I've just noticed that I posted a reply to the wrong discussion-thread at this website. I posted a reply to a question in a different discussion-thread at this website, but I accidentally posted it to this discussion-thread.

The post that I'm referring to is the post by me on this page of this discussion-thread, that starts with the words:

…In other words : why am I in that body ?

...the question that I was answering.

My apologies for that. I didn't mean to post it to the wrong discussion-thread.

I invite any moderators to delete that posting, above on this page, from this discussion thread.

(But my post on a previous page of this discussion-thread was intended for this thread, and was an answer to the question asked by the original-poster to this thread.)

Michael Ossipoff

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…In other words : why am I in that body ?
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[…]

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…why am I attached to this brain, my brain, and not to another, another person's brain ?

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…because there isno you, other than the body that you are.
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…because you are your body. Your body is all that you are. There isn’t any “you” other than your body.
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Your question is a question only if you assume, without evidence, that you’re something other than your body.
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Difficult questions, paradoxes, etc. usually mean that the premises for the question are likely incorrect.
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Each of us is nothing other than a body, which we could also call a human or maybe a person or a being. When I say “person”, “being”, or “human”, that’s how I mean those words.
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Well, evidently there’s a human who is you. So, based on what I said above, it’s no surprise that you’re that human. That human is the only you.
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It wouldn’t make any sense at all for you to not be the person that you are, because you are defined by the person that you are. There’s no other you than that person.
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The only explanation that I found was that I was the only one who was able to think, and therefore to be, and that other people were just projection of my brain. But this way of thinking is called solipsism and though it is the most attractive and frighteningly indemonstrable and solid philosophical doctrine, it is also the one that makes me most afraid and whose veracity I cannot want...

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There’s a meaningful sense in which you aren’t the only person. For there to be you, there must be a species that you belong to, to which your parents and other ancestors belong. So, of course, in your life possibility-story, there must be the other members of your species.
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But your hypothetical life-experience possibility-story is entirely your life-experience possibility-story. You’re its Protagonist, and it is centered on, and about, you only.
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You’re primary to that story. As its Protagonist, you’re its essential component. A life-experience possibility-story isn’t one unless it has a Protagonist.
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I’ve been accused of “Solipsism” when saying that. “Solipsism” has various definitions, and, when I looked it up, some of them seemed to fit, and some didn’t. It doesn’t matter. Don’t let someone claim to discredit something just by applying a name to it.
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So, it can be fairly said that you’re the reason for your hypothetical life-experience possibility-story. …in the sense that you’re its essential component. It’s a life-experience story only because it has a Protagonist—you, in this instance.
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My explanation, above, for why you’re you instead of someone else didn’t explain why there’s a you at all. Why should there even be that physical world that produced that person?
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There infinitely many such stories, and yours is one with you as its Protagonist.
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Why are there those hypothetical possibility-stories? Each of those stories is a hypothetical system of inter-related, inter-referring hypotheticals, including hypothetical values for hypothetical quantities; hypothetical “physical laws” relating those hypothetical quantities, and hypothetical if-then statements of various kinds that refer to those other hypotheticals. These hypotheticals also include such abstract facts as mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts.
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Why are there these intricate systems of inter-related, inter-referring hypotheticals? How could there not be? No one’s saying that they have any “existence” or “reality” other than the meaning, reference and applicability of their component if-then facts, and other hypotheticals, in reference to eachother.
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Of course the if-then facts about those hypotheticals are true, in the context of the system of hypotheticals in which they refer to eachother. No one’s claiming that system is existent or real in any other context.
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So that’s why there are infinitely many hypothetical possibility-worlds, and infinitely-many hypothetical life-experience possibility-stories, set in those hypothetical possibility-worlds.
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…including your own hypothetical life-experience possibility-story.

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So will this problem remain eternally insoluble or do you have any other opinion that could move the debate forward ?

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I suggest that there’s a good explanation—the one stated above in this reply.
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You said, in reply to Rich:
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So, your sentence "you are an intelligence (not confined to the physical brain) that manifests the physical body" pleased me very much but in this case why does intelligence manifest the physical body in this way and not another ?

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Aye, there’s the rub.

Why indeed in that way instead of some other.
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That’s the problem with any unparsimonious metaphysics. And the more unparsimonious the metaphysics is, the more such “Why that way?” questions can and must be asked of it.

A metaphysics needn't be that questionable.
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I emphasize that the metaphysics that I described above makes no assumptions and posits no brute-facts.
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I realize that I answered the following question, at the beginning of this post, but let me answer it here too:
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So I am a brain, my brain (or my body), I can understand that but in this case, why am I that brain in particular ?

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Because there is no “you” other than that body that you are.
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For instance (you may not see the link but for me it is important), let's suppose that during the great race of life, another spermatozoid than the one that led to me today reached the ovum first, what would have happened ? Probably, I would have been physically different but would it always have been "me" ? Would I be "born" ? Would my conscience have emerged like today ?

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That happens in a different life-experience possibility-story—the life-experience story of that different person conceived as you described.
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Obviously this hypothetical life-experience possibility-story of yours isn’t that one.
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As I said, there are infinitely-many hypothetical life-experience possibility-stories.
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Michael Ossipoff

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…In other words : why am I in that body ?
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[…]

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…why am I attached to this brain, my brain, and not to another, another person's brain ?

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…because there is no you, other than the body that you are.
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…because you are your body. Your body is all that you are. There isn’t any “you” other than your body.
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Your question is a question only if you assume, without evidence, that you’re something other than your body.
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Difficult questions, paradoxes, etc. usually mean that the premises for the question are likely incorrect.
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Each of us is nothing other than a body, which we could also call a human or maybe a person or a being. When I say “person”, “being”, or “human”, that’s how I mean those words.
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Well, evidently there’s a human who is you. So, based on what I said above, it’s no surprise that you’re that human. That human is the only you.
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It wouldn’t make any sense at all for you to not be the person that you are, because you are defined by the person that you are. There’s no other you than that person.
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The only explanation that I found was that I was the only one who was able to think, and therefore to be, and that other people were just projection of my brain. But this way of thinking is called solipsism and though it is the most attractive and frighteningly indemonstrable and solid philosophical doctrine, it is also the one that makes me most afraid and whose veracity I cannot want...

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There’s a meaningful sense in which you aren’t the only person. For there to be you, there must be a species that you belong to, to which your parents and other ancestors belong. So, of course, in your life possibility-story, there must be the other members of your species.
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But your hypothetical life-experience possibility-story is entirely your life-experience possibility-story. You’re its Protagonist, and it is centered on, and about, you only.
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You’re primary to that story. As its Protagonist, you’re its essential component. A life-experience possibility-story isn’t one unless it has a Protagonist.
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I’ve been accused of “Solipsism” when saying that. “Solipsism” has various definitions, and, when I looked it up, some of them seemed to fit, and some didn’t. It doesn’t matter. Don’t let someone claim to discredit something just by applying a name to it.
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So, it can be fairly said that you’re the reason for your hypothetical life-experience possibility-story. …in the sense that you’re its essential component. It’s a life-experience story only because it has a Protagonist—you, in this instance.
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My explanation, above, for why you’re you instead of someone else didn’t explain why there’s a you at all. Why should there even be that physical world that produced that person?
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There infinitely many such stories, and there’s one with you as its Protagonist.
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Why are there those hypothetical possibility-stories? Each of those stories is a hypothetical system of inter-related, inter-referring hypotheticals, including hypothetical values for hypothetical quantities; hypothetical “physical laws” relating those hypothetical quantities, and hypothetical if-then statements of various kinds that refer to those other hypotheticals. These hypotheticals also include such abstract facts as mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts.
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Why are there these intricate systems of inter-related, inter-referring hypotheticals? How could there not be? No one’s saying that they have any “existence” or “reality” other than the meaning, reference and applicability of their component if-then facts, and other hypotheticals, in reference to eachother.
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Of course the if-then facts about those hypotheticals are true, in the context of the system of hypotheticals in which they refer to eachother. No one’s claiming that system is existent or real in any other context.
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So that’s why there are infinitely many hypothetical possibility-worlds, and infinitely-many hypothetical life-experience possibility-stories, set in those hypothetical possibility-worlds.
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…including your own hypothetical life-experience possibility-story.

