I'm just saying that it's moot to assume that one derives their conception of philosophy as entirely individualistic, if we assume things progress in a dialectical manner or in as a web of beliefs.

There's a small conundrum there. How can progress obtain for a singular "I". It doesn't.

Haha, I think we're making progress, methinks.

I'm still waiting for more people to chime in, @Srap Tasmaner. Thanks for posting @unenlightened.

I got an email back from Jeff Speaks, recommending that I pick up Scott Soames, History of Analytic Philosophy Volume I. I'll see what I can find through libgen and the other website posted by another member as I don't really have money to spend on the book currently.

In the Quora page I posted someone said that in the P&M translation the distinction was simply omitted out of personal preference? Strange.

Try this link:
http://www.kfs.org/jonathan/witt/ten.html

Super easy toggling between English and German, along with an easy tree format.

I'll get back to your previous message in due time.

Yeah, I'm pretty much in agreement with everything you've said thus far as that's how I've been interpreting Sachlagen, which obtains from Sachverhalten in a picture in logical space.

I'm amazed at how distorted the other translation can lead to a whole different interpretation. Once we're finished with this reading group I strongly suggest we reach out to some scholar and have our ideas about this distortion in interpretation considered seriously as grounds for some kind of paper or some such matter.

Wow, you stumbled on something worth publishing about. Honestly...

Now I'm totally confused about Sachlage and Sachverhalt.

Edit: I'm going to stick with the O&R translation due to the above. I'm pretty sure Sachverhalten is atomic facts and not a state of affairs.

So, I posted a question on Quora, and here's the link if anyone is interested:

https://www.quora.com/Wittgenstein-Tractatus-States-of-affairs-and-atomic-facts-What-s-the-difference-between-Sachverhalten-and-Sachlage-in-the-Tractatus-Does-one-obtain-from-the-other-and-is-one-actual-rather-than-possible-in-reality/

Maybe the question was ill phrased?

It's almost as if a psychologist would be needed to support another psychologist in their analysis. A sort of infinite regress that can only be resolved by assuming authority over the matter. However, assuming authority on the matter discredits what you have to say by default. So, now you have a catch-22.

Dunno.

This was a very ambiguous comment my dear Posty; not directed in any particular direction lol. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

*despair*

I agree to disagree?

I posted this on a CNN news feed earlier this week and it hit the top comment for a while, so I'd thought I wanted as whether the vetting process should apply to presidents too?

Didn't mean to imply anything by that comment. I'm just enjoying the show.

If anyone else ever gets banned due to this discussion, a proper 'we welcome you back if you alter your views slightly' would be pretty cool. :cool:

Well, he does use: "existent atomic facts", so I'm not sure what he means by "existent/bestehenden" or "nonexistent/Nichtbestehen". So, again the issue with actual vs possible or obtaining and not obtaining. So, again I would say that existent atomic facts are what obtain in reality from the world. Maybe a fancy way of saying 'a true states of affairs existent in reality', because it would be redundant to say 'a true atomic fact in the world existent in reality'; but, not 'an atomic fact obtaining in reality from the world'.

I'm probably wrong about all this for the matter.

Edit: Playing around with "a" and "an" here.
Edit#2: Sorry for using "obtaining" and "existent" and "not obtaining" and "non-existent" interchangeably here. Hope it doesn't muddy the waters.

So, this post might help a little more when thinking about the world and reality even deeper:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/190476

Edit (I'll just repost it again):

But, if you recall, Russell had a kind of convincing argument for the existence of
negative facts: suppose that we have a list of atomic facts f1 . . . fn. Now consider
some true sentence ‘not-S.’ Is the truth of ‘not-S’ determined by f1 . . . fn? It seems
not. For f1 . . . fn are atomic facts, and there is nothing to prevent a series of atomic
facts from being consistent both with the truth of S, the falsity of S, or even S lacking
a truth-value. Hence, Russell concluded, true negations of atomic propositions must
correspond to negative facts. How can Wittgenstein avoid this argument?
I think that his ideas about objects provide him a way out. Recall that, for Wittgenstein,
objects are not only what underlie change over time, but also what underlie
necessity and possibility: all possible changes to the world are just a matter of the
recombination of simple objects. As he puts it,
2.0124 If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of
affairs are also given.
If there are a fixed number of objects, then a list of all the states of affairs (i.e.,
atomic facts) will not be consistent with both the truth and falsity of a sentence S.
A worry about this view: the intuition that all objects exist only contingently.
Wittgenstein often discusses the world or reality. How are these two notions related?
(This question is made especially difficult by the fact that Wittgenstein seems to
say contradictory things in §§2.04, 2.06, 2.063.)I think that the basic idea can be
stated as follows: the world consists of all the existing states of affairs, whereas reality
consists of the world plus all possible but non-actual states of affairs. Wittgenstein’s
claim is then that the world determines reality: once we know everything about what
states of affairs exist, we know everything about what states of affairs could exist
as well. (Indeed, as Fogelin points out, this follows from the claims that the world
consists of states of affairs, that all objects must be in some state of affairs, and the
passage from §2.0124 cited above.) — Jeff Speaks

Edit #2: The author left out atomic facts, but, I think you get the point by now.

