Both. They aren't mutually exclusive. — Posty McPostface

My temptation is to say that only things have ontological existence. Facts are generated by minds. Facts are a product of language, and language is dependent on the evolution of social animals like us.

My temptation is to say that only things have ontological existence. Facts are generated by minds. Facts are a product of language, and language is dependent on the evolution of social animals like us. — Marchesk

But, after all the world is the totality of facts, not things. Facts are not mind-independent though. On a hard reading, you can designate facts as having ontological significance superior to things.

But, after all the world is the totality of facts, not things. Facts are not mind-independent though. On a hard reading, you can designate facts as having ontological significance superior to things. — Posty McPostface

I don't understand what that means, at least not as a materialist.

I don't understand what that means, at least not as a materialist. — Marchesk

It means that facts have a greater ontological significance than things. Atomic facts that are. States of affairs are important too.

It means that facts have a greater ontological significance than things. Atom facts that is. States of affairs are important too. — Posty McPostface

That sounds really difficult to square with a world made up of particles and forces. We can talk about atomic facts of .a table, such as it's color, solidity, constitution, etc, but it's the physical stuff which makes it what it is.

That sounds really difficult to square with a world made up of particles and forces. We can talk about atomic facts of .a table, such as it's color, solidity, constitution, etc, but it's the physical stuff which makes it what it is. — Marchesk

Atomic facts are those things and relations you talk about. Contrast this with sachlage and sachverhalten.

Atomic facts are those things and relations you talk about. Contrast this with sachlage and sachverhalten. — Posty McPostface

And what's the difference between atomic facts and hylomorphism? Was he unwittingly committed to a form of universals?

And what's the difference between atomic facts and hylomorphism? Was he unwittingly committed to a form of universals? — Marchesk

As far as I'm aware, Wittgenstein of the Tractatus was a nominalist. That's all I can figure out on the matter. @Sam26 might have to chime in.

As far as I'm aware, Wittgenstein of the Tractatus was a nominalist. — Posty McPostface

Problem being that nominalism is a bit hard to square with saying the world is a totality of relations and properties, since you're going to have a lot of the same properties and relations repeated all over the place.

Problem being that nominalism is a bit hard to square with saying the world is a totality of relations and properties. — Marchesk

Not really. Again, facts aren't mind independent. Which, gives me the suspicion that Wittgenstein still held onto Kantian transcendentalism in some sense of the Tractatus.

Not really. Again, facts aren't mind independent. Which, gives me the suspicion that Wittgenstein still held onto Kantian transcendentalism in some sense of the Tractatus. — Posty McPostface

In that case, the totality of the world is the categories of my mind coming into contact with the various sense impressions.

In that case, the totality of the world is the categories of my mind coming into contact with the various sense impressions. — Marchesk

I don't see what's wrong with that argument. I agree that if you read Kant it might help better understand the Tractarian ontology of facts existing in logical space.

Relevant:

https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-facts-in-logical-space-a-tractarian-ontology/

And:

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.724.9022&rep=rep1&type=pdf

I've long held the suspicion that Wittgenstein of the Tractatus was a monist or believed in modalism of atomic facts.

What are some thoughts about this idea derived from Libenitz?

So early Wittgenstein actually thought reality consisted of atomic facts and not things like apples, trees, people, etc? — Marchesk

Language ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- World
| |
Proposition ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fact
| |
Elementary Proposition --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Atomic Fact
| |
Name -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Object

Think of this as a mirror image. Moreover, don't think of names or objects like you normally think of these words, or you'll get confused. The smallest constituent part of a proposition is a name, and the smallest constituent part of a fact is an object. There is a one-to-one correspondence between an object in the world and a name in a proposition. Names form elementary propositions, which then form propositions. Objects make up atomic facts, which then form the facts of the world. Wittgenstein believed that there had to be this relationship between language and the world, so he constructed a logical (a priori) relationship.

Wittgenstein wasn't saying there aren't things like apples, trees, people, etc., how these are arranged would be the facts, but facts are broken down even further, into smaller parts (objects). You can think of objects as occupying a place in space.

It's much more complex than this, but what I'm trying to get across to you is that objects and names are not what you would think they are.

Here's something I posted on Quora. This was written to answer the following question:

What did Ludwig Wittgenstein mean by "the limits of my language are the limits of my world"?

To answer this question one needs to have a good understanding of the *Tractatus* and what Wittgenstein was trying to accomplish. There are three main ideas in the *Tractatus*, and these three ideas will help answer your question.

