What I meant to say, in summary was that:

Metaphysics doesn't need a brute-fact.

Physics might or might not lead to a brute-fact being found.

It seems to me that there are 3 possibilities for physics:

1. An infinite sequence of explanations, each of which has an explanation at a deeper, more fundamental level of physics laws and things.

From the experience reported by physicists, that seems the most likely state of affairs.

2. A physics brute-fact could be found at some point. An explanation (of the rest of physics), that doesn't, itself, have any explanation.

3. Maybe physics will find a set of physical laws and things that explain the rest of physics, but doesn't need an explanation because it's inevitable. Its inevitability would be its explanation, and so it wouldn't be a brute-fact..

Possibility #3 is the one that seems that it would be the most pleasing and neat.

Is #3 a possibillty?

Michael Ossipoff

Going back briefly to the beginning:

"His analysis is that there has to be some things for which there is no explanation that explain the things that do have explanations. Something must be brute." — Cuthbert

Certainly not. There's no reason to believe in a metaphysical brute-fact.

There's a metaphysics that doesn't posit a brute-fact. (I posted a discussion-thread about it).

Earlier I'd said that whether there's a brute fact depends on whether a fact can be called "brute" even if that fact is undeniable. Of course it can't: If a fact is undeniable, then it isn't unexplained, and, not needing and lacking an explanation, it isn't Brute.

I don't agree it's true to say that everything, to avoid bruteness, has to be explained in terms of something more fundamental.

For example, how about a system of abstract logical statements and facts, mathematical theorems, and the if-then relation among these and a system of if/then statements, including hypothetical statements stating hypothetical relations among hypothetical quantities.

"If certain quantities are related by the following formula, and if some of them have the following values, then, as a consequence of that, and of certain mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts, then..."

Those things don't claim any existence or reality other than in reference to eachother. Call them "real", or not; it doesn't matter. But they nevertheless can be true, in reference to eachother.

That system doesn't need any explanation in terms of anything else. But it's the basis of our physical world, a hypothetical possibility-world. There's no reason to believe that our physical world is other than that.

Infinitely-many other such systems describe other hypothetical possibility worlds too.

None of this requires a brute-fact.

It's probably true that physics will remain an open-ended discovery-process. But, in metaphysics, the hypothetical relational system I described doesn't need an explanation.

But is that sound? I'm not sure. Suppose there exist no things that lack an explanation, at least in principle. Then there would be an infinite regress of both things to be explained and of explanations.

The hypothetical relational system that I described doesn't need explanation in terms of anything else. It doesn't need existence or reality in terms of anything else, or in any context other than its own, the context of its elements' referential relations to eachother.

Suppose we accept that possibility. In that scenario, whenever we find an explanation we also find a new thing to be explained.

It can be expected that that's how it will remain in physics.

But not in metaphysics, as I described above.

I think we are tempted by the notion of brute facts because it opens up the possibility that in the future anything that can be explained will have been explained; and that anything that has not been explained is beyond explanation. It's a comforting thought, perhaps. But there's no reason to suppose that we will ever reach that happy state.

It probably won't and can't happen in physics.

And even if we did reach it, we would never know that we had reached it, because we could never be quite certain that the things we presume to be 'brute facts' are not, after all, explicable by something else.

Good point.

So perhaps the whole 'brute fact' idea is an illusion.

Yes, in metaphysics, and almost surely in physics too.

Michael Ossipoff

Does computation exist independent of human minds and culture? — Marchesk

Isn't computation a human activity (or an activity of manmade devices)?

But of course abstract logical facts, mathematical theorems, hypothetical relational-rules among hypotheticals, etc. don't depend on people, and needn't exist in any context other than their referential relation to eachother.

Of course, for a hypothetical story to be perceived by someone requires someone. ...a story-protagonist. ...as in the example of you, your life-experience story, and the possibility-world in which it is set.

...we could be living inside a simulation, etc.

Thanks for bringing up that claim.

Our life-experience possibility-stories, and the possibility-world in which they're set, "are there" as a hypothetical if/then relational system. Being already "there", in the sense of its elements' referential relation to eachother, it doesn't need to be created by a computer simulation.

Yes, maybe, in some world, programmers of some supercomputer could (by chance) simulate our world. But they wouldn't be creating it (for the reason given in the previous paragraph). All they'd be creating would be an opportunity for them to observe our world.

However, if the any physical system can in principle be simulated, does that say something deep about the world? Does math or qubits form the structure of what we experience?

Yes. Search Google for Max Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH)

Michael Ossipoff

If they want to define existence in terms of something else, then that something else cannot exist. — jorndoe

Maybe, but I don't try to define existence.

But it's rather trivial to exemplify, can't miss it, it's all over the place. ;)

Existence is all over the place? By what particular definition?

I agree that it's reasonable to speak of our physical world as real and existent, because it's real and existent in the context of our lives. But I only say it with respect to a particular context.

I've become a bit wary of (always) demanding definitions; doing so may also be susceptible to a regress anyway.

Definitions can be helpful for expressing what we mean when we say something.

Michael Ossipoff

I’d said:

Yes, it's a relative term, so it's something of a matter of opinion--the matter of where we draw the line to call a planet barbaric. I suggest that our planet qualifies with flying colors, because, routinely, so many people (not to mention other animals) are being wrongfully harmed. If that isn't barbarism, what is? — Michael Ossipoff

You wrote:

I don't think that that's enough to conclude that we live on a barbaric planet, rather than a planet which contains barbarism…

But it isn’t just some violent people here and there, or the occasional isolated Charlie Manson. Without my going into details or naming names, you know what I mean when I say that the barbarism and brutality are systemic, systematic, official, and routine on this planet, and a high percentage of the planet’s inhabitants are its victims.

The fact that only some (large) percentage of the population are its victims isn’t enough to make it not be a planetary attribute, something that negatively characterizes the planetary societal situation.

, as the barbaric aspects go hand in hand with the civilised aspects.

But doesn’t that make it worse, that it’s the civilization’s rulers who are routinely perpetrating the barbarism worldwide?

In my day to day life, I encounter people behaving in a more civilised manner than in a more barbaric manner. Throughout the day, if I look around, I observe people maintaining a certain level of respect towards each other, or towards dogs, cats, and birds.

Most people don’t act badly in their interactions with their nearby neighbors. They say that even Hitler was kind to his dog.

But when the barbarism is so systemic and systematic, mustn’t the social merit of a planet be judged by the plight of the large groups, the large numbers of people, who are the victims of the systematic barbarism perpetrated by the civilization on a worldwide scale?

A famous person once said, “What you do to the least of them, you do to me.”

I’d said

Well, just speaking for myself, I wouldn't want to bring, into a snake-pit social world like this, someone whom I care about (...and don't people start caring about their offspring even before they're born?).