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So will this problem remain eternally insoluble or do you have any other opinion that could move the debate forward ?

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I suggest that there’s a good explanation—the one stated above in this reply.
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You said, in reply to Rich:
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So, your sentence "you are an intelligence (not confined to the physical brain) that manifests the physical body" pleased me very much but in this case why does intelligence manifest the physical body in this way and not another ?

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Aye, there’s the rub.
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That’s the problem with any unparsimonious metaphysics. And the more unparsimonious the metaphysics is, the more such “Why” questions can and must be asked of it. That’s what “questionable” means.
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I emphasize that the metaphysics that I described above makes no assumptions and posits no brute-facts.
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I realize that I answered the following question, at the beginning of this post, but let me answer it here too:
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So I am a brain, my brain (or my body), I can understand that but in this case, why am I that brain in particular ?

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Because there is no “you” other than that body that you are.
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For instance (you may not see the link but for me it is important), let's suppose that during the great race of life, another spermatozoid than the one that led to me today reached the ovum first, what would have happened ? Probably, I would have been physically different but would it always have been "me" ? Would I be "born" ? Would my conscience have emerged like today ?

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That happens in a different life-experience possibility-story—the life-experience story of that different person conceived as you described.
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Obviously this hypothetical life-experience possibility-story of yours isn’t that one.
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As I said, there are infinitely-many hypothetical life-experience possibility-stories.
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Michael Ossipoff

Religions have a metaphysics. The metaphysics belonging to or adopted by the religion of Science-Worship is Physicalism.

As an alternative to Science-Worship's Physicalism, I refer you to Skepticism, the metaphysics that I propose in the discussion-thread "A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics", in the "Metaphysics and Epistemology" forum at this website

That isn't an off-topic plug for my post. It's relevant to the matter of an alternative to the world-view and metaphysics of Science-Worship, the religion that is the cause of your unhappiness.

In other words, when you drop the religion of Science-Worslhip, there's no need to believe in its metaphysics.

Michael Ossipoff

The term "Nihilism" has various meanings, but you seem to referring to purposeless and meaninglessness.

I agree with those who have been saying that your whole problem is your belief in the religion of Science-Worship.

The good news is that, if you let go of that religion, if you drop that religion, then your Nihilism problem evaporates.

You're talking about concepts, in this case nightmare bad-news concepts. So just drop the concepts.

With them, will go your issues of purpose and meaning. They're conceptual only.

What else is there besides concepts? Disregard them and find out. What else is there? Just the whole world of experience. It isn't something to describe, catagorize, or theorize, of course.

You mentioned a homeless man in the park who was talking to himself. But, even if it isn't out-loud, you've been talking to yourself too much.

Eckhart Tolle has been criticized as a Neo-Advaitist. I don't know about that, but undeniably, Tolle has had a lot useful and helpful to say about talking-to-ourselves too much. He says that, when we do, we're no more sane than that man in the park.

He said, something like, "is it normal? Sure. And it's insane."

Without realizing it, we tend to always unnecessarily be describing and evaluating things and experiences--jabbering a running narrative in our own ear. An evaluated and described experience is of course no longer an experience, but rather some discussion about an experience that's long-gone--ended and killed by the conceptual evaluation, classification and description of it.

That's a major distinction.

I mention this because your conceptual narrative has been particularly harmful to your ability to have your life.

But, though conceptual narrative isn't a substitute for simple plain experience, of course people can whorthwhile-ly discuss purposes, meanings and values.

Where would you look, to read about worthwhile general discussion about that? I'd suggest googling "Vedanta's four Purusharthas", or "Hinduism's four Purusharthas", or just "Purusharthas".

Michael Ossipoff

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I'm not sure if you offered your definition of 'exists'. Maybe it is buried up above.

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I don’t have a metaphysical definition of it. When I use it with metaphysical meaning, I usually use it with quotes, and emphasize that I’m talking about an impression or an agreement, rather than a fact.
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My definite statements don’t use “exist” or “real”
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But, when I do use “real” or “existent”, I use them with the same meaning. I feel that anything that’s real and existent in the context of our lives is as real or existent as we could ask for, so I agree about such things being real and existent, though I don’t consider those words to really mean anything in metaphysics.
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“The far side of the Moon is definitely part of your life-experience possibility-story. The Soviets photographed in in 1959, if I remember correctly.” — Michael Ossipoff
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So let's pick something the Soviets can't measure for me. How about really distant planets (say 30 billion light years away). I can make a case for their existence, and I can make a case for their nonexistence. I can drive both arguments to apparent inconsistency, mostly by not having a stable definition of existence. Point is, all the models of the universe that work imply their existence, but such planets cannot have relevance to me personally.

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NPR news and tv have no relevance to me, but I don’t call them nonexistent.
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As I described, above, about what I agree about “exist”, I’d say that almost surely planets exist 30 billion lightyears away, because, as you said, physical science predicts them.
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“Yes, Physicalism can refer to a position in the philosophy of mind, but it's also fully recognized as a metaphysical position.”—Michael Ossipoff
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The definition [of Physicalism] by google says "the real world consists simply of the physical world". The word 'simply' is the mind part, asserting lack of a second mental substance.

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Ok, of course, now that you mention it, the metaphysical definition of Physicalism, seems to imply the philosophy-of-mind definition. If I understand it correctly, I agree with philosophy-of-mind Physicalism (though I consider philosophy of mind to be pointless and unnecessary) But I don’t agree with metaphysical Physcalism, which believes in a big brute-fact.
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“ "Supervenes"? :) Western academic philosophers have exhibited a need to invent expanding terminologies, evidently to obfuscate, to justify continual publishing.”—Michael Ossipoff
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I am unaware of another word for it, but am open to suggestions if you have one.

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When I was in Junior High School (pre-secondary school, now called “Middle School”), I’d never heard of “Supervene”, but I didn’t perceive any “Hard Problem of Consciousness”, or any need for a philosophy of mind.
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We’re biological organisms. …animals, to be more specific. Animals have evolved—been designed--, by natural selection, to respond to their surroundings so as to maximize the probability of their survival, reproduction, and successful rearing of offspring. We can be regarded as purposeful devices.
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Other purposefully-responding devices include the other animals, and such things as mousetraps, refrigerator-lights, thermostats, etc.
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That was obvious to me in Junior High School. It didn’t even occur to me that there could be some “Hard Problem of Consciousness”, or a need for a philosophy-of-mind, even though I’d never heard the word “Supervenes”.
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Academic philosophers like or need to make things complicated, allegedly difficult, so that they’ll have something to write about.
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Of course we’re remarkable and amazing devices, and I certainly don’t mean to belittle us.
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None of the three assert a foundation for ontology. Materialism does I think, the view that nothing is more fundamental than, well, material. — noAxioms
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“That's metaphysial Physicalism too. (...as opposed to philosophy-of-mind Physicalism)”—Michael Ossipoff
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I thought that was the difference between materialism and physicalism

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As I was saying, what I’ve understood about metaphysical Physicalism, vs Materialism, is that Physicalism is just the modern extension and update of Materialism, to include something physical but not material, such as fields.

