What do you think about technology being a 'third arm' of our evolution as a species?

Just a welcome question...

I'm just going to pause and wait until @mcdoodle makes an appearance. I'm still waiting for his input on the first segment that we are covering.

My gauge of progress is what has been learned over and above what was initially known about some proposition or the general gist of an overarching theme. So, that's how I think we should approach these summaries.

What do you mean?

I think it would be a good idea that upon agreeing on completion of each segment that we pause and summarize what has been covered to address any lingering doubt or uncertainty about what has been covered, also allowing other members to post what they might have missed or just joined the reading group.

Thoughts?

Don't be and feel free to chime in whenever you want. I don't think there's any detriment if you bring up questions we already tried to cover. In fact we would have already gone through the interpretation phase so win win for you. :smile:

I don't understand. Are you unhappy with how things are being handled thus far? If so let me know what would you like for me to change in the manner we're going about things here. Others might have different opinions, but since we're not sticking to any particular companion or interpretation of the Tractatus then by default this is the only method to go about answering lingering questions about what W meant by this or that proposition.

For the matter, MetaphysicsNow is in charge of how were approaching the reading group.

This might help:

But, if you recall, Russell had a kind of convincing argument for the existence of
negative facts: suppose that we have a list of atomic facts f1 . . . fn. Now consider
some true sentence ‘not-S.’ Is the truth of ‘not-S’ determined by f1 . . . fn? It seems
not. For f1 . . . fn are atomic facts, and there is nothing to prevent a series of atomic
facts from being consistent both with the truth of S, the falsity of S, or even S lacking
a truth-value. Hence, Russell concluded, true negations of atomic propositions must
correspond to negative facts. How can Wittgenstein avoid this argument?
I think that his ideas about objects provide him a way out. Recall that, for Wittgenstein,
objects are not only what underlie change over time, but also what underlie
necessity and possibility: all possible changes to the world are just a matter of the
recombination of simple objects. As he puts it,
2.0124 If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of
affairs are also given.
If there are a fixed number of objects, then a list of all the states of affairs (i.e.,
atomic facts) will not be consistent with both the truth and falsity of a sentence S.
A worry about this view: the intuition that all objects exist only contingently.
Wittgenstein often discusses the world or reality. How are these two notions related?
(This question is made especially difficult by the fact that Wittgenstein seems to
say contradictory things in §§2.04, 2.06, 2.063.)I think that the basic idea can be
stated as follows: the world consists of all the existing states of affairs, whereas reality
consists of the world plus all possible but non-actual states of affairs. Wittgenstein’s
claim is then that the world determines reality: once we know everything about what
states of affairs exist, we know everything about what states of affairs could exist
as well. (Indeed, as Fogelin points out, this follows from the claims that the world
consists of states of affairs, that all objects must be in some state of affairs, and the
passage from §2.0124 cited above.) — Jeff Speaks

He's been banned.

There's something niggling at me that makes me want to say that the difference between an actual state of affairs and a possible state of affairs is significant to understanding W here, but I'm having difficulty putting my finger on what might be the difference between our positions here. I'll have a rethink and see if I can be more precise - but you may be right that there is nothing significant here. — MetaphysicsNow

I actually sent an e-mail to Professor Jeff Speaks about this issue. I'll post what he has to say about it if he replies.

I also sent an e-mail to Professor Conant in regards to the same issue. Let's see who gets back.

The link to the Jeff Speaks lecture notes was useful, thanks. — MetaphysicsNow

As we go along you might find these useful:

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Jeff Speaks
Wittgenstein on logical form and the nature of philosophy by Jeff Speaks

When we think about differences in the way the world might be, we expect to be able to find a smallest unit of difference. Must we be able to do so? Can we imagine always being able to go still smaller, never reaching something that is only a class member and not itself a class? — Srap Tasmaner

Well, these are just objects. The relation of objects (in a chain) are what constitute atomic facts. The properties of objects and things doesn't get mentioned until we bring up the idea of complex or simple facts, which are constituted in the form of states of affairs, I think.

From the above referenced website:



Although, I disagree with the author that Sachverhalt are the same as Sachlage.

Edit: Actually, the author incorrectly references Sachverhalte as 'states of affairs', so maybe not such a great reference to the pertaining questions.

