree in the yard" such that they believe it to be true.

We cannot do this with this example.

How is it invalid?

p1 Sometimes we believe that a broken clock is working
p2 We never believe that "a broken clock is working" is true
C Not all belief is equivalent to propositional attitude

This discussion is about conventional belief ascription practices, particularly regarding propositional attitude reports.

I'm claiming that we sometimes believe that a broken clock is working, but never do we ever believe that "a broken clock is working" is true.

Do you agree with what I'm claiming... as set out directly above?

That S believes the clock is broken was specified, by you. — Banno

That's not true.

You emphasized that a certain proposition had "to stay within the scope of S's belief". I'm asking how you determine what must be included or not within the scope of S's belief. Rules? Intuition? What S would assent to at the time?

"The clock is not broken" has to stay within the scope of S's belief. And it seems to me that you miss this. — Banno

How do you determine what would be included or not within the scope of S's belief at any given time?

Okay. No problem. I'm just attempting to understand the position you're defending.

How do you determine what would be included or not within the scope of S's belief at any given time?

There's an ambiguity about that, between the clock being broken and S believing it is broken. S's belief is about a clock, yes. But it's not, for S, a belief about a broken clock. As in, It's not true that "S believes that (the broken clock is not broken)"; but that, to get the scope right, "Of the clock, S believes (the clock is not broken) AND the clock is broken.

"The clock is not broken" has to stay within the scope of S's belief. And it seems to me that you miss this. — Banno

Okay.

Am I correct in saying that - according to the position you're working from and/or defending - the scope of S's belief is determined by what S would say at the time?

:blush:

Ah my friend...

I've misunderstood you. My apologies for doubting your integrity. Stellar reply. Thank you for that. I'm still processing, but I think I understand a bit better now. I'll do my best to fill in the blanks that I've left. I've always been bad for mistakenly assuming everyone else is already on the same page as I am. I've become aware of the fact that I've actually not addressed your replies as they deserve to be addressed.

Again... stellar reply. Admirable. :point:

Well... that tells me that we must misunderstand one another.

:worry:

Perhaps it best to find places of agreement.

S's belief is about a broken clock. Do you agree?

I've laid out several, and they've yet to have been given careful consideration. You've been drowning strawmen in the poison well instead. I've no idea what your intent is. I still like to believe that you're arguing in good faith, and I ought make my words as impeccable as I can.. That's worth saying. So, here goes...

The position you're arguing for/from arrives at either self-contradiction or incoherence. Neither is acceptable. You're all over the place. Earlier you claimed that the clock in S's belief was both... broken and not. Clocks cannot be both at the same time. We're talking about S's belief at time t1. The clock that S looked at is the clock in S's belief, and it was broken. There is no grey area here. None.

But, you want to invent a completely different clock - whole cloth. As if just because S does not believe the clock is broken, as if just because S does not know that the clock is broken, as if just because S does not know they were trusting what a broken clock said, as if just because S believed that that particular broken clock was working at that particular time....

Somehow - magically - there's now two clocks instead of one(according to you). The new one is not broken, because S believes it's working...

:yikes:

So much for the distinction between truth and belief. I was surprised to see that from you, but Janus, not so much.

Propositional attitude, psychological state usually expressed by a verb that may take a subordinate clause beginning with “that” as its complement. Verbs such as “believe,” “hope,” “fear,” “desire,” “intend,” and “know” all express propositional attitudes. — Janus

The above applies to speaking. According to the accounting practice under examination, S would not say "I believe that that broken clock is working", and thus would not - could not - believe that either. I'm claiming that S believed that a broken clock was working, but would not say so... until after they came to realize that the clock they looked at was broken.

So, if we're to give preference to S, what argument or reasoning would support giving preference to what S would say at time t1 instead of what they would say at time t2, after realizing that they had believed a broken clock was working?

S holds that, "The clock is functioning," not that, "The broken clock is functioning." "Broken" does not enter into their intentional act. They do not hold a belief regarding a broken clock; they hold a belief regarding a (working) clock. They just happen to be mistaken.

But I am probably not honing in on the exact difference that Banno and creativesoul are meting out. — Leontiskos

Well, the above reflects a large part of it. The differences are many but most all of them seem to be logical consequences of our respective positions regarding belief.

A question may help...