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…, which is whether material is fundamental or not. No, I don't think it is, especially since nobody has every actually found material. I keep reading articles stating that say rocks are 99.<something>% empty space. My reaction is always: Really? Somebody found some nonempty space??

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That sounds like a reasonable expression of what’s wrong with Physicalism/Materialism.
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Nevertheless, I am a physicalist in the sense that I think the stuff we see is real…

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I agree about calling it “real”, because it’s real in the context of our lives.
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and we're made of only it.

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I agree with that too. Everyone is a body, and nothing more.
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(But we’re still primary, in the sense that we’re the essential component of the hypothetical life-experience possibility-story that we’re in.)
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So I fit your definition of “Physicalist”, except that I don’t really regard “real” or “existent” as having meaning in metaphysics.
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But I call myself an Idealist, not a Physicalist, because I don’t believe that the physical world is primary, fundamental, objective, or independent. It’s merely the hypothetical setting for our hypothetical life-experience possibility-stories.
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By the way, regarding the word “conscious”, of course it isn’t obvious or clear where “consciousness” starts, in the hierarchy of life, from viruses up to humans. At what point can an organism be said to be conscious. Surely mice are. Insects too, right?
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Bacteria swim in accordance to what they seek or avoid.
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Viruses do purposefully-responsive actions, when they perceive a cell that is the kind that they can use, and drill into it.
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And, as I mentioned above, mousetraps, refrigerator-lights and thermostats are purposefully-responding devices too.
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How do we draw the line for consciousness?
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I suggest that the difficulty of drawing that line tells us that “conscious” isn’t really a useful or meaningful word.
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I suggest that all that can really be said for sure about that is that everything from humans down to mousetraps is purposefully-responsive.
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As for “conscious”, that’s purely a matter of opinion and individual labeling-choice. I consider it obvious that insects should be called conscious, but I don’t know if I’d apply that word to viruses.
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Maybe a good definition of a conscious being is “Something that a humane person wouldn’t want to harm, unless in self-defense, or to protect someone or something else.”
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I don’t squash insects when they enter my apartment. I put them out. If an ant is on the counter or table, I brush it onto the floor instead of squashing it. If any insect, including an ant, is drowning in water, I fish it out with tissue, and leave it on the tissue, to give it the opportunity to dry and recover.
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I do squash spiders, because, for one thing, each spider you squash means lots of insects that won’t die in a particularly unpleasant manner. …so it more than balances out. Also, of course some spiders dangerously bite us humans.
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But I don’t squash Fire-Ants, in spite of their great propensity to bite (sting, actually) us. And, in fact, I protest the extermination of them However I feel justified in squashing a fire-ant that has just bit me. In fact, if you have a dozen or two of them biting you, then there’s really no other practical way of avoiding continuing to get bit by them, other than by squash-rubbing them all off you with one swipe.
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I don’t have a feeling of doing harm, when we protect ourselves from viruses and bacteria, and so that would mean that I don’t feel them to be “conscious”, as I defined it above.
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But I emphasize that that’s just an arbitrary definition.
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Michael Ossipoff

Yesterday I let Banno say that it's "moot" whether his cycle of explanations give complete explanations to the elements of the cycle.

...and I merely pointed out that a moot explanation isn't an explanation.

That's true, but of course there's really nothing moot about it:

Yesterday, I told why Banno's cycle of explanations amounts to saying:

"A, because A."

Forgive me, but that sounds brute. :)

In fact, it's pretty much what "brute" means.

Michael Ossipoff

I'd said:

That's my best effort to explain it to you. If I still haven't reached you, then I accept that it isn't possible. — Michael Ossipoff

...but I'm going to contradict myself now, on that matter, because maybe you are reachable, with the clearer, undeniable, demonstration which follows, after this paragraph (after which I'll answer the comments in your most recent post on this topic):

As before, I'll number the statements:

1. Suppose A, B, and C are in a cycle of explanations. Each one is explained and verified in terms of the one before it in that list.

2. An item can be explained and verified in either one of the following two ways:

2a) The item is self-evident or inevitable.

2b) The item is explained and verified in terms of something else which is, itself, completely explained (by either 2a or 2b).

3. Suppose that neither A, nor B, nor C is self evident, inevitable, or explained or verified by anything outside the cycle.

4. Therefore, A has no complete explanation or verification other than that which it might get from C (because, by statements #1 and #2, A is completely explained and verified if C is completely explained and verified, and because, by statement #3, A has no other source of complete explanation or verification.

So A is completely explained if and only if C is completely explained and verified. And of course, likewise, C is explained and verified only if B is explained and verified. And B is completely explained and verified only if A is completely explained and verified.

From the above, then, A is completely explained if and only if A is completely explained and verified.

Saying that A is completely explained and verified only if A is completely explained and verified doesn't constitute a meaningful or reliable explanation and verification of A.

Even if you say that A could (somehow) be explained and verified in that manner (A is completely explained and verified if A is completely explained and verified, you wouldn't have anything like a reliable explanation and verification.

How do I know you're not a liar? Because i say I'm not.

What's the explanation for how or why that machine works? It works because it does.

That example brings out the fact that, even if you could say that A might be, completely explained and verified, from the statement that A is completely explained and verified if it is--the fact is, that A still might not be true. Or if we're talking about explanations, A might not be explained.

And that's if we generously let you say that A even might be true, when none of A, B, or C have any explanation or verification other than cyclically from eachother.

So even if we allow you the most generous latitude and benefit of the doubt, item A might not be true or explained.

I don't call that a useful or meaningful verification or explanation. It isn't any explanation or verification at all. A maybe complete explanation or verification isn't a complete explanation or verification at all.
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As I said at the outset:

Further, what sense could we make of asking if the cycle itself has an explanation? We could say that the cycle has no explanation, and hence that it is brute; or that since each element is explained, the cycle explains itself, and hence is not brute. — Banno


I explicitly recognised the two possibilities.
— Banno

If you said that, I missed it..

But, in any case, if you recognize both possibilities, then you're admitting that item A is only maybe explained or verified.

I suggest that maybe being explained or verified, isn't worth anything, isn't any explanation or verification at all.

It is a moot point,

A moot explanation or verification isn't any explanation or verification.

Michael Ossipoff

"Well, Ockham's Principle of Parsimony is pretty-much universally-accepted as a standard for merit". — Michael Ossipoff


Let's just say it has no merit. It is just a brute fact. And that others like it equally has no merit. — Rich

Spoken like a fully true-believing Relativist.

"Any statement, any standard, is no better than any other, and is only a brute fact"

...presumably justifying and supporting a metaphysics that's built upon, consists of, a stack of assumptions and brute-facts.

All right, Rich, I give up. It's completely evident now that nothing that I say will reach you, and I hereby quit that effort.

(As I often say, at this point in a "discussion", when I subsequently don't answer something that Rich says, it doesn't mean that Rich has said something irrefutable. It means only that I've given up trying to communicate with Rich in this "discussion".)

Michael Ossipoff

It seems that Eliminative Ontic Structural Realism fills the bill, for a metaphysics combining Idealism and Realism.

"I like the Eliminative Ontic Structural apart, but I don't agree with the Realism part." — Michael Ossipoff

You'd have to define what the realism part means to you, that you don't like it. — noAxioms

Didn't I do that?

Realism isn't really a view, it just means you consider something to exist, but without a definition of existence, that can be taken a number of different ways.

If I understand you correctly, you're saying that, because "real" is undefined, and "real-ness" is a matter of opinion, then Realism isn't a factual claim...if the advocate of Realism acknowledges that "real" is just a matter of opinion.

