So the antinatalist is psychologically projecting his own misery onto the unborn. But the antinatalist was himself once that very unborn child. — Inyenzi

But, that doesn't give him the right to say that the unborn fetus should not live!

Really listen. — leo

But, what is the antinatalist really telling us?

But, your position is inherently based on the subjective experience of suffering or strife, which you try to rationalize into an objective brute fact about existence. Is this at least correct?

So, I don't know what you're getting at other than trolling for the sake of trolling. — schopenhauer1

Uhh, really? I used to profess a negative outlook on life; but, this isn't trolling in the least. And, you shouldn't care about what others think. I admire your doggedness in regards to the issue.

At the very strongest case, there would be an appeal to how the world is structurally suffering for everyone, no matter what contingent circumstances the person experiences. — schopenhauer1

See, and that's a form of black-and-white thinking along with overgeneralizing. You prevent the unborn fetus to make up their own mind in regards to the issue, and project a fatalistic, pessimistic, and highly negative outlook on their future life, which manifests in the form of denying the fetus ANY life. That's just wrong, and I'm the first to point it out or make explicit.

What's the point of even bringing this up if you are only going to have, what, two antinatalists on this forum defend it against the hordes of non-antinatalists? That is a bit of trolling if you ask me. BUT I'll indulge your trolling attempts... — schopenhauer1

No trolling implied. I stand by what I said, that you didn't care to address.

Nice work. Been wondering about how the (CP) coincides with the apparent pragmatic touch of the later Wittgenstein.

But since I now am on SSDI I get to wallow every day...

I’m not a threat and I’m not dangerous. I just want to be left alone by certain people; not you, you’re fine. I like Wallows. It’s certain other people. — Noah Te Stroete

Yeah I don't like dealing with other people, either. It's such a hassle...

Obviously you think I’m just psychotic. — Noah Te Stroete

Not really. Just paranoid. You can be paranoid without being psychotic.

If it's a core belief that you pose a danger to the government or some stuff like that, then I'm only trying to address it in the confines of this thread. I wish you didn't take it the wrong way as I've been through that crap and it sucks.

Who you gonna call ? Hanover ? :kiss: — Amity

Hanny only believes in himself.

Cheers Wallows, are you reading the Preface? — Amity

I'm wallowing through it slowly.

Well, the CIA/Pentagon is protecting me as compensation for what they did to me.

You have my sympathy. I’m sorry you lost your freedom. — Noah Te Stroete

Why are you paranoid about our government? I was in the military for a brief while, and after I got out, I was constantly paranoid about helicopters flying overhead and police still observing me. That's when I decided that I needed a mood stabilizer or antipsychotic and the paranoia subsided.

You said you take stimulant medication... Is that helping you or exacerbating the paranoia?

He's having a bad day, @Amity.

Cheers.

1) It is possible for an omniscient being to know other minds exist. So omniscience doesn't lead to solipsism. — TheMadFool

Not really. Think about a dream world which you inhabit during sleep. You see other people in it who seemingly have an intent of their own. But, the reality of the solipsistic dream world is one where you are the only mind present in it, and your-self is the only mind creating these dream characters with "other minds". Hope that makes sense. It's important that I highlight here that the solipsist's self is one and the same with the "world". There is nothing beyond this solipsistic world, epistemologically.

But it's not necessary for there to be no other minds. An omniscient being may come to know other minds exist. — TheMadFool

That may be true, but doesn't detract from God ever truthfully answering a question with:

I don't know. — Said no God ever.

How's omniscience related to solipsism? — TheMadFool

Yeah, well think about it this way. I am omniscient, there is nothing more to know about the "world". Hence, the life of a solipsist is epistemically absolute, no doubt can arise.

From what I can see solipsism is born from not knowing rather than knowing. You may be referring to hardline solipsism here but I don't subscribe to the belief that only I exist. — TheMadFool

Pretty much hardline solipsism.

As you can see the solipsist view stems from doubt[/] that the question "do other minds exist?" clearly demonstrates. I don't see how that questioning mind, the doubt that bothers the solipsist, leads to certainty as you put it. — TheMadFool

Imagine if you were a true solipsist, or "God", does God doubt? Wouldn't an omniscient being not even be able to doubt?

