Part 2 of 2:
So, as I use the term, “a metaphysics” it refers to an account of what describably is.
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What does it mean to say that "in a metaphysics... there are... systems of ... facts"?
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Are you sure that all of that was in one sentence said by me?
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I said, above in this reply, that there are abstract implications, in the sense that we can refer to them, and that there consequently are infinitely-many complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications”.
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If you ask what that means, then I invite you to specify a particular word, phrase or term that I used, that you don’t know the meaning of.
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Is such a metaphysics just a story that someone tells?
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No. Did I say it was? As I use the term, “a metaphysics” is an account of what describably is.
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Can't we always tell another sort of story, even an incompatible one?
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Of course. You can tell any story you want to. You can even believe in and advocate a metaphysics based on a brute-fact. I can’t prove that your brute-fact isn’t true, if it isn’t inconsistent with observation, because it’s impossible to disprove an unfalsifiable proposition.
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When you say "in the metaphysics I propose, there are such and such facts..."
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That doesn’t sound like my wording, saying that the facts are in my metaphysics. I say that there are abstract implications, in the sense that we can refer to them.
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We don’t put things in quotes unless we’re making a direct quotation of one specific sentence that was actually said.
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, do you mean to suggest that this is an apt characterization of the way things are
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Yes. It’s an apt characterization of how describable things are.
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, or merely that this is one possible way to depict the world? Is it the only way?
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No. There are all sorts of metaphysicses based on brute-facts and depending on assumptions. …Materialism, for example.
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My proposal differs by not depending on any assumptions or brute-facts.
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When I propose a metaphysics, I propose the logical systems that I’ve referred to. …without our physical world being other than that.
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However, I don’t
claim that our physical world isn’t more than that, in some (usually unspecified) brute-fact way. Obviously it wouldn’t be possible to prove such a claim. …to disprove an unfalsifiable proposition.
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Is it a noncontroversial way?
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My limited claims are uncontroversial as I defined that term above.
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Moreover, it seems to me perhaps you've jumped ahead, by claiming that your metaphysical picture is necessary and noncontroversial, before you've even cleared up your terms:
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What is a fact? Is there a noncontroversial definition of "fact"?
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A fact is usually defined as a state of affairs, or as a relation among things. The implications that I speak of are facts by those definitions.
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But, as I say it now, I avoid that definitional issue by speaking instead of “abstract implications”, and clarify that, by “an implication”, I mean an implying of one proposition by another proposition.
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What is an implication-fact?
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It’s a fact that is an implication, as I defined “implication” above. But (as I said) I now just say “implication”, and define it as an implying of one proposition by another proposition, to avoid issues about definitions of “fact”.
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What is an abstract implication-fact
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I use “abstract implication” to refer to an implication about hypothetical things that needn’t have any particular “reality” or “existence” status.
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, and is there any other sort of implication-fact?
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“If there’s a car parked in front of your house, then that car was built by someone and parked or placed in front or your house by someone.”
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…where that car is actually observed there by the speaker and the person spoken to, and isn’t hypothetical (You could say it’s hypothetical if we haven’t looked out the window yet—but the implication in quotes above is say-able even if we have looked out the window and know that there’s a car parked in front).
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Of course yes, the use of “if “ can be argued to make every implication “hypothetical”. …except in the example above, if we’re looking out the window and the car is in front of us as we speak.
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What is a "complex system of abstract implication-facts"?
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It’s a system of implications that is complex.
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I speak of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications. …inter-referring in the sense that there are instances in which one or more implication is/are about one or more propositions or things that one or more other of the implications is/are about. …or in which one or more of the propositions is/are about things that one or more other propositions is/are about.
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In what sense are the abstract implication-facts in a complex system "inter-referring"?
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See directly above.
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Do you define an "abstract implication-fact' as an "instance of one hypothetical proposition implying another"?
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Yes. But now I just call it an “abstract implication”. …by which I mean an implying of one hypothetical proposition by another hypothetical proposition.
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Then it seems hypothetical propositions are the basis, or basic unit of the "complex systems" you describe.
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\Yes. …and implications about them.
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How do you distinguish between one such "complex system" and the "infinitely many others" you indicate?
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They consist of different abstract implications, about different propositions, about different things, with different consistent configurations of hypothetical truth-values for those hypothetical propositions.
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Why not say there is only one infinitely complex system?
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Because not all abstract implications are inter-referring, as I defined that term above.
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That’s the sense in which they aren’t all in the same inter-referring system.
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These separate, different, hypothetical logical systems are entirely isolated and independent of eachother, and each is independent of any outside context…any context other than its own inter-referring context.
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”Among those infinitely many such systems, there is inevitably one whose events and relations are those of your experience.” — Michael Ossipoff
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Why "inevitable"? The fact that a system contains infinitely many subsystems does not entail that it contains every possible subsystem.
I was referring specifically to the infinity of systems of abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things. Tautologically it includes all such systems.
I wasn't referring to just any infinite set of abstract propositions.
Every possible system of inter-referring abstract implications is one of the infinitely-many systems of inter-referring abstract implications.
