I want to be given a rational argument to convince me out of my beliefs, because regardless of whether it's a product of my survival instinct, I want to live. It's just incredibly difficult to do so when I don't have a logical justification. — simmerdown

There really isn't a conceived criteria that would justify living, unless one were to think in terms of an exclusively binary situation. I feel as though it's a mistake to think in terms of finding a reason to live, when it all depends on what you value most.

What is a counterfactual existentially dependent for successful reference?

But, it's the same individual due to his (its) descriptive content. Therefore we can assume that we're talking about the same individual.

we can place certain values on life, such as life is good or bad. — simmerdown

[...] but, thinking makes it so?

I suspect that if we are going to address issues pertaining to the propositional attitude we have towards life, then we ought to examine the process of thinking about it. If one has distorted conceptions of life, such that death is no better than living, which by all means is a highly subjective statement to make, then we ought to consult with other people about what they think also, yes?

Think that through for me. What sort of stipulation would allow us to bring Santa Clause into existence? — Banno

Through adhering to the only thing that the proper name "Santa Claus" refers to, his descriptive content of being a fat plump man living at the North Pole, who know's whether you've been naughty or nice, and rewards accordingly with coal or presents.

I don't see any magic. — Banno

So, Santa Claus isn't a magical being? Because we might as well refer to empty names when we "discover" through creating (or is it stipulating?) these new individuals in other possible worlds.

I think darthbarracuda is closer to the line of thinking I'm getting at. — simmerdown

Can you expand on it? I think his post was interesting for a number of reasons; but, ultimately self-refuting.

You will have to explain this to me. — Banno

You are aware of the actualist and possibilist interpretations of modal logic?

Under the Barcan Formula, individuals across the domain of possible worlds remain the same and can't magically grow from one world to the other. This seems to appeal to the actualist account of modal logic.

Or in other words, there's nothing to be discovered from one possible world to the next, since there are no new individuals populating said possible world.

If we assume that individuals can magically come about in another possible world, then we are indeed appealing to "discovering" some new entity or individual in another possible world.

But, doesn't the Barcan Formula eliminate the appeal of "discovering" instead of "stipulating" possible worlds. That whole distinction sort of gets dissolved with the Barcan Formula. It also holds great import for the issue of trans-world identification.

The Barcan formula is not a thesis of his system. — Banno

Why not?

"The nature of EQ is to assert that there is at least one object being quantified that exists"

In that case, is 'empty set' factual, counterfactual, both, neither? — id-entity

I would simplify the concept and ask the pertinent question as to whether empty names are representative of an empty set in natural language. If so, then what's the idea behind quantification of empty names?

Good students will generally do well regardless of which school they attend. — prothero

What defines a "good student"? You would think that it would be obvious by now, due to the amount of time we've had education present in the affairs of humanity, that we would be able to figure out how to produce students ideally suited for a college education.

The logical form that underlies the facts and propositions is the same. The subject is neither one of those facts and so cannot be represented in a proposition. The subject’s relation to the world is not a logical one. More on this in # 6. — Fooloso4

Then what can be said about the subject at all if it forms cannot be depicted? A subject cannot represent itself; but, to another person or even "God", his or her form is apparent in behavior or mannerisms or characteristics. Or to put this another way, "traits" cannot be modeled but observed.

Please read my post on 5 (the one you said was incoherent. I assure you that it is not). It is mostly direct quotes from the text and addresses all of the questions you raised. — Fooloso4

I never said your posts are incoherent. I wouldn't dare to say that to a grad student which I assume you are. I merely, am asking if what you're saying can be expanded on instead of having to use the Tractatus as punchlines. The work is easy to use as a means to end a sentence; but, I hope we can delve more deeply into the metaphysical self and its relation to the world through the logical form in logical space.

So, let me break it down.

The meter stick is not the rigid designator, but the length of the meter stick is? How can this be?

Interesting. But the metaphysical self is then transcendental?

Same. But it's a healthy addiction. I like when I get a post to respond to...

Ok, that much I understand. But, the standard length of a meter isn't stipulated, is it?

So, how do you address the issue of trans-world identification?