Of course.

So I'm just saying that I don't agree with that opinion or impression expressed by Realism.



You're the center of your life-experience possibiity-story. You're its essential component. It's about your experiences.

"Could our possibility-world be there without you, could it have existence apart from you? Sure. But then we're talking about an entirely different story, and that doesn't have relevance to your own actual life-experience story. "


That is the gist of the new thread I'm working on, once I seem to have time to attend to it.

"So sure, the physical world without you has some sort of existence, as do all of the infinitely-many hypothetical possibilty-worlds and possibility-stories--but that doesn't matter because that isn't the story that you're living in. There are infinitely-many hypothetical possibility-stories, and only one of them is real for you. ...the one that you're in."

So I suggest that Realism is unrealistic."

Nonsense. You've just described existence in sort of idealistic terms. Inferred things exist, even to you.

Of course they can be said to exist in some way. But, it's also arguable that the possibility-world in which we actually live, which includes your solid desk and chair, exists in a sense that the infinitely-many other possibility-worlds don't.

That's all I was saying.

The far side of the moon makes no difference to my life, but that doesn't mean I think it doesn't exist.

The far side of the Moon is definitely part of your life-experience possibility-story. The Soviets photographed in in 1959, if I remember correctly.

(Not that it's relevant to this discussion, but the far side of the Moon is relevant to your life, if the Moon's tidal forces made possible the tide-pools, and if the tide-pools were necessary or helpful for the developement of life, as some have theorized. Of course an object like the Moon inevitably has a far-side (whether or not that far-side always consists of the same part of the Moon's surface.)

"By the way, I was pleased to find,in an Ontic Structural Realism article, that the article refers to Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) as Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), because that means that Skepticism is different from MUH, and so Tegmark didn't propose exactly the same metaphysics that I propose. "

Tegmark himself did a post or two on the old forum, and actually referenced my post where I noted that a determined structure need not be instantiated (computed say) for the elements within (us) to be functional. My tiny little claim to fame I guess. I think that statement is the gist of what you're saying with this if-then terminology of this thread.

Yes, that's a way of saying something that I'm saying.

"Do you advocate Physicalism?"--Michael Ossipoff

This was also asked of me, and it seems irrelevant to the thread. Physicalism isn't really any ontological stance. It is mostly a view that the mental supervenes on the physical

You're saying that Physicalism is only a position in the philosophy of mind, not in metaphysics. That's contrary to what seems to be the consensus regarding what Physicalism means.

Yes, Physicalism can refer to a position in the philosophy of mind, but it's also fully recognized as a metaphysical position.

"Supervenes"? :) Western academic philosophers have exhibited a need to invent expanding terminologies, evidently to obfuscate, to justify continual publishing.

, and yes, I think that is the case. If the other way around

You're the body. The Eliminative Physicalists are right about that, and about the fact that the philosophy of mind is balderdash.

The first error of the philosophy of mind is the fact that there's even a philosophy of mind at all.

Each person is the body, and that's it. Supposing there is or might be a separate metaphysical substance called "Mind" is the basis of philosophy of mind, and is--as I said--philosophy of mind's first error. In other words, philosophy of mind is, itself, an error.

...an error that leads to the nonsensical "Hard Problem of Consciousness", which is a problem only to some Physicalists (by whatever name) and Dualists.

If the other way around, it is idealism of sorts

Call it what you want, but I advocate an Idealism, the metaphysics that I call Skepticalism , and I don't doubt that the each of is nothing other than a body. (...recognizing, of course, that the body is a system, a device, if you like, rather than just an ordinary object.)

None of the three assert a foundation for ontology. Materialism does I think, the view that nothing is more fundamental than, well, material.

That's metaphysial Physicalism too. (...as opposed to philosophy-of-mind Physicalism)

If you don't want to say whether or not you subscribe to that view, then I respect your right to your privacy and your personal secrets.

The only difference between metaphysical Physicalism (as opposed to philosophy-of-mind Physicalism) and Materialism is that the word "Physicalism" acknowledges that the physical includes such a thing as a field, which isn't pieces of matter.

So, in its metaphysical meaning (its only meaning that I recognize) "Physicalism" is just a modern extension and update of Materialism.

I'll say that I must admit that I'm probably what you'd call a "philosophy-of-mind Physicalist".

Henceforth, when I say "Physicalism", I'm referring to metaphysical Physicalism, because I feel that the philosophy-of-mind, itself, is an error.

Though I'm not a Physicalist there are matters on which I agree with Physicalists.

Michael Ossipoff

Now, if A is brute, self-evident, inevitable, or explained by something outside the cycle that is brute, inevitable, self-evident or completely-explained, then yes, A is completely-explained, and that makes B and C completely-explained too. — Michael Ossipoff

I should have said: "...then yes, A is completely explained or brute, and that makes B and C completely explained too."

Michael Ossipoff

"...from outside the cycle.".. — Michael Ossipoff


That bit is no more than an expression of your own aesthetic. But let's leave that as moot. — Banno

Incorrect. lt isn't an aesthetic question.

I slightly mis-spoke when I said that your {A,B,C} cycle of explanations amounts to saying that A is explained because A is explained.

Actually (as I've already admitted), every element of your explanation-cycle is explained...partially.

If you explain A in terms of B, but you can't explain B, then I call that a partial, not complete,. explanation of jA.

So let me re-word my statement:

Your claim for A being completely-explained depends on B being completely explained, by B is explained by C, which is completely explained by C being explained by A, which is completely-explained.

Therefore, given your {A,B,C} cycle of explanations: Saying that A, B, & C are completely explained amounts to slaying that A is completely explained because A is completely explained.

Do you see why that's circular reasoning? And why it isn't a useful conclusion?

What if A isn't completely-explained? Then A isn't completely explained.

Do you see that that's possible?

Now, if A is brute, self-evident, inevitable, or explained by something outside the cycle that is brute, inevitable, self-evident or completely-explained, then yes, A is completely-explained, and that makes B and C completely-explained too.

If not, if no member of the cycle is completely-explained as described in the above paragraph, then the above way of saying that A, B, and C are completely explained aren't true.

That's my best effort to explain it to you. If I still haven't reached you, then I accept that it isn't possible..

As discussed in another recent discussion-thread, people don't readily change their beliefs, and it's often or usually futile to get people to reconsider their beliefs.

Michael Ossipoff

Well, academics have a saying: "Publish or Perish". So maybe, for that reason, it's necessary for academic philosophers to perpetually proliferate philosophies, elaborate new terminology, etc.

Sorry, but all this invoking of someone else's long-time-acquired skills just doesn't count as an argument, an answer or a justification for a metaphysics. ...or something with any relevance to the comparison of two metaphysicses.

Merit is subjective as is any idea put forth — Rich

Well, Ockham's Principle of Parsimony is pretty-much universally-accepted as a standard for merit.

Say that there are two metaphysicss. One of them makes no assumptions, and posits no brute-facts.

The other one largely consists of assumptions and brute-facts.

Metaphysicses can't be proven, and so your subjective relativism can try to claim that one is as good as the other, even though one of them is assumption-ridden.

I don't expect to convince you about that merit-difference. I'm just pointing this out for the record, for anyone else who encounters this discussion.

As pointed out in another recent discussion-thread, people have their own reasons for believing as they do, and often or usually it's entirely futile to expect to get through to them regarding the merits of their beliefs.

