The Chairman of the Fed and the Secrerary of the Treasury were attempting to avoid a massive economic collapse following the failure of financial services companies. — frank
True and by all accounts they succeeded but at what cost in the long run? And I'm not talking about the immediate financial burden carried by tax payers for this specific bailout but because we know this will happen again and again. The moral hazard, e.g. the risks banks are willing to take because they will be bailed out, remains the same or has even increased. A typical "first as tragedy then as farce" and the farcical nature of these bailouts will only increase over time.
We've already seen (just in the US):
1. Franklin National Bank failing in 1964;
2. First Pennsulvania Bank failing in 1980;
3. Contintental Illinois Bank failing in 1984 (too big to fail mentioned for the first time);
4. Bank of New England failing in 1991;
5. the national banking crsis of the 80s (1600 banks failed and 1300 savings and loan banks);
The thing is Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers followed the same patterns where assets grew at incredible rates funded by short-term borrowing (with ridiculous maturity mismatch as a result).
Same pattern but different market circumstances exacerbated the failures in 2008. Money market funds provided better returns from the 80s onwards than those available on savings accounts, because those were set by the Fed at the time, so the set rate was rescinded. The growth of those funds fueled demand for short-term corporate commercial paper, which lowered the long term revolving lines of credits existing between banks and corporates.
Junk bonds started to finance M&A and longterm borrowing needs for corporates, further lowering income for the traditional banking model.
Add to that the various asset-backed securitisation and the role of banks changed from ultimate lender to an intermediary making money from loan origination fees, underwriting fees (for securitasation) and lona-servicing fees. Banks thought they had no risk on poor quality loans except, of ourse, that the riskier loans generated higher fees and were more profitable.
The increased competition of capital markets to provide funding as opposed to banks resulted in the slow but steady repeal or easing of various aspects of the Glass-Steagall act. During the 80s, banks were allowed to enter the following more riskier businesses:
- to own retail brokerage subsidiaries;
- to own and trade in a holding company proprietary account any form of equity, debt, or derivative security;
- to underwrite municipal securities; and to underwrite corporate securities.
The result: only a small percentage of income originates from loans to US corporates and instead investment banking, prop trading, morgtage and loan origination and processsing fees drive profits for banks. The banking model changed.
Then there's the derivatives business they entered into and in particular the Credit Default Swap (CDS), that were sold as "insurance". But it isn't insurance. If you buy insurance, you can only insure the event once and the insurance will only pay out actual loss and give insurance only to a person who has an insurable interest. The insurance has an obligation to only insure amounts for which it has sufficient reserves to cover estimated probabilities of loss. Anybody can buy a CDS (no insurable interest needed), the person writing the CDS has no limit on how much it can write (no reserves to cover estimated losses) and it can be more than the underlying value of expected loss. So at it's peak the CDS market was 60 trillion USD; 10 times the size of the value of default.
Add to the above the extraordinary consolidation of the past three decades and the incredibly increase in banking assets. In 1995 the combined assets of the six largest banks equaled 20% of US GDP, in 2009 that was more than 60%.
It is a fantastical notion to expect that having once pulled poorly run, systemically threatened firms out of the fire, government won’t do it again, no matter how many times and how loudly it says it won’t. — Richard Fisher, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
And the reason for these consolidations was not because bigger banks make better banks but because of the greater profitability for too-big-to-fail banks due to the implicit government guarantee. This reduces borrowing rates by 78 bps on average, which saved the 18 largest banks about 34 billion USD a year. (See:
The Value of the “Too Big to Fail” Big Bank Subsidy)
It doesn't benefit consumers. It doesn't benefit tax payers. It does benefit stockholders and bank executives. So yeah, "socialism for the rich" seems a pretty good shorthand for the above. But no matter, that is probably just semantics. I think we can agree, leaving aside the term socialism, that some did the deciding (politicians, lobby groups & executives) but others did the risking (tax payers).