What does S's belief - at time t1 - consist of?

You all three seem to hold that S's belief - at time t1 - does not consist of a broken clock. Although Banno agrees with me that S's attitude at time t1 is towards a broken clock. You're now claiming that S does not hold a belief regarding a broken clock. Banno said much the same thing earlier. This seems to be a huge problem from my vantage point.

The particular clock that S looked at at time t1 was broken. That is true regardless of S's belief. Here, I think we all agree. On my view, if their belief was about the particular clock they looked at, and the particular clock they looked at was a broken one, then their belief was about a particular broken clock, and it does not matter if S realizes that it was broken or not.

Cool. Now we're getting somewhere useful. I'm afraid it will be much later in the evening before I can take the time needed to further explain other consequences/implications, but now we can at least begin to see the importance of timestamping S's belief.

According to all three of you, and I take that as current conventional practice, at time t1, S's belief was not about a broken clock. The clock in S's belief was not broken. I ask all of you to now imagine a later time, after S became aware that at time t1 the clock was broken.

Here, at time t2, S would readily admit that at time t1, they believed that a broken clock was working.

Gotta rest, my friend. Building some furniture tomorrow, lotsa millwork needs a good night's rest!

You claim that the clock in S's belief is both... broken and not. You first claimed that the clock in S's belief was not broken, then agreed entirely with me when I claimed it was.

Do you not see that?

"The broken clock" cannot refer to the clock in S's beliefs, because that clock is not broken. — Banno

The clock in S's beliefs is the one they looked at, and it is most certainly a broken one. On this... I'll not budge.
— creativesoul
Sure. I agree entirely. — Banno

This looks like a contradiction to me.

I think we just made a bit of progress.

Next time!

Cheers!!!

:smile:

"The broken clock" cannot refer to the clock in S's beliefs, because that clock is not broken. — Banno

This looks suspiciously like unnecessarily multiplying entities.

The clock in S's beliefs is the one they looked at, and it is most certainly a broken one. On this... I'll not budge.

Banno's law: the easiest way to critique some view is to begin by misunderstanding it. — Banno

Yeah! That 's it. I was close...

:wink:

I'll call it by name from this point forward when using it!

So, am I correct in thinking that you're claiming that S's attitude towards the broken clock at time t1 does not count as S believing that that particular broken clock was working?

My position here is neither difficult to understand nor somehow complex. I'm simply claiming that at time t1 S believed that a broken clock was working.

Why can't it be said that S had a propositional attitude towards the clock — Janus

Well, that's not the sort of thing we say when discussing propositional attitudes. Those are attitudes towards propositions. We don't talk about having 'propositional attitudes' towards other things... clocks notwithstanding. Propositional attitudes are towards propositions... by definition nonetheless.

So, to directly answer your question, it could be said, but it would amount to nonsense or misuse.

Call me old-fashioned, but I think it would be helpful if creativesoul provided a compass like, "Banno believes X. I believe Y. X contradicts Y." — Leontiskos

You take belief to be some sort of mental furnishing, while I take it to be some sort of stopgap imputation used in explanations of intentional acts. — Banno

The above is what Banno believes about the notion of belief I'm working from. I do not take belief to be some form of mental furnishing. All furnishings have a fairly precise spatiotemporal location. On my view, belief is not the sort of thing that has a spatiotemporal location. Banno's account of my position on belief contradicts my own position on belief.

It's been around a decade ago that Banno and I participated in a debate about whether or not truth was/is prior to language. He argued in the negative. I argued in the affirmative. We have since had another debate about whether or not all belief have propositional form.

Banno holds that belief is imputed/attributed to another creature as a means for explaining its behaviour. I do not disagree completely with that idea. We do just that and we do it quite often. It's just not an explanation for how belief emerges onto the world stage nor what belief consists of.

I am of the carefully considered opinion that some belief is prior to language. Hence, it only follows that language less belief cannot possibly be equivalent to a propositional attitude unless propositions can exist - somehow - prior to language in such a way that a language less creature could have an attitude towards one. Most defenders of the position he's arguing from deny the very idea that language less creatures have belief. He does not.

That just scratches the surface of the disagreement between Banno and myself. The differences between his position and my own are often tied to the respective notions of belief that we're working from.