Michael Ossipoff

It hadn't occurred to me, but I guess those hypothetical values could be spoken of as facts about hypothetical values, and the hypothetical relations between them could likewise be spoken of as hypothetical facts. — Michael Ossipoff

Well, for it all to be facts, it would be a matter of speaking of the quantities, the values, as facts. The matter of what they're the quantities or values of or for could be spoken of as merely those facts' names or labels.

Then it could be spoken of as just hypothetical facts about other hypothetical facts.

I've been speaking of a system of inter-related and inter-referring hypotheticals. Maybe I could subsitute "hypothetical facts" for "hypotheticals".

But I don't know that wording-differences like that are important. I don't think the viability of Skepticism depends on it.

Michael Ossipoff

I agree. I just thought that your ontology was limited to facts but now it seems that it also contains other existent objects. — litewave

No, I'd been speaking about hypothetical values for hypothetical quantities, and hypothetical relations (physical laws) between those quantities..

It hadn't occurred to me, but I guess those hypothetical values could be spoken of as facts about hypothetical values, and the hypothetical relations between them could likewise be spoken of as hypothetical facts.

I've been speaking of a system of inter-related and inter-referring hypotheticals. Maybe I could subsitute "hypothetical facts" for "hypotheticals".

Even if so, it's just a matter of wordings.

Michael Ossipoff

I have found that interesting metaphysics is a combination of knowledge, personal observations, pattern recognition (finding similarities within differences and differences within similarities), as well as excellent creative intuition. Most philosophers I've studied spent a good part of their life honing these skills each in their own way. It takes much time and patience to begin to develop a completely new way of looking at nature which moves toward a deeper understanding. I really appreciate new ways of looking at life. — Rich

That's all very nice, but I was just talking about merit.

No doubt there's much creative drama involved, etc. I guess I never doubted that.

But the fact remains that your metaphysics depends on assumptions and brute-facts.

Alright, I accept your answer that I quoted above is your best answer to that statement. Discussion concluded.

Forgive me for emphasizing merit, instead of resorting to invoking the "creative intuition" and "deeper understanding" of someone else..

Invocation of authority is a familiar Internet substitute for answering comments, criticisms or questions regarding your statements.

I've encountered that at another philosophy forum, but, not here, until now.

Anyway, invocation of authority makes little sense, because academics and authors don't even agree.

One person expressed the idea you spoke of, in one of the interviews on Kuhn's "Closer to Truth", but it's not often heard.

Michael Ossipoff

Alright, I used the word "nature" when I said "laws of nature".

"Laws of nature" refers to physical laws.

The laws of physics are hypothetical relations (usually expressed by mathematical formulas or other mathematics statements) among hypothetical quantities called "physical quantities".

So your question was a fair one, and you don't have to define "nature", because I used that term in the passage that you quoted.

So your question can be reworded as:

"Can you tell me what kind of things aren't part of the physical laws?"

Sure. Mathematical theorems aren't part of the laws of physics. Abstract logical facts and statements, such as logical syllogisms aren't part of the laws of physics.

If-then facts about the hypothetical consequences of the laws of physics and certain hlypothetical values of the quantities that they're about, aren't part of the laws of physics either.

The physical laws are part of a system of inter-related and inter-referring hypotheticals.

Michael Ossipoff

Can you tell what kind of things aren't part of laws of nature? — kris22

Maybe, if you can tell me what "nature" is.

Michael Ossipoff

"The hypothetical if-then statements do have content. They're about relations among other hypotheticals, as I described above." — Michael Ossipoff


But if there are relations between objects then there must also be the objects. — litewave

Of course. Such as the hypotheticals that I referred to.

Are you claiming that there can't be hypothetical facts about hypotheticals and their relations?

So it seems to me that the objects that constitute the content of facts are ontologically just as real as the facts.

Fine, but that doesn't mean that there can't be hypothetical facts about hypotheticals, or that (to say it in another wording) hypotheticals can't be what facts refer to.

Do you advocate Physicalism?

Michael Ossipoff.

Inconsistent facts can be ignored as soon as their inconsistency is pointed out. Do they "exist"? Certainly importantly. Not in a way that makes them useful or relevant. — Michael Ossipoff — litewave

I meant to write, "Certanly not importantly..."

Sure, propositions known to be inconsistent are absurdly un-useful, so a conventional definition that they don't "exist" seems fair. But, because such propositions don't matter, then the issue of their existence of nonexistence doesn't seem to matter.

Michael Ossipoff

Certainly many metaphysicses can be, and are, proposed. ...most of which (such as the one you describe) need various assumptions and brute-facts.

Michael Ossipoff

"So sure, the facts exist, as facts." — Michael Ossipoff

And facts are related to other objects... — litewave

Yes, and those "objects" (more specifically, certain hypothetical quantities that can be described as object-propertie) are among the hypotheticals that I was referring to.

, at least, obviously, to those objects that constitute the content of the facts.

Yes, the hypothetical if-then facts are about those hypothetical "objects", and, specifically, about the hypothetical quantities that "are" their mass, positions, motions, etc., and the hypothetical "physical-law" relations among those facts.

You may take an arbitrary fact, for example an if-then fact such as "If I jump of out window I will fall", but would this fact have any meaning without objects like "I", "window", or (temporal) objects/processes like "jumping" and "falling"? It seems that if such a fact "exists" then those objects should "exist" too, or else the fact would have no content and thus no "truth" or "existence" either.

The hypothetical if-then statements do have content. They're about relations among other hypotheticals, as I described above.

I emphasize that a fact needn't be about anything other than relations among hypothetical things.

Referring to other possible metaphysicses, you write:

So I would say that facts (or if-then facts) are not the only objects that exist; that there are also other existent objects, and facts (true propositions) are just a particular kind of existent objects. The most general ontology I can think of contains all consistently defined objects.

Of course you can propose such metaphysicses, such as Physicalism. No metaphysics can be proved, and there are probably many that can't be disproved.

Do you subscribe to Physicalism?

" I suppose it could be argued that even plainly false statements and propositions exist as false statements and propositions. I mean, are there false statements and propositions? Sure". — Michael Ossipoff


A proposition may be false in some context (possible world) and true in another. I see a proposition as a kind of property, so if a proposition is false in some context it just means that the proposition is not instantiated in that context (is not a property of that context). The proposition itself may exist but is not instantiated in that context. A proposition that is false in every context is inconsistent. Such a proposition does not even exist as a false proposition because it is nothing. (a proposition should not be confused with statements in the sense of utterances or ink marks on paper though)

[/quote]

That's a special definition of "exist". As I said, people can and do define "exist" how they want to.

Yes, "exist" could be defined so that only consistent propositions "exist"., and that's one possible definition for "exist".

Certainly only the consistent propositions or consistent facts relating hypotheticals are important or relevant to us.

Inconsistent facts can be ignored as soon as their inconsistency is pointed out. Do they "exist"? Certainly importantly. Not in a way that makes them useful or relevant.

So your definition is reasonable in a practical way.

Michael Ossipoff

"And, within a system of inter-related hypothetical if-then facts or statements, those hypotheticals have their validity in their reference and relation to eacother....and don't need any other validity or measure of their existence." — Michael Ossipoff

Yes, but not all contexts contain if-then relations, as you put it. Most do not. Just so happens that ours does. — noAxioms

Maybe, but ours is of special interest to us.

" I don't regard God as an element of metaphysics, subject to the issue of existence, or issues of proof or argument. Not a metaphysical topic. Many, including some philosophers, have expressed the impression of a Principle of Good. "

Applying metaphysical tools helps clarify such things

But I was referring to a principle above metaphysics, Not an assertion, not subject to proof or disproof. An impression. People often express gratitude for how good what is, is.

, but no proof is to be had.

Agreed. ...neither regarding that, nor even regarding any metaphysics either.

.

