That question is based on values. I value my kid more than I value rats, therefore the rats die. — Book273

What you are saying about the comparison is of course correct. But a "value" suggests something that can be expressed in dollars.

Sure, I can say that my child's life is worth more than the life of a rat, but I can't give an absolute value, but maybe a relative one.

If one considers a virus as a life, that would be correct. However, as I understand it, a virus is not a living entity, therefore your example is inaccurate. — Book273

OK, let's better take an example with rats. If we don't kill them, they will eventually attack our children. Who would say that the life of a rat is worth as much as that of his child?

The whole question is wrong. The question is not about value, but: What should we do?

But really, ending a life is ending a life. People=bunnies=whales=cats=bugs — Book273

Then it would be unethical to save a C-patient, because you would be killing a large number of C-viruses.

I think quantum mechanics will eventually prove negligibly indeterministic even at the level of single events, but that's just speculation. — Enrique

The point is: Is qualia possible in a deterministic world or not?

P-zombies require they can uphold the illusion of being a human over the course of time. But even the most complex P-zombie robot would not be able to sustain such an illusion for long. — Christoffer

You are right in the sense that to date there is no chatbot that passes a Turing test. Just ask a chatbot what it thinks about climate change and it will answer something like: Ask someone who knows about it. Ridiculous.

But the question is, what if there was a chatbot that passed the Turing test?

Case point, does Ava in Ex Machina have consciousness? Without the ability to internally adapt and change behavior, she would be stuck in a feedback loop of choices that are easily predictable, thus not act like a human. — Christoffer

That is the right question. And the answer is: We can't know, because we don't have a bridge from the third-person perspective to the first-person perspective. Quite simply, both possibilities are conceivable. Likewise, p-zombies are also conceivable.

All that remains, that is the similarity principle. The more similar something is to us, the more likely we are to assume the first-person perspective. But the similarity principle is not a law of nature like others.

My preliminary guess is that additive wavelengths of entangled particles are qualia, ... — Enrique

I do not understand the connection between additive wavelengths and the subjective impression of the smell of roses.

Electric field of brain as registered by EEG interacts with quantum fields of entangled particles (qualia) in additive way (like wavelengths of the visible light spectrum), to produce qualitative experience (sounds, images, feels) in the head. — Enrique

Why does entanglement generate qualia? This also exists in a laboratory and in a much purer form. And every high-voltage line generates more electric fields than a brain. Consequently, a laboratory that studies entanglement and is under a high-voltage line would have to have qualia.

My hypothesis was that all qualia emerge from extremely complex additive properties of quantum entangled and superpositioned wavicles, so qualitative experience is actually a component of the matter itself rather than being an incoherently conceived immaterial supervenience either generated as an illusion or transcending the empirical world. This perhaps resolves the perennial mind/body problem of philosophy. — Enrique

Suppose we lived in a world where atomic stability came not from quantum mechanics but from some other (deterministic) mechanics. If there were human-like creatures in such a world, would they not have feelings or would "classical" humans be philosophical zombies?

Could you please explain in a few words why the word "naturalism" is needed when it actually just means "atheism"?

And how does naturalism bridge the gap between descriptive and normative attributes?

It might well be that QM is complete and deterministic, we just can't simulate large enough systems to observe how macroscopic superposition is avoided. — Kenosha Kid

I have already written it in another thread:

I think the answer is the Schrödinger-Newton-Equation.

"The regime where the mass is around 10^10 atomic mass units while the width is of the order of micrometers is expected to allow for an experimental test of the Schrödinger–Newton equation in the future."

Wave functions of more heavy parts than 10^10 atomic mass units will catch their own wave function.

Is there an article you can point me to, to explain this... hopefully in a way that non-specialists can understand?

The only things I have seen to date are findings which suggest that the Bell Test results can be brought back within expected norms if we take entanglement into account - but there is no explanation for entanglement either. — Gary Enfield

I don't have a link. It's the way I think of it. I assume knowledge of Bohmiam Mechanics and quantum potential, I can't explain that too.

Take two particles with coordinates x1,y1,z1,x2,y2,z2, then the quantum potential is Q = Q(x1,y1,z1,x2,y2,z2,t). We simplify and are only interested in the z-coordinates and also consider Q as constant in time: Q = Q(z1,z2). Then take a landscape with x = z1 and y = z2 and the height z = Q(z1,z2) = Q(x,y).

The two particles are one particle in this representation, where the x-coordinate belongs to particle 1 (z1) and the y-coordinate to particle 2 (z2). If one now moves the "double particle" in the x-direction, the inclination in the y-direction can change. The movement of one particle directly affects the other.

From the point of view of quantum theory, the coordinates z1 and z2 are perpendicular to each other (configuration space), in classical mechanics they are parallel, lying on top of each other.