The fact that sticking my hand in fire will hurt does not create a bias in me. It is a factual piece of information about what reality is like. — Andrew4Handel

All of life? Who's reality? Yours or the unborn fetus?

What they fail to consider is two things:
1. The vast, vast majority of people on earth do not perceive themselves as suffering unbearably.
2. Even those who suffer unbearably at some point in their lives, are not necessarily of the opinion that never having been born at all would be a better alternative. — Tzeentch

This sounds very similar to what I read as the antithesis of 'antinatalism', being logotherapy. Even in the most extreme forms of despair and powerlessness one's attitude or world-view can be controlled.

Have you read Viktor Frankl's Man's Search for Meaning? It details the life of a Jewish doctor/psychiatrist in an extermination camp, and how he was able to still choose what and how he felt to his predicament in life.

Yes, these are all terrible things; but, is this really an unbiased analysis of the world?

How is reading about the holocaust and other mass murders and tortures depression and not just an acceptance of harsh brutal facts? — Andrew4Handel

What facts?

I'm not sure if what you're saying is factually correct. The majority of marijuana in legalized states is produced locally, as far as I know. The marijuana grown in Mexico or South America is of poor quality.

Noting that even in a legal market some portion of marijuana would be from criminal cartels that practice violence, is it ethical to use marijuana? — Jude Joanis

Well, this doesn't follow if the cartels aren't profiting from it, yes?

In my own experience antinatalism is based on the reality of suffering.

Depression,anxiety, schizophrenia, two world wars, the holocaust slavery, cancer. MS etc . Noone has a right to inflict this on anyone or expose them to it and also to shore up gross global inequality. — Andrew4Handel

OK, so is this depression and anxiety speaking or an unbiased and 'objective' analysis of the current state of affairs in the world?

Antinatalism in my opinion is also an enlightened view on the true nature and connotations of creating life. — Andrew4Handel

What do you mean by that?

You mean to frame anything in terms of "suffering"? — Terrapin Station

Well, not only that; but, also the issue of characterizing the life of an unborn fetus, which one never knows really how would unfold, as unworthy of experience. By what standards, or to what purpose?

The idea of any ethical stance hinging on "suffering" isn't at all appealing to me, because I think that "suffering" is both (a) way too vague, and (b) not something that's inherently proscribable ethically. — Terrapin Station

"Gross-overgeneralization," would be the first thing that comes to my mind...

I am discussing the fact that none can automatically be considered to have consented any aspect of life and society. — Andrew4Handel

Yeah, and since they can't form coherent sentences, or let alone consent to anything.

What I'm saying is that it's not a "good" decision bestowed by a parent, rather a projection of insecurities and concerns about the world onto a fictional entity that is this unborn child.

This is part of what Wittgenstein was getting at regarding solipsism. He is not using solipsism in the sense of doubting the existence of an external world or other minds but rather, but as the metaphysical subject. The I alone, solus ipse, sees the world, experiences, describes, lives my life. — Fooloso4

Please expand on what you mean by a "metaphysical subject"? Another stipulated term I suppose.

Yeah, one question that lingers in my mind, is whether Wittgenstein advocated nominalism in his latter or early period. (Debatable)

Haven't yet read Austin, though it might be a good thing to do.

The early Wittgenstein dealt with the problem of universals by advocating an approach that quantified a qualifier of the property of an object. Logical simples/Russellian atomism, descriptivism, and whatnot.

The latter Wittgenstein repudiated this by adhering to an approach that negated the 'objectivity' of a universal by the way we use language. Family resemblances/pragmatism, and intuitionism, or the property of human beings that allows them to agree that red is red, and whatnot.

'From inside' means only 'as I know things'; I describe those things - something, however, I cannot communicate or express: I try to, by saying I speak 'from an inside point of view'. But there is no other point of view. Suppose others too speak of the 'inside point of view'? That is my experience of my supposition of spoken words.
— Anscombe, G. E. M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 1971. G. E. M. Anscombe, pg. 166

Tractatus reading group — Fooloso4

In case anyone is wondering here is the reading group Fooloso4 is referring to:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/3558/ongoing-tractatus-logico-philosophicus-reading-group/

How could we know how close we get? But this is the wrong way to look at it.

With regard to the facts of the world we should be able to agree. But my world is not the world of facts. Consider what he says about the world of the happy man. When I die the world as I know it ends, but this does not mean it ends at that point for everyone else. — Fooloso4

So, this opens a can of worms.

