What is the 'otherwise" that you are asserting? I would need to know that as well as what a 'Rogerian agreement" is before I could sincerely assent. — Janus

Any contrary proposition you could have to my propositional attitudes.

You might want to revive my old thread to continue this discussion:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/3739/monism-pluralism-and-instrumentalism-in-logic

In other words there are both liberating and neurotic aspects to both marxism and logical positivism. It is not a zero/sum game, I would say. — Janus

I would not assert otherwise. Therefore a Rogerian agreement should be achieved if we're both sincere.

They talk about the Rapper in Harvard. He's just that good.

Good philosophy is descriptive and illuminating of our practices. If doing philosophy consists in understanding our practices, then why should we give it up? If doing philosophy consists in trying to nail it down once and for all, then of course we should give it up. — Janus

Then how did some many Marxist philosophers or logical positivists got it wrong? It seems we're stuck between Plato and Aristotle as of late.

That's your mistake. Philosophy is a symptom, not a cure. — Relativist

That's I think what I meant to point out. Philosophy can be no substitute for life, try and we might.

Does anyone have any luck with achieving remission?

I feel ailed and dead inside.

Sometimes images are overdetermined, and I suspect that is often the case in philosophy.

Modelling is about maximising simplicity. You've been going on about bipolarity. Why do you think logic relies on reducing possibilities to crisply counterfactual choices? — apokrisis

But, you're mistaking the forest for the trees here. Dimensionality is not captured in a single image. You need multiple overlaying images at different angles and degrees to do that. Eventually, dimensionality is captured when going to a higher dimension.

Idealists would say they are not, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact. — Janus

I'm not sure I'm getting the drift here. Objects populate the world and can be called names, their relations are asserting a different kind of truth in a state space of sorts. Dimensionality is not captured by a 2D-image, you need to resort to a higher dimension. As you zoom out, you can tell the forest for the trees.

We're all in heaven already, but we get bored singing hallelujah, So God has made us this totally immersive game full of goodies and baddies and difficulties and problems. The creator of Mario also created Bowser - it was no mistake or failure. — unenlightened

Sorry; but, this is obviously a false cause fallacy, Just pointing that out.

What makes you say that? Is this a prejudice you can support? Why would you disparage the ability to discover unity in opposites? — apokrisis

Because it oversimplifies things to simple binary states, which you of all people know that's not how nature operates in practice. (Human nature).

And have your whole identity based on a single defect? No thanks,

I think a friend is someone who will tell you when you're doing a wrong when you think you're doing a right.

We won't go out of our way to correct ungrateful wrongs.

The Judao-Christian tradition... — unenlightened

Oh heavens. Not that. We don't need any more martyrdom.

Idealized? The cups are in use.

I am a monster, btw. — frank

I meant to say that presenting humans as imperfect goods or broken goods is a strange and warped POV. I'm not sure if you're professing that here.

People learn, grow, and change. That we can be broken down and rebuilt is the fantasy of would-be dictators and such folk.

I can see the relation to your profile avatar. Yet, we are never idealized in terms of being broken goods. Only monsters say that.

What is this thing called a friend? — LD Saunders

I don't know. We're both scratching our heads aren't we?

Not that we need more hurricanes to resolve disputes. — Bitter Crank

This is an interesting point you raise. Reagan spoke about the need for little green men to exist to unite the world against a common enemy.

Why hasn't this thinking applied to climate change boggles my mind?

So what are your grounds for agreement being of higher value - in the context of worthwhile philosophical debate?

As I said, I would have no problem with Rogerian reasoning in a context where conflict resolution might be the goal.

And really, if you think about it, it would be odd if you objected to my point that dichotomies reduce philosophical conflicts to their fewest number of possibilities. If you boil the choices down to two mutually opposing/jointly exhaustive alternatives, you have already agreed on the most important thing. — apokrisis

Dichotomistic thinking is the bane of philosophy. I wanted to purchase a book presenting philosophy in terms of a dialectical manner progressing from Plato onwards. But, if you really think about it, it would be an effort in futility to present philosophy as a progression in terms of dichotomies.