To what extent does naturalism make statements about technology, ethics or politics? I don't see any connection.

In my opinion, naturalism only says: "Everything is natural", which is not a statement at all, because if there were ghosts, then they would also be natural.

I hate naturalism because it presents itself as clever, but ultimately only asserts a triviality.

That is why the loophole free Bell Test experiments were so important. — Gary Enfield

Bell's inequality can be explained with Bohmian Mechanics. You have a 3n-dimensional (n elementary particles) quantum potential, which is non-local. If you move one particle, it immediately affects all the others through the quantum potential.

It is like walking on a landscape. If you walk to the west, the slope can change in the north-south direction. In classical mechanics, the (for example) z-axes of the particles are parallel, in quantum mechanics they are perpendicular to each other. Thus are the formulas.

It is not certain that he sees it as a rhetorical question. But the question with the identity of the gods is so clear that everything must collapse.

Islam and Christianity are both theistic religions. What's the difference? — Wayfarer

Could you please explain how a god with a son can be the same as a god without a son?

That is correct. The only certain thing is that we ourselves are conscious (I feel, therefore I am), but this cannot be proved to anyone else.

In the same way, we do not know whether a stone, a plant, an animal or a fellow human being is conscious. There are neither sufficient nor necessary criteria for consciousness. All we do is to use the similarity principle.

I think if you get the body exactly right you will inadvertently get consciousness. It’s not like consciousness is some magic sauce you add at the end that you can do without. It’s deeply intertwined with the body. In other words: p-zombies are conceivable (not logically contradictory) but not possible. — khaled

Counter question: How do you know that your computer/BASIC program is not aware when it says "I am aware that you have now pressed so-and-so key!"?

Sorry, I find it very difficult to imagine being another person. I find it logically insignificant as to whether I am me, or you, or John Malkovich, but i find it impossible to imagine actually being another person. Logic can take me places where imagination can't go. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's make it even simpler. Let's say you have an identical twin brother who is almost always around you. Then you can't imagine being him either?

Is it the same for you as imagining being a stone?

How is that less difficult then imagining that each one of my cells, or each one of my molecules is a fish? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't get it.

Let's make it simple. I think you can imagine (roughly) being another person (e.g. John Malkovich). Can you also imagine being all actors at the same time?

Sure, the organization is a "self", but the question is what causes the elements to organize in this way. You cannot say that the "self" is the cause, because you've already said that the "self" is the effect. It doesn't seem like an understanding to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a very good argument. I would like to add that someone can possibly still imagine being a fish, but no one can imagine being a school of fish.

To being or not to being. :)

There must be something else that collapses that darn wave function... — Olivier5

I think the answer is the Schrödinger-Newton-Equation.

"The regime where the mass is around 10^10 atomic mass units while the width is of the order of micrometers is expected to allow for an experimental test of the Schrödinger–Newton equation in the future."

Wave functions of more heavy parts than 10^10 atomic mass units will catch their own wave function.

Thus the cat is a measuring instrument.

I wonder if those molecules with some sort of consciousness have philosophical discussions on to what part of them, and how their consciousness connects to their physical existence.

If only someone could document the discourse between conscious molecules, then the argument would be over.

1. Things that have consciousness know that they have consciousness.
2. As conscious beings, they probably ponder the origin of their physical as well as their spiritual existences.
3. Because they ponder their existence's origins, they have consciousness.
Q.E.D. They have consciousness. — god must be atheist

What about sheep? Is bleating a philosophical discussion?

"In what way is someone dead in a different way if they are not born than if they have lived and died?" — SolarWind

I already explained my contention in what you quoted. — schopenhauer1

That is pathetic. When someone is at a loss, they refer to an ominous have already explained.
The status "not born" and the status "already dead" should be the same (in this moment).
You didn't go into the rest with the exit-pill either.

"Suppose there were a pill that killed instantly, should parents be allowed to bring children into the world if the children were allowed to take that pill at any time?

Surely that would be in accordance with your logic?" — SolarWind

No, procreation isn't justified with faster ways to commit suicide. It's like a game that you start for someone else, and death is an escape. The very fact that you have to do this harm of death, is enough reason not to start the game for that person. It is quite presumptuous to assume, "Well, you'll just endure it.. death is your only option". Something wrong about that. Never existing and existing and then dying are two very different cases. — schopenhauer1

In what way is someone dead in a different way if they are not born than if they have lived and died?

If a child is born with the exit-pill and it is happy, then it will not take the pill, if it becomes very unhappy, then it can take the pill at any time and is dead in a second, as if it had never been born.

It is about the parent making the decision that affects someone negatively. Don't do it. — schopenhauer1

Suppose there were a pill that killed instantly, should parents be allowed to bring children into the world if the children were allowed to take that pill at any time?

Surely that would be in accordance with your logic?