Ah, I see. But, then if the metaphysical self doesn't reside in the world, then where does it reside then?

But it isn't. The length of the stick might have been other than it was.

Did you mean "The length of the meter is rigid in all possible worlds"? That works. — Banno

My point seems to be that there is no difference between the two. If we are to assume a possible world where the nomological necessity of the length of the meter stick is defined by the conditions quoted text in the OP, which obtains due to being the same as our world, then stating otherwise is nonsense.

Well, yes. Here's is what I'm referencing again:

Today, a meter is defined as the length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299,792,458 of a second. A second is the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the caesium-133 atom. So in effect, we have substituted the caesium-133 atom for the standard meter bar. The same points could still be made, but we’ll stick with the meter bar for simplicity. — John MacFarlane

Had the speed of light been any different in another possible world, then the above would simply not be true or nonsensical wrt. to define the length of a meter in that world. I don't see how you can quibble over that.

The metre stick is not rigid. It might be different lengths in other possible situations. But the metre is rigidly designated by "one metre" — Banno

Let's at least try and not be obtuse here. The length of the meter stick is rigid in all possible worlds where the accessibility relation of one world also guarantees nomological necessity in another. Those accessibility relations, or if you prefer, "properties" of said object are outlined in the OP's quoted text.

See:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accessibility_relation#Philosophical_applications

One of the applications of 'possible worlds' semantics and the 'accessibility relation' is to physics. Instead of just talking generically about 'necessity (or logical necessity),' the relation in physics deals with 'nomological necessity.' The fundamental translational schema (TS) described earlier can be exemplified as follows for physics:

(TSN) P is nomologically necessary means that P is true at all possible worlds that are nomologically accessible from the actual world. In other words, P is true at all possible worlds that obey the physical laws of the actual world.

So, that is to say, that the stipulation that the meter stick is the same as a meter, is true in all possible worlds, and talking otherwise would invoke some nonsense or senseless declarative statement.

Indeed, I had the liar sentence in mind as I was writing that. The similarities are strong. I also agree that it is fun to play around with such sentences. We only get ourselves into a muddle if we start to believe it tells us anything about how people really use language. — andrewk

As much as I would want to call 'philosophy' mental masturbation, I have learned a lot and have been stimulated by this thread. It has helped me understand that analytic philosophy can be fun to entertain.

Free will.

The soul is not part of the natural world. — Fooloso4

These are concepts that Wittgenstein doesn't explicitly talk about in the Tractatus... Are you inferring them from what has been said contrasted to what hasn't been said?

Solipsism: The “I” alone (solus "alone" and ipse "self”) is a limit of the world, the limit of what I can say and think. This is not a fixed limit, since it is always possible to learn something new, but a limit nonetheless. We cannot step out beyond ourselves. — Fooloso4

Yes, I think so. But, it's just redundant to state a limit where none can be drawn, no?

The facts that make up the world are not independent of the subject who perceives and represents those facts. Facts are not independent of their representation. My world, the microcosm, is the world as I represent it. — Fooloso4

Not true, the facts of science are indisputable.

The subject is metaphysical because it is not a part of the physical world. Propositions about it are nonsense, for it does not represent anything in the world. That which sees is not something seen. Just as the eye is not in visual space, the subject is not in logical space. The subject that represents is not something represented. — Fooloso4

The subject may not represent itself; but, that is irrelevant. The form is the same.

The I alone which sees the world, that experiences, that describes, has no logical connection to the world. We can only say how things are, not how they must be or will be. — Fooloso4

I disagree. I think that whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. That we cannot talk about the "metaphysical subject" doesn't mean it doesn't exist in the world.

My world is the world I see, the world I experience, the life I lead. My limits are its limits. — Fooloso4

Yes, but, the world came first. I cannot doubt you don't have a beetle if you say it exists.

The limits of my world are not the limits of the world. This limit marks a form of skepticism. — Fooloso4

Yes and no, because if we are to talk about the logical space of the first person, then yes, the limits of your world are one and the same as the limits of the actual world. But, you can always tell me you have a beetle if I can't see one.

No, he seems to know what he is talking about. "A priori metaphysics" is somewhat superfluous and I'm still not sure what purpose was it suppose to serve.

