These are from Book I, section II, part VI

"...external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion." (p.67)

"...tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from- ideas and impressions." (p.67)

"The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos’d specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects." (p.68)

He does call the idea "absurd" in the chapter we are discussing, but what I take him to be saying in these quotes, is that we cannot conceive of them other than by our perceptions.

I'll later share some of Strawson's observations here, in which I think he argues, persuasively, that Hume can readily allow for these types of metaphysical issues to arise, but we cannot make a conclusion one way or the other about them.

That first quote you gave of Hume is indeed beautiful and I think, spot on. I didn't post it because I don't want to hammer home the "mysterian" angle, but it's there in the text.

But then where does that leave this argument which originally established that only perceptions not objects are present to the mind? If we can't contrast the apparent extension of the table with its 'real' extension, then we have no argument at all. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I agree that this is quite a problem for him, because if objects and perceptions were identical in all respects, there would be no way to distinguish the table or chamber because each perception is new and then what reference point would we have between my perception of the table at t1 and my perception of the table at t2?

One wouldn't even be able at t2, to call our perception "a table" at t1, it's a new object. We have to postulate a temporal space (a second, fractions of a second?) to t1 so a resemblance can arise which relates it at t2.

I think a key passage to make this less confusing is when he says:

"The only conclusion we can draw from the existence of one thing to that of another, is by means of the relation of cause and effect, which shews, that there is a connexion betwixt them, and that the existence of one is dependent on that of the other, The idea of this relation is deriv’d from past experience, by which we find, that two beings are constantly conjoin’d together, and are always present at once to the mind." (Italics mine) (p.212)

But then he goes on to say: "But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it follows that we may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect between different perceptions, but can never observe. it between perceptions and objects." (p.212)

I think this last quote is problematic, a stimulus is needed.

To end this post, he does say:

"There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (p.214) (again, italics mine).

So clearly a "natural impulse" is quite important in our ordinary image of the world.

Ok, now I can reply. There are many aspects one can choose to focus on in this chapter, so it can be interpreted in several ways, I want to single out a brief passage, prior to you quote of "We cannot in any property of speech...", he speaks about how time implies succession, and then says that:

"This fiction of the imagination almost universally takes place; and ’tis by means of it, that a single object, plac’d before us, and survey’d for any time without our discovering in it any interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity." (pp.200-201)

I think it is important to point out, that in Hume's use of the term, "fiction", does not mean what we mean by it today, something not being "real", or belonging to mythical tale or a novel. It simply means "more than is warranted by the empirically available evidence." It is real, in the sense that we do experience the identity of objects, but when we look at the evidence, it turns out to be weaker than we would like.

He says, on p.203:

"When we fix our thought on any object, and suppose it to continue the same for some time; 'tis evident
we suppose the change to lie only in the time, and never exert ourselves to produce any new image or idea of the object. "

That speaks of your concerns that each perception is different, and it is by resemblance that we posit continuity. True. Now he says, on p. 204:

"I survey the furniture of my chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This resemblance is observ’d in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions
by the strongest relation and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another. "

Italics mine. Each perception is new, and he does not want to distinguish between objects and perceptions. Yet he still speaks of "my chamber", if he didn't have a notion of identity, he couldn't speak like this, because he would have no way to separate his chamber from anything else.

An important, passage, I think, is this:

"We may begin with observing, that the difficulty in the present case is not concerning the matter of fact, or whether the mind forms such a conclusion concerning the continu'd existence of its perceptions, but only concerning the manner in which the conclusion is forrn'd, and principies from which it is deriv'd."(p.206)

Italics and bold mine. So, I don't think there is a tension is speaking about identity as we do, in regard to the The Ship of Theseus, only that Hume goes deeper and presents us with problems that go beyond, or are deeper in a sense, than the example of the ship.

As I said, one can pick out many quotes here, supporting different views, so one should keep this in mind. What I quoted here is what I think makes sense from a holistic perspective, but this can be debated.

Lula!! A sliver of good news. Now lets see what Bolsonaro does, stupid clown.

Yeah, this will be interesting to discuss, I'll get back to you sometime tomorrow, there's a lot to say here.

