It's a peculiar feeling to be tired of life. Rudderless really.

Trying to answer my own questions is difficult; but, one needs goals in life to sustain one's fire in a manner of speaking. Yet, I have no desire to really change anything in my life. It's this nagging urge to not feel depressed that is bothering me, as I have come to accept it.

If it will not go away, that's fine, I just have to learn to cope with it. But, that sense of coping with something that is at the same time within and out of one's control is not fun.

Welcome.

And idealism sounds about right here.

I feel as though the issue is resolved if we disregard the behaviorism. One must resort to talking about intentionality and volition, which come before words?

Any quotes? I think you might be relating this to his idea of beyond good and evil and eternal return — schopenhauer1

Not an expert. Just mentioning.

Correct. They are misguided as they are using "the pursuit of happiness" as an excuse to justify violating the non-aggression principle (not forcing others). It is the ultimate "get out of free card" because somehow the connotation of the emotion/state-of-being of happiness makes people fee warm and fuzzy and therefore must be automatically a good justification. — schopenhauer1

You don't talk much about Nietzsche; but, he expounded on this to great lengths.

Then you can tell them to feck off. They're misguided, like some religious fanatics that want to live forever in some paradise.

I agree, but this does not stop people from thinking that "pursuing happiness" is a principle people should be forced into pursuing by procreation. — schopenhauer1

And, we can both agree that such people are stupid and will suffer, so why use them as a template against the very notion of existence, which goes way beyond the notion of "happiness"?

However, this makes an assumption that happiness, and the pursuit thereof, is a reason unto itself for why procreation is justified. What makes happiness an automatic justification for procreation of another person? Is it really the ultimate "trump" card for why it is justified to put new people into existence and have to experience life? — schopenhauer1

Non-sequitur, really. Happiness isn't the ultimate goal of life, and thinking so would cause the very misery you are propounding against existence...

What is meant by "unsharable content" in this thread? That you can't talk about it? Or that other people can't directly access it? — Marchesk

Think of the man who just is infatuated with love. He says that it goes beyond what is sayable.


Paradox?

How is direct realism incompatible with private content? Set it out for us. — Banno

Ask @Terrapin Station?

Wallows Blog — Purple Pond

Wallows, just likes talking. But, the 7'th proposition keeps me in perpetual check. It's a stalemate really.

I don't know how you'd see the "beetle in the box" part as an epistemic issue. It has epistemic upshots, but it's an ontological issue. — Terrapin Station

It's epistemic if you're an indirect realist. That's the best way I can put it. Seems like you didn't read too much On Certainty by Wittgenstein or Moore.

Re this question, "Substance>Ontological>Epistemic>Perceptual>Mind?" I'm not sure I understand what you're asking. For one, what are the right arrows symbolizing there? — Terrapin Station

Starting from substance, in that order, ending with the mind.

Actually, here's something I omitted.

Tastes and preferences will radically change. Marx epitomized this in saying,

From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs

(I need to figure out why you're thinking they'd be incompatible, especially as you didn't understand my earlier explanation of this.) — Terrapin Station

Look, I view the issue as epistemic, so what you mean is the following?

Substance>Ontological>Epistemic>Perceptual>Mind?

Not sure. It could be.

NOT — Terrapin Station

Yeah, as if that were self-explanatory. Spill the beans already, why is direct realism NOT incompatible with private content?

Yeah, but if we're Borg, then I don't ANY issue.

How about just addressing the question? — Terrapin Station

I'm lost here. Just where did this start and where are we going?

The fact that it's what I've been typing makes it an epistemic issue? — Terrapin Station

So you agree or not that it is an epistemic issue?

Gah! That's what I've been typing. lol — Terrapin Station

That makes it an epistemic issue, not an ontological one, derp.

Also,

https://www.coursera.org/learn/philosophy

I still prefer the juicy Brayan Magee interviews about philosophers from philosophers and their work:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4960/bryan-magee-videos-on-youtube

I was explaining how direct realism isn't incompatible with non-shareable mental content. — Terrapin Station

Yeah, this part I don't entirely get. If I were a direct-realist, then there wouldn't really be unsharable content in my mind. Let me know why would you think otherwise?

