On the contrary, it can win you a foot race with a faster opponent.

Does chess even exercise useful parts of the brain? — TiredThinker

Maybe it helps to develop strategic thinking.

Nothing out of the ordinary. The same kind of problems that exist in all religions.

Reason is essential for moral development. Faith, or intuition without reason, is moral stagnation.

Buddhism can tend to gloss over, in a way different from distracting thoughts, what is really going on also. — Bylaw

Worse, I think there's a strong tendency in Buddhism to devalue rationality in their promotion of intuition and it has led to all sorts of problems for them.

Language itself is just this: a body of tools, "scientifically acquired" meaning we, as infants and children were faced with models of language behavior and internalized these to the delight of others, and therefore, to our delight as well. We "tested" our knowledge with primitive utterances, and found successes in the way these became useful, and this was all imprinted in our young psyches. Now that is a fundamental attachment. — Constance

Language is certainly more fundamental than culture. Knowledge does not require language, however, so the fundamental attachment must go deeper than culture or language.

It would probably be helpful to discuss the nature of this 'fundamental attachment'.

In any case it wasn't really absent-mindedness I has in mind when I spoke of becoming blind to lived experience, it was more being stuck in certain conventional patterns of dealing with 'the world'. — Janus

In that case wouldn’t it simply be repatterning to what you’re calling “lived experience”?

:ok: :lol:

Do you thinks it's possible that, in being enamored with one's discursive knowledge of the world, one might become blind to lived experience? — Janus

I don't care for the phrasing but I know what you mean and yes, in fact, I'm the worst. Just today I drove a half-hour to a client's office only to realize upon arrival that I forgot my briefcase, so lost in thought was I.

Can you explain this simply? What's an example of metaphysical intuition? — Tom Storm

I don't have a good grasp of it, I'm afraid. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Henri Bergson makes the claim that metaphysical intuition is the “kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible” In terms of actual experience, maybe something akin to aesthetic experience, I suppose.

He talks about change or movement and a key demarcation from intuition to analysis is when an object stops moving, so to speak, like when marking a point on a line of trajectory, or to put it differently, when making a multiplicity out of unity.

It seems important that it be cultural rather than fundamental because if it were fundamental then metaphysical intuition would be impossible.

To conceive in a way that puts the concept of God outside of the prejudices of narratives, of history and its groundless meta-thinking, requires a step beyond these. This is both difficult and easy: difficult because one has to step out of something firmly fixed in our culture; easy because the solution lies with the Buddhists, which a kind of apophatic existential approach, a "simple" dropping of the illusions of knowledge suppositions by practical negation: ignoring desires and attachments. The most fundamental attachment is knowledge of the world. — Constance

One thing that doesn't make sense in this is how Constance refers to knowledge suppositions as both cultural artifacts and fundamental attachments. If they're fundamental then they're not cultural.

I'm earnestly searching for the importance of the point. The search has led me halfway through a Bergson essay today, in fact, which seems to shed some light. Bergson is anything but stingy with his points, unlike others, who shall remain nameless, for the sake of civility.

I'll say that when you wrote earlier that "This is a very important point" I wanted to know why and have been trying to discover that since. There are different approaches to discovery. Sometimes a trial-and-error approach works wonders. Sometimes trial-and-error only produces errors. :gasp:

I meant discursive knowledge; the point is that such knowledge is always in the form of subjects knowing objects, or knowers knowing what is known, or objects analyzed in terms of their predicates, Lived experience is prior to that and not given or apprehended in such terms. — Janus

Forgive my lack of nuance but all experience is lived experience and we're continually intuiting or perceiving and predicting subconsciously according to our conditioning.

I’m not in a tooth pulling mood at the moment so if you’d care to say more about the comment of yours that I responded to with my beloved generalizations that would be great, or you can just ignore me.

I was hoping the comment might inspire you to be less general. It seems to have failed.

This is a very important point, and it should also be emphasized that knowledge of the world is not lived experience. — Janus

Buddhists are certainly attached to their system of beliefs.

Emotivity is reckless? — Constance

I don't think so, or rather I might think it is under particular circumstances.