First, I assume that the only way to address this is through/from an inward-outward view of the matter, as per the G.E.M Anscombe quote from above.
Second, this raises the issue of the nature of experience, I think.
Third, what is ethical and mystical are those features of talking about the inward workings of the mind in an intersubjective manner.

I just doesn't make sense to ask for consent to live of a newborn baby.

The limits are knowledge are seen in that we cannot identify or name all of the simple objects, and in the distinction between the world and my world. — Fooloso4

So, to present this issue from calculus, as I approach the limit between "my world" and "the world", there is an infinitesimal joint discontinuity, where "my world" ends and "the world" begins?

Or this:

In exploring the theme of Wittgenstein's view of solipsism, G. E. M. Anscombe describes his contrast between what can be expressed (or thought) through language and what can only be shown but not expressed. Language is a mirror of reality: (page 164)

All the logical devices - the detailed twiddles and manipulations of our language - combine, Wittgenstein tells us at 5.511, into an infinitely fine network, forming 'the great mirror' - that is to say, the mirror of language, whose logical character makes it reflect the world and makes its individual sentences say that such-and-such is the case. — Anscombe, G. E. M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 1971. G. E. M. Anscombe, pg. 164

This mirroring suggests realism. Something is being mirrored. However, the mirroring not only expresses statements about reality but also shows what cannot be expressed: (page 166)

Thus when the Tractatus tells us that 'Logic is transcendental', it does not mean that the propositions of logic state transcendental truths; it means that they, like all other propositions, shew something that pervades everything sayable and is itself unsayable. — Anscombe, G. E. M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 1971. G. E. M. Anscombe, pg. 166

What is unsayable is in the "limits" of logic which are the world's "limits" (5.61) and the world is "my world" (5.62 and 5.63). This is where solipsism comes in: (page 166)

So, it comes out that it is illegitimate to speak of 'an I'. 'From inside' means only 'as I know things'; I describe those things - something, however, I cannot communicate or express: I try to, by saying I speak 'from an inside point of view'. But there is no other point of view. Suppose others too speak of the 'inside point of view'? That is my experience of my supposition of spoken words. — Anscombe, G. E. M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 1971. G. E. M. Anscombe, pg. 166

This leads to Wittgenstein's paradoxical view of solipsism expressed in 5.64:

Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality coordinated with it. — Anscombe, G. E. M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 1971. G. E. M. Anscombe, pg. 166

This can be seen as coming from Wittgenstein's view of language as saying what can be said about my world and showing what cannot be said about my world.

Hope this helps:

Wittgenstein--that is, Wittgenstein of the Tractatus--is the last philosopher we shall mention in this regard. Wittgenstein's conception of the "metaphysical subject," the subject that is not part of the world but its "limit," is, I believe, the conception of the personal horizon, the subject matter with which we shall be occupied in this book. [...] In the Tractatus, the deepest truths, like the "truth" in solipsism, are truths that have reference to the personal horizon, to the "limit" of the world (the metaphysical subject). — Dream, Death, and the Self, JJ Valberg, pg.17

Personal horizon.

To me, that seems like Wittgenstein wouldn't really understand what those terms refer to. — Terrapin Station

If the sentence after that is supposed to offer some insight, I don't know how. Wittgenstein says, "The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension." That just seems like math-fetishist gobbledygook . — Terrapin Station

See if @Fooloso4's comment might make more sense or within the context he is offering?

In what way does the limits of language show that the world is my world? Suppose someone were to reject W.’s claim saying: “There must be more to my world”, to which the response would be: “What more is there”? And of course no answer could be given. If an answer could be given, whatever is said would be within that limit. I take this to be a form of skepticism. He is not denying that there may be more than I can say or think but that it is nonsense to say this because it does not point to anything. It does not mark a limit to the world or to language but to my world and the language I understand. But the same is true for all of us. — Fooloso4

What makes you say this is a skeptical argument? I think it is along the lines of a claim that epistemic closure is absolute for a solipsist (by the very definition of solipsism), and nothing more can be known for him or her.

I'm not talking about things that are hidden or unknown/not conscious. — Terrapin Station

Then please specify, what's the problem in my analysis of claiming that a solipsist (such as a God) is epistemically omniscient?