You can also find the story of Pinocchio as an interesting parable somewhat related to this thread.

It seems to me that the fantasy of a child is engendered by society nowadays with RPG games and all those first person games. I think the role of fantasy manifests in the enduring popularity of traditions like Halloween despite the pagan tradition that it is.

I also think that the promise of being rewarded for good deeds in the after life is a source of fantasy for many people.

Just some random thoughts.

I would like to mention the role of fantasy and the inner child in the role of conflicting identities. It seems that the sublimination of fantasy occurs more often than not nowadays than at any period of human history...

So, one can find a decent amount of joy in this parable of the subject subjected.

Sounds like Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus... :smile:

I'll look into the logotherapy connection. Thanks. — Baden

The thought behind mentioning logotherapy would be for people to develop a healthy identity by finding meaningful jobs and activities in life, thus enabling them to form healthy selves. It's linked to logotherapy by the appeal to purpose.

Is lack of purpose something you were trying to address? Obviously, technology and consumerism tend to debase that metric.

Centrally problematic is that the behaviours of "free" individuals tend not to stray far from well-trodden paths, despite the proliferation of such paths, thereby an overall social/ideological stability that subsumes intra-cultural political conflict is maintained, while personal stability is rendered at best incidental. In fact, identity formation in modern “free” societies allows for and even encourages the creation of conflicting identities that war with themselves in a (self) destructive fashion. And there are practical reasons for but no overwhelming force towards the attainment and perpetuation of an identity that is consistent and encompassing enough to effectively abrogate such inner self conflict. In fact, such an orientation is often actively discouraged under ideologies of "self-exploration" etc. Fundamentally then, modern society facilitates the greater and greater separation of identity from self, or, more specifically, the proliferation of identities that do not tend to reconcile themselves in a stable self but form unstable selves that are defined largely by inner conflict. — Baden

Is this Erich Fromm? And if so, as I read most of the OP, is logotherapy a solution to our purposeless lives that we engender in modern society?

Excuse my stupidity, but how is it possible to give a property properties without first considering goodness to be an an object in itself? — NOS4A2

That's verging on the naturalistic fallacy.

So, the axiology of good is what Moore advocated. I'd have to read about that... Got sources?

It seems you are asking the metaethical question "what is goodness, in and of itself?" and not the normative question "what things are good?", yes? — Bartricks

Yes.

Well, Moore provided the example of yellow existing at a certain wavelength for example. I think what one can call good is something like that, as a simple.

I don't think I'm concerned with the relations themselves but more with goodness itself as we all can discern what "good" is.

So, the lesson from Moore is that you need to clarify your question. What are you asking when you ask us 'what is good?'? Are you asking us which acts are good and which ones bad? Or are you asking what goodness is, in and of itself? — Bartricks

I'm asking mainly, what constitutes labeling an act or deed as good, and how that qualifier arises in our description of ethics.

:cool:

But I think that's Moore's contention: good can't be defined by or analyzed in terms of any other properties, good is a simple, sort of an atomic unit or fundamental building block of moral language and reasoning. — busycuttingcrap

Yes. I think it's true.

Whether Moore is right about this is, of course, a different story. — busycuttingcrap

What do you think about whether it's right or wrong and why?

So, what's the consensus of the good in ethics? Moore proposed a form of consequentialism in terms of the good. Do you agree with him?

Oh sorry, I misunderstood you.

So, you say that it's dependent of the evaluative context. Do you have any criteria to propose? Mostly epistemic?

As I point out, in ethics I think "defining good" is besides the point. — 180 Proof

I think I can see what your saying. In that, treating good in the excluded of what is bad?

That is, the notion of what is willed is distinct from the notion of what is good. — Banno

Assuming @bert1 is a Kantian, does it follow that which is willed, is the good?

Good has no fixed referent, but the meaning itself holds constant — hypericin

@Banno, this is surely something in your ballpark.

What meaning isn't? — 180 Proof

But, according to Moore, "good" is a simple. A simple is a thing that has no parts. Yet, we often use the term "good" in ways that make it seem as if it were something more than a simple.

Why is that, @Banno, if you care to mention...

