I don't think their choice of name reflected their ideology as well as we might hope. Perhaps they intended to disguise their true aspirations? — Pattern-chaser

Well, if you eliminate the warmongering, the idolatry or cult of the leader, and all those nasty things that Nazism was associated with, you're left with a fairly liberal and likable ideology. Yes?

I always thought that socialism was a left-wing political movement, while fascism exists at the other, right-wing, end of the political spectrum. — Pattern-chaser

Well, yes. But, fascism is national socialism. So, logical conclusion? Maybe, maybe not.

Just my two pennyworth. — Pattern-chaser

Penny's are welcome. :_)

Basically, it's the epitome of what Chomsky has been berating for the past X years.

If there's a version of 'fascism' that's applicable to the US, I'd call it 'economic fascism'. Thoughts, not a very popular neologism?

Trollololo.

Yeah, it's a bit of a stretch; but, given his theory of monads and logical space which they occupy, there's no reason to say otherwise. I not sure about all the internet stuff though...

But, then the question is, was Leibniz a Platonist?

No, a solipsist lives in a hermetically sealed epistemological certain world. Therefore their beliefs are not prone to doubt. I put it all into words in the OP.

I'm a solipsist! AMA

If I were a solipsist, yes.

Are you 1) claiming belief entails certainty; 2) (re)defining solipsism as the certainty that only the solipsist's mind exists; or 3) suggesting certainty is entailed by something in the common definition of "solipsist"? — Relativist

All three, although #2 isn't me redefining solipsism, I think.

I'm still not getting the discrepancy between what and that statements for a solipsist. In my mind, they are both the same for a solipsist...

I suppose a solipsist cannot doubt that their experiences exist (like everyone else), but they could doubt whatever ideas about what they are. — jorndoe

What do you mean by that? I read the thread; but, in my opinion differences between that and what get muddy when confronted with solipsism due to the very nature of the mind of the solipsist.

No. As I said, belief does not entail absolute certainty — Relativist

So, you're saying that the belief that I am a solipsism, is open for doubt? Again, that's not solipsism.

I must be certain that everything I believe is true for me to be a solipsist.

I'll need to see your definition of solipsism. By my definition, a solipsist is someone who believes his mind, and only his mind, exists. I've never seen this belief stated in terms of being something of which the solipsist is absolutely certain about. A lack of absolute certainty implies some level of doubt. — Relativist

Well, if a solipsist doubts that they are the only self, then that's no longer solipsism, yes?

It's discrimination, I tell you.

You can't have your cake and eat it too.

Just save some for later. :halo:

So be it. You can't have your cake and ice cream too.

Madness!

Cheesecake!!!

:love:

Cheese!

Cheese!

Ah Posty... have you been on Malibu Beach, working on the tan? — Marcus de Brun

Oh, nothing much, been preoccupied with the Tractatus thread. Been doing some deep thinking on myself also.

Posty has been eating stuff out of the sandbox again — 0 thru 9

If you wish the issues on the playground and the immanent risk to Posty's health to be addressed in the context of the parental analogy, you would be best advised to first ask yourself:

Who's yo daddy now! — Marcus de Brun

I have no clue what's going on here. :lol:

Yeah, I leave it to Banno to clarify the issue.

This is from the Morris companion:

The proposition is what we have when we have a string of signs with the range of possible grammatical combinations fixed. It is, therefore, only the constituents of a proposition — rather than a mere propositional sign — which can be correlated with items in reality. In effect, a proposition is a certain kind of sign with the syntax fixed. Contrary to some modern uses, syntax brings in more than what we are given with the mere signs: we can have two examples of the same sign, which have different syntax; syntax provides us with the range of combinations.

Let me know if the following helps a little:

https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/33878/what-is-the-difference-between-propositional-sign-and-proposition-in-wittgenstei

Dubya, did play the idiot card pretty often; but, boy is Donald killing it.

the picture and the propositional sign are facts that each have a structure that mirrors the structure of facts, or, rather, possible facts, ways things might be, and either are or aren't. This is their sense. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, this I agree with.