Planning a post soon that attempts to tie realism with idealism, despite their seemingly mutual contradiction. — noAxioms

[...]

I think I will post it under advocatus diaboli, since it is not really a view I hold, but one I feel needs to be explored. I did a similar thing with presentism once.

It seems that Eliminative Ontic Structural Realism fills the bill, for a metaphysics combining Idealism and Realism.

I like the Eliminative Ontic Structural apart, but I don't agree with the Realism part.

You're the center of your life-experience possibiity-story. You're its essential component. It's about your experiences.

Could our possibility-world be there without you, could it have existence apart from you? Sure. But then we're talking about an entirely different story, and that doesn't have relevance to your own actual life-experience story.

So sure, the physical world without you has some sort of existence, as do all of the infinitely-many hypothetical possibilty-worlds and possibility-stories--but that doesn't matter because that isn't the story that you're living in. There are infinitely-many hypothetical possibility-stories, and only one of them is real for you. ...the one that you're in.

So I suggest that Realism is unrealistic.

By the way, I was pleased to find,in an Ontic Structural Realism article, that the article refers to Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) as Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), because that means that Skepticism is different from MUH, and so Tegmark didn't propose exactly the same metaphysics that I propose.


Had you asked this question of me, I'd say facts exist in the same way anything exists: within some context. Are there no objective facts then? Not even the paradoxical "There are no objective facts"? This is a good way to destroy my definition of existence requiring a context. If no-context is a valid context, then there is objective existence. But the fact must be demonstrable without any empirical evidence at all. — noAxioms

I'd said:

I might have already made this comment in reply to that passage, where quoted in one of the subsequent replies, but:yes, I'd say that facts exist (only) in some referential relational context, among some system of other such hypotheticals.

About the statement or argued-conceivable fact "There are no facts other than the fact that there are no other facts.", I'm just saying that that couldn't have been so, because systems of interrelated hypotheticals are self-contained, and so is their meanng, applicability and "existence" (in relation and reference to eachother).

Michael Ossipoff

"2. The words "Exist" and "Real" don't have agreed-upon metaphysical definitions." — Michael Ossipoff

Agree on this, but one can supply a definition. I seem to be settling on existence being a relation between some thing and some context. — noAxioms

And, within a system of inter-related hypothetical if-then facts or statements, those hypotheticals have their validity in their reference and relation to eacother....and don't need any other validity or measure of their existence.

This chair exists in the world to which my phenomenal experience is confined. The world is the context. The velocity of my car exists only in the context of some reference frame (the road presumably). Twelve is even because there exists in the context of integers some number which can be doubled to get twelve. But six doesn't have existence without that context. Platonism would disagree, working off a different definition.

It sounds reasonable and right to say that existence needs (only) a relational, referential context.

The square-root of two has its meaning, relevance, and "existence" in relation to a larger system of relations of mutual reference among such things.

"Given those facts, you obviously can't tell us for sure what exists and what doesn't. "

You can if you have a mutual agreed upon definition. The intuitive definition of existence is more of a context-free property, which falls apart when you try to make sense of things like the universe or a god.

Yes, though we can speak of facts' existence without mentioning context, they only meaningfully have meaning and "existence" in relation to some system of such things.

I don't regard God as an element of metaphysics, subject to the issue of existence, or issues of proof or argument. Not a metaphysical topic. Many, including some philosophers, have expressed the impression of a Principle of Good.








"You seem to take "physical" and "existent" as meaning the same thing. You're probably a Physicalist. Physicalists are maybe unique in their assertion of the proved certainty of their metaphysics. "--Michael Ossipoff

Yea, I threw away 'physicalist' long ago because of this. My 'realist' description is also slowly eroding. Planning a post soon that attempts to tie realism with idealism, despite their seemingly mutual contradiction.

Will be curious to hear it.


"You said that there are certain facts. Isn't it the same as saying that there exist certain facts?" — litewave

Had you asked this question of me, I'd say facts exist in the same way anything exists: within some context. Are there no objective facts then? Not even the paradoxical "There are no objective facts"? This is a good way to destroy my definition of existence requiring a context. If no-context is a valid context, then there is objective existence. But the fact must be demonstrable without any empirical evidence at all.

--noAxioms

I might have already made this comment in reply to that passage, where quoted in one of the subsequent replies, but:yes, I'd say that facts exist (only) in some referential relational context, among some system of other such hypotheticals.

In the statement, "There are no facts other than the one fact that there are no other facts." that use of "There are no..." wouldn't make sense and couldn't have any authority. because, hypothetical if-then facts don' t need to "be", other than in relation to a system of other hypotheticals. They couldn't not have that relational "existence" as part of such a system.

Michael Ossipoff

Every object, including facts, exists in relations to all other objects, even in objective reality. For example, a fact exists in relations to the objects it explicitely refers to: the fact that 1+1=2 exists in relations to number 1 and number 2. Or you can always define a collection of which this fact is a part — litewave

Yes, that's why I was saying that there couldn't have not been systems of inter-related hypothetical if-then facts: Their existence is in relation and reference to eachother, and there's no need to even consider whether they exist in any other context than that of their relation and reference to eachother.

Their reference and relation to eachother is their "existence", and it's inevitable, and couldn't have not been.

So the hypothetical possibility stories and worlds, such as ours, were inevitable and couldn't have not "been".

Michael Ossipoff

But yes, as you suggested, by the default meaning of "Exist", without qualification, context, or specific definition, a person would have to admit that pretty much anything that can be mentioned exists — Michael Ossipoff

Well,at least all facts, statements and propositions, and anything that's a possibility in some hypothetical possibility-world.. (Or an impossibility in an impossibility-world?)

Michael Ossipoff

"1. Metaphysics is about what is. There is a wide diversity of metaphysicses, and no proof of which of them is right.

2. The words "Exist" and "Real" don't have agreed-upon metaphysical definitions". — Michael Ossipoff


You said that there are certain facts. Isn't it the same as saying that there exist certain facts? — litewave

That's true. I usually uncomfortably, awkwardly say that the hypothetical if-then statements or facts "are there" (with the quotes)..

So sure, the facts exist, as facts.

But some Advaitists (mostly Western "Neo-Advaitists") say that the physical world is illusory, not really existent; and they can say that because they mean something different when (at least in that instance) they use "exist".

(As I've mentioned elsewhere, Sankara, the recognized Advaita authority, didn't say that the physical world doesn't exist; and I don't say that either, because it exists in the context of our lives.)

I suppose it could be argued that even plainly false statements and propositions exist as false statements and propositions. I mean, are there false statements and propositions? Sure.

It seems to me that it's a matter of context.

But yes, as you suggested, by the default meaning of "Exist", without qualification, context, or specific definition, a person would have to admit that pretty much anything that can be mentioned exists.

Michael Ossipoff

"I've shown why, given that statements #1 through #6 are true, items A, B, and C could be completely explained" — Michael Ossipoff


Indeed; they could be completely explained by a cycle. — Banno

...with a little bit of help from something else, such as one of the cycle-elements being inevitable or self-evident. ...or one of the cycle-elements being explained by something outside the cycle.

The mere fact of a cycle of explanations doesn't mean a cycle of complete explanation.

If some element of that cycle is self-evident, inevitable, or else completely explained from outside the cycle, then yes, everything in the cycle could be completely explained, and the cycle of explanations could be part of why that is.

I must have been tired last night, because I said only that something is completely explained if it's explained in terms of something that's completely explained. That isn't enough to say. It's also necessary to name a few other ways something can be completely explained:

1. Something is completely explained if it's explained in terms of something that's completely explained.

2. ...or if it's self-evident or inevitable

3. ...or if it's explained in terms of something brute.