If an object has continuous existence, it must continue to be the object which it is, or it becomes something else. That's what change does, it annihilates the object as being what it was, to be something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how this follows. I mean, one can use the example of the Ship of Thesus: we replace one part of the boat with new wood and discard the old parts, it's literally not the same object - as it has new pieces in it, but we still recognize it as the same ship.

Likewise, if we are looking at a flower, miniscule parts of the flower are blown off by the wind, so it's literally not the exact same object one moment to the next, but we still recognize it as the same object. You can think of it as flower at T1 and flower at T2.

Therefore, that the object is continuous is supported logically, but that the object is distinct is not. This is the consequence of him trying to make the assumption of "object" (as a distinct individual) consistent with sense perception which is continuous. The object loses its status of being a real distinct individual, because it requires the dual status, of two separate instances, and memory to relate them. And the separate instances are similar rather than the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is this difficulty, of thinking about distinct existences, I agree. Nevertheless, it looks to me as if there is something about a given object that makes us recognize it as that specific object, otherwise, it seems to me that we would have no way to distinguish on object from another. But it is problematic, no problem granting that.

The "necessary effect" is the assumption itself, the assumption of a body, or an object. If we have no choice in this matter, as Hume says, then this assumption must be taken as necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

But we have cases, which aren't that rare, in which we imagine objects to exist, when they do not: mirages, dreams, hallucinations, mistaken perceptions and so on. So an object is not, strictly speaking necessary, even if in most of the cases of perception, this is what we assume to be the case.

the skeptic says that we do have a choice in this matter, and even that our belief in such objects is unfounded and therefore a bad choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

As far as I can see, he doesn't present it a choice, postulating an enduring object is kind of like breathing or perceiving. It's not that it's a bad choice, as he says, (and pardon my over-repetition of quotes, but I think they matter):

"tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings."

The issue is that the reasons the (mitigated) skeptic (he's no Pyrrhonian) teases out, turn out to be much weaker than what we would like, particularly when we look at the world through "common sense" - what he calls "the vulgar system".

So skepticism affords us the capacity to believe what you say we have no choice but not to believe. And to validate this statement "we don't have a choice", we need to determine the cause which produces this as a necessary effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that for this, I'll need to introduce the Appendix to the Treatise, there he admits of his failure to provide what you ask for, it's very interesting and also very short, the relevant pages are like 2 at most.

Reading between the lines, it seems to me an inscrutable fact about how we experience the world. We strongly believe in the continuity of objects, but they change all the time. As do our perceptions.

We postulate a continuity we are not sensitive of, and hand wave it away by ignoring that each perception is new, and that in the intervals between experiences of the object it continues to exist as we perceived it, which creates the famous two-objects argument.

So, I see where you are coming from, and it is a very sensible question. But textually, I see no easy answer. In my own opinion, putting Hume aside, it's not evident what this necessary effect would be.

He says that:

"The imagination tells us, that our resembIing perceptions have a continu’d and uninterrupted existence, and are not annihilated by their absence. Reflection tells us, that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in their existence, and different from each other. The contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new fiction, which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy, by ascribing these contrary qualities to different existences; the interruption to perceptions, and the continuance to objects."

Nature is obstinate, and will not quit the field, however strongly attack’d by reason ; and at
the same time reason is so clear in the point, that there is no possibility of disguising her, Not being able to reconcile these two enemies, we endeavour to set ourselves at ease as much as possible, by succesively granting’ to each whatever it demands, and by feigning a double existence, where each may find something, that has, all the conditions, it desires." (p.215)

He ends this section pretty much in a skeptical crisis, or close to it. The only thing I can read into all his very penetrating critiques that could offer a way out, is the highlighted portions I show above. We grant to each what it desires (nature and reason), but it is something we do,we don't have a choice. That pretty much sounds like an instinct to me, you can also look at javra's posts, which he has been nice enough to quote some of Hume's comments on instinct.

I am starting to realize that, even though one could read this chapter in isolation, it is by going to other parts of Hume's work, that one could find potential, reliefs as solutions seem to be wanting.