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Maybe you’re questioning whether a system of inter-referring abstracts implications can match the physical events and relations of your experience in this physical world.
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I’ve mentioned that a set of hypothetical physical quantity-values, and a hypothetical relation among them (called a physical law, theory or hypothesis) together constitute the antecedent of an implication. …except that one of those hypothetical physical-quantity-values can be taken as the consequent of that implication.
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I’ve mentioned that a true mathematical theorem is an implication whose antecedent consists, at least in part, of a set of mathematical axioms.
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It isn’t controversial to say that a physical system of things and events is modeled by a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications.
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Michael Faraday, in1844, pointed out that there’s no reason to believe that our physical world is other than a complex mathematical and logical relational structure. More recently Frank Tippler and Max Tegmark have said the same thing.
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There are those mathematical and logical relations, with or without objectively-existent “stuff” (whatever “objectively-existent” would mean).
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My metaphysical proposal differs mostly in being about a subjective experience-story rather than an objective world-story.
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I suggest it's "inevitable" just because you have inserted this inevitability into your landscape, along with all the rest of the scenery.
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See above.
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What does it mean to say that a set of propositions and implications among propositions has "events and relations" that *are* the "events and relations of my life"?
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Yes, it’s not easy to word. Familiar topics are easier to word.
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I mean that that logical system models your physical experience in your physical world, in the sense that, if the hypothetical things, propositions and implications of that system are suitably-named, then a description of that system would be indistinguishable from an account of your experience.
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Yes, I know you don’t ordinarily experience all the things of physics. But you experience them when you more closely investigate and examine the physical world, or when you’re told of them by physicists, who find out about them when they more closely examine matter and its interactions.
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That’s one reason why I don’t just call it a mathematical system (like MUH).
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Because of my subjective emphasis, and because the only requirement of a subjective experience-story is consistency, I call it, more broadly, a logical system.
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Then I ask what you think this physical world additionally is, if you think it’s more than the hypothetical setting of such a hypothetical story.
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And I ask you in what context you want or believe this physical world to be or exist in, other than its own context.
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And I point out that whatever additional “objective reality” or “existence” you attribute to this physical world is an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact.
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Kiss Materialism goodbye unless you insist on believing in a brute-fact.
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So far as I can see, an event described is not the same as a description of that event. Surely it would be controversial to say so.
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There’s a logical system such that, with suitable naming of its things, a description of that logical system and its hypothetical things is the same as a description of your physical experience in your physical world.
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"It's raining (here, now)" may be called a proposition. That's not the same as the rain or the rain-event thus described.
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As you know, I’m speaking not only of hypothetical propositions, but also of implications about those propositions, and hypothetical things that the propositions are about, and a mutually-consistent configuration of hypothetical truth-values for the propositions.
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If it’s raining where you are, then, in the hypothetical experience-story that is your physical experience, with suitable naming of its things, it can be said that, in that experience-story, raindrops are now falling where you are.
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There’s an experience-story whose description matches a description of your experience.
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What kind of propositions are we talking about here?
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See above, where I discussed hypothetical quantity-values and a hypothetical relation among them. It is a proposition that a particular physical quantity-value has a certain value. It is a proposition that a certain hypothetical relation among the physical quantity-values obtains.
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But it isn’t just physical/mathematical matters. If you drop a heavy stone on your toe, it will at least hurt. No mathematics there. It’s a proposition that you drop the stone on your toe. It’s a proposition that it will at least hurt. One implies the other, unless you’re wearing boots with steel-reinforced toes.
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Closer examination of the situation, including some experiments, will result in directly experiencing relations among physical quantities.
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But, as I said, your experience isn’t entirely of physics and mathematics:
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As I often say, to say that there’s a traffic-roundabout at 34th & Vine is to say that if you go to 34th & Vine, you’ll encounter a traffic roundabout.
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But sometimes, via an experiment or observation, you experience the operation of a physical law. Sometimes you experience physical laws via reading about what physicists have found in their investigations and close examination of matter.
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When does one hypothetical proposition imply another?
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When the truth of one would mean that the other is true.
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In the physical example that I spoke of, I was speaking of an implication in which a certain hypothetical set of physical quantity-values, and a certain hypothetical relation among physical quantities, implies a certain value for another physical quantity-value.
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For a non-mathematical example: If I observe a traffic-roundabout at 34th & Vine, then I can tell you that “you go to 34th I Vine” implies “You encounter a traffic-roundabout”.
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For instance, "It's raining" doesn't imply that I'll take an umbrella on my walk, and "I'm hungry" doesn't imply that I'll eat before morning.
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Of course.
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Can you give particular examples of the fine-grained propositions and implications you have in mind?
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I gave the general example of some hypothetical quantity values, and a hypothetical relation among them; and the general example of a true mathematical theorem; and two non-mathematical examples.
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Is that an answer to your question?
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”There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.” — Michael Ossipoff
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Do you mean to suggest: There's no reason to believe that my experience is anything other than one subset of an infinite system of hypothetical propositions with implicatory relations?
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Yes. Of course at any time, your experience is only one place in your overall life-experience-story. …which is one of infinitely-many (mutually unrelated, unconnected, isolated and independent) complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, with their various mutually-consistent configurations of truth-values for those hypothetical propositions.