There is no metaphysical entity that exists prior to its birth. — schopenhauer1

Let's assume that's true.

Children often say to their parents, "Why did you give birth to me?". The parents might reply, "What would you be if you had not been born, would that be better or worse?"

This is obviously a comparison of existence with non-existence. In this comparison, non-existence does not win over existence, but the comparison is invalid.

What is wrong with my argument?

So did you read the two reformulations that I wrote below this? I purposely added that in anticipation of this kind of objection. Benatar takes a view that prevention of harm is always good, even if there are no subjective entities to know this. The reformulations below this reformulate this for people who do not have this point of view of the absolute "goodness" of "no harm". — schopenhauer1

Of course I read it. Nevertheless, everything depends on the evaluation of self-non-existence.
If self-non-existence is like hell, then you save someone from that hell by bringing him into life.

A personal question, how do you imagine death, are you afraid of it?

2) There is no rebirth. Then one is non-existent before and after life. One compares existence with non-existence. This comparison is impossible. Mathematically speaking: Is 42 greater or less than 0/0? — SolarWind

No, not exactly what's going on. One way to answer this is the Benatarian Asymmetry argument.

Essentially his idea is that if there is no actual person, not experiencing good is neither good nor bad (as there is no "one" to be deprived). It is neutral. — schopenhauer1

In this "neutral" lies the problem. If death is self-non-existence, how are we to imagine it? Seeing nothing and hearing nothing? But the perception of blackness and silence is also a perception. One has to imagine this perception away too.

It is not the same as a dreamless sleep, because one can speak of that after awakening. Personally, I find the indefinable self-non-existence frightening and not neutral.

@all: This question is easy to analyse, but probably impossible to answer.

1) There is rebirth, then you have to compare the probabilities of what the child will be reborn as, because life is always lived. Do I give the child better or worse conditions than the average?

2) There is no rebirth. Then one is non-existent before and after life. One compares existence with non-existence. This comparison is impossible. Mathematically speaking: Is 42 greater or less than 0/0?

How to continue?

Are there people here who think everything is physics?

Please show your world view.

@TheMadFool

You simply compare the set {A*,B,C,...,X,Y,Z} with the set {A,B,C,...,X,Y,Z*}, where the star indicates which life you would live in the corresponding world.
It is possible that the persons are materially identical in pairs, i.e. A* =(material) A, B =(material) B, ... , Y =(material) Y, Z =(material) Z*. So {A*,B,C,...,X,Y,Z} =(material) {A,B,C,...,X,Y,Z*}, but of course also {A*,B,C,...,X,Y,Z} <>(total) {A,B,C,...,X,Y,Z*}. — SolarWind

I do not compare A with Z, but A with A* and Z with Z*. And of course I consider not only the body but also the memories. The memories are stored physically, of course, and belong to the material world.

If physicalists don't answer to feelings/qualia, you just admit that physicalism is incomplete?

Compatibility is not enough. That 3 times 3 is 9 does not contradict the world formula, but it does not explain it either.

Physicalism, as epiphenomenalism, certainly does not contradict the first-person perspective, but it does not explain it either.

How, please, does a feeling arise from four forces, how many atoms does it need at the very least, does the C-virus also have feelings?

These are all questions I like to pummel physicists with.

Well, your thought experiment shows only that if you assume dualism at the outset, then dualism is what you will conclude. Same with identity thought experiments: they need not pose problems for physicalism unless you have already assumed that they do. — SophistiCat

I can simplify the thought experiment even further. Let us assume that physicalism is true. Then the description of the world would simply be the particles and fields. Some form living beings.

Nowhere in this description is there any mention of which living being you are.

The pointer is missing.

More importantly, these thought experiments are (in)famously controversial; they are the opposite of an argument. If anything, their controversy suggests that there may not be objectively right or wrong answers to the questions that they pose. — SophistiCat

The teletransporting / copy-beam thought experiment shows that it is unclear what the objective solution is, not that there is none.
Both the beaming and my thought experiment show the same thing: physics has an explanatory gap with personal identity => physicalism is incomplete.

I suppose one could say that every brainstate is me? So as you say, as I forget my name, there will be a brain state that correlates with it. — DoppyTheElv

How is the brain state defined? Let's assume that a super technology makes it possible to replace every neuron with a functionally identical chip and turn your brain into a computer.

Would you then be that computer or would you be dead and the computer would just claim to be you?

In set theory, these would be the same set. Your insistence on a difference nonetheless is precisely the circularity in your argument. This is not a subtle point. — Kenosha Kid

Let's assume that reincarnation is true.
Would it make a difference to you which creature you were reborn as?

The brain changes every moment you learn or forget something => you are another person every minute.

Please explain how you can be identical with a dynamic object.

When you go to the toilet, how can you say you are the same person afterwards as before?

Afterwards you are lighter than before, so you cannot be identical with a body.