I think towards the end of this thread, I'll post here the Appendix, and only focus on like 2 pages, literally, that shows that he is not satisfied with his system, I think it shows that this problem is a bit too hard for us to solve.

is indicative of the external existence of objects — javra

Yes, and that's part of what makes this so fascinating and frustrating, we have indications of the existence of external objects, and plainly we take them as a given in our "vulgar reasoning", but we can't find proof for something that should be so obvious. So, it isn't as obvious as we think it is.

It's very hard for me to sustain his though experiment, that once we stop perceiving an object, we don't have many good reasons (although something must be there, in the world) to suppose it continues to exist. For as he says (I know I'm re-quoting him, but, he articulates it so well):

"...we find ourselves somewhat at a loss, and are involv’d in a kind of contradiction. In order to free ourselves from this difficulty... by supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which we are insensible."

Italics mine.

Still, what I’ve read about Hume is often quite different than what I gathered from directly reading Hume. For one example, to me, Kant borrowed from Hume rather than debunking him. — javra

I think so too on Kant. He improved some of the framework, but did not solve the problems Hume raised. They're too difficult, in my opinion. You are a good reader, had I not read Strawson's work before Hume himself, I might have gotten the impression that causality is just constant conjunction, I can't be sure. But it is very, very clear, that Hume was what is now called a "mysterian", which should be the common- sense view that we are natural creatures, and hence some things are beyond our capacities, as some things are beyond the capacities of dogs or birds.

Yes, that's a great quote from his Treatise. That's exactly right, or at least, that's how it looks like to me as well. This is somewhat paradoxical, given his reputation and thrust of his thought, an argument for innate faculties, as he puts what you quoted in his Enquiry:

"...and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate Instincts, and are so apt to admire, as something very extraordinary..."

Italics mine.

He was speaking of animals in this quote, but it applies to us too. After all, Hume was a naturalist. And like you say, he had to be somewhat cautious in what he said at his time.

Some of what? — Srap Tasmaner

You're doubts about him depending on perceptions to speak about the continuity of external objects when not perceived. His gives a lot of role to the imagination.

The word might be in there somewhere, but there doesn't seem to be much use made of the idea; the whole flavor of the account is causal, mechanical. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. I think he has in mind something like mechanical, but also something like an instinct, a phrase he doesn't appear to use in this chapter. Perceiving is like breathing or seeing, we can't not have perceptions.

Even if there are principles connecting objects to each other 'out there', beyond our minds, those principles apply to objects, not to our perceptions of them — thus we must have our own mental principles, which will apply to our perceptions, in order to conceive something like causality. — Srap Tasmaner

This is tricky. He's focusing here on our reasons for believing in them, but I keep going back to the "for granted" comment. The tension here, if there is one, is that there seems to be no connection, under these arguments from perceptions to those bodies we take for granted. But when he leaves philosophy and goes to "the vulgar system" (vulgar meant ordinary people, not an insult as it taken today), there are no problems about our recognizing and interacting with the world.

we need principles that will relate certain perceptions to each other. — Srap Tasmaner

VERY perceptive. This is one of the reasons he gives in the Appendix for, essentially stating that his system fails, or as he puts it "my hopes vanish". This is one of the things he cannot account for, how perceptions relate to each other. The other being that we really do perceive continuity in the objects. In other words, he has used these two principles: the uniting principle and the continuity principle (my terminology, not his), without being able to justify them, but he isn't able to renounce either of them.

That goes way beyond this chapter in terms of pages, but it's connected. Very, very interesting. And humbling too, to be able to say that about one's own system.

Spending waaaay too much time in a lab, or you try to get attention by putting forth a fancy argument.

I dunno. It's very strange.

But but, how can you be a pessimist if Schopenhauer is an idealist?

I mean, his idealism is of the transcendental variety, but idealist nonetheless. How can an Idealist be a pessimist?

hmmmm

Ah. One of those threads. That's a matter of taking physics way, way outside of its purview.

But, that's pertinent for that thread, not this one. Thanks for the clarification.

Some philosophical approaches deny there is any reality. — T Clark

You mean what is usually called an idealist? Roughly the view that there are only ideas and nothing else. But those who take these positions say ideas are real.