And, in fact, in a world where people are fighting and dying over resources, and dying because they're doing without, I wouldn't want to add to the number of people in that fight. — Michael Ossipoff

That there's a risk of harm is not in itself a good reason not to do something

Of course. That’s why we’re here. Yes, that’s what I was telling the OP.

I just meant that I wouldn’t want to personally have a role as even part of the mechanism of putting someone in this particular world, even if such births are inevitable, or even right for some reason, anyway.

, so there'd have to be a greater reason. We both compared it to gambling, and we both accept that gambling can pay off. Many, many people live lives that they would affirm are worth living, and would also affirm that it is better to have lived and lost than never to have lived at all, to borrow a phrase.

All of that’s true, which is why my criticism of procreation doesn’t apply to people living in a better societal-world. I emphasized that I was talking about a planetary aberration, not a general conclusion about life itself.

I suggest that being someone about whom there could be a life possibility-story means being someone with some predisposition to life, wanting or needing life, in some way—even if, for whatever reason, that life has to be in this Land of the Lost that is our planet.

In fact, maybe in some instances, someone’s predisposition is for life in the Land of the Lost. I mean, we’re all here, aren’t we.

But that doesn’t mean that I’d want to be the reason why a loved-one of mine has to negotiate life in the Land of the Lost.

If someone needs life, even on this planet, they’ll be born, maybe here. I just don’t want to be part of how it happened. And, on an immediate personal level, I don’t want a loved-one of mine to suffer after being brought into this world by me.

Some things are, in a sense at least, more important than even a lack of vital resources in parts of the world. You only live once, and opportunities do not last indefinitely.

Opportunities here can be gone before we know what’s going on.

I am not encouraging you to have children - I don't want to have children myself - I'm just saying that you should have a good reason, and I think that it should be more of a personal reason than a reason which puts the world over and above one's own interests, since the world will keep on keeping on regardless of whether you do or do not have children, and either way, it would likely be miniscule and inconsequential in the grand scheme of things, if the grand scheme of things is what you care about.

Quite so. I don’t have any influence over the fact that births, including births here, are inevitable. I just don’t personally want to be even part of the agency by which someone is born in this world.

Michael Ossipoff

I believe in answering any objection that is made, to a proposal that I’ve posted, such as the proposal in my initial post to this discussion-thread.
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Here’s T Clark’s objection again:
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I’d said:
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There’s no evidence that our physical universe consists of more than inter-related if-then statements. — Michael Ossipoff

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T Clark’s objection:
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Here I am, sitting in my chair. My fan is on. It's almost time for dinner. The sun is a bit low in the West. The chair arms are brown-stained wood, ash I think. It's smooth. The varnish and stain on the right side, which gets more use, is fading in some spots.

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Please explain how this concrete expression of physical reality consists of interrelated if-then statements.

In my initial reply, I told how T’s facts could be said as if-then statements, from T, by intercom, to someone else in his household, that if they come into his room, then they’d find the facts that T describes.
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Then, in a subsequent reply, I told how these if-then statements can be said about T’s expected experience, if he makes the necessary observations.
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So I told how T’s facts could be said as if-then statements.
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But that wasn’t enough, or satisfactory to me, because of course the Protagonist of a life sometimes already knows such facts--having already made the observations, for example. In such cases, the facts aren’t conditional for T, and so, though my initial claim can be supported, it plainly isn’t the whole story, and T’s question wasn’t yet fully answered.
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What I should have said is that every event and thing in the physical world can be described in terms of if-then statements.
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I’ve said some of this in other discussion-threads:
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The laws of physics are hypothetical mathematical relations between hypothetical quantities.
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Maybe life requires, or is facilitated by constancy of those physical laws, and constancy or at least near-constancy of the physical constants referred to in those laws.
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There are “if-then” statements/facts that, if those hypothetical relations between “physical” quantities be so, and if certain of the hypothetical quantities have certain hypothetical values, then there are conclusions regarding the values of other hypothetical quantities.
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Such if-then facts are uncontroversial. They aren’t saying that there is anything. They’re just uncontroversially saying “If this and this, then that.”
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…all hypothetical. All matters of “if-then”.
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And those uncontroversial systems of if-then fact have conclusions describing every state-of-affairs in this physical world, which could be the setting for one big hypothetical if-then story.
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There’s no reason to believe otherwise. There’s no reason to believe that there’s other than that possibility-world, and the hypothetical if-then life-experience possibility-story that has our possibility-world as its setting.
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T Clark’s statements of his facts are his statements about some of those conclusions (called “results”) of those if-then facts regarding the conditions for those conclusions.
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I never meant to say that T can’t mention a state of affairs that’s the conclusion of many if-then statements about many hypothetical relations among the values of quantities, and hypothetical values of many of those quantities. …”if” conditions whose conclusions are the state-of-affairs facts that T stated.
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T wasn’t talking about all the physical laws and quantity-values that have his facts as their conclusions. He mentioned some results…logical conclusions of many if-then facts.
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And those conclusions are, of course, also part of hypothetical conditions which (along with the hypothetical physical laws) imply still other conclusions. (Dinner will soon be served. Sunset will be soon. …etc.)
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T Clark’s statements describe a point in his ongoing life-experience possibility-story.
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Such a story, and the possibility-world that is its setting, can be examined as closely as (feasibly) desired, by physicists. What they find will, of course, always be consistent with our being here, and with previously-concluded conclusion-facts. …because a possibility-story has to be self-consistent. Otherwise, contradicting itself, it would be an impossibility-story.
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Of course the observations that we humans make aren’t usually the detailed probing of matter that the physicists’ experiments are. But the physicists’ observations, told to us (after being thoroughly verified as mutually-consistent by the physicists) must be, and are, consistent with ours. And when we read of the physicists’ observations, then they become, indirectly, our observations.
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T’s facts seem very “concrete”, because he’s part of his life-experience possibility-story (…the essential part, in fact), and of the possibility-world in which that story is set. That life-experience possibility-story is about T, so obviously it’s the one that’s real for T.
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Other possibility-worlds of course don’t seem at all real to us. Because the definition of “real” is an individual matter, I’d say that, for us, our possibility-world is “real”, and the other possibility-worlds are not. But that only seems so, and can be locally said to be so, because we inhabit this possibility-world. This possibility-world, as I said, is “real” to T, because it’s the setting of the life-experience possibility-story that is about T.
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(I use quotes for the word “real”, because I don’t like to encourage its use.)
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As I said, to say that our possibility world is intrinsically, objectively metaphysically more real or existent than the other possibility-worlds would be pre-Copernican.
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But, when the question comes up, I call our possibility-world “real”, because it’s real in the context of our lives. …with the understanding that that’s all I mean.
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I’m posting these answers so that it can’t be said that I haven’t answered the objections to my proposed metaphysics. …the genuinely parsimonious metaphysics.