"Good" is an adjective denoting that a thing that is good is a thing that is advantageous and pleasant and helpful and accommodating OR at least three at the same time and in the same respect of the aforementioned qualifiers.

I invite examples that debunk this definition. — god must be atheist

It seems to me and Banno, that what the open ended argument entails is that there are things that can be all those three and yet not be good. So, it seems there's room to provide more context here.

I set up the stage, so I give the floor to you. :cool:

Answering this question depends on a specific evaluative context. — 180 Proof

So, good is context dependent?

Seems all the more complex since good as a simple is defined by circular definitions. Again we have this relational stuff arising out of a simple.

Is that how it works?

But, how is stuff related to what is good?

And for the arguments about the premises, I don't see what help logical form will give. In your example above, if I disagree it is raining, then we will have a discussion about justification to say it is raining, that has nothing to do with the above logical form in your previous post. — PhilosophyRunner

Sure, I mean syllogistic logic isn't necessarily ideal; but, at least it (a premise) shouldn't be lumped into the argument as a truth if it does arise.

Logical form usually entails that the person knows what an argument looks like to begin with. So, I don't see the discussion fruitful without appeal to logical form.

There is a lot more to explore with regards to premises, than with regards to logical form. — PhilosophyRunner

I see you added this so I'll respond to it.

I believe that premises are always up for scrutiny, whereas unsound reasoning creates these long threads that actually need an appeal to authority to get them set in the right way ...

As I understand your OP (correct me if I misunderstand), you are wondering why more posts on this forum are not about logic form. — PhilosophyRunner

Not necessarily. It's simply an issue of too few people actually putting in the effort to make their arguments in logical form such as syllogistic logic or even symbolic logic...

I think the reason is because the main disagreements are about the premises as per the point you were trying to make with the rat example. — PhilosophyRunner

Well, I can't make a person present sound reasoning and as per our exchange this can manifest in arguments that can be valid but unsound to state it correctly. Yet, I'd we don't advocate for such presentation, then I suspect we're engaging in unsound reasoning, no?

Yes, I would like to provide an example:

1. Worms and rats come out of the ground when it rains.
2. It rained.
3. Worms and rats are created by rain.

It might sound funny to you; but, people used to believe in such creationist arguments back in the days. But, the argument is clearly false nowadays, and only due to analyzing the validity of the premises and conclusion.

Yet, logically it seems sound, right?

Edit: Sound in the sense that the premises and conclusions follow...

Are you saying that an argument can have the correct logical form, but the premises can be false, and the conclusion false? Absolutely. — PhilosophyRunner

I always thought that validity was a property of epistemological verification (old jargon seemingly).

I saw in old books the use of an argument both being sound and valid given the correct logical form and verification of epistemological validity of the premises and conclusion.

I swear my book on philosophical analysis by Stanford stated it the way I stated in in our exchanges.

Edit: It's an old book.

Yup, then I got it backwards.

But, I only say the above the way I said because you can always be wrong about validity in terms of empirical truths whilst soundness remains within the realm of logical form.

I'm sorry; but, in logic empirical validity is a guarantee for validity of an argument, not soundness. Soundness only rests with logical form, as I have come to understand it.

I'm only separating logic from empiricism. Take for example the various syllogism's that one can use in making an argument. We can use them, as did they used them after Aristotle, and could come up with sound arguments. However, their validity is based on empirical observation.

I did Google the distinction, and it seems different than what I say, but does what I said make sense?

Sorry, I must be professing an empiricist argument with what I meant.

We can have logically sound arguments that are empirically false, yet still be sound according to our truth tables. Does that make sense?

Well, the premises can be false and the argument can still be sound. But, a valid argument requires true premises.

But the difference lies within the truth of the premises themselves with respect to validity.

Yes?

Logical form is not sufficient to determine if an argument is sound. — PhilosophyRunner

I think a sound argument is based on a sound logical form. Aren't you referring to 'validity'?

@Banno, it's a great thread until the teacher leaves the classroom.

Looking forward to that one. I don't have much to say hereabouts.

I plan a thread on Danièle Moyal-Sharrock's Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, which apparently addresses the pre-predicative and the predicative distinction in an interesting way. I think she's muddled, but the devil will be in the detail. — Banno

- @Banno
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/768370