Again, what I'm saying is NOT just about perception. It would be the same if no people/no perceivers/observers existed.

That's why I wrote "NOT" in big capital letters. So you wouldn't think that I'm saying something about perception, etc. — Terrapin Station

Then please elaborate about ontological commitments in light of private content or whatnot?

Spinoza comment. — Terrapin Station

My point is that an observer is redundant if God is one and the same with god being nature. Hence, I don't really subscribe to the ontological commitment of the moon not existing if I don't look at it. Quantum mechanics is can be (depending on which interpretation you believe in) very idealistic, something that doesn't get mentioned enough.

I mean, I get where this is going, Plato's third man argument and all; but, if we assume a Spinoza *g*od, then this is just trite.

Yes, of course. Nothing is identical from two different spatiotemporal locations. This is NOT just about perception. It's about ontology in general. It would be the case if no people/no perceivers existed. — Terrapin Station

Are you advocating a form of idealism in ontology?

Are you saying that if I drew the number 9 in the sand, and stood at the top of the number and someone stood at the bottom, we would have different perceptions of this symbolic representation? That's doesn't really prove anything apart from relativism in perception. Indirect realism rules in my mind.

One thing, that doesn't make sense is to say that people are direct realists, yet have beetles in boxes, what do you think @Terrapin Station?

Well yes, Wittgensteins beetle.

And, furthermore, dear Banno, do you believe in propositional attitudes?

This is perhaps the ultimate question.

@Banno, I really like the example you provided about the chap that loves so much that words can't express it. What are we left with to determine his or her love for another or even him or herself?

Strictly behavior?

But, then we have the private (language) argument creep up all over again. And beetles...

@Frank is referring to @Banno's profile feed, which I shall quote including my questions that others may relate to:

Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such as; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition.

--Please explain to us, what excludes “The present king of France is bald” from the qualifier of being a proposition?

Beliefs range over propositions. (arguably, they might be made to range over statements: Fred believes the present king of France is bald.)

--Yet, the domain or the domain of discourse (wiki it) of propositions that are sensical, as opposed to the nonsense Fred may belief, remains the same, so Fred doesn’t need to take his meds, or does he?

Beliefs set out a relation of a particular sort between an agent and a proposition.

--This isn’t clear. It seems your advocating either a correspondence theory between an agent and a proposition or rather a belief that obtains. Yet, Fred denies this by maintaining that the present King of France is bald. For all I know, this may be true in a possible world. Perhaps, you are implying a T-schema that obtains iff we compare it to our world.

This relation is such that if the agent acts in some way then there is a belief and a desire that together are sufficient to explain the agent's action. Banno wants water; he believes he can pour a glass from the tap; so he goes to the tap to pour a glass of water.

--This is very behaviorist and quite outdated. Rather, I posit that propositional attitudes, such as Banno wants water, are determined by not belief or desire, but a volition.

The logical problem here, the philosophical interesting side issue, is that beliefs overdetermine our actions. There are other beliefs and desires that could explain my going to the tap.

--No, disagreement; but, this is too simple. A volition is something that determines action, and beliefs need not even be mentioned here.
______________

We know some statements when at the least we believe it, it fits in with our other beliefs, and when it is true.

--This is too simple. Take your famous example of the Romantic that proclaims his love as being greater than words can say. How does this statement jive with truth aptness?

The "fits in with other beliefs" is the first approximation for a justification. Something stronger is needed, but material implication will not do.

--Please elaborate.

Discard Gettier. The definition is not hard-and-fast.

It does not make sense to ask if we know X to be true; that's exactly the same as asking if we know X. The "we only know it if it is true" bit is only there because we can't know things that are false.

--I beg to differ, the principle of bipolarity, assumes that every utterance that is truth-apt can be either true or false. Wittgenstein would know.

If you cannot provide a justification, that is, if you cannot provide other beliefs with which a given statement coheres, then you cannot be said to know it.

--This is not true or rather how can it be true. In other words, what kind of justification is required here? E.g. the Romantic, who professes his love, has overdetermined justification in his love towards his partner by encompassing the entire domain of discourse with his statement about his love towards her being greater than what words can say. Instead, I advocate a pragmatic account of a man who is acting, not following a pattern or set of rules. Again, volitions creep up here.