First, though, one must understand what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein’s goal is to investigate the essence of language, that is, how it functions, and how it is structured. Second, he assumes that the function of language is to describe the world, and he assumes that the structure of language is revealed by logic. Why did Wittgenstein think that logic would reveal the structure of language, and reveal how language is connected to the world? We have hints here and there, but it seems that not only did he believe that logic lay at the bottom of all science, but he also believed that there was something universal about logic (his idea of logic has ontological implications), a peculiar depth (PI 89). In fact, logic is one of the three main ideas behind his work in the *Tractatus*, the other two are language and the world.

Wittgenstein starts his investigation in the *Tractatus* with the world. The beginning statements of the *Tractatus* can be thought of as conclusions, which are required by his theory of language. There are two components of Wittgenstein’s theory of language, *the picture theory* and *the truth-function theory*. Wittgenstein believed that if we can talk about the world, then propositions must be logically connected with the world. In this way, the truth of a proposition is not connected with other propositions, but connected with the world. He called propositions that are directly connected with the world, *elementary propositions*. So you have propositions (complex propositions), which are made up of simpler propositions called elementary propositions that are directly connected to the world. Two questions that naturally arise, how are elementary propositions related to complex propositions, and how are elementary propositions logically connected to the world?

First, complex propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. Thus, if a complex proposition is broken down into elementary propositions, then the truth-value of the proposition is determined by the truth-value of its component parts (seen in truth-tables), namely, the elementary propositions that make up the proposition. Second, elementary propositions connect with the world in that they are pictures of atomic facts, which are the smallest constituent parts of facts.

Wittgenstein believed that his process of analysis, in terms of the structure of a proposition, must come to an end, but “…what will the end be?” (Nb p. 46). Once we have completely analyzed the proposition, that analysis will have the same complexity as its referent (Nb p. 46). The referent being facts in the world.

However, we are not done with propositions. Elementary propositions, according to Wittgenstein, have more basic parts, namely, a nexus of *names *(T 4.22). Do not think of names like pencil, cup, chair, etc, these kinds of names are not what Wittgenstein had in mind. For Wittgenstein a *name* is a primitive sign, and he uses the symbols x, y, and z to refer to them. These names cannot be dissected any further. They are, in one sense, the end result of the analysis, in terms of the elementary proposition.

So how do propositions correspond to facts in the world? Keep in mind that in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy he holds to the traditional view of language, that is, a name’s meaning is directly associated with the object it denotes (T 3.203). Thus, this is carried over into his thinking in the *Tractatus.*

The totality of facts* *are what make up the world (T 1.1). Facts are divided into atomic facts, just as complex propositions are divided into elementary propositions. There is a direct picturing correlation between an elementary proposition and an atomic fact. The elementary proposition, which is made up of *names*, has its counterpart in the world of facts, because the smallest constituent part of a fact is an *object *(do not think of objects in the normal sense), objects for Wittgenstein are simple, just as names are simple.

The elementary proposition is in touch with the world via *names*, which are in direct contact with the world via *objects*. The arrangement of names in the elementary proposition must have the same logical structure as the arrangement of objects within the atomic fact. If it has the same arrangement, then it’s true, if not, it’s false.

Propositions show their sense by their logical structure, and if that sense is correct or true, then it matches the facts in reality, or it mirrors reality. Think of a picture, a picture has a sense, the sense is given by the arrangement of things in the picture, but that sense need not match reality (the way things are), the same is true of a proposition according to Wittgenstein’s early philosophy.

So how does all of this answer your question? Well, for early Wittgenstein language is completely descriptive, that is, it attempts to describe the world, either truly or falsely. The limits of language, or what can be said, is the limit of our world. Things that have sense happen only within the limits of language. Senseless propositions attempt to say something about the limit of language; and attempts to go beyond the limits of what can be said, result in nonsense. It follows from all of this that the limit of language is the limit of our world.

The logical positivists misunderstood Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* in that they thought his work was anti-metaphysical, on the contrary, he thought that philosophical propositions that try to go beyond the world were attempts to say what cannot be said. They are attempts to transcend language, and thus the world. And although Wittgenstein tried to set out what can and cannot be said (in terms of propositions), he did think that that which transcends our world was important; and although that which transcends the world cannot be stated, as Wittgenstein tried to show, the mystical could be shown.

Hope this helps.

Hope this helps. — Sam26

Sure did!

What about your thoughts on Tractarian ontology? I can't shake the suspicion that Wittgenstein was some monist in the Tractatus.

Because logical positivism is essentially an extension of a Leibnizian ontology of logical relations, in my mind.

What about your thoughts on Tractarian ontology? I can't shake the suspicion that Wittgenstein was some monist in the Tractatus. — Posty McPostface

There is a very definite undertone of metaphysics to what Wittgenstein is saying, and as such, it does have ontological implications.

