It makes sense because properties are unique at each spatio-temporal location.

So for example, we have this:

A...............................@......................................B

The properties of @ are different at @, at A and at B (and at every point in between). If A and B are persons with perception, etc., they can directly perceive what @ is like at their spatio-temporal location, but that's not identical to what @ is like at any other spatio-temporal location.

In addition to that, there's also what it's like to have subjective mental content, including qualia, with respect to those perceptions.

Are you saying that if I drew the number 9 in the sand, and stood at the top of the number and someone stood at the bottom, we would have different perceptions of this symbolic representation? That's doesn't really prove anything apart from relativism in perception. Indirect realism rules in my mind.

Yes, of course. Nothing is identical from two different spatiotemporal locations. This is NOT just about perception. It's about ontology (or "the ontic") in general. It would be the case if no people/no perceivers existed.

Yes, of course. Nothing is identical from two different spatiotemporal locations. This is NOT just about perception. It's about ontology in general. It would be the case if no people/no perceivers existed. — Terrapin Station

Are you advocating a form of idealism in ontology?

I mean, I get where this is going, Plato's third man argument and all; but, if we assume a Spinoza *g*od, then this is just trite.

Are you advocating a form of idealism in ontology? — Wallows

If we have no people/no perceivers, how do we have ideas (for idealism)?

I'm not saying anything about the third man argument. You'd have to explain the Spinoza comment.

Spinoza comment. — Terrapin Station

My point is that an observer is redundant if God is one and the same with god being nature. Hence, I don't really subscribe to the ontological commitment of the moon not existing if I don't look at it. Quantum mechanics is can be (depending on which interpretation you believe in) very idealistic, something that doesn't get mentioned enough.

My point is that an observer is redundant is God is one and the same with god being nature. — Wallows

Again, what I'm saying is NOT just about perception. It would be the same if no people/no perceivers/observers existed.

That's why I wrote "NOT" in big capital letters--hoping you'd notice it more that way. So you wouldn't think that I'm saying something about perception, etc.

Again, what I'm saying is NOT just about perception. It would be the same if no people/no perceivers/observers existed.

That's why I wrote "NOT" in big capital letters. So you wouldn't think that I'm saying something about perception, etc. — Terrapin Station

Then please elaborate about ontological commitments in light of private content or whatnot?

Then please elaborate about ontological commitments in light of private content or whatnot? — Wallows

I'm confused what you're asking about there. I wasn't saying anything about "ontological commitments."

I was explaining how direct realism isn't incompatible with non-shareable mental content.

For one, you're assuming a naive "objective things are just one way" claim. That's not the case. Objective things are all sorts of ways, from different spatio-temporal locations.

I was explaining how direct realism isn't incompatible with non-shareable mental content. — Terrapin Station

Yeah, this part I don't entirely get. If I were a direct-realist, then there wouldn't really be unsharable content in my mind. Let me know why would you think otherwise?

Let me know why would you think otherwise? — Wallows

Gah! That's what I've been typing. lol

Gah! That's what I've been typing. lol — Terrapin Station

That makes it an epistemic issue, not an ontological one, derp.

The fact that it's what I've been typing makes it an epistemic issue?

The fact that it's what I've been typing makes it an epistemic issue? — Terrapin Station

So you agree or not that it is an epistemic issue?

So you agree or not that it is an epistemic issue? — Wallows

It would be difficult to tell whether I agree from me asking you a question, wouldn't it? How about just addressing the question?

I asked this: "The fact that it's what I've been typing makes it an epistemic issue? "

Because this: "That makes it an epistemic issue, not an ontological one, derp."

Made no sense as a response to this: "Gah! That's what I've been typing. lol "

How about just addressing the question? — Terrapin Station

I'm lost here. Just where did this start and where are we going?

I'm lost here. Just where did this start and where are we going? — Wallows

You wrote: "One thing, that doesn't make sense is to say that people are direct realists, yet have beetles in boxes, what do you think @Terrapin Station?"

I responded with "It makes sense because . . ." and then I explained.

You asked a clarification question. I answered.

Then you got sidetracked/confused by an issue that I said my response was NOT about--you figured I was saying something about that . . . right after I made sure to explicitly say that the response was NOT about that. And then things seemed to devolve into increasingly weird, incoherent (at least in context) responses.

Yeah, but if we're Borg, then I don't ANY issue.

NOT — Terrapin Station

Yeah, as if that were self-explanatory. Spill the beans already, why is direct realism NOT incompatible with private content?