Michael Ossipoff

Hi

I have questions about laws of nature:
1. Laws of nature - are they eternal? — kris22

Depends on how you mean "eternal". In principle they're "there", timelessly, as are all hypotheticals, but they only apply in a universe, and a universe is time-bound because it's part of your life-experience, which is temporary.

We know, they are now, but was before universe and will be after?

Laws of nature are about a universe, and don't have meaning other than for, about, and in a universe.

2. Could there ever be no laws of nature?

No, and there couldn't have not been.

But, from an individual's own experiential point of view, there will come a time (a timelessness, actually) when there isn't a universe, a body, an individual life, or any knowledge that there ever were those things.

3. Is everything part of laws of nature?

No, but of course everything physical in a universe is part of the laws of nature and their consequences and conclusions.

Our worldly lives seem very long. They started well before we even remember, and it feels as if this life has always been. But its great duration is small in comparison to the timelessness at the end of worldly life.

Michael Ossipoff

I'd said:

But yes, after you posted, I clarified that I agree that any caring person who lives on this planet wouldn't want to reproduce

— Michael Ossipoff

You replied:

That's not true. Lots of caring people on this planet want to reproduce, and lots do.

Yes, when I said that, I didn't really feel right about saying it. It was an exaggeration, and wasn't what I really meant to say.

There's (understandably, due to natural-selection) a strong procreative instinct. And of course yes that's true of caring people too. I'm sure that nearly all procreation is well-intended, and that new people are brought into the world with loving intent.

Instincts caused by natural-selection aren't necessarily desirable or beneficial to others just because they're natural.

I'd said:

So, better that I just say, "Living on a barbaric planet, it's better to not reproduce.", and leave it at that.

— Michael Ossipoff

You replied:

But it isn't accurate to say that we live on a barbaric planet. That kind of thing is relative.

Yes, it's a relative term, so it's something of a matter of opinion--the matter of where we draw the line to call a planet barbaric. I suggest that our planet qualifies with flying colors, because, routinely, so many people (not to mention other animals) are being wrongfully harmed. If that isn't barbarism, what is?

Anyway, we don't live in a world that is so barbaric that it's better not to reproduce.

Well, just speaking for myself, I wouldn't want to bring, into a snake-pit social world like this, someone whom I care about (...and don't people start caring about their offspring even before they're born?).

And, in fact, in a world where people are fighting and dying over resources, and dying because they're doing without, i wouldn't want to add to the number of people in that fight.
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Michael Ossipoff

Hypothetically (even if not realistically), if everyone who is on the wrong end of barbarism made that refusal — Michael Ossipoff

[referring to the refusal to reproduce]

That supposition doesn't make sense. Just as there's an "if no one in barbaric worlds reproduced", of course there's also an "if" that they do reproduce, and, hence, there are possibility-worlds in which they do.

So, better that I just say, "Living on a barbaric planet, it's better to not reproduce.", and leave it at that.

Michael Ossipoff

I hasten to clarify that, though I said that the OP had a point, I was not referring to his wish to forcibly involuntarily sterilize everyone. Forced sterilization of an entire population can't be justified, and would be unconscionable. When some people forcibly impose their own preferences and beliefs on others, that's one of the things that makes this a world in which you wouldn't choose to be born.

Here's what I meant when I said that the OP has a point: Yes, none of us asked to be born.

And yes, if you, as an individual who is on the wrong end of a planet's barbarism, refuse to reproduce, then you're 1) not bring someone into a life under barbarism; and 2) not contributing to there being an overall possibility to be born under barbarism at all.

Hypothetically (even if not realistically), if everyone who is on the wrong end of barbarism made that refusal, then no one on any planet in any universe would be born on the wrong end of barbarism. It wouldn't be a possibility.

But not reproducing must be an individual choice,unless someone is objectively and fairly judged to be unqualified as a parent. (I emphasize that I don't claim that our society has a feasible trustworthy means to objectively and fairly make that determination.)

Making our own life choices is a basic

Of course you surely agree that it would be better if, in our planet's societal system, no one were wrongfully harmed. (Dream on). If that unattainable condition were so, then there'd be no need to not reproduce.

So, just complain about the things that make being born on this planet undesirable, and make an individual choice to not reproduce.

Replying to a comment:

I'd said:

Or, looking at it evolutionarily, natural-selection makes it so that people who are born have an inclination toward life. Part of what made you was natural selection's influence that made you inclined toward life.

And that was encoded in the genes from which yours were going to be chosen,, even before your own genes were finally determined by your conception.

You commented:

But that's the naturalistic fallacy. It's a self-fulfilling prophecy. — schopenhauer1

Which of my statements that you quoted isn't true? It all seemed, to me, uncontroversial.

"Naturalist"? You really know how to insult someone >:o

Potentially all future suffering can be prevented if no one procreated.

If you lived on a non-barbaric planet, there'd be no need to not reproduce.

But yes, after you posted, I clarified that I agree that any caring person who lives on this planet wouldn't want to reproduce.

But that's only because of a planetary societal aberration. It isn't a general conclusion about life itself.

No disagreement there. We probably don't disagree on this subject.

Michael Ossipoff

Or, looking at it evolutionarily, natural-selection makes it so that people who are born have an inclination toward life. Part of what made you was natural selection's influence that made you inclined toward life.

And that was encoded in the genes from which yours were going to be chosen,, even before your own genes were finally determined by your conception.

...in addition to the fact that your conception and birth were inevitable, due to predisposition, as I described.

Michael Ossipoff

Of course the OP has a point, and that should be admitted even if we don't agree with him completely.

For one thing, of course life isn't all suffering. It's a combination of alternate good things and bad things. It's like a gamble, except that nearly everyone wins sometimes, often paying a price in suffering and hardship.

So, what you're imposing on your offspring isn't unadulterated misery. Let's be clear about that. It's a gamble, an exciting and risky game. A dangerous adventure. That isn't an unmitigated bad thing.

Sure, it's true that you weren't asked if you wanted to be conceived.

But your hypothetical life possibility-story, one of infinitely-many such possiblility-stories, has you as its protagonist. Presumably a life possibility-story wouldn't have a protagonist who isn't predisposed to life, for some reason. Some need, inclination or other predisposition.

So it can be said that you were born into this life because of your predispositions for life. You're life-Protagonist material. You're someone about whom there can be a life possibility-story.

What if everyone on this planet participated in a boycott on procreation? Would that have kept you from being born? Of course not. Hypothetically there could be a world in which children are born, and you'd have been born there anyway.

So no, it isn't entirely the doing of your parents. You're blaming them unfairly.

If the worst thing that they've done to you is to conceive and bear you, you can consider yourself very fortunate.