4. ...or if it's explained by an infinite sequence of explanations.

But, without any of these source of complete explanation, a cycle of explanation isn't enough, because element A's explanation in that cycle ultimately comes back to depending on A being qualified to completely explain the next element of the cycle. How can it be, if it needs that cycle in order to have a complete explanation from something that wouldn't have an explanation if A weren't explained?

Without any of the helps that I mentioned, the cycle, as far as item A is concerned, is just a statement that A is explained if A is already explained.

Of course, if it's an infinite chain of explanations, then physicists, as they probe the physical world more and more deeply, will keep finding things that are consistent with our being here, and with their previous observations.

Michael Ossipoff

Banno--

The point remains that circular reasoning is valid. It is rejected usually for aesthetic purposes.

No. Circular reasoning can, and often does, lead to false conclusions.

Recursion gives valid conclusions. Circularity is different from recursion. Circularity can lead to false conclusions.

Again, suppose each and every item in a cycle of explanation has a complete explanation within the cycle.

Then that would be different. But you've been claiming something else, You've been claiming that each item in the cycle is completely explained if merely each item in the cycle has an explanation in terms of the next item in the cycle.

Your original claim didn't pre-suppose that all the items in the cycle are completely explained. That they're all completely explained is the conclusion that you reached from the statement that each item of the cycle has an explanation in terms of the next item in the cycle.

...and I'm saying that that conclusion (that all the items are completely explained) doesn'tt follow from your premise (that each item in the cycle has an explanation in terms of the next item in the cycle).

I know that I can convince you of this.
.
1. Say A is explained by B, and B is explained by C, and C is explained by A.
.
2. Therefore A, B, and C are explained.
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3. A is completely explained by B if A is explained by B and B is completely explained.
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4.Otherwise A is merely partly explained.
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5. A, B, and C are either completely or partly explained.
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6. From #1 and #3, we can say that A is completely explained by B if B is completely explained. B is completely explained by C if C is completely explained. C is completely explained by A if A is completely explained.
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7. A, B, and C being only partly, not completely, explained is entirely consistent with statements #1 through #6.
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7a. Suppose that none of {A,B,C} is completely explained. Statements #1 through #6 could still all be true, and the lack of complete explanation of A, B, and C would be consistent with that.
.
Or look at it particularly in terms of A:
.
Statement #6 says that A is completely explained if A is completely explained. It doesn’t say that A is completely explained.
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8. Item A could be only partially explained, and that would be consistent with statements #1 through #6.
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Statements #7 and #8 mean that, even if statements #1 through #6 are true, it’s possible for A, B, and C to be not completely explained, only partially explained.
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Given statements #1 throught #6, items A, B, and C could be not completely explained, in spite of statements #1 through #6 being true.
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I've shown why, given that statements #1 through #6 are true, items A, B, and C could be completely explained, or could be only partly explained (explained in terms of something that doesn't have a complete explanation).
.
Michael Ossipoff

But a complete explanation depends on having an explanation of the facts that are your explanation. — Michael Ossipoff


And again, each and every fact in a cycle of explanation can be explained, including those that form the explanations for other facts. — Banno

...and that cycle of explanation, when followed far enough, leads back to the conclusion that the first thing explained, which needs everything else to back up its explanation, it supposed to be the basis for those explanations Making it the basis of its own explanation..

It's called "circular reasoning".

Yes, everything in your cycle has an explanation. But not a complete explanation. An explanation is complete only if it, itself, has explanation, or doesn't need it.

A is explained by B is explained by C is explained by A.

Classic circular reasoning.

Michael Ossipoff

You seem above to imply that it is material equivalence - that if A explains B then B explains A.

Certainly not. Two things can't provide complete explanations for eachother. I gave that example with two things because I thought it was obvious that two things can't provide complete explanations of eachother.

In fact, of course neither can three things:

B gets its explanation from A, C gets its explanation from B, and A gets its explanation from C.

If a fact has an explanation, then another way of saying that would be to say that it's true without our accepting it as a brute-fact. So, if we talk about verification of truth, instead of explanation, will that make it more obvious?

Then it's like those 3 bank-robbers. Cyclically, they all verify eachother's truthfulness and honesty.

...and it means nothing.

Here it is with alleged facts instead of bank-robbers:

A says that B is true.B says that C is true. C says that A is true.

Does that mean that all of them are true?

Not unless something brute-true says that at least one of {A,B,C} is true, or an infinite sequence of verifications says so.

(...or my possibility #3, where the sequence of verifications leads to a set of facts that are inevitable)

Michael Ossipoff

I sounded a bit partisan in that most recent post, because I answered in terms of my proposed metaphysics. So let me say it more non-partisanly:

1. Metaphysics is about what is. There is a wide diversity of metaphysicses, and no proof of which of them is right.

2. The words "Exist" and "Real" don't have agreed-upon metaphysical definitions.

Given those facts, you obviously can't tell us for sure what exists and what doesn't.

You seem to take "physical" and "existent" as meaning the same thing. You're probably a Physicalist. Physicalists are maybe unique in their assertion of the proved certainty of their metaphysics.

I'm not an Advaitst, but many Advaitists say that the physical world is illusory. I mention that just to show that not everyone agrees that your chair and desk exist.

I emphasize that Sankara, considered Advaita's main authority, didn't say that the physical world doesn't exist. "Neo-Advaitists", mostly Western, tend to disagree with him, and with much of actual traditional Advaita.

As I said, I agree that your chair and desk exist, because the physical world exists in the context of our lives, and that's as much existence as we could ask for. But, when making a statement like that, I specify how I mean it.

Michael Ossipoff

Yes, scientists often over-apply science.

Your statement about physics is reasonable enough. But it doesn't answer the question of whether that author was right when he said that quantum-mechanics lays to rest the notion of an objective, independently-existent physical world.

His statement surprised me, because I didn't think that physics said anything about metaphysics. But there are ways in which quantum-mechanics differs from previous physics too. Anyway, it doesn't sound so unreasonable to say that science can say something about its own limitations.

Bottom-line: Neither you nor I are qualified in quantum-mechanics enough to evaluate the accuracy of that guy's statement. Was it just another instance of science being over-applied? Or was he right? It's his subject, not ours, and so we both don't know whether he was right.

But I will say that his rejection of an objective, independently-existing world is in agreement with my metaphysics, and that suggests to me that just maybe his statement was valid. But neither of us know about that for sure, one way or the other.

Of course you realize that you're in the minority if you reject Special Relativity. There's some consensus that General Relativity needs work. But wholesale rejection of it would be a minority position.

I'm not sure what you mean about time being a physical movement, and Einstein elevating it to an ontology. Time and space are properties of the hypothetical possibility-world, the setting of our life-experience possibility-stories. I thought that Einstein was only talking about the physics, with Relativity, and that he wasn't making metaphysical claims with it.

Einstein often used religious language, but Physicalists insist that he was only doing so as a figure of
speech. I don't know about that, one way or the other.

The metaphysics that you advocate has lots of assumptions and brute-facts.

As I've been saying, I don't believe that any metaphysics can be proved, but assumptions and brute-facts do not count in a metaphysics's favor.

Ultimately, you will have to come up with your own metaphysical view.

I have, and i call it "Skepticism". I've described in in the discussion-thread, "A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics." It's an Idealism. I admit that Michael Faraday, Frank Tippler, and Max Tegmark discussed its main basis before I did.

Michael Ossipoff

Circular implication is perfectly valid.

Ask yourself: Which thing in the ring of explanation is not explained? — Banno

Each one is explained...partially. But a complete explanation depends on having an explanation of the facts that are your explanation. Otherwise your explanation is only partial, not complete.