The poisoning the well fallacy looms large here, my friend. I'm perfectly capable of making and defending my own position. I'm not going to spend the limited time I've available fending off strawmen.

You've been consistently misattributing belief to me throughout. I once saw you exclaim that the easiest way to win a disagreement with someone else(yourself at the time you said it) was to begin by misunderstanding it. Trust me when I tell you that you've misunderstood a few things - evidently.

I've asked you several times to explain the proposition that S had an attitude towards at time t1 such that they believed it to be true. We agreed that S's attitude - at time t1 - was towards a broken clock. Broken clocks are not propositions. So, either S's attitude towards the broken clock - at time t1`- was not a belief about the broken clock or not all belief is equivalent to a propositional attitude, because broken clocks are neither propositions nor attitudes.

Are you claiming that S's attitude towards the broken clock - at time t1 - was not that that particular clock was working?

I ask you to reread our exchange here.

So... they both share the exact same belief about your spatiotemporal location and do not?

:worry:

Not following your point at all. — Banno

May I suggest attending to what I've written?

If you go back a couple of pages, to the beginning of this discussion, you'll see that instead of addressing what I've written, you've addressed other things... consistently. I want to continue, but I need you to address the words I've written.

A believes that Banno is at x; B believes that Banno is at y; C believes that Banno is at z; and so on. Each has a different belief.

Not following your point at all. — Banno

According to the practice you're defending, all of them believe that you're not at w.

Earlier we agreed that S's attitude was towards the broken clock. Broken clocks are not propositions.
— creativesoul

Sure, the clock is not a proposition, nor an attitude. . But "The clock is broken" is a proposition, and to believe that the clock is broken is to adopt an attitude towards that proposition. — Banno

At time t1, S did not believe the clock was broken.

At time t1, S believed the clock was working. It was not. S believed a broken clock was working. What I'm asking you to do is show me how the accounting practice you're defending handles such a situation. We can - and do sometimes - believe that a broken clock is working. However, what I'm pointing towards is the fact that no one would say so at the time. After having been shown, they would readily admit that they had indeed once believed that a broken clock was working, despite never having an attitude towards the proposition "a broken clock is working" such that they believe it to be true.

I'm saying that this and other examples show the inherent inadequacy in the conventional understanding of belief as propositional attitude as well as the belief that approach.
— creativesoul
I still don't see how. — Banno

Hopefully the above helps?

:yikes:

There are other issues as well. Following the practice you've defended, five different people can believe that you are currently in five different places, but the practice in question will render them all as having the exact same belief about your spatiotemporal location. The earlier example you set out about my being rational could be used by me to show you.

Fair enough. I should've said some... not all.

:yikes:

...millions choose to believe Trump's lies over reality. — Wayfarer

In order to choose better, one must first know of better. For reasons that are far too numerous for me to get into here, I'm not at all certain that many of those supporters are even able to comprehend all the relevant facts that may influence their worldview... particularly about Trump and US government.

Okay. So, at time t1, where's the proposition that S has an attitude towards. Earlier we agreed that S's attitude was towards the broken clock. Broken clocks are not propositions.

I'm saying that this and other examples show the inherent inadequacy in the conventional understanding of belief as propositional attitude as well as the belief that approach.

I've a bit of time tonight, so...

I appreciate the kind words earlier, and I can only hope that you already know that I have quite a bit of respect and admiration for your participation in the forums throughout time. In addition, as you've said concerning my role in helping you, you've helped me in more ways than I can think of. Davidson, Searle, Kripke, and other respected academics have helped me via you.

I appreciate ya!

:wink:

Are you claiming that at time t1, S had an attitude towards your words now?

S has an attitude towards the broken clock. — Banno

That's what I arrive at.

So where's the proposition/statement that S has an attitude towards?

Do you see a problem with that? — Banno

You complained about ambiguity, then added some.

Are you claiming that at time t1, S had an attitude towards your words now?

Next time...

Cheers!

Beliefs are propositional attitudes, and as such can be put in the form: M believes that p for some proposition p and some believer M. — Banno

At time t1, S believes that a particular broken clock is working.

Show me.

Next time...

Cheers!

My only point about de re and de dicto would be that they too fail to take proper account of someone's belief at time t1, when - at that time - they believe that a particular broken clock is working. As before...

If at time t1 someone believes that a particular broken clock is working, they would not say so. — creativesoul