God is not a person, a creator, a judgment, a principle, a kind old man, and should not be conceived in the traditional way as something impossible remote. — Constance

There are all sorts of conceptions, I imagine. You seem to believe very strongly in your conception so naturally I'm curious how you could have such strong beliefs. I speculate that in order to believe that you know God this well is to believe that you are a God or Godlike yourself. Is that not a reasonable speculation?

if you take that rotten apple and rub it in someone's face, is this not by default (defeasibly) wrong? — Constance

As far as I can see the only way it could be wrong by default is if there were somehow an inherent moral quality to the sensation or specific actions involved, in which case it could not be possible for rotten-apple-rubbing-in-the-face to be right in any way. I can imagine several ways that rotten-apple-rubbing-in-the-face could be seen as good. Perhaps the apple is moldy, for instance, and contains penicillium which could act as an antibiotic to help prevent the infection of a wounded face. Or it could be part of a hilarious slapstick bit. I love slapstick. Or it could be a punishment and seen as good because it may help to correct poor behavior of some kind. I also imagine that it may be possible that someone could simply, and perhaps inexplicably, enjoy having a rotten apple rubbed in their face.

Careful about the connotative value of words. You say evil and we think we are in a dramatic moral conflict between God and Satan, and this is precisely what bad metaphysics does, the kind of thing that sends women to a fiery death and the spiritual sanitization of social rules. ... God is love. — Constance

You advise care in connotative phrasing and in the same breath demonstrate recklessness. "God is love" is rather emotive. Rules for thee but not for me, it seems.

How can you know God so well, btw, to know that "God is not a person who speaks, judges, lays down the law"? Do you believe that you are a God?

Getting back to your beliefs about sensations, I think evil is the correct term to use because you seem to be saying that sensations like pain have inherent moral qualities. I'm curious where you believe the moral quality exists. Is it somehow in the sensation itself or in what causes a sensation? For example, is the sensation of an unpleasant smell evil or is what causes the smell evil? A rotten apple will have an unpleasant smell and the cause of that smell could be determined to be bacteria. So does that mean bacteria is inherently bad or evil?

Someone extracts your tooth without analgesic: not a fantasy. In fact, far more ethically emphatic than any rule can possible be. — Constance

You seem to believe that sensations, like the sensation of pain, have a moral quality. Do believe that an unpleasant smell, for instance, is evil?

No, not literally. — Constance

So we are talking about fantasies?

There are an infinite number of facts. — Constance

This is not true. Our world is quite limited. I know it may seem like we know, or can know, everything about the world but trust me, we don't, and I highly doubt that we have the capacity to know everything.

With value, there is something else, once the facts are exhausted for their content. there is the "non natural" property of good and bad. — Constance

There's nothing unnatural about the experience or concepts of 'good' or 'bad'.

This finds its justification in the pain or joy itself--these serve as their own presupposition, as I have said. — Constance

Our conditioning does not require justification.

They are not things that defer to other things for their meaning; — Constance

Everything requires context to have meaning.

... the expressed principle issues from the world, not just some arbitrarily conceived bit of pragmatic systematizing of our affairs called jurisprudence. — Constance

Arbitrarily conceived laws? :lol: But you're right of course, they don't issue from jurisprudence.

Does that burn "say" with undeniable clarity, "don't do that"? — Constance

Of course it doesn't. People say such things. Burning sensations to not "say" things. Sensations are not independent minds that make recomendations or whatever.

If someone needed to cauterize a wound, for instance, they may think positively about a burning sensation and basically think "do that." The sensation itself doesn't care what you do.

Any example will do: place your hand in a fire, and ask what is this pain? It is not a construct of language; it is the world itself "speaking" so to speak. It says, don't do this, to yourself, anyone, just keep this out of existence. — Constance

It's not the world speaking, it's you speaking. You are saying "don't do this," not the world.

This is the foundational indeterminacy of our existence: take any concept about the world, any at all knowledge claim, and it can be demonstrated readily that there is no "center" no "final vocabulary" no "metanarrative" no stone tablets or anything at all that will intimate what is truly and really what the world IS. — Constance

It sounds like you've determined indeterminacy. Nicely done. :up:

The claim is not that a metavalue account of ethics is everything there is to ethical decision making. It is just that other questions are suspended here simply because they are not relevant to the inquiry.

Talk about God is why this metaethical line of inquiry is taken, and questioning about God is metaphysical inquiry. — Constance

You haven't talked about metanarratives yet, which is curious.

So, what is exemplary moral character about? It has to do with right choices, motivations and intentions, but intention to do what? Treat others as one should. Why is this a concern at all? Because all people are vulnerable to suffering. If a person cannot be hurt at all, then this is not a person for whom others can have a moral obligation. — Constance

The essence of morality is cooperation. You seem to be essentially claiming that it's avoidance of harm. Harm/care is only one dimension of morality. This is important because the aspects that you neglect are essential for religion to fulfill its purpose (it's not all about our ethics).