There is good reason to be unhappy with how we teach people about our psychology. Exploiting psychological insights for commercial purposes is de rigueur; exploiting any academic field for commercial benefit is pretty common. Unethical? That may very well be the case outside of market place thinking. — Bitter Crank

I think you highlighted my point here. Since, psychology is about people and their inner workings, isnt the case of exploitation of psychology for whatever means, all the more vivid and apparent. It should be in my mind, at least.

Learning about psychology should give us insight into why we behave as we do. I don't see that happening often enough. — Bitter Crank

What do you mean by that if I may humbly ask?

Thanks.

"If we build it, they will come"??? — Srap Tasmaner

Here's me hoping: :sweat:

The plot thickens.

If it is combined with other objects in a definite way, we have an atomic fact, and it is surely appropriate to call the object a "part" of this atomic fact. But what about all the possible atomic facts which it could be a part of, the possibility of being a part of which is prejudged in the object? Would you say it is a "part" of those? That seems wrong. So 2.013 has that little "gleichsam" in it. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm going to refer to "gleichsam" analogically as "manner and form" here (jumping ahead a little): Yes, but it's one and the same to talk about atomic facts and states of affairs in some manner or form. I mean, we are limited by what we can think of to be true, and if we can't think illogically, then we're somewhat limited in our ability to talk about what is being said in manner and form. Or at least borrowing from Wittgenstein, a picture cannot depict its own form.

So there's a distinction near the one you're talking about: an object isn't part of something that's only possible; that appellation we'd reserve for being so combined in something actual. — Srap Tasmaner

It's a self referential ambiguity here, again made apparent with Sachlage and Sachverhalten.

Where does that leave states of affairs? I read "state of affairs" as a way of looking at atomic facts, possible or actual, in which we still only consider the objects so combined as objects, rather than as parts. — Srap Tasmaner

I tend to think, that what obtains is the actuality of a state of affairs although both can exist in possibilities, made apparent by atomic facts. (Yeah, we're talking past each other here, again.) Maybe, to drive the point home, is that atomic facts are tautologies or true in every circumstance, where states of affairs are truth apt.

Here's what really puzzles me about treating atomic facts themselves as always only actual and never possible: what about facts? — Srap Tasmaner

They can be both, I think; but, much like tautologies, it's redundant to assume that some obtain or not without superimposing states of affairs on them.

How do you reconcile the above notion with a solipsistic entity, which I have come to understand that we are to some degree?

For example, you can assert that "god" is the ultimate solipsist or the 'wavefunction' here; but, then that would be redundant if we too were in some sense solipsists also partaking in his wavefunctional dream...

2.013 Jedes Ding ist, gleichsam, in einem Raume möglicher Sachverhalte. Diesen Raum kann ich mir leer denken, nicht aber das Ding ohne den Raum.

2.013 Every thing is, as it were, in a space of possible atomic facts. I can think of this space as empty, but not of the thing without the space.

Yes, and those atomic facts and their relations are what make up the actual world. Me picturing them as possible states of affairs is what constitutes my reality (hinting at the Tractarian solipsism that we'll encounter).

Why don't we just table this until we finally move on to the picture theory. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure, although it seems it seems like its just us two at the moment. So, I hope someone else can chime in also... :confused:

EDIT: It's an insurmountable trap to talk about states of affairs independently of atomic facts, if you get the point.

So, I think the gist of the whole issue resides in the following propositions:

2.012
In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in an atomic fact the possibility of that atomic fact must already be prejudged in the thing.
-------
2.0121
It would, so to speak, appear as an accident, when to a thing that could exist alone on its own account, subsequently a state of affairs could be made to fit.
If things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility must already lie in them.

(A logical entity cannot be merely possible. Logic treats of every possibility, and all possibilities are its facts.)

Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space, or temporal objects apart from time, so we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its connexion with other things.