Here's proposition 2.0201 that supports what I'm asserting about there being complex and simple facts:

2.0201 Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely.

This website is helpful:

http://faculty.fiu.edu/~hauptli/Wittgenstein'sTractatus.html

When we think about differences in the way the world might be, we expect to be able to find a smallest unit of difference. — Srap Tasmaner

As far as I know, those are the atomic facts that pertain to actual facts. An interesting corollary question is whether Wittgenstein meant to impress upon us differing degrees of fact-hood or factually bound claims about the world depending on Sachverhalt and Sachlage. But, then again if the world is the totality of facts, then does that make this a redundant claim?

This is what I meant about there being 'composite' facts derived from atomic facts and/or states of affairs. Tatasche seems to entail both, yet I'm not sure if there was a distinction being made in the Tractatus about the two. In my mind, there is as I've read some notions of Wittgenstein implying the existence of 'plain facts' and 'complex facts'.

I'll stop there, as its verging on the nonsensical.

I'm reading the following to help clarify the issue:

Wittgenstein on facts and objects: the metaphysics of the Tractatus

can you unpack that more please (if you have time of course). — mrnormal5150

@Wayfarer will be able to help more. I don't recall the differences in the validity of differing beliefs according to Plato. I think 'doxa' is what Plato believed to be in the lowest bound of beliefs.

You can be contextually bound to believe something to be true; but, given that it is 'doxa' it's limited to only a contextually bound scope.

Well, you got to start somewhere...

Same here. That's my preferred method of communication and learning. It's very tedious and cumbersome though. Not something that will ever allow you to succeed in college. Maybe if you were ultra fast at this method, which I am not.

Yeah, if you know any companion that would answer this question about the lingering ambiguity please post a link. I'm also apprehensive to commit to that interpretation.

I just assume that Sachverhalt is what is actually the case in t=0, and Sachlage is what is possible in t=0....1.

Dunno if that makes any sense.

However, on the other hand doesn't at least some of what is going on in these opening propositions suggest a distinction between actual and possible states of affairs? — MetaphysicsNow

As for some Sachverhalten being actual rather than possible -- I'm a little puzzled by the dichotomy. S is actual entails S is possible. — Srap Tasmaner

This is where I think it would be pertinent to use at least some comprehensive companion to refer to in regards to matters of what was meant by Tatasche, Sachverhalten, and Sachlage. I believe I might have answered this above in regards to the companion I quoted; but, I don't have a PDF available to that matter. Any suggestions or should we just dismiss this issue as to treating Sachverhalten as actual and obtaining to the world, and Sachlage as possible and not necessarily obtaining to the world, and Tatasche as being a composite of the previous two?

Hey, Bob. I'm not sure. I feel as though it's the foundational difference between being a solipsist or not one.

This is what the Canadian government is now thinking about doing. And none, absolutely none of this, was necessary. This one is 100% on you, guys. — Akanthinos

It isn't as bad as you think it is. In many cases the majority of the goods needed are supplied by neighboring partners or the tariffs aren't that destructive to the trade relations of both partners. Alot of this is just posturing and false signaling on both ends. Canada or the US wont suffer any economics losses due to their trade dispute. However, there is some substance to what's going on between China and the US. It's more of a concern with dealing with mercantilist economies.

Curious. If I were a solipsist, I would say, 'all being is personal, nothing is beyond it.' — unenlightened

Actually, that would never happen because the personal is all there is to a solipsist. So, nothing more can be said about what's 'beyond the personal'.

Yeah, I don't want to go down that conspiracy road. I just think it's ludicrous that Trump being Putin's favorite, as in many ways Bush was, is complementing his way of envisioning the current world order. It just smacks of the shit you hear from the crazy Alex Jones and other conservative news outlets.

In fact, I don't think I could live in the US if that were actually the case. So, yeah, here's me having high hopes for what Mueller discovers.

You think he's a Republican tool; I think he's a Russian tool. — tim wood

The guy can't speak proper English. He speaks American, according to Republicans. Anyway, I think there is a deep sense of cynicism apparent in saying Trump is a Russian tool. I say this because the amount of exposure that you get from running for president would almost certainly lead to such things being exposed.