Pyramid schemes work, because it's easy to be deceived by them. . That's why I suggested trying the explanations in the opposite direction. If that doesn't work, that should make you question the matter.

Michael Ossipoff

I don't see that physics is taking a position. Physics is offering the Schrodinger's equation as a way of probabilistically predicting the position of the election and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Beyond this we enter the domain of metaphysics, as we should be. Understanding the nature of nature is the providence of philosophy not science.
[//quote]

That's what I thought. I thought that physics doesn't say anything about metaphysics. But that physicist author, someone with impressive credentials in quantum-mechanics, said otherwise. So I took that to mean that there was an exception. ...that there was an instance of physics saying something about metaphysics..

Well, maybe it isn't so implausible if we admit that science might sometimes be able to say something about is limitations.

Sure, scientists have a way of claiming mistakenly that science covers metaphysics, or that science has all the answers to everything. So I know that scientists sometimes overstep science's limitations, and apply it beyond its legitimate area of applicability.

So is his statement not true? Does quantum-mechanics not contradict the notion of an objective physical world that exists independently of us?

I don't claim to be able to answer that, but I just re-emphasize that that author was someone with impressive credentials in quantum-mechanics. I should find the book, name the author, and quote the passage, but it was a long time ago. Obviously a quote without the name of the author, or his exact words isn't very compelling.
— Rich

Metaphysics doesn't provide final answers

I've been saying that no metaphysics can be proved, and so the subject can only be speculative.

But metaphysicses can be compared by the standard of parsimony, and the need for a brute-fact.

So even if we can't say which metaphysics is true, we can compare their merit on the basis of parsimony, the need for assumptions, and the need for a brute-fact.

And, without saying for sure what's true, we can say, "There's no reason to believe that....". (referring to a claim made, or something posited, by a metaphysics)

So there's much of interest that can be said about metaphysicses, even if it can't be proved which one is true.

rather it continues to explore by positing questions and creating potential new ways of looking at things

No doubt about that.

Michael Ossipoff

You can explain A in terms of B, but that isn't a complete explanation of A unless you can explain B.
.
Each element of the cycle has the next element as is explanation and reason. Each is explained in terms of the next thing in the cycle, which is a complete explanation only if the next thing in the cycle is explained in terms of something. ...in this case,..by the next thing in the cycle. ...and so on.

So, eventually this sequential explanation comes back to the first thing that you wanted to explain: The things that it needs for explanation need for it to be already independently explained, in order for them to be any good for explaining anything.

So,any particular element is explained only because it is explained in terms ot things whose explanations need it to be explained.
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Try it in the other direction:] . "Obviously this first thing, #1, is explained--we already know the explanation-- and so that next thing, which is explained in terms of
#1, is completely explained. Likewise for the next thing, that needs the previous thing as an explanation....and so on."

Don't you see that the first thing in this chain doesn't have really any explanation? The first explanation-statement in this paragraph can't be made, because the first thing doesn't already have an explanation, to qualify it to explain something else.

The fact that your explanation-cycle doesn't work in the opposite direction should make you suspicious.

When you do it in the opposite direction, you're running a pyramid scheme. The elements are borrowing based on credit that depends on expecting someone else to borrow in order to lend to them. In that way, you can miss the fact that the money isn't there.

To make my bank-robbers example more realistic, make it 3 bank-robbers instead of 2, cyclically vouching for eachother's truthfulness. Meaningless without some outside voucher for at least one of them.

Michael Ossipoff

I'd said:

Existence is all over the place? By what particular definition? — Michael Ossipoff

You reply:

Not by definition.

Anything you say means something only if we both know the definitions of the words and phrases that you're using.

And the meaning of what you say can be different, depending on those definitions.

Or your statement can be true or false, depending on those definitions.

You said:

You exist, I exist, my coffee cup exists

Suppose that, as I claim, our physical world and everything in it consists only of a system of interrelated hypotheticals, if;then statements.

Does anything in that physical world really exist?

I agree with you in saying that those things exist, because they exist in the context of our lives.

I'm saying that they exist in a particular context. I'm saying what I mean by "exist", when I call something "existent"..

We don't have any agreement about saying that those things exist.

But, if "exist" means some kind of fundamental, unconditional objective existence, then it's another matter. Then you, I, your table and your chair don't exist anymore. Or at least there's no particular reason to believe that they exist.

The physical world that the Physicalist believes in doesn't exist, I claim. The physical world that he believes in is the Fundamental, primary existent, the Ground of All Being. ...independently, objectively uncoditionally existent..

I suggest that there's no reason to believe that there's any such thing as the physical world that the Physicalist believes in.

So, if you're using "exist" to refer to the existence that the Physicalist believes in for the physical world and its contents, then there's no reason to believe that our physical world exists, by that definition.

Michael Ossipoff

I'd said:

But wouldn't it be brute? Such a system cyclically implies itself, but why should any part of it be true. — Michael Ossipoff

You replied:

Each item in the cycle has an explanation. So no item in the cycle is brute, by the assumed definition of "brute".
[.quote]

Two bank-robbers are arrested coming out of a bank with the loot. They both deny their guilt. Each one points to the other and says, "I vouch for him. He's telling the truth."

How much does that count for?

The fact that each item in the cycle is explained in terms of the cycle just before it in the cycle means nothing if none of the items in the cycle have any support outside the cycle.

Maybe "brute" needs a more careful definition.

Yes, as you said, the whole cycle is brute, and therefore so is each of its elements, by any meaningful definition of "brute".

Michael Ossipoff

Is it the case that all disagreements come down to Metaphysical beliefs (and faith in those beliefs)? Is it possible to come to any agreement on any issue, when the root issue is Metaphysics? — anonymous66

It seems to me that metaphysics is unavoidably speculative. It seems to me that no metaphysics can be proved.

Couldn't any metaphysics be shored-up with enough ad-hoc assumptions, ("epicycles") to "answer" objections to it, and explain whatever someone asks for an explanation of?

Physicalism posits a brute-fact, but that doesn't prove that physicalism is wrong.

I suggest that, though we can't prove which metaphysics is correct, we can compare the metaphysicses by Ockham's Principle of Parsimony. Is there a metaphysics that doesn't make any assumptions, or posit a brute-fact? Sure, the one that I propose, and call "Skepticism".

Someone could call Skepticism an "unfalsifiable proposition". Sure it is.

When you defend Flat-Earth advocacy by more and more assumptions, to explain all the ways that observations contradict Flat-Earth, you're making it an unfalsifiable proposition.

But Skepticism is a different kind of unfalsifiable proposition, because it doesn't need any assumptions.

Of course Physicalism is an unfalsifiable proposition too, depending on a brute-fact.

Well, maybe Physicalism isn't unfalsifiable: There was a quantum-mechanics specialist, someone with high academic standing (I don't remember his name) who wrote a book in which he said that quantum-mechannics lays to rest the notion of an objectively-existent physical world.

That sounds like a very rare instance of physics establishing a conclusion about metaphysics.

Michael Ossipoff

There is a third possibility; a cycle of explanation in which each physical explanation is explained by some other physical explanation. — Banno

That cycle of explanations would be #4 in my list.

It's like #1, except cyclical instead of infinite.

But wouldn't it be brute? Such a system cyclically implies itself, but why should any part of it be true.

So #4 would seem to have more in common with #2, a brute-fact, than with #1, an infinite sequence of explanations.

You said something about this matter being a question that philosophers have considered.

That would be interesting, if philosophers have ruled out some of those physics possibilities, #1 through #4.

Have they?

Michael Ossipoff