The 'Nixon might not have been named Nixon' sentence is a classic example of how analytic philosophy often disappears up its own fundament, by agonising over the meaning of a sentence that nobody would ever use, and claiming that the analysis is somehow relevant to how people do use language. — andrewk

No, but it is an interesting thought experiment, and the sentence is perfectly well structured. Akin to the liar paradox.

That's not circular. — Banno

Then it is instantiated or obtains through something that cannot be disputed, such as the laws of physics or nature.

The metre stick is used to set a specific length, designated rigidly by the name "Metre". — Banno

I think you missed the entirety of the OP. It is the properties of the meter stick that maintain its rigidity in all possible worlds where the same accessibility relations (laws of nature) are the same.

Lucky man. Ain't ever had to visit complaint clinics.

Meanwhile you have completely ignored my discussion of 5. — Fooloso4

Please distill your thoughts. I can't gather them all in one coherent fashion,

Everything is defined circularly, by the way. That's how definitions work. All the words in a dictionary are defined in the dictionary by other words being defined in the dictionary. If you don't have any intuitive semantic grasp of some of those words, it's just one big circular mess and you'd be stuck. — Terrapin Station

Is that so? What do you think, @Banno?

Aren't tastes and personal preferences also truth-apt? — sime

I don't know, You tell me. It's interesting.

We can logically conceive of him being called “Smith” in a possible world that he was adopted. However, “Nixon” is still a rigid designator because that is how we know we are talking about the same person. It’s a rigid designator, but that name given to him is a contingent truth. — Noah Te Stroete

See, this is like trying to have it both ways. We stipulate according to some criteria the rigidity of Nixon being a rigid designator according to some properties that are assumed. What are those properties?

Or let me try another way. What properties are we looking at or what criteria are we assuming in picking out designators in other possible worlds? To assume that they are rigid designators across possible worlds seems to imply that these entities assume properties congruent with their counterparts in another possible world.

Or even another way. How is trans-world identification possible?

All this. It’s difficult for me to parse. — Noah Te Stroete

So, let me provide the rationale behind what I'm trying to say.

... although the man (Nixon) might not have been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he might not have been called ‘Nixon’). [1, p. 49] — Kripke, Naming and Necessity

Now, with the above in mind, isn't Kripke setting up the properties of what constitutes "Nixon" as a rigid designator, as a certain feature of accessibility relations that adhere to some form of essentialism?

I feel as though Kripke is setting the cart in front of the horse when he talks about rigid designators, that are bona fide dependent on the actual world to be true. Again, hand waiving comes to my mind.

What are you having difficulty understanding?

All what seems like hand-waiving? — Noah Te Stroete

Setting up a possible world to conform (altering the accessibility relations) to a certain set of circumstances instead of having it (rightly so) , the other way around of the world dictating or determining states of affairs.

What do you mean by “accessibility”? — Noah Te Stroete

I typically think of "accessibility" as features of the world that endow or enable us to speak about counterfactuals.

My point here is that if we have no sense of counterfactual definitiveness (or an accessibility relation that is true for all possible worlds, such as the laws of physics) defined in the axioms of a stipulated possible world, then all this seems to amount to is hand-waving.

But accessibility relations are determined by the properties of the modal logic in use (basically which worlds can quantify over other worlds given certain properties like transitivity or Euclideanness), they aren't properties of the possible worlds themselves, right? I'm not sure if this is essentialism. — MindForged

Well, yeah. It's somewhat a trite truism to state that an accessibility relation holds if we can change the axioms of the possible world's properties at will or at leisure? What do you think?

I mean if we are going to assume certain properties as equivalent to our own world, then we might as well restrict the domain of stipulating possible worlds to a certain set of circumstances. But, that just renders the whole issue as tantamount to nothing determinate.

Possible worlds are stipulated. We stipulate the counterfactuals. So, we would have to stipulate that the laws of nature are the same or different. — Noah Te Stroete

Yes, possible worlds are stipulated; yet, I'm highlighting the fact that their accessibility relations must be the same as those of the actual world to be able to rigidly refer to their status as rigid designators.