There are a lot of parents who have no business being parents, who are quite unqualified to be parents, and they have no right to have children. ...but are regrettably allowed to.

If you want to complain about something, complain about that.

I suggest that not just anyone should be allowed to create children, or to raise them. Ok, sure, who's to decide who's qualified? Yes, but even f there's no one who can be trusted to make that evaluation, the prevention of unqualified parents is still a good idea in principle.

Michael Ossipoff

In line with something that Lightwave pointed out:

This putative world in which there are no hypotheticals is, itself, a hypothetical alleged possibility.

A hypothetical that there could have not been any hypotheticals (including the hypothetical possibility that it, itself, is?)

Michael Ossipoff

What would be a brute fact that is undeniable, or whose denial has the burden of proof?

**How about the fact that there are, and couldn't have not been, abstract facts, or abstract statements about hypothetical conclusions from hypothetical statements about hypothetical relations among hypothetical quantities?**

I suggest that the burden of proof would be on anyone denying that. — Michael Ossipoff

In fact, I further suggest that it's undeniable.

What would it mean to say that there "aren't" those statements about hypotheticals? Would such a claim it mean anything?

That system of abstract hypothetical statements about hypothetical conclusions from hypothetical statements about hypothetical relations among hypothetical quantities--That system of hypotheticals have meaning and application only in relation to eachother.

They have that meaning in relation to eachother regardless of whether they "are" in any larger context. Evaluating them in some other context would be meaningless.

So, some global fact that there "aren't" such a system of interrelated hypotheticals would be meaningless.

You can call that a brute fact, but it's an undeniable one, or at least its denial has the burden of proof.

If every metaphysics depends on a brute fact, the metaphysics that I propose only depends on an undeniable one, or one whose denial has the burden of proof (and that proof hasn't been supplied).

Michael Ossipoff

It would be good for a brute-fact to be something undeniable, or at least something whose denial has the burden of proof. Maybe it wouldn't be called a "brute fact" then, because maybe only arbitrary brute-facts are brute-facts.

What would be a brute fact that is undeniable, or whose denial has the burden of proof?

How about the fact that there are, and couldn't have not been, abstract facts, or abstract statements about hypothetical conclusions from hypothetical statements about hypothetical relations among hypothetical quantities?

I suggest that the burden of proof would be on anyone denying that.

We've been discussing that matter at the discussion-thread called "A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics", at the Metaphysics and Epistemology forum at this website. In that discussion, several arguments have been posted, to the effect that the fact in the paragraph before last is either undeniable, or that at least its denial has the burden of proof.

When I say that the metaphysics that I propose in that discussion-thread doesn't posit any brute-facts, I'm going by the meaning of "brute-fact" that says that a fact isn't brute if it's really undeniable, or at least if its denial has the burden of proof.

Michael Ossipoff

When I said that Newton's law of gravity could be expressed as a relation between 2 masses' spatial coordinate positions, their mass, and the time rate of change of their positions...

...I should have said, "the 2nd-order time rate-of-change of their positions." ...referring to acceleration, the rate of change of the rate of change of their position-vectors.

But the point was that if there were a space-time continuum, with those masses at those positions, then they'd accelerate in that space as described by a certain formula.

...all completely hypothetical of course.

If there were space-time, and those point-masses, and if the quantities were related by that formula...

So the hypothetical story proceeds.

Michael Ossipoff

Rich—
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I’d said:
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Conceivably relatively soon after death.
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But, of course, before long, there can't any longer be that much detail in the person's perception or experience.

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— Michael Ossipoff
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You reply:
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This depends upon one's concept of the mind, which I perceive as memory embedded in a holographic universe. The brain within this access scenario is just acting as a reference/reconstruction generator of external memory (what is out there). What is perceived as private memory still exists, possibly as a personal dreamlike condition not dependent upon a brain.

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I’ll return to the last sentence later in this post, but, for now, regarding the above paragraph’s position in general:
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That isn't parsimonious. If you’ve seen my initial post at my discussion-thread (A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics", at the Metaphysics & Epistemology forum), you know that I emphasize Ockham’s Principle of Parsimony for comparing metaphysicses and metaphysical statements. Minimize, or, better yet, completely avoid unnecessary or unjustified assumptions and brute-facts..
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It’s agreed by all that, for each person, there’s a body. That’s what there’s undeniable evidence for. There’s really no evidence that we are anything other than our body. Any unsupported assumption is a violation of the Principle of Parsimony…a negative point in any comparison of metaphysicses.
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The holographic universe memory-repository is an unnecessary assumption, and a comparison disadvantage, for a comparison with a metaphysics that doesn’t need any assumptions.
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And you’d be asked to explain why there’s that holographic universe memory-repository. Otherwise, you’re positing it as a brute-fact.
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My proposed metaphysics completely avoids assumptions and brute-facts.
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Now, more about that paragraph’s last sentence:
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I’ll re-copy it here:
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What is perceived as private memory still exists, possibly as a personal dreamlike condition not dependent upon a brain.

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Yes, I’m not saying that everything ends at death, or that nothing lasts after death.
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Sure, that statement seems at-odds with my claim that you’re the body, and only that. So let me explain:
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Some things can be agreed-on by advocates of very different metaphysicses, and such a thing is what I’ve started with, in my previous post to this thread. I said that it should be agreeable, even by an Atheists Physicalist.
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I said that, at the end of life, before long, there’s no longer anything as elaborate as dreams. For that person, there’s no time, events, identity, concern, lack, incompletion, need, or worry—or any memory that there ever were such things, or that there’s was, or could be such a thing as, existence as a body.
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That seems an uncontroversial statement, agreeable to most everyone, from Vedantists to Physicalists.
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Timelessness is being approached and seen, if not already arrived at.
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Of course the body is about to shut down, but the person doesn’t know that there ever was one anyway. The person is arriving, or has already arrived, at timelessness, and knows only its peace, completeness, and absence of concern and lack.
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Michael Ossipoff

Also, wouldn't the burden of proof be on the person who claims that there could have not been self-consistent systems of interrelated hypothetical if-statements that relate only to eachother?

That sounds like a very big claim, in need of good justification.

...maybe partly because, maybe it isn't even clear what it would mean to say that there could have not even been even that?

Michael Ossipoff

Rich--

Dinnertime now, so my reply will be tomorrow morning.

Michael Ossipoff

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I would speculate that the dream state is very close to what it may seem like after death.. — Rich

Conceivably relatively soon after death.

But, of course, before long, there can't any longer be that much detail in the person's perception or experience.

At the eventual end of life, there'll be no time; no events;no perception of anything to overcome, improve or protect;.no identity, no concern,

That much shouldn't draw any disagreement, even from an Atheist Physicalist.