I love fireworks. And that dude seemed to be troubled by the experience. I feel sorry for people who cannot convey their own truths to other people and hold it inside.

If the first then facts are independent of the mind. If the second, it would seem that the world needs us to exist. — Sir2u

This. Fact's exist relative to an observer. It's a fact.

** So said Hal9000 in 2001. — Bitter Crank

I think I'm getting the drift here. But, we aren't collectively hallucinating here or anything. There are things out there that we can agree on. If this is a matter of professing the right attitude, then I'm not sure what can be done about that. Perhaps, a better education or upbringing?

"I think I hear you saying that Rogerian therapy methodology seems like a good, non-threatening way to discover truth, Mr. McPostface." — Bitter Crank

That's exactly what I'm saying. I'm also saying that truth becomes irrelevant if there's a no win situation. Someone always has to feel like they are right; but, what about agreeing to disagree?

But, what if an agreement is of higher value than truth itself? Is that a problematic position to hold? If I can't uphold my end of the bargaining stick, then so be it; but, at least I'll be satisfied in my curiosity even if the truth is neglected.

In who's mind? Would it not go back to the brain in the vat creating its surroundings if facts are mind-dependent. Or actual physical objects appearing as you obtain the facts about them. — Sir2u

In my mind, Wittgenstein was not professing mind-independent facts. This is central to his argument for solipsism.

So if the picture is basically describes how to make an object, then the the picture must have existed before the object. So where did the picture come from? — Sir2u

Are you leading us to believe in idealism? There are some elements of idealism present in the Tractatus. Like what PMS Hacker calls 'transcendental solipsism'.

His ontological views would take some explaining. I'm currently trying to write a book, but not on Wittgenstein's ideas. — Sam26

Oh, that's interesting. Hope you keep us posted.

There is a very definite undertone of metaphysics to what Wittgenstein is saying, and as such, it does have ontological implications. — Sam26

Can you expand on that?

I'm keen on learning better the metaphysics of the Tractatus.

As far as him being a monist, I don't believe this to be the case. Why would you think so? — Sam26

It just seemed natural in my mind. Logic, the totality of facts, the principle of bipolarity all seemed to point in that direction for me.

Hope this helps. — Sam26

Sure did!

What about your thoughts on Tractarian ontology? I can't shake the suspicion that Wittgenstein was some monist in the Tractatus.

Because logical positivism is essentially an extension of a Leibnizian ontology of logical relations, in my mind.

I've long held the suspicion that Wittgenstein of the Tractatus was a monist or believed in modalism of atomic facts.

What are some thoughts about this idea derived from Libenitz?

And:

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.724.9022&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Relevant:

https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-facts-in-logical-space-a-tractarian-ontology/

In that case, the totality of the world is the categories of my mind coming into contact with the various sense impressions. — Marchesk

I don't see what's wrong with that argument. I agree that if you read Kant it might help better understand the Tractarian ontology of facts existing in logical space.

Problem being that nominalism is a bit hard to square with saying the world is a totality of relations and properties. — Marchesk

Not really. Again, facts aren't mind independent. Which, gives me the suspicion that Wittgenstein still held onto Kantian transcendentalism in some sense of the Tractatus.

And what's the difference between atomic facts and hylomorphism? Was he unwittingly committed to a form of universals? — Marchesk

As far as I'm aware, Wittgenstein of the Tractatus was a nominalist. That's all I can figure out on the matter. @Sam26 might have to chime in.

Pragmatically speaking, all of this makes sense. How couldn't it?

That sounds really difficult to square with a world made up of particles and forces. We can talk about atomic facts of .a table, such as it's color, solidity, constitution, etc, but it's the physical stuff which makes it what it is. — Marchesk

Atomic facts are those things and relations you talk about. Contrast this with sachlage and sachverhalten.

I don't understand what that means, at least not as a materialist. — Marchesk

It means that facts have a greater ontological significance than things. Atomic facts that are. States of affairs are important too.