It is what they say. (What they cannot say, what is not part of the sense of a picture or a proposition, is the logical form itself, which they show.) — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, they complement one another. What isn't said is said through what can be said. Kinda tautologous.

I guess the question is whether saying that facts have logical form amounts to saying facts have propositional form, are the expressions of propositions, rather than saying propositions also have logical form. — Srap Tasmaner

Please clarify.

Thank you for participating in this (nearly) abandoned reading group for the matter.

Is my puzzlement clear yet? — Srap Tasmaner

So, as promised, I'm returning to this post. Yet, I'm not entirely sure what the question is. If you could possibly specify further what you are asking, I might be able to answer better.

My impression is that sense arises out of modality of possible configurations of atomic facts. Nothing more or less. Logical form is inherently expressed through this modality. I know it sounds like something what Kripke might possibly say; but, it seems correct.

No, but seriously, please report posts more often, and if possible can we add a disclaimer as to what specifically is being reported, to ease the lives of the current moderators?

Well, I still encourage the draft thread to be utilized. In practice, it would indeed be too burdensome on any team of moderators to sort out through all the mess, given the nature of philosophic questions, as opposed to something like a close ended mathematical question.

One other alternative, is to create a group of storm-reporters, who can flag any dumb and stupid posts and report them as soon as possible.

I wonder if you really intend to target psychology in this thread? You seem to be aiming at propagandists? — Pattern-chaser

Yes, I think that was the intent, but got carried away with targeting a harmless sheep that psychology is.

Take:
2.1513 According to this view the depicting relation which makes it a picture, also belongs to the picture.
2.172 The picture, however, cannot depict its form of depiction; it shows it forth.

And, the version of Wittgenstein's stipulative isomorphism becomes clear.

So, hence saying and showing are not the same, or where one finds oneself at the limit of saying, then showing becomes necessary.

I'll get back to you on that.

I'm not quite sure; but, I have the feeling that Wittgenstein deviated from Frege and Russell. I don't think there is much isomorphism due to not associating a fact, or 'that' sentence with anything else than elements in reality. Notice using 'reality' here, instead of 'world'.

Take 2.1513 for example:

According to this view the depicting relation which makes it a picture, also belongs to the picture.

2.151 The form of representation is the possibility that the things are combined with one another as are the elements of the picture.

isomorphism — Srap Tasmaner

This could use some expanding on. What do you think?

The model is a model of something: it agrees or disagrees with what it models, represents it rightly or falsely. Do we say that what is modeled also expresses the sense of a proposition, and that the model and what is modeled agree if they express the same sense? — Srap Tasmaner

Well, going back to 1.1, The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

So, no. Pictures don't represent things, but facts.

About sense, I'm not quite there yet.

Are the elements of logical space obtaining and non-obtaining atomic facts, or are the elements of logical space the obtaining and the non-obtaining of atomic facts? — Srap Tasmaner

To answer this better here is a passage from the companion I'm using, which should clarify the issue:

The remainder of the 2.01's (up until 2.0141) are concerned with the relation between objects and atomic facts; and Wittgenstein returns to the topic in the 2.03's. Wittgenstein is concerned to explain here certain complicated relations of dependence and independence. Objects are both, in one sense, dependent on, and, in another sense, independent of, atomic facts. Atomic facts are, in a sense, dependent on objects, despite themselves being the most basic organic unities in the world.

Objects have to be, in a sense, independent of atomic facts, if we are to make sense of the idea that atomic facts are composed of objects. They are independent of atomic facts in the following sense. Objects appear in combination with one another, in atomic facts, but the very same objects could have existed even if those particular atomic facts had not existed. Suppose that there is an atomic fact that Bill is to the left of Ben, in which the objects Bill and Ben stand in relation to each other. Bill and Ben could have existed, even if they had not stood in that particular relation to each other (if Bill had been to the right of Ben, for example). The crucial point here is that atomic facts are contingent: they are what is actually the case, but might not have been. The independence of objects from atomic facts consists in this: the existence of objects does not depend on what is actually the case, but simply on what is possible.