Whether the end of life occurs at the end of every particular life is a matter on which people disagree, and a matter, maybe off-topic here, that we needn't get into here.

That's another topic, maybe argued in a different discussion-thread somewhere at this forum..

This is similar to Hamlet's speculation about death.

...if Hamlet's words are interpreted very broadly.

It seems to me that the dream metaphor isn't close enough to be very helpful as an explanation or prediction.

Reported near-deat experiences (NDEs) are very similar to eachother, unlike the very diverse nature of dreams.

And, please, another issue we needn't get into is the matter of whether NDEs are "real".

As I've said elsewhere, the word "Real" isn't even metaphysically-defined.

And I remind you that life, itself, the body of every living-thing, including humans, is chemical.

Therefore every experience, of every person and other animal, has an ultimately chemical basis. So let's not quibble about what experience is "real".

Michael Ossipoff

The position I propose to defend is weak naturalism. Conforming broadly to the standard of scientific inquiry known as methodological naturalism, it can be distinguished from the stronger position of philosophical naturalism, which claims categorically that the natural world is all there is. — Hugh Harris

If "natural" means "not man-made", then Naturalism is obviously incorrect, because there are many man-made things.

If "natural" doesn't mean "man-made", then what does it mean??

What would then be an example of something unnatural?

I suggest that the unstated definition of "Natural" is "Physical". Naturalists are evidently using an unstated assumption that what's natural consists only of what's Physical. ...meaning the physical world is the Ground of All Being, and the fundamentally existent and primary thing. ...the thing that is metaphysically prior to everything else (if there is anything else).

That's implied merely by the use of "Natural" to mean "Physical".

I suggest that, as has been suggested elsewhere, "Naturalism" is being used as a currently-more-popular word for "Physicalism". ...more vague in meaning, but that vagueness makes it less criticizable (To criticize a position, you first have to pin-down what its proponents mean.)

Also, if Naturalists can succeed with establishing, in the conversation, the assumption (presumably so obvious that it needn't be stated :D ) that all that's natural consists of what's physical, then their (however-labeled) Physicalism is sold without explicit labeling of it.

As nearly as I can guess, then, "Natural" means "Physical", and "Supernatural" means "not Physical".

So, just by definition, then, anything that doesn't agree with Physicalism is a belief in the Supernatural :D

And that's literally true, by the definitions (in the paragraph before last) of "Natural" and "Supernatural".

What's the point of that? Well, maybe that "the Supernatural" is usually taken to mean superstition, and contravention of physical law.

So, by (intended?) implication, when you call every Idealism a belief in the Supernatural, your audience is supposed to equate Idealism with the contravention of physical law, that takes place in the familiar movies about the Supernatural. ...you know, vampires, werewoleves...and anything other than Physicalism :D

So these two different meanings for "Supernatural" can serve to make it sound as if anything other than Physicalim is like Vampires, walking mummies, werewolves, witchcraft...etc.
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I'll add that Physicalism (by any name, including "Naturalism") loses, by the Principle of Parsimony, to Skepticism, the metaphysics that I propose in my discussion-thread "A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics", in the Metaphysics and Epistemology forum.





I'm also contending that naturalism is more probable than supernaturalism.

You said:

Weak naturalism: as far as we know, the natural world is all there is.

Well, taken literally, doesn't that mean that everyone is a Naturalist? I can say that I don't believe in anything that isn't natural (unless "natural" means not manmade).
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It's just that "Naturalists" presume the authority to say what "natural" means.

I defend the claim that naturalism is more probable than supernaturalism, in my essay Naturalism versus Supernaturalism- the false dichotomy – I argue that the observance of the natural world along with its laws combined with the absence of any evidence of the supernatural, amounts to a strong prima facie case for naturalism

Yes, I agree that there are no vampires or werewolves.

But no, that doesn't support Physicalism, however labeled.

What there is "no evidence for" is the claim that the physical universe is the Ground of All Being, the reason for everything else, or maybe just all that there is. There's "no evidence for" the brute-fact of that fundamental, primary Existent that you regard this physical universe as.

, and its likelihood in comparison to the sans-evidence claims of supernaturalism.

Is Idealism "Supernaturalism" by your meaning?

The Idealist metaphysics that I propose in the post that I've referred you to (above) doesn't need or make any assumptions, or posit any brute-fact(s). ...unlike Physicalims, or "Naturalism" (regardless of whether or not there's some difference between the two).

Michael Ossipoff

I've always had trouble pinning down precisely what absolute idealism IS so I would love to hear your thoughts on this. — Brian

The metaphysics that I propose, in the Metaphysics & Epistemology forum, in the "A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics" discussion-thread, is a pure Idealism metaphysics.

Michael Ossipoff

Wayfarer--

The matter or question of the difference between the kinds of existence of material objects and abstract facts doesn't bother me, because it seems to me that there's no reason to believe that, metaphysically, there's anything other than abstract facts.

That certainly simplifies explanations.
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What I read about that statement by Nagarjuna agrees with my impression that there's no provably correct metaphysics.

But, when Buddhists sometimes seem to be suggesting a metaphysics, I don't understand what they're suggesting. That's just speaking for myself--I don't mean any criticism of Buddhism.

I've read important good points made by Buddhists. It's just that I haven't understood their metaphysics.

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It has been argued that there was a relationship between the origins of Greek skepticism and Buddhism, in the person of Pyrrho of Elis, who was a wandering Greek, said to have visited 'India' (probably ancient Gandhara, nowadays Afghanistan) and conversed with Indian sages who may well have been Mahayana Buddhists. This idea is explored in books such as The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies, Thomas C. Mcevilley and Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism, Adrian Kuzminski

Interesting. I hadn't heard about that.

Though I agree with the suggestion that there isn't a provably correct metaphysics, no doubt there's more to Greek Skepticism than that, and so I can't say that I know about Greek Skepticism, or what it is; and I certainly am not claiming that what I call "Skepticism" is the same thing or similar.

I'm just borrowing the name "Skepticism" as a name for a particular proposed metaphysics,because avoidance of assumptions, controversial statements, and brute-facts certainly qualifies as skeptical.

Michael Ossipoff

I think this statement is inconsistent, because it needs a logic that generates also other facts. For example, it uses relations of abstraction (instantiation) and other-than (difference/similarity), which generate a vast world of possibilities. — litewave

I hope you're referring to the statement "There are no abstract facts other than this one", or "The only fact is the fact that there are no other facts", or "There is only one fact", etc.

If so, thanks--That's more like what I wanted to hear.

...because, if that statement could have been true, then that brings back the question, "Why is there something instead of nothing?"

There's just something distasteful, displeasing or wrong-sounding about the suggestion that there could have been a Nothing in which there weren't even abstract facts, like the ones that make our richly intricate possibility-worlds..

