Kripke's Meter-Stick

Shawn

I've been having some difficulty understanding how Kripke in Naming and Necessity dissolves or removes the concept of essentialism from identification of entities across possible worlds.

Let's take the example of the meter-stick that Kripke brings up. Nowadays a meter stick is defined as:

Today, a meter is defined as the length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299,792,458 of a second. A second is the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the caesium-133 atom. So in effect, we have substituted the caesium-133 atom for the standard meter bar. The same points could still be made, but we’ll stick with the meter bar for simplicity. — John MacFarlane

So, a meter stick is defined circularly through the substitution of the caesium-133 atom's properties along with the speed of light.

So, here's the confusion of mine. Namely, if we assume that properties of names are what define them, as in the case of the standard meter stick, then how can we know that the same properties apply in any other possible world?

One solution to this issue is to assume that accessibility relations between possible world are the same as in the actual world. Or in other words, the laws of physics are the same in another possible world as in this one. Kripke never specifies any accessibility relations between possible worlds; but, I suppose it needs mentioning that for water to necessarily be H2O, or for the meter stick to maintain rigidity, one has to assume that the accessibility relations of our world are compatible with other possible worlds. But, get this... If we assume that accessibility relations are the same across possible worlds, then that assumes a form of scientific essentialism. This is because rigidity and necessary conditions are guaranteed through adhering to properties that are immutable, such as the laws of physics and nature.

Any thoughts about this?

RegularGuy

↪Wallows

Possible worlds are stipulated. We stipulate the counterfactuals. So, we would have to stipulate that the laws of nature are the same or different.

Shawn

Possible worlds are stipulated. We stipulate the counterfactuals. So, we would have to stipulate that the laws of nature are the same or different. — Noah Te Stroete

Yes, possible worlds are stipulated; yet, I'm highlighting the fact that their accessibility relations must be the same as those of the actual world to be able to rigidly refer to their status as rigid designators.

MindForged

If we assume that accessibility relations are the same across possible worlds, then that assumes a form of scientific essentialism. This is because rigidity and necessary conditions are guaranteed through adhering to properties that are immutable, such as the laws of physics and nature. — Wallows

But accessibility relations are determined by the properties of the modal logic in use (basically which worlds can quantify over other worlds given certain properties like transitivity or Euclideanness), they aren't properties of the possible worlds themselves, right? I'm not sure if this is essentialism.

RegularGuy

↪Wallows

If by accessibility you mean that they are human life supporting, then they are possible worlds. If they are not, then the meter stick wouldn’t exist in that possible (or maybe impossible) world. “Meter” is a human construction. So, rigid designators refer to all possible worlds in which they occur. “Noah” refers to all instances of me in all possible worlds where I am stipulated to exist. It is not necessarily true in all possible worlds that I exist, however.

Shawn

But accessibility relations are determined by the properties of the modal logic in use (basically which worlds can quantify over other worlds given certain properties like transitivity or Euclideanness), they aren't properties of the possible worlds themselves, right? I'm not sure if this is essentialism. — MindForged

Well, yeah. It's somewhat a trite truism to state that an accessibility relation holds if we can change the axioms of the possible world's properties at will or at leisure? What do you think?

I mean if we are going to assume certain properties as equivalent to our own world, then we might as well restrict the domain of stipulating possible worlds to a certain set of circumstances. But, that just renders the whole issue as tantamount to nothing determinate.

RegularGuy

↪Wallows

What do you mean by “accessibility”?

RegularGuy

Kripke holds that something is necessary if you can’t logically conceive of it being otherwise.

Shawn

What do you mean by “accessibility”? — Noah Te Stroete

I typically think of "accessibility" as features of the world that endow or enable us to speak about counterfactuals.

My point here is that if we have no sense of counterfactual definitiveness (or an accessibility relation that is true for all possible worlds, such as the laws of physics) defined in the axioms of a stipulated possible world, then all this seems to amount to is hand-waving.

RegularGuy

↪Wallows

All what seems like hand-waiving?

RegularGuy

Like I said, the laws of nature are stipulated or assumed to hold in all possible worlds where Noah exists.

Shawn

All what seems like hand-waiving? — Noah Te Stroete

Setting up a possible world to conform (altering the accessibility relations) to a certain set of circumstances instead of having it (rightly so) , the other way around of the world dictating or determining states of affairs.

RegularGuy

The possible worlds thing is just a modal logic language game. You shouldn’t take them as actually existing literal possible worlds. It’s meant to help us determine necessary from contingent truths.

RegularGuy

Forgive me if I am misunderstanding you, but your language and grammar are difficult for me to follow. That’s probably my fault, not yours.

Shawn

↪Noah Te Stroete

What are you having difficulty understanding?

RegularGuy

Setting up a possible world to conform (altering the accessibility relations) to a certain set of circumstances instead of having it (rightly so) , the other way around of the world dictating or determining states of affairs. — Wallows

All this. It’s difficult for me to parse.