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Here's one reason: It seems my experience is actual, not hypothetical.
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What do you mean by “actual”?
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One consensus-meaning of “actual” that I’ve found is: “Part of or consisting of this physical world”. By that definition, whatever is or happens in this physical world is “actual”, even it it’s all only hypothetical.
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In fact it seems our experience is the very basis of our concepts of actuality and possibility, among other concepts.
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Of course.
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That’s why I say that the experiencer, the protagonist is complementary with his/her physical world, but primary and metaphysically prior to it in a meaningful sense.
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…and complementary with logic itself, for that matter, now that you bring that up--if you say that there are no abstract implications without someone to speak of them.
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”Of course I can’t prove that the Materialist’s objectively, concretely, fundamentally existent physical world, and its objectively, concretely existent stuff and things don’t superfluously exist, as an unverifiable and unfalsifiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the hypothetical logical system that I described above.” — Michael Ossipoff
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This concession seems to threaten the claim that your picture is noncontroversial.
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On contrary, limiting my claim protects it from controversial-ness, by disclaiming something that could be controversial.
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Not only can I not prove what I said that I can’t prove, but I don’t claim it either.
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In this context, the adverb "superflously" seems grossly tendentious.
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No, it seems reasonable to use that word for something that is “an unverifiable and unfalsifiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the [uncontroversially-inevitable] hypothetical logical system that I described above.”
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By now it seems you've begun to speak as if your complex system of hypothetical propositions is a thing that "exists", even apart from and independently of any physical world. But this claim is extremely controversial.
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…except that I’ve specified many times that I make no claims for its existence or reality.
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My only claim about these hypothetical systems’ “existence” is that there are abstract implications (and therefore systems of them) in the sense that we can speak of or refer to them.
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I make no other claim about their existence or reality.
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If you think that this physical world has “existence” “objective existence”, or “reality” that isn’t had by the logical system that I speak of, then what do you mean by “existence”, “objective existence”, or “reality”?
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In what context do you believe or want for this physical universe to “exist”, other than its own context?
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…and, if you have an answer to the above questions, or to one of them, are you sure that you aren’t positing a brute-fact?
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It's one thing to sketch a model of hypotheses
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Yes, the complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, with all the mutually-consistent configurations of hypothetical truth-values for those hypothetical propositions—to which I refer—is indeed hypothetical.
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However, that there are abstract implications, in the sense that we can speak of and refer to them isn’t a “hypothesis”. It’s uncontroversially-inevitable.
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…and , another to claim that the system of hypotheses "exists" apart from and prior to the physical world. How would you support such a claim, if that's what you're suggesting?
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See above. I don’t make any claims for its existence or reality, other than saying that there are abstract implications (and therefore systems of them) in the sense that we can speak of or refer to them.
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As for this physical world of your experience being something else, or something more, than such a hypothetical system—If you claim that, then I ask you in what way you think that this physical world is more than that. ...and be sure to define your terms.
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And after you answer that, I’ll ask you why there is whatever it is that you believe in. Brute-fact?
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”I emphasize that, in this metaphysics, I regard the experiencer and his/her experience as primary.” — Michael Ossipoff
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I'd say even more emphatically, that experience is a good starting point for all philosophy.
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It seems we reach rather different conclusions from this starting point.
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I’ll take your word for that, because you haven’t mentioned a metaphysical/ontological proposal that you claim is more parsimonious or supportable than mine, because you don’t know of one.
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There are other Subjective Idealists and Subjective Idealisms.
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I add mention of the premise that there are abstract implications (and therefore systems of them) in the sense that we can speak of and refer to them.
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Thereby, I talk about a completely parsimonious metaphysical “mechanism” and explanation for what describably is.
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There have been and are other Ontic Structuralists. The (Western, at least) ones I’ve heard of are Ontic Structural Realists (…but I haven’t heard enough about Michael Faraday to say that for sure).
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But I speak of subjective experience-stories, rather than objective world-stories.
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I don’t claim that all experience is logical, or that experience is entirely of logic, mathematics or physics.
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But a notable characteristic of our experience of this physical world’s physical things and events is that our experience of that isn’t inconsistent. Consistency seems be a requirement for that kind of experience.
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Arguably it would be impossible to really prove that a physical world is inconsistent, because a seeming inconsistency might merely be due to as-yet undiscovered physics (as has often been the case in the past), or mistaken memory, or hallucination, or dream.
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I agree with Litewave, that it would be meaningless to speak of an inconsistent physical universe, because there are no such things as mutually-inconsistent facts.
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But, in physics, there’s been a clear tendency for seeming inconstancies to later be explained by new physics that makes those seemingly mutually-inconsistent observations all consistent with the new physics.
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Most likely physics will be an open-ended endless sequences of explanations of physical things and laws by subsequently-discovered other physical things and laws. …and a never-ending revision of those laws.
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…unless maybe that endeavor eventually comes up against a final barrier due (for example) to high energies or small sizes that are infeasible for examination, or are inaccessible in principle.
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Michael Ossipoff