If I understand you right, you're saying that the concepts used in that statement imply the many other abstract facts that the statements claims that there are not.

I don't claim to approach this question with any rigor. As you can see, I'm just an amateur at this question, and I'd appreciate any comments about it, or any quotes from what's been written in answer to it.

I was wondering if maybe there's some reason why there couldn't be only one fact. So maybe you've answered that question, and provided a more solid objection to "only one fact".

Another hopeful possibility could be that there's just something about if-then facts that makes them inevitable. Any suggestions?

Because "only one fact" is a speculative putative possibility, could there conceivably have not been the opposite possibility?

Saying that there equally could have been or not been more than one fact, seems to mean that, if there were only one fact, then it could have been otherwise. ...another fact, about lots of other facts--so there wouldn't really be just one fact.

Even if there's be no one to say it, wouldn't there be the fact that if there were other facts, then there'd be hypothetical possibility-worlds?

I appreciate any suggestions or quotes that can improve on this non-rigorous amateur speculation that I'm posting about this question.

Michael Ossipoff



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Jake--

My 2nd objection doesn't work as well as I'd at first believed it to.

The fact could consist of "The only fact is the fact that there are no other facts.", avoiding most of the opportunity to object to it..

Or (and I like this one best):

"There is only one fact."
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My 1st objection seems stronger.

Could there have not even been any facts about what quantity-values would be implied if there were certain hypothetical relations between some only-hypothetical quantities, and if some of those hypothetical quantities hypothetically had certain hypothetical values?

All these "if"s aren't saying that there really is anything. ....aren't saying that there's anything to be ruled out by a fact about there not being anything. ...or so it seems.

...but I admit that I guess that Isn't rigorous, and I can't guarantee that it's sound.

Michael Ossipoff

"This is the only abstract fact" .... as good as "nothing" perhaps? — Jake Tarragon

Uh-Oh.

.... as good as "nothing" perhaps?

Seemingly.

Maybe the person who originated the argument that I quoted had an answer to that. Maybe someone else has. Maybe someone here does. I hope so, because I agree with Dr. Kuhn, the interviewer in the Closer To Truth, when he said that It seems better if there couldn't have been (effectively) nothing.

Two possible approaches:

1. Is it possible for an abstract fact to forbid other abstract facts? As I was saying, a system of abstract facts needn't "exist" in any context outside itself. ...needn't have any validity or reality in any context outside itself. ...needn't be in any context outside of itself.

So, when there's an abstract fact that says "There aren't any abstract facts other than t his one.", could such a fact be true, given that a system of abstract facts is quite independent of anything outside its own context.

There can certainly be, as an abstract object, the statement "There are no abstract facts other than this one.". But the fact that it is, as a statement and an abstract object, doesn't make it an abstract fact.

It's a question of whether it could have been true.

The independence of a system of abstract facts from anything outside it, the seemingly undeniable validity of any such system in its own context, seems to say that an abstract fact that forbids other abstract facts isn't true, and therefore isn't a fact.

If it doesn't have the jurisdictional authority to forbid other abstract facts, "There aren't any abstract facts other than this one." can't be a fact.

2. Maybe there could be a valid quibble about the wording "...this one." Maybe it should have to say, "...other than the fact that there are no abstract facts other than the fact that there are no abstract facts other than the fact that there are no abstract facts...[and so on]."

Maybe a valid abstract fact has to not use a shortcut like "this one", and must be finite in length.

Michael Ossipoff

What about "if I see a chair then it exists?" — Jake Tarragon

Sure, I'd agree with that.

Because of lack (impossibility?) of a consensus definition, I feel that "exist" or "real" should be accompanied by a qualification or a specification of the context in which something is said to exist or be real..

But yes, I feel that there wouldn't be any point in saying that our physical world and its contents don't exist. They exists in the context of our hypothetical life-experience possibility-stories. What more existence could someone ask for?
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Michael Ossipoff

I’d said:

When we say, “If this, then that”, that statement would be just as true (within our universe’s context of a set of inter-related abstract if-then facts) if there is nothing to our universe other than just the if-then facts themselves.

There’s no need for the supposed “stuff”. No particular reason to believe in it. I suggest that the alleged “concretely” fundamentally existent “stuff” is as unnecessary an assumption as the old phlogiston.

— Michael Ossipoff

You reply:

As much as I disdain materialism, I feel an obvious rejoinder to this claim is that one cannot drop an if-then statement on one's foot. Sure, if one's foot is in such and such a place and you drop a brick there, then you will suffer pain and injury. But that is not the consequence of an if-then statement; it's the consequence of a physical interaction.

There’s a broad if-then fact that if you drop a brick on your foot, then your foot will get hurt. …because the kinetic energy, to which the brick’s previous gravitational potential energy has been converted--as gravitational force acts on the brick and accelerates it--will inevitably do work on your foot, when your foot stops the brick’s motion.

That broad if-then fact is implied by other if-then facts consisting of various physical laws (and maybe mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts).

So yes, that broader if-then fact is, as you said, a consequence of physical interaction consisting of if-then facts.

Maybe just a little more should be said about the if-then nature of those physical interactions:
One of Newton’s laws says F = M*A.

But, if we choose to, Newton’s law of gravitation could be just stated as a relation between masses, distances and a time-rate-of-change of motion.

If there is a system of time and space, and if there are masses that have co-ordinate positions in that space-time, and if these quantities are related by Newton’s law of gravitation, and his laws (&/or definitions) of motion, then all of this implies that if you hold a brick high over your foot, and let go of it, the brick will do work on your foot.

Yes, Newtonian physics is only an approximation, and there’s more modern physics that applies more generally and more fundamentally. But Newtonian physics is true for many practical purpose. And modern physics, like Newtonian physics, consists of hypothetical if-then relations. …just different ones.

Given all those ifs, then the brick will do work on your foot, as part of a hypothetical if-then story. …based on various other physical, mathematical and logical if-then relations.

All of this is true and “happens”, in its own context, in the context of this story. As I said, there’s no need for this story to have any existence or reality in any context other than its own.

That’s worth repeating: The matter of whether all this is “real” or “concrete” in some larger context, is irrelevant. It happens anyway, in its own context.

…and it untroversially “is”, as a hypothetical story, and is valid and real in its own context.

You, as the Protagonist in your hypothetical if-then life possibility-story, therefore don’t want to drop a brick, cinder-block or boulder on your foot.

Of course if you want to examine why that is, it’s because that’s how the biological organism called “you” is instinctively designed, of course.

Why is there such an organism? No particular reason, other than that all possibility-stories, and all abstract facts just “are”, as possibility-stories and abstract facts. That’s uncontroversial.

So, for that reason, there is, and couldn’t not have been, a hypothetical if-then life-possibility-story with you as Protagonist.

