Non-naturalism is a form of what's known as 'objectivist' metaethical theory. 'Objective' in this context means 'exists as something other than subjective states'. Moore positively rejects the idea that morality could be made of our own - or someone else's - subjective states, for that would be to reduce morality to something else.

And Moore himself was a realist. A 'realist' about morality is someone who thinks morality exists. That is, moral objects and relations are real. — Bartricks

But, see the quote by Banno above. It clearly states in the SEP entry that:

Moore’s non-naturalism comprised two main theses. One was the realist thesis that moral and more generally normative judgements – like many of his contemporaries, Moore did not distinguish the two – are true or false objectively, or independently of any beliefs or attitudes we may have. The other was the autonomy-of-ethics thesis that moral judgements are sui generis, neither reducible to nor derivable from non-moral, for example scientific or metaphysical, judgements; they express a distinctive kind of objective truth. Closely connected to his non-naturalism was the epistemological view that our knowledge of moral truths is intuitive, in the sense that it is not arrived at by inference from non-moral truths but rests on our recognizing certain moral propositions as self-evident, by a kind of direct or immediate insight. — SEP

To say that something in inherently intuitive (such as morality in Moore's case) seems to indicate that what moral claims represent are at least very subjective states, that are commensurably agreed upon. Do you think that's something correct to state?

It clearly states in the SEP entry that — Shawn

Like I said, Banno regurgitates SEP entries. Now I think neither your nor Banno actually know what that quote means.

Now, do you think I'm someone who a) knows nothing about Moore or b) knows a shit load about him?

Come on Shawn - you clearly think that something in that quote from the SEP contradicts something I wrote. What? Or do you not really know what the words in it mean?

Have you read Moore, Shawn? Or have you only read 'about' him?

To say that something in inherently intuitive (such as morality in Moore's case) seems to indicate that what moral claims represent are at least very subjective states, that are commensurably agreed upon. Do you think that's something correct to state? — Shawn

How on earth do you get that from the quote above?

Moore is not a subjectivist about morality.

A subjectivist about morality is someone who believes morality is made of subjective states.

What you're doing is confusing states of awareness with objects of awareness.

You're thinking "if we're aware of moral rightness and goodness via subjective states - intuitions - then moral rightness and goodness are themselves made of subjective states". Yes?

So, I'm aware of my partner via subjective states. I can see her. That is, I have a visual impression of her. That's a subjective state. Therefore - by your logic - my partner is made of subjective states. She exists in my mind and as states of mind.

That's the conclusion you're going to draw about everything, if you are consistent.

But you're just making a basic error. It's like confusing a book about Obama with Obama.

Moore is an 'objectivist' about morality. He - like most moral philosophers - believes that morality does not exist 'as subjective states'. At least not as 'our' subjective states. (Strictly speaking divine command theory is a form of subjectivism, but the standard objections to subjectivism do not apply to it).

Why?

Because the view is stupid. It means that if you approve of yourself raping Jane, then it is morally right for you to rape Jane.

It means Hitler did nothing wrong so long as he sincerely appproved of what he himself did.

It's a stupid view that has nothing to be said for it, which is why no ethicist - including Moore - endorses it.

You only think he's a subjectivist because you're confusing intuitions - which are subjective - with what they give the bearer an awareness of - which is not subjective, or need not be.

Note as well that subjectivism about morality is a reductionist view - it reduces morality to something else (in this case, subjective states). And Moore is not a reductionist. His whole point is that morality can't be reduced. He's wrong about that. But 'if' it can't be reduced, then clearly he's not a subjectivist, as that's a reductionist view.

How to kill a thread.

:clap:

I can't see why the word "good" is indefinable. If it were, then most if not all the adjectives would be indefinable and it would be impossible to communicate.

The word "good" is mostly used to indicate a satisfactory level or degree of something, based on commonly or generally accepted standards. It is applied to both quality and quantity: Good food, good joke, good essay, good news, good health, good friend, ...

Then it is also used in reference to morality, also based on commonly or generally accepted standards: doing good, good behavior, good person, ...

Being relative and dependent on context does not mean that it cannot be defined.

@Banno, for the sake of the thread can you expand on the open ended argument in reference to what implications it has in the domain of discourse wrt. to ethics?

The word "good" is mostly used to indicate a satisfactory level or degree of something, based on commonly or generally accepted standards. It is applied to both quality and quantity: Good food, good joke, good essay, good news, good health, good friend, ... — Alkis Piskas

Well, instead of running in circles, what does that something mean?

Well, instead of running in circles, what does that something mean? — Shawn

Why running in circles? I can only see a straight line! :grin:

I gave you examples, Shawn. I can't do more than that.
(And please don't ask me "What does 'examples' mean?" :smile:)

The good is that which is life-enhancing, pain and discomfort diminish the life force. Avoidance itself is good if it protects one from that which would diminish one's will.

Moore claims ...

If X is good because X is beneficial, why is beneficial good? If the response is beneficial is good because it enhances cooperation, we can then ask, why is enhancing cooperation good? So on and so forth ad infinitum/ad nauseum. It seems to be one of the dentes of Agrippa's trident (infinite regress).

That is why Aristotle proposed "happiness" as the end which breaks the infinite regress.

That is why Aristotle proposed "happiness" as the end which breaks the infinite regress — Metaphysician Undercover

I fear that doesn't work. Why is happiness good?