If I can think of an object in the context of an atomic fact, I cannot think of it apart from the possibility of this context.
--------
and jumping ahead a little:

2.202
The picture represents a possible state of affairs in logical space.
---------
2.203
The picture contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it represents.
----------

I'm going to refrain from interpretations at the moment and meditate over this a little.

Sorry if this isn't much of help, just trying to reread or bring up again what has been said in a new light.

Just out of courtesy. I'll get back with a more detailed post tomorrow or later today. Might take a while. But if you read the Max Black post I referenced Wittgenstein does talk about mögliche Sachlagen...

@Srap Tasmaner, do you want me to post a question to the Quora community about this whole issue about obtaining or not in reality of Sachlagen vs Sachverhalten being the actual state of affairs upon which Sachlage depends on in the world? I don't want to spam this whole thread about that distinction between possible vs actual, as I think there might be bigger fish to fry although it seems important on face value.

I don't think there's a better place to post than Quora, as there's a lot of qualified individuals there.

Why do you want to talk about something when it's clear that no one on this thread knows what the topic is. — tim wood

I digress. Just was my sentiment about what I think has happened to psychology.

What is logical space? — Arne

https://www.quora.com/What-is-Wittgenstein-s-Logical-Space
http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9780631185376_chunk_g978063118537614_ss1-8
http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405106795_chunk_g978140510679513_ss1-104

How could it be otherwise, and why would it be otherwise? What has not been hijacked to economic ends? I don't like it, but short of the revolution... — Bitter Crank

I'm just unhappy with how we go about educating people about psychology. It seems on face value to treat psychology as a science (to be exploited for some unknown motive by advertisers or others) is/as fundamentally unethical.

In course of time I approached the instructor and asked in the most mild and respectful terms how one might start even to approach the problem of reconciling all the irreconcilable aspects of the differing theories of personality we were covering. — tim wood

The problem is that this was all presented as a "science." And it was clear that whatever it was, it was specifically not a science. — tim wood

So, what does that make psychology? It seems to me that the differences are only made apparent if psychology is used as some means to and end (the profit motive), which is quite troublesome. I would find more utility if I studied psychology to address the latter issue (for sake of the future patient you might encounter) and then proceed with the earlier.

On a formal definition, I might argue that no science can be hi-jacked, although the knowledge gained from a science can certainly be put to ill use. — tim wood

This isn't particular to psychology, yes. But, I would assume that psychologists would be more aware of this at least, than a physicist having his ideas misappropriated to build a new bomb or device that can be weaponized. Isn't this a sort of moral dilemma?

It is not so much that psychology has been hijacked, as psychology is now being used as a way to create jobs and make money in the free market. — wellwisher

Can you provide a causal link between the two? If what you're saying is just that psychology is being exploited to the demands of the economy, then I rest my case.

This was a large business boom for the psychology industry. — wellwisher

What is the 'psychology industry'?

But you’re speaking to an old hippie. — Wayfarer

Yeah, we have an over-representation of hippies on this forum. : - ))

I guess I'm berating the fact that hippies conformed after all, I mean how couldn't they? Not all, not the most idealistic driven ones at least.

Our whole shtick was seeing through social conditioning. — Wayfarer

But, it goes a little deeper than that, when you throw in psychology into the mix. I mean, when it comes to psychology, no sane or rather undeluded psychologist want's to assert authority over such matters pertaining the human soul or nature, and that's unfortunate because then you get witch-doctors like Bernays who instead do that.

Sure I’ve long since joined the middle class - actually never really left it - but I hope that I at least can see through a lot of that. — Wayfarer

Yeah, in my more idealistic years, I wanted to live on some commune or something of that sort. I read a little too deeply into Skinner's Walden Two.

In fact I would like to think that is why my career has always been somewhat marginal - I can’t really take ‘square’ reality all that seriously. — Wayfarer

Yeah, I get you. It's just the easier path to go through.

On the personal level, it’s important to be self-aware enough to sense when you’re being played by these techniques. It sounds like it ought to be easy, but they’re very sophisticated and we’re constantly bombarded by media. — Wayfarer

Fortunately enough I lived abroad for quite some time to have a template against which I can compare these insidious gaslighting or propagandist mind games. Not to sound anti-education but sadly these psychological ideals get reinforced into a person quite often due to the profit motive and such or at least to those who go to college due to the profit motive. Did I mention that it's hard to go to college if one doesn't subscribe to the profit motive, at least here in the great US.

Yes, I encountered his name in a documentary suggested hereabouts called The Century of the Self by Adam Curtis. It was eye opening and I figure can serve as a backdrop to this thread.