That story necessarily has, as part of is chain of hypothetical causation, a world in which you the Protagonist live, and other organisms of the same species, and a background of evolution for that biological organism and his species…in which your ancestors survived long enough to reproduce and successfully rear their offspring. …partly because they didn’t drop boulders on their foot. …or or fail to take precautions against predation, etc.

You wrote:

And if there were nothing in our universe, then there would be no-one to entertain any kind of proposition.

I’m not saying that there’s nothing. There are possibility-worlds, settings for possibility-stores, including your own personal hypothetical if-then life-experience possibility-story.

...and of course all of the abstract facts, consisting of mathematical theorems, abstract logical facts.

...and, for each possibility world, a set of hypothetical relations called physical laws--hypothetical relations among the hypothetical quantities in that hypothetical possibility-world..

...the building-blocks of a possibility-world.

…including this universe as the possibility-world that is the setting for your life possibility-story.

(By “this universe”, I refer to our Big-Bang Universe (BBU), and any broader “multiverse” of physically-related sub-universes (such as our BBU) that it might belong to.)

(Things that would otherwise be universes are physically-related to eachother (and therefore are only sub-universes in a larger universe called a “multiverse”) if they’re physically causally-related to eachother, whereby one is physically caused in or by another, or they have a common physical causal origin; or if there can be any kind of physical interaction between them or their contents. So, as I use the word “universe”, a genuine universe isn’t physically-related to anything else.)
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But yes, as the Physicalist or Naturalist means the “something” that he believes in, there’s no reason to believe that there’s “something”.

There’s no reason to believe that there’s metaphysically anything other than the hypothetical possibility-stories, set in hypothetical possibility-worlds.

…and of course also all of the various abstract facts, including mathematical theorems, abstract logical facts, and the physical laws of the hypothetical possibility-worlds. …the building-blocks of hypothetical possibility worlds and the hypothetical life-experience possibility-stories that are set in them.

Michael Ossipoff

P.S.:

I should emphasize that I got onto this topic justifiably from my mention of Nothing, and wanting to explain and qualify that mention.

People have sometimes expressed gratitude for the immense, timeless goodness and beauty of what is.

There isn't a debate-issue there, about terminology, or who is right or wrong.

Maybe I could say that the subject could be called Meta-Metaphysics

Michael Ossipoff

An inconsistent proposition is not true in any part of reality, but that means that it is a property that is not instantiated in any part of reality - a property without a thing it would be a property of - and so it is a property that is not a property - it is nothing. — litewave

That sounds right.

Sure, an untruth such as that doesn't count among the valid abstract facts.

By the way, it has been asked if there could have been a Nothing in which there weren't even any abstract facts.

But It's been pointed out that there couldn't have not been abstract facts, because then it would have been an abstract fact that there are no abstract facts.

I just meant that I don't like to use the word "exist", or "real" without qualifying them, or expressing, when using them, the understanding that people can and do disagree about what exists or is real.

You wrote:

What if you took an arbitrary statement A and formed a compound statement "if A then A"? It would be always true, a tautology. (same for "A if and only if A") What would that mean in your view?

Even if it's a tautology, and so it isn't useful or necessary to say, it's still one of the valid abstract facts.

...which maybe can be said about my answer, too..

By the way, it seems to me that, in the Physicalist's terms, there's Nothing, in the senses that there isn't the Something that the Physicalist or Naturalist believes in.

I suggest that there's Nothing other than the abstract facts, including the ones that constitute the hypothetical life-experience possibililty-stories, with us, their Protagonists, as a (primary, central) part of them.

But I emphasize that our hypothetical life-experience possibillity-stories are obviously incomparably more interesting and meaningful than the Western philosophers' abstract facts. It doesn't do our life-stories justice to speak of them in terms of the neutral, impersonal, dry general abstract facts. Something beautiful can be made of something that, by itself would character-less and impersonal. Something valuable and justifiable can be made of something that otherwise wouldn't be so.

Like the way a sculpture can be made of dirt or something.

Saying that there's nothing except for the abstract facts and the possibility-stories...

Some people would say that that's an expression of Atheism, but it isn't. It's only about metaphysics.

God isn't an element of Metaphysics.

I emphasize that that matter is an individual matter, not something subject to proof or an existence-issue. A matter of feeling (when it is), and not a matter of proof or debate.

It has been pointed out that the suggestion that God's existence could be proved by logic is an implication that logic is above God.

Martin Buber pointed out that God is above such distinctions as existence and non-existence.

For humans to debate whether God exists is like for mice to debate whether humans gnaw hardwood or softwood.

In their song, "5-D", the Byrds sang:

"I opened my heart to the whole universe, and found it was loving."

(Surely, by "universe", they were referring to all that is (what Western philosophers refer to as "the world".), rather than to our physical universe.)

Metaphysics is about what is. It can be felt, and is by many people, that what is, is so good that maybe there's a Principle of Good that's above metaphysics.

Being a feeling, it (as I said) isn't a matter of proof or debate, or convincing eachother.

Why do I bring all that up here? Partly to qualify and explain my statement that there's Nothing other than our hypothetical life-experience possibilily-stories, and the hypothetical if/then possiblity-worlds in which those stories are set, and the general abstract facts...which would otherwise sound like an expression of Atheism.

And partly as a reply to the threads at this forum in which the issue of God is being discussed. I claim that that matter is something above an "issue". It's a feeling for some. Feelings are above concepts, issues, proof and debate. ...and above metaphysics.

Michael Ossipoff



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Reply to T Clark, continued:
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Some if/then conditions and their conclusions involve easy gross ordinary observations or actions on the part of the Protagonist of a life possibility-story. They’re the ones about which I answered more easily, in my previous post.
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But that isn’t true of some facts, including some internal states, such as feelings. If someone has sore place on hir skin, it might not be due to an action by hir or a cause known to hir.
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And that’s true of other facts in the physical world too, of course.
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But doesn’t it still come down to observations?
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If physicists perform certain experiments, probing matter in various ways, they can find out things about the structure of matter. …as Rutherford did, when he sent alpha particles (they’re positively-charged) into metal-foil.
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He was surprised to find the alpha particles scattered differently than he’d expected, based on Thompson’s theory that electrons were uniformly distributed in an otherwise positive atom, like raisins in a muffin.
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He expected the alpha particles to be weakly deflected by relatively uniform electrical charge. But most of the particles went right though the foil, un-deflected, with a few being bounced back in directions drastically different from their direction of entry, with some bouncing nearly straight backwards.
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Rutherford said that it was as if he’d fired a cannon-ball into tissue-paper and it bounced back.
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Rutherford was forced to conclude that an atom’s positive charge is concentrated in a very small region of the atom.
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Though atoms, electrons and atomic nuclei aren’t visible to us, physicists have found out things about them via special observations. …matter-probing experiments.
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If you make a certain observation, then you’ll get a result in which you’ll find out about a certain fact (and maybe others).
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And it can involve things that aren’t visible to a person.
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…such as the placement of an atom’s positive charge, or the cause of the sore place on someone’s skin.
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…or someone’s other internal feelings, of whatever kind. Maybe that cause can only be explained via chemistry (in principle a branch of physics), something not visible to the person involved. …or micro-biology, equally non-visible to the person.
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Then you might find out about the cause of the sore place on your skin via a doctor’s observations. Or you might find that it’s something that the doctor’s observations can’t find the cause of, and that’s a fact about it too, found by the observation.--Then that fact still tells the doctor (and, hence, you) something about the cause of the condition, even if it doesn’t tell exactly what the condition is. For example, it might tell you what the cause _isn’t_.
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So, in conclusion, your knowledge of facts about your internal feelings (or anything else) isn’t a problem for my proposed metaphysics that I call “Skepticism”.
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Michael Ossipoff