As far as him being a monist, I don't believe this to be the case. Why would you think so?

There is a very definite undertone of metaphysics to what Wittgenstein is saying, and as such, it does have ontological implications. — Sam26

Can you expand on that?

I'm keen on learning better the metaphysics of the Tractatus.

As far as him being a monist, I don't believe this to be the case. Why would you think so? — Sam26

It just seemed natural in my mind. Logic, the totality of facts, the principle of bipolarity all seemed to point in that direction for me.

His ontological views would take some explaining. I'm currently trying to write a book, but not on Wittgenstein's ideas.

His ontological views would take some explaining. I'm currently trying to write a book, but not on Wittgenstein's ideas. — Sam26

Oh, that's interesting. Hope you keep us posted.

Atomic facts are reflections of elementary propositions. Atomic facts can combine to form facts of any complexity, and as such, describe the world. So yes the whole of the world would be included. — Sam26

So if the picture is basically describes how to make an object, then the the picture must have existed before the object. So where did the picture come from?

So if the picture is basically describes how to make an object, then the the picture must have existed before the object. So where did the picture come from? — Sir2u

Are you leading us to believe in idealism? There are some elements of idealism present in the Tractatus. Like what PMS Hacker calls 'transcendental solipsism'.

I'm not sure, I suppose that one can have facts that are mind-dependent. I wouldn't assert that facts are mind-independent. — Posty McPostface

In who's mind? Would it not go back to the brain in the vat creating its surroundings if facts are mind-dependent. Or actual physical objects appearing as you obtain the facts about them.

In who's mind? Would it not go back to the brain in the vat creating its surroundings if facts are mind-dependent. Or actual physical objects appearing as you obtain the facts about them. — Sir2u

In my mind, Wittgenstein was not professing mind-independent facts. This is central to his argument for solipsism.

Are you leading us to believe in idealism? — Posty McPostface

No, I'm not leading in any direction. But if one had to explain where the picture came from, creationism would be an easy answer I think. That sucks.

In my mind, Wittgenstein was not professing mind-independent facts. — Posty McPostface

I am going to look for the audio book I got and listen to it. It might shake up my memory.

So if the picture is basically describes how to make an object, then the the picture must have existed before the object. So where did the picture come from? — Sir2u

A picture describes how to make an object? What? Where did you get this from? What do you think objects are?

No, I'm not leading in any direction. But if one had to explain where the picture came from, creationism would be an easy answer I think. That sucks. — Sir2u

You're chasing the boogie man.

A picture describes how to make an object? What? Where did you get this from? What do you think objects are? — Sam26

Sorry, I got that a bit mixed up. Retry:

So if the picture basically describes the make up of an object, then would it have existed before the object? Is it necessary for the object to exist before the picture is created?

If the first then facts are independent of the mind. If the second, it would seem that the world needs us to exist.

So if the picture basically describes the make up of an object, then would it have existed before the object? Is it necessary for the object to exist before the picture is created?

If the first then facts are independent of the mind. If the second, it would seem that the world needs us to exist. — Sir2u

Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning is not pictures of the objects. In fact, it's not even clear what an object is. It is though, a picture of a fact, which is composed of atomic facts, and atomic facts are composed of objects.

A proposition, for Wittgenstein, is a picture. So, if we say the Earth has one moon, that proposition is a picture of the relationship between the Earth and the Moon. The words of a proposition stand in a certain relationship, just as a fact in reality mirrors a certain relationship. It mirrors reality, and many propositions are like this. However, in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, he demonstrates that propositions do more than picture facts.

If a picture is a picture of a fact, then the fact has to exist first, i.e., if it is true. If the proposition is false, then it's a negative fact, i.e., one that has not obtained (it reflects a possible picture of reality), but one that is possible nonetheless. But strictly speaking pictures are only possible given certain facts. For example, if there were no people, then there would be no propositions, and without propositions there would be no pictures of facts. So pictures of facts (positive or negative facts) are dependent on the propositions and the people who express them. In this sense pictures are secondary and dependent or contingent.

You seem to be worried about the metaphysical implications of what Wittgenstein is saying. As if the picture implies some intelligence in back of reality, but you're stretching his ideas way beyond what they mean. Wittgenstein does believe in the mystical, but not in terms of propositions. Propositions for Wittgenstein are confined to the world, not the mystical, which is beyond the world. The mystical can only be shown, not expressed in terms of propositions. How is the mystical shown? One can show the mystical by certain actions (prayer, meditation, chants, etc).