A belief that is not subject to doubt is a certainty.

--The solipsist of the Tractatus agrees.

Without a difference between belief and truth, we can't be wrong; if we can't be wrong, we can't fix our mistakes; without being able to fix our mistakes, we can't make things better

--Again, Banno, what theory of truth are you advocating here? I am quite interested in knowing this. It would seem to me that Davidson and Tarski were bedfellows. — Banno's profile quizzed by Wallows

Try Nardil dude.

@Baden, @Banno this is the best I could do, take it or leave it:


Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such as; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition.

--Please explain to us, what excludes “The present king of France is bald” from the qualifier of being a proposition?

Beliefs range over propositions. (arguably, they might be made to range over statements: Fred believes the present king of France is bald.)

--Yet, the domain or the domain of discourse (wiki it) of propositions that are sensical, as opposed to the nonsense Fred may belief, remains the same, so Fred doesn’t need to take his meds, or does he?

Beliefs set out a relation of a particular sort between an agent and a proposition.

--This isn’t clear. It seems your advocating either a correspondence theory between an agent and a proposition or rather a belief that obtains. Yet, Fred denies this by maintaining that the present King of France is bald. For all I know, this may be true in a possible world. Perhaps, you are implying a T-schema that obtains iff we compare it to our world.

This relation is such that if the agent acts in some way then there is a belief and a desire that together are sufficient to explain the agent's action. Banno wants water; he believes he can pour a glass from the tap; so he goes to the tap to pour a glass of water.

--This is very behaviorist and quite outdated. Rather, I posit that propositional attitudes, such as Banno wants water, are determined by not belief or desire, but a volition.

The logical problem here, the philosophical interesting side issue, is that beliefs overdetermine our actions. There are other beliefs and desires that could explain my going to the tap.

--No, disagreement; but, this is too simple. A volition is something that determines action, and beliefs need not even be mentioned here.
______________

We know some statements when at the least we believe it, it fits in with our other beliefs, and when it is true.

--This is too simple. Take your famous example of the Romantic that proclaims his love as being greater than words can say. How does this statement jive with truth aptness?

The "fits in with other beliefs" is the first approximation for a justification. Something stronger is needed, but material implication will not do.

--Please elaborate.

Discard Gettier. The definition is not hard-and-fast.

It does not make sense to ask if we know X to be true; that's exactly the same as asking if we know X. The "we only know it if it is true" bit is only there because we can't know things that are false.

--I beg to differ, the principle of bipolarity, assumes that every utterance that is truth-apt can be either true or false. Wittgenstein would know.

If you cannot provide a justification, that is, if you cannot provide other beliefs with which a given statement coheres, then you cannot be said to know it.

--This is not true or rather how can it be true. In other words, what kind of justification is required here? E.g. the Romantic, who professes his love, has overdetermined justification in his love towards his partner by encompassing the entire domain of discourse with his statement about his love towards her being greater than what words can say. Instead, I advocate a pragmatic account of a man who is acting, not following a pattern or set of rules. Again, volitions creep up here.

A belief that is not subject to doubt is a certainty.

--The solipsist of the Tractatus agrees.

Without a difference between belief and truth, we can't be wrong; if we can't be wrong, we can't fix our mistakes; without being able to fix our mistakes, we can't make things better

--Again, Banno, what theory of truth are you advocating here? I am quite interested in knowing this. It would seem to me that Davidson and Tarski were bedfellows.

Well, yes, after all, everything is a goat.

Does this need mentioning?

(I literally have Reference and Existence right next to me but haven't started it yet).

Why assume that descriptions must refer? — Banno

Here's my takeaway from the Naming and Necessity thread, that you managed. Descriptors can attain the status of rigid designators. Do you object to this?

It's a stream of consciousness type thing. Picking anything out would be like pizza without tomatoes.

Words don't refer. Referring is something we do with words. So we can put words together that look just like they are referring; but don't. — Banno

But, descriptors, like Saint Nick is an old fat bloke that lives in the North Pole, refer to what exactly?