I challenge anyone to argue that regarding Trump as a psychopath impairs anyone's ability to see him more clearly. — tim wood

I do think he has some traits of antisocial personality disorder, along with a strong sense of narcissism. I don't think its psychopathy, bona fide. I've actually begun to think that most rational psychopaths, who value hiding their secret more than anything, would actually be dissuaded from running for such positions of power and influence.

I do not think the Russians are planning on invading Long Island or Cape Cod, but I do think it's their goal to tie us in as many knots as possible. — tim wood

You might want to read up on the modus operandi of the Russian intelligence and counter intelligence agencies, like the FSB and so on.

See y'all tomorrow. — Srap Tasmaner

Still waiting on what @mcdoodle has to say. Sorry for jumping ahead, just that you kind of have to to clarify what is meant in some holistic manner of the whole shtick.

Hope you guys are having a good summer. I know I am. =]

Sorry, I'm a bit overwhelmed. I'll post screenshots of what I'm going on about here.






From.

Thanks for clarifying these confusing concepts, Srap Tasmaner and John Doe.

So, in other words;

Sachverhalt is what is and Sachlage is what could be.

Hope I didn't oversimplify it.

For Sach-lage, I like to think of "how stuff lies together". It might also mean an "objective situation" — John Doe

Yeah, that's not how I understand Sachlage. More like a possible configuration of atomic facts giving rise to it having a 'sense'. Please correct me if I'm wrong. The companion I referenced above seems to support this interpretation... Pages 44-49.

It's a semantic quibble over what obtains in reality (Sachverhalt) and what not necessarily so or is otherwise possible (Sachlage). Further complicating the issue is talk about 'complex' and 'simple', facts. I suppose someone more in touch with Frege might be able to better answer the question pertaining that Sachlage has a 'sense' where Sachverhalt does not necessarily do so.

I just searched my own companion I'm using to elucidate some issues with technicalities here:

https://books.google.com/books?id=uzY9AAAAIAAJ&q=sachlage#v=snippet&q=sachlage&f=false

For all intents and purposes, it seems Sachlage (state of affairs) is indistinguishable from Sachverhalt (atomic facts), along with some nuances related to Tatasche (facts).

So, never-mind my quibbles.

OK, so Sachlage is the sense of a proposition. Think that narrows it down a little.

So, I hope I'm not going too off topic here. I'm just trying to understand if there is any apparent difference between 'Sachlage' (state of affairs) and 'Sachverhalt' (atomic facts).

Here are some propositions that might eludicate the matter:

2.0121
It would, so to speak, appear as an accident, when to a thing that could exist alone on its own account, subsequently a state of affairs could be made to fit.
If things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility must already lie in them.

(A logical entity cannot be merely possible. Logic treats of every possibility, and all possibilities are its facts.)

Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space, or temporal objects apart from time, so we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its connexion with other things.

If I can think of an object in the context of an atomic fact, I cannot think of it apart from the possibility of this context. — Wittgenstein

and,

2.014
Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs. — Wittgenstein

2.0141
The possibility of its occurrence in atomic facts is the form of the object. — Wittgenstein

Trump's psychopathy — tim wood

I'm not entirely sure if this is just another ad hominem or not, despite me agreeing with it to some degree. I mean, Trump is just a puppet in all this and detracts to the fact that everything that's happening under his watch is all in alignment with what the Republicans have for a long time wished to accomplish.

Strange, as I've always been under the impression that states of affairs was synonymous with pictorial forms (the basis of Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning) or depictions of the logical relations of atomic facts in logical space. I might go to my local community college tomorrow to confirm if that is the case and pick up a companion that lead me to my sentiments about this and post about it then with greater confidence.

Thanks.

Ok, I digress. Sorry.

If states of affairs are the pictorial form of logical relations between atomic facts, which are further understood as simples, then they are not one and the same, no?

No, if memory serves me correctly according to Max Black, the two are distict and separate in meaning.

First I'd like to address the terminology of the terms used in the Tractatus.

Objects and atomic facts are simple.

Facts are the logical relations between objects and atomic facts in logical space.

States of affairs are the resulting pictorial form of the relation between atomic facts.

Logical space is the ontology of where atomic facts and objects reside in.

Facts cannot depict themselves, only in pictorial form are they apparent.

I'll leave it there for the moment being... Basically, when we talk about objects, they are atomic facts, correct?

In case anyone is confused here's the whole thing broken down to its constituents.