I fear that doesn't work. Why is happiness good? — Agent Smith

Happiness does not depend on "good" or "bad". It is not a virtue but an objective. Aristotle claimed that happiness is a state of mind that every person aspire to achieve, because (and he was so right in his arguments) it is the main engine which makes the people to make and elaborate objectives, dreams, things, etc...

In ethics, I think 'X is less harmful than Y' (or 'X is least harmful of all') is much less vague or arbitrary, therefore more reliably actionable, than "X is good". It's pragmatic to address disvalue by preventing or reducing disvalue (e.g. harm to h. sapiens); however, we can only aspire to value because value tautologically transcends (in "platonic heaven") our condition such that "moral value" judgments / actions are arbitrary in practice (à la nihilism). Moore seems half-right but wholly for the wrong reasons. Rather than "good", less bad – minimize ill-being (re: disvalues) for its own sake (like medicine or ecology) rather than tilting at the windmill of "well-being" (re: value, ideal). Epicureans / Stoics rather than Bentham-Mill / Kant.

Is Moore's intuitionism a form of Platonism? What does it mean for goodness to be intuited? Noesis of goodness?

Moore's "intuitionism" was only that moral truths are not derived from any other sorts of truths. That is, it is an error to ask for a reason to conclude that something is morally good.

So no, nothing much to do with the nonsense of Platonic forms.

And this regress:

If X is good because X is beneficial, why is beneficial good? If the response is beneficial is good because it enhances cooperation, we can then ask, why is enhancing cooperation good? So on and so forth ad infinitum/ad nauseum. — Agent Smith

is avoided, since the "why" is an illegitimate question, a grammatical error, a misunderstanding of what ""...is good" does.

Why is happiness good? — Agent Smith

Almost. Better, "Is happiness the very same as what is good?" The answer is "No", since it is conceivable that we might have to give up one's happiness for what is good. Happiness anf the good are not the very same thing.

The open question is supposed to show that any mooted equivalence between good and something else will fail.

Moore's "intuitionism" was only that moral truths are not derived from any other sorts of truths. That is, it is an error to ask for a reason to conclude that something is morally good.

So no, nothing much to do with the nonsense of Platonic forms. — Banno

To say it is a form of Platonism is not to say that there is a form the Good, but that it is a type of Platonism in that it consistent with Platonist claims, that is is something known in itself by themselves by the mind itself.

If you say so, although I've no clear idea what "something known in itself by themselves by the mind itself" means. What could it be for something to be known, but not by a mind? So isn't any knowledge known by "mind itself"?

Seems to me that introducing Plato only servers to add more fog.

It just seems clearer to say that the good is indefinable.

It means that it is not a product of the mind or a deduction or arrived at by analysis. It is known independently of all else.

Seems to me that introducing Plato only servers to add more fog. — Banno

It was a deliberate choice that does not add more fog but clarity. Moore himself said in a letter to a friend:

I am pleased to believe that this is the most Platonic system of modern times. (Hylton, p. 137)

I was not aware of this, I found it just now while looking for support. I found it here

From the same article:

Hence Moore's version of realism, as it claimed the constituents of reality to be unchangeable non-spatial non-temporal entities with which we are in contact only in thought, is a kind of Platonism.

Both those quotes appear to be about Moore's realism with regard to the physical world, rather than about his intuitionism with regard to good.

Maybe I've asked this of you before (if I have pardon me), but are you familiar with Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good and, if so, what do think of her moral-aesthetic reconception of 'Platonic Good'?

Both those quotes appear to be about Moore's realism with regard to the physical world, rather than about his intuitionism with regard to good. — Banno

From the article:

To say, as he did, that goodness is a non-natural property detected only by intuition, i.e. by thought and not by perception, is to treat it as a Platonic entity, inhabiting some transcendent realm of being.)

I have read some of her novels but not her work on ethics.

What are your thoughts?

Good call. "The sovereignty of good over other concepts" might be what @Fooloso4 is after.

Ok, other folk have shared that interpretation. But did Moore? What evidence is there that he thought of his argument as platonic? Seems to involve too great a reification for comfort, at odds with Moore's rejection of idealism.

Again, this is a side issue. SO for instance the SEP article on Moore makes no such comparison, mentioning neither Plato nor Forms.

She has been a significant influence for me, especially The Sovereignty of Good, as I've briefly discussed ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/705105

Btw, I don't care for her fiction but I believe I've read all of her (collected) philosophical papers & lectures a few times, though decades ago.

Ok, other folk have shared that interpretation. But did Moore? — Banno

I don't know. The truth is, I have not read him. More than once I tried. Reading through the posts here it occured to me that it sounded a lot like noesis - something known by direct intellectual apprehension.

at odds with Moore's rejection of idealism. — Banno

Yes, that is the point. What is and is not rejected in his rejection of idealism?

From the article:

Moore simply denied that "fundamental presupposition of any sort of Idealism" by asserting that "the objects of knowledge [are] completely independent of us."

Plato's Forms are completely independent of us.

Quoting you from the link:

Iris Murdoch's idea of metaphysics more like that of Plato than like Aristotle's referring to what she called "the inner life" of imagining The Good (love) instead of as a logical demonstration of "The Absolute" (truth) ...

I agree with the importance of the imagination for Plato. I also agree that it cannot be determined by logical demonstration. If it is known it is known noetically not via reason or dianoia. But I have argued why the good cannot be known

I would add that Plato is a political philosopher. As important as the inner life is, so is the shared life of friends and the public/political.

Yes, that's Iris Murdoch's position too. She was quite political as well as sociable in her day.