Just to figure out why you're thinking they'd be incompatible, you're not thinking that direct realism amounts to eliminative materialism, are you? (I need to figure out why you're thinking they'd be incompatible, especially as you didn't understand my earlier explanation of this.)

Not sure. It could be.

(I need to figure out why you're thinking they'd be incompatible, especially as you didn't understand my earlier explanation of this.) — Terrapin Station

Look, I view the issue as epistemic, so what you mean is the following?

Substance>Ontological>Epistemic>Perceptual>Mind?

I think Chomsky avers (somewhere on youtube) that Hume and Heraclitus were privy to the same insight. Of course he draws a different lesson from it than Quine. But he doesn't say the doctrine itself is mistaken, or even that it is behaviouristic. And it isn't. It points out that you can't objectively ground reference in behaviour. — bongo fury

To that, one might want to add a long list philosophers who have rejected epistemological foundationalism on the basis of either phenomenological or causal arguments, for inscrutability is a simple corollary of holism and uncertainty.

Whenever an engineer measures the 'false positive' rate of a prediction rule, it is always in relation to a definition of ground-truth, that varies from experiment to experiment. For example, in a face-recognition machine-learning problem the definition of 'ground truth' is the particular image dataset used to train the classifier algorithm. But there cannot be an all-encompassing data-set for defining what a face image is across every face recognition problem, because every situation has different and conflicting auxiliary premises, such as what counts as a 'disguised' or occluded face.

I don't think Quine meant to imply anything more than that.

I don't know how you'd see the "beetle in the box" part as an epistemic issue. It has epistemic upshots, but it's an ontological issue.

Substance>Ontological>Epistemic>Perceptual>Mind? — Wallows

Re this question, "Substance>Ontological>Epistemic>Perceptual>Mind?" I'm not sure I understand what you're asking. For one, what are the right arrows symbolizing there?

I don't know how you'd see the "beetle in the box" part as an epistemic issue. It has epistemic upshots, but it's an ontological issue. — Terrapin Station

It's epistemic if you're an indirect realist. That's the best way I can put it. Seems like you didn't read too much On Certainty by Wittgenstein or Moore.

Re this question, "Substance>Ontological>Epistemic>Perceptual>Mind?" I'm not sure I understand what you're asking. For one, what are the right arrows symbolizing there? — Terrapin Station

Starting from substance, in that order, ending with the mind.

It's epistemic if you're an indirect realist. — Wallows

How is it epistemic if you're an indirect realist? The issue is whether there's something inherently private and not directly shareable (in the show and tell sense). That has epistemic upshots, but it's an ontological situation. So how do you see it as being an epistemic issue if one is an indirect realist?

Starting from substance, in that order, ending with the mind. — Wallows

What is starting with substance? The world? Someone's theory? Someone's discussion preference?

The logical problem here, the philosophical interesting side issue, is that beliefs overdetermine our actions. There are other beliefs and desires that could explain my going to the tap. — Banno's profile quizzed by Wallows

It's remarkable that when it comes to simple AI agents such as Amazon Alexa, we tend to avoid attributing beliefs to them because we are confident in our causal understanding of their linguistic behaviour. So for instance, if Alexa expressed a false sentence we might for example say she was merely reporting the contents of an outdated database, or directly expressing a programming error or sensor failure, rather than accusing her of literally harbouring a false belief. In short i think we tend to be externalists relying on the causal theory of reference when it comes to understanding artificial brains, which ironically makes us more forgiving of AI than of humans to whom we tend to subconsciously attribute miraculous causative and representational internal properties without scientific justification.

Examples such as this tempt me into thinking that the notions of belief and volition will gradually be eliminated from human psychology and ordinary discourse, along with the epistemological notion of 'objective' truth, and replaced by a richer and environmentally-integrated holistic notion of behavioural semantics that is specific to each and every individual. Such a notion would appeal heavily to the causal theory of reference when it is used to understand the state of any human or AI agent, to the effect that the notion of a 'shared' linguistic semantics would effectively be abandoned.

I'm sure it's been covered here, but I do not find it - if a kind soul will direct me, point me on the way, I'd be grateful. The question is, why do we not here recognize the distinction between the practical and the theoretic? The test of the practical, does it work? Of the theoretic - well, those tests depend on the who and the what for, but generally are tests of internal consistency at least, and the possibility of verification of converting to practical.

Pigs and cows. Pigs in the sty, cows in the field. On the farm co-existing, but not indiscriminately mixed; the skill of the farmer being in understanding these things and applying the understandings appropriately.

Like a beetle in a box...?