If T Clark already knows that he's sitting at his desk, and that the clock says it's about dinner-time, and that the sun is a bit low in the west, and that the chair-arms are smooth finished wood, then he could state those facts on his intercom, to someone else in the house, which would be equivalent to telling that person that, if they come into the room and check, that's what they'll find to be so.

That was basically my answer in my reply to T, and maybe it's ok. But I wasn't entirely satisfied with that, because a life experience possibility-story is about its Protagonist's experience, and so it seems desirable that the facts be said from T's point of view.

If T hasn't checked those facts yet, then of course they could be said as if-then facts from his point of view. That was actually how I worded my reply to T.

But maybe not appropriately, because, if he already knows those facts, they aren't conditional.

That was part of the problem that I mentioned in my previous post.

But I knew that it wasn't a proposal-spoiling problem.

Maybe it can reasonably just be said that T's facts are just the "then" parts of the if/then facts.

During our life-stories, of course there are always current facts, currently known by us. ...some "then'" conclusions of if-then facts in the workings and playing-out of our ongoing if/then life-experience possibility-stories.

If T looks down, he'll find that he's sitting in his favorite chair. T has looked down. He has found, and knows, that he's sitting in his favorite chair.(Of course he's known that ever since he sat down, in fact.) Of course his if/then life-experience possibility-story steadily continues from there.

T could have made his question more difficult by adding: "...and I feel comfortable, but a little tired, and I Iook forward to an interesting day.tomorrow"

Whoa--now what?

Maybe there are versions of Dualism or Idealism in which someone's internal feelings aren't considered facts about the physical world, but my proposed metaphysics isn't among those.

This posting is long, and so I'll resume this in a subsequent posting.

Michael Ossipoff

Litewave--

I like to avoid the word "Exist", because there isn't a consensus about a metaphysical definition for it.

Someone could say that any proposition exists as a proposition, meaning only that it is a proposition. Then every false proposition exists, such as the proposition that circles (by their usual definition) have four sides, or the proposition that if all Slithytoves are purple, and Joe is a Slithytove, then Joe is yellow, or that the shortest distance between two points on a Euclidian plane is along a semicircle.

I've often been saying that a hypothetical life-possibility-story "is there" (as a possibility-story). But I suppose that I should only say that about stories that are not demonstrably self-contradictory. (Otherwise it would be an "impossibility-story")

I must admit that you're probably more familiar with logic than I am.

About the possible objections to my statement that any fact about our physical universe can be said as an if/then fact (referred to from a Protagonist's own point of view), there's the possible problem of a fact about someone's current conscious mental state ((from his/her point of view). That can be called, indirectly, some kind of a fact about the physical world, because hir (his/her) mental state is related to hir physical configuration).

(Not being an Advaitist, i believe that someone is the person and the body.

From hir (his/her) point of view, that fact is a fact that doesn't have an "if". That person knows that fact about hir current conscious mental state as an un-conditional fact.

For that matter, what about a fact that the person has previously learned, and knows for sure (again, discussed from hir own point of view)? "The Earth's diameter is greater than that of Mars." ", or "My house is at a street-corner." Those are things that s/he knows without having to (again) find out.

I suppose you could always say, "If I'm right, ....", or, "If I check, I'll find verification that....", even when you're sure that you're right.

These things could suggest that my wording might need a small bit of touch-up, or clarifying wording, but I doubt that it presents a persisting fundamental problem for it.

Michael Ossipoff

T Clark:

I'd said:

There’s no evidence that our physical universes consists of more than inter-related if-then statements. — Michael Ossipoff

You reply:

Here I am, sitting in my chair. My fan is on. It's almost time for dinner. The sun is a bit low in the West. The chair arms are brown-stained wood, ash I think. It's smooth. The varnish and stain on the right side, which gets more use, is fading in some spots.

Please explain how this concrete expression of physical reality consists of interrelated if-then statements.

Elswhere in that initial post, I clarified that everything that can be said about our physical universe can be said as an if-then statement... is equivalent to an if/then statement.

So, forgive me for calling them all if/then statements, for brevity.

Re-wording your statements (from your point of view, because of course that's the experiential point of view of your life possibility-story):

If you look down, you’ll find that you’re sitting in your chair. If you look at the clock, you’ll find that it’s time for dinner. If you look at the length and direction of a shadow (You shouldn’t look at the Sun), you’ll find that the sun is a bit low in the west. If you look at the arms of your chair, you’ll find that they’re brown-stained wood. If you feel their surface, you’ll find that it’s smooth. If you examine the appearance of the varnish and stain on the chair’s arms, you’ll find that the right arm’s finish is fading in some spots.

But wait, doesn’t my claim sound like one of those “unfalsifiable propositions” that debunkers like to point out?

Of course it’s an unfalsifiable proposition. …just like the proposition of the “Naturalist” ‘s or Physicalist’s “stuff”, and his “concretely” and fundamentally existent physical world that is the Ground of All Being.

I’ve said that I suggest that it isn’t possible to prove a metaphysics.

I was merely comparing some metaphysicses on the basis of the Principle of Parsimony.

By the Principle of Parsimony, Skepticism beats “Naturalism”.

Michael Ossipoff

Jake--

Yes, maybe the if/then facts consisting of the laws of physics (maybe along with some mathematical theorems and some abstract logical facts) imply many more if/then facts.

Michael Ossipoff

1) Is there not always a subset of if-then statements than can be used to derive all of them in any given context? — Jake Tarragon

That hadn't occurred to me. I'd like to hear more about it.

2) Are mathematical truths perhaps exceptionally irreducible (to if ...thens)?

It seems so to me.

That would certainly give them a special place in existence - buttressing all of it in fact.

Yes.

Michael Ossipoff

And the latter consequence is, per se, a situation that Tegmark believes in .