… value desperation … — Constance

To be as succinct as I can, desperation is reckless in nature, leading to rash and extreme behavior. Such behavior is quite often less than exemplary in good moral character.

Desperate people are easy to lead though, the more desperate the better.

Any thoughts so far? — Constance

I'm being patient. :smile:

To your mind, have you made an argument for why you think God (or religion, including Buddhism) is all about our ethics or are you ignoring my question?

... metaethical... — Constance

I do not think that word means what you think it means. "What-to-do questions" are questions of normative ethics and not metaethical. In any case, you've made an argument?

anthropomorphic, meaning what we call perceptually "out there" cannot be removed from "in here". — Constance

I do not think that word means what you think it means.

God is all about our ethics... — Constance

I strongly disagree. Can you make an argument for why you think God (or religion, including Buddhism) is all about our ethics?

The existence of God is controversial also, nevertheless belief in God is kind of a prerequisite in many religions. Maybe there are secular theist too though. Wouldn’t surprise me in the least.

Buddhists do not consider liberation a temporary mental state. That's pretty clear, isn't it? If a person is 'reborn' in any sense, then according to a Buddhist it is because of their karma, which means that they are not liberated.

That's one, perhaps simplistic, interpretation of the meaning of nirvana. Buddhists have also said that nirvana just is samsara. — Janus

Well, I've never heard of a Buddhist heaven, high up in the clouds or whatever, so nirvana must be right here, neck deep in the midst of all the shit. Where else would it be?

Must it be the same for all, in any case?

If we're talking about Buddhist Nirvana, it must only be what they claim it is. If we're not talking about Buddhist Nirvana, then we are completely free to confer whatever grand and nuanced meanings we wish to our uncanny experiences.

You believe that nirvana is merely an uncanny experience? Like seeing a ghost or something?
— praxis

Not purporting to answer for Constance but I'd say it's an altered state of consciousness, not a matter of seeing something uncanny (like a ghost) but seeing ordinary things uncannily. — Janus

A brain state, yes. A suppressed DMN, to be precise. I don't think that uncanny is a good descriptor though because it means something strange, particularly in an unsettling way. That's why I mentioned a ghost sighting. Seeing a ghost would be both strange and unsettling. Nirvana, on the other hand, means liberation from the cycle of life and death and perfect happiness. Quite unlike a ghost sighting.

Also, if Constance is talking about a transient experience then they are not talking about Buddhist nirvana and the liberation from karma and the cycle of life and death.

Nirvana - liberation and not 'unsettling'

Constance's uncanny experience - unsettling and of unknown duration

Affective apprehension: what is nirvana? And what is liberation/enlightenment? The epoche is a method, so what happens when thought encounters the world, and is reduced to the bare perceptual away from the apperceptual (sp?)? The self becomes free. It is not just an intellectual movement, but an experience. Enlightenment is the wonderful feeling of experiencing the world free of implicit "knowledge claims, keeping in mind that knowledge never was just a conceptual tag hung on a thing; it is a conditioned response to the world established since the time of infancy, and it is settled deep into experience as a default acceptance of things. Release from this is not just a nullity, though there is much that is nullified. It is an uncanny experience of extraordinary dimensions. — Constance

You believe that nirvana is merely an uncanny experience? Like seeing a ghost or something?

To put it quite plainly, the practical benefit of such a pursuit is simply the reduction of anxiety, existential and others sorts. The ‘cessation of suffering’ that the Buddha promises is a fat carrot that religious types find irresistible .

Your subjective experiences of satisfaction are essential, not simplistic. Again, you are free to confer whatever nuanced meaning you like to your experiences of satisfaction, or dissatisfaction. That’s up to you. Religions confer all sorts of grand and nuanced narratives to the world and our essential experiences.

But it shows none of the nuance of the brief review of the matter I provided above. Yours is a manichean pov, a reduction to a two sided simplicity of something that is not really simple. I took t that you didn't really read what I wrote and so, oh well. — Constance

At the start you wrote “the matter has to be approached phenomenologically” so that’s what I’m doing. You are entirely free to confer whatever meaning you like to the phenomenon of your subjective experiences of satisfaction. I’ve not made any judgment of it, simplified it, or polarized your meaning.

Oh. Well, thank you very much! — Constance

It’s not a complement. I merely point out that you subjectively experience the phenomena of both satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and this is evidence that life is not dissatisfaction but both satisfaction and dissatisfaction. If your body is dehydrated you will suffer the dissatisfaction of thirst and should you be fortunate enough to find water and drink your thirst will be satisfied. This isn’t “materialist” science. It is phenomena that you subjectivity experience.