Are facts observer independent?
— Posty McPostface

Yes. In the Tractatus and in reality — Srap Tasmaner

I'm under the impression that the world is the totality of facts and reality is the totality of those facts and states of affairs.

I'm gonna leave this open to debate with others if they contest that way of framing the issue.

I think there is a distinction suggested -- I just don't think it's actual vs. possible. — Srap Tasmaner

See:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/190055

It jumps ahead a little but illustrates my trifle...

Ah, so that's Russell. I feel like reading that would only confuse matters. Does that seem crazy? I mean, it's hard enough to get a handle on what W is saying. Maybe more historical context would help, but there's also that danger of substituting a view that's easier to grasp for W's. Do you see what I mean? — Srap Tasmaner

I get what you're saying; but, I suppose if we want to talk about these propositions, then some understanding of logical atomism is necessary. And, given that Russell so heavily influenced the early Wittgenstein, then it's only pertinent that we bring up how their views differed from each other.

Obtaining per se -- I can't even imagine having anything to say about that. — Srap Tasmaner

Same.

As for the Sachverhalt/Sachverlage thing -- I don't see this splitting as one's actual and the other's possible. There's some distinction in the text but I don't see it as that, so I don't want to assign the terms those meanings. — Srap Tasmaner

Why not? If Wittgenstein wanted to avoid the ambiguity he could have just stuck to one term instead of convolution the whole thing with both terms. I doubt Wittgenstein would have done this unintentionally had there been some reason.

So if the point were that one's actual and the other's not -- that's not much help is it? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not quite sure yet. It might become more apparent as we progress though the work. Too early to say at the moment.

I also don't see anything in the text about the way the world is versus the way we observe it. Maybe that'll come out later, but I'm not reading ahead. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, I might be jumping ahead.

Btw, do you mean this is in fact your view, or it's your understanding of LW? — Srap Tasmaner

To answer your question with another question; Are facts observer independent or dependent?

Expanded how? At this point anyway, I'm guessing, because we don't have anything yet on propositions or truth. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, I feel that it inevitably leads us to address Logical Atomism and how Wittgenstein's views differed from Russell.

Did I write something that conflicts with this quote? (And where's that quote from?) — Srap Tasmaner

You can find more info here:

https://users.drew.edu/jlenz/br-logical-atomism1.html

Do a Ctl+f to find the quoted text in that page, which is elaborated on.

Do you mean here, how one and not the other, or how does obtaining work? — Srap Tasmaner

I mean to say the latter. I feel that the difference between Sachlage and Sachverhalte is crucial here. I might be wrong. As for my opinion, I think atomic facts are what constitute the world, and reality is constituted/construed by states of affairs, speaking as an observer of the world.

[...] the truth of a proposition is the obtaining of such a state of affairs. — Srap Tasmaner

I think this needs to be expanded a little more, although I agree with it.

[...] a proposition that describes a different world from ours, or describes our world different in some way, perhaps different only in respect of a single fact, is clearly still about something, even though that something is not actual. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, so again, how does it obtain in reality, not the world.

Also, this might help:

“I want you to realize that when I speak of a fact I do not mean a particular
existing thing, such as Socrates or the rain or the sun. Socrates himself does not
render any statement true or false. What I call a fact is the sort of thing that
is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a single name like ‘Socrates.’ . . .We
express a fact, for example, when we say that a certain thing has a certain
property, or that it has a certain relation to another thing; but the thing which
has the property or the relation is not what I call a ‘fact.”’ (‘Logical atomism’,
41, Russell)

These vibes are just too real:

You mean, technology as the third arm after maths & physics? — Ron Besdansky

I was thinking more along the lines of it being math and physics manifest in reality through technology, as off as that sounds, which is just asserting anthropomorphism.

It follows from the first two - knowing about atoms and how they behave enabled us to invent the transistor, for example. — Ron Besdansky

Yes, and a whole range of other things...

I've been reading "The Mind of God" by Paul Davies. It pretty much covers my area of interest though, of course, it doesn't answer the question of WHY we know so much. — Ron Besdansky

So, I guess your in the right place. :)

My current view is there is "something" at a higher level of "existence" than time and space. Whether it's "guiding us", and to what end, I can't imagine. Nor can we probably inquire into "it" in any meaningful way - we stand in relation to whatever "it" is as, say, ants to the earth they inhabit. — Ron Besdansky

Have you read Plato? This seems to be something he has already talked about in terms of arriving at some 'truths' or 'noesis' about the world.