Shawn

All this. It’s difficult for me to parse. — Noah Te Stroete

So, let me provide the rationale behind what I'm trying to say.

... although the man (Nixon) might not have been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he might not have been called ‘Nixon’). [1, p. 49] — Kripke, Naming and Necessity

Now, with the above in mind, isn't Kripke setting up the properties of what constitutes "Nixon" as a rigid designator, as a certain feature of accessibility relations that adhere to some form of essentialism?

I feel as though Kripke is setting the cart in front of the horse when he talks about rigid designators, that are bona fide dependent on the actual world to be true. Again, hand waiving comes to my mind.

Shawn

Or let me try another way. What properties are we looking at or what criteria are we assuming in picking out designators in other possible worlds? To assume that they are rigid designators across possible worlds seems to imply that these entities assume properties congruent with their counterparts in another possible world.

Or even another way. How is trans-world identification possible?

RegularGuy

↪Wallows

If the actual world determines everything, then all actual states of affairs would be necessary truths. But we can still speak of counterfactuals somehow, right?

“Nixon” is a rigid designator so we know who we are talking about in other stipulated possible worlds. It’s a contingent truth that he was president because we can logically conceive of him not being president. It’s a necessary truth that he is not a cow, for example. We wouldn’t be talking about Nixon then.

We can logically conceive of him being called “Smith” in a possible world that he was adopted. However, “Nixon” is still a rigid designator because that is how we know we are talking about the same person. It’s a rigid designator, but that name given to him is a contingent truth.

Shawn

We can logically conceive of him being called “Smith” in a possible world that he was adopted. However, “Nixon” is still a rigid designator because that is how we know we are talking about the same person. It’s a rigid designator, but that name given to him is a contingent truth. — Noah Te Stroete

See, this is like trying to have it both ways. We stipulate according to some criteria the rigidity of Nixon being a rigid designator according to some properties that are assumed. What are those properties?

Terrapin Station

So, a meter stick is defined circularly — Wallows

Everything is defined circularly, by the way. That's how definitions work. All the words in a dictionary are defined in the dictionary by other words being defined in the dictionary. If you don't have any intuitive semantic grasp of some of those words, it's just one big circular mess and you'd be stuck.

then how can we know that the same properties apply in any other possible world? — Wallows

We don't know that anything in particular applies in any possible world. Possible worlds are a combo of our individual imaginings, our individual abilities to conceive of various things however we're conceiving of them, and things we're stipulating.

Shawn

Everything is defined circularly, by the way. That's how definitions work. All the words in a dictionary are defined in the dictionary by other words being defined in the dictionary. If you don't have any intuitive semantic grasp of some of those words, it's just one big circular mess and you'd be stuck. — Terrapin Station

Is that so? What do you think, @Banno?

Banno

↪Wallows

Davidson, Quine. Austin. Wittgenstein - there is a way of following a rule that is shown by doing, not by saying.

Banno

The metre stick is used to set a specific length, designated rigidly by the name "Metre".

A metre is hence the same length in all possible worlds.

In some possible worlds "metre" is used to refer to a length other than one metre.

Banno

So, a meter stick is defined circularly through the substitution of the caesium-133 atom's properties along with the speed of light. — Wallows

That's not circular.

Hanover

It’s a contingent truth that he was president because we can logically conceive of him not being president. It’s a necessary truth that he is not a cow, for example. We wouldn’t be talking about Nixon then. — Noah Te Stroete

Why can't I conceive of him being a cow? If he had a Nixon face, a Nixon personality, a Nixon Watergate scandal, and Ford was his VP, yet he had a bovine everything else, he'd be Nixon. I get @Wallows essentialism concerns. Necessary and contingent truths are just another way of saying primary and secondary qualities aren't they?

Hanover

The metre stick is used to set a specific length, designated rigidly by the name "Metre".

A metre is hence the same length in all possible worlds. — Banno

So is the essence of the meter stick its length and not that it's a stick. If it were in the form of a cat, is it still a meter stick. Is a meter stick the same as a metre stick. We don't even have a rigid name for it is seems.

RegularGuy

necessary and contingent truths are just another way of saying primary and secondary qualities aren't they? — Hanover

Maybe. I’m not sure. AJ Ayer only accounted for the necessary a priori (analytic truths) and the contingent a posteriori (synthetic truths). Kripke added two more categories.

Shawn

The metre stick is used to set a specific length, designated rigidly by the name "Metre". — Banno

I think you missed the entirety of the OP. It is the properties of the meter stick that maintain its rigidity in all possible worlds where the same accessibility relations (laws of nature) are the same.

Shawn

That's not circular. — Banno

Then it is instantiated or obtains through something that cannot be disputed, such as the laws of physics or nature.

Banno

↪Hanover

"Metre" is a rigid designator for a certain length.

Kripke's Meter-Stick

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