Then you have Goodman's "irrealism", roughly the view that what there is, are "versions", theories and descriptions we have of the world, which vary depending on the person's version, a chemist would have a different version than a plumber, most of the time. But the posits made by each respective person's version are real.

Now if you have in mind anti-realism, I can't say much, the very little I know about them don't make much sense to me.

Point being, very few people are just going to say "the things I argue for/believe in are not real", it's a very strange statement to make.

Language and mathematics do NOT exist in the physical world. They are not of matter. — god must be atheist

Where does math come from? Where does language come from? They come from people, who are made of matter, realized in brains, which are modifications of matter.

But if this image of matter is too restrictive, because in a sense it is, not everything in the universe is matter - dark energy, light, etc, are physical.

As Joseph Priestley says:

"It is said that we can have no conception how sensation or thought can arise from matter, they being things so very different from it, and bearing no sort of resemblance to anything like figure or motion; which is all that can result from any modification of matter, or any operation upon it.…this is an argument which derives all its force from our ignorance. Different as are the properties of sensation and thought, from such as are usually ascribed to matter, they may, nevertheless, inhere in the same substance, unless we can shew them to be absolutely incompatible with one another."

And also this quote, even more forcefully stated, from Schopenhauer:

"The tendency to gravity in the stone is precisely as inexplicable as is thinking in the human brain, and so on this score, we could also infer a spirit in the stone. Therefore to these disputants [between 'spiritualists' and 'materialists'] I would say: you think you know a dead matter, that is, one that is completely passive and devoid of properties, because you imagine you really understand everything that you are able to reduce to mechanical effect. But… you are unable to reduce them… If matter can fall to earth without you knowing why, so can it also think without you knowing why… If your dead and purely passive matter can as heaviness gravitate, or as electricity attract, repel, and emit spark, so too as brain pulp can it think."

Emphasis mine.

I think these are very solid arguments. We do not know how it is possible that matter (or physical stuff) can think, but it clearly does, as we see in ourselves.

And it makes sense, because it is essentially the same thought presented in slightly different ways, which can go one forever.

And it is a very narrow topic too, not much to add once the arguments have been established.

It is, and I agree. I do think you are being sensible here, I've protested once or twice before, but you guys do pretty good work by and large, in my opinion.

Beyond a point, there are diminishing returns on this topic.

It's about 3 or 4 of them, mostly. But, I mean, what's the point? Like, you want to depress everybody? Read the news.

You suffer so much in life? Then there is a way out, nobody is stopping you.

Jeez, it's hard to think of a topic on the internet in which the serious reply "kill yourself" wouldn't be taken as a threat.

Agreed.

Latest step in our descent into absolute fucking lunacy. Well done everyone. — Isaac

We're not content with merely heading towards annihilation, we are racing to it, with enthusiasm!

https://news.antiwar.com/2022/10/26/us-accelerates-plan-to-deploy-upgraded-nukes-to-europe/

Are you remaining within the chapter? I've been reading the section, but the exact quote you gave I found in another section of the book, concerning the self, with is several sections after this one. I may be reading too fast, which is why giving the page number is clearer.

But attributing, like relating or associating -- these don't sound like perceptions but ways of handling or working with or acting upon perceptions. We can, in addition, have ideas about what we're doing when do this sort of thing, and Hume bundles some of these mental behaviors together and calls them our notion of external existence. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that's likely true. I think that some of this may be alleviated once you get to the part in which he discusses the imagination.

So far as I can see, he's still talking about our perceptions of the object, and then the problem is how do these perceptions tell us something about the existence and continuity of these objects ("body"), which "we must take for granted."

There's no optimal way to read, imo. We all have our biases, sympathies, ways of thinking. We may attempt to be as faithful as possible to what he's saying, but these are hard issues with no straight answers.

I can't get Strawson or Chomsky's comments out of my reading of Hume, that may be my fault, but that's what I see when I read him, and I've found that useful, maybe it's a distorting view, it's possible.

In any case, if you could point out to the specific page number, instead of the section, it would be easier for me to find what is giving you trouble.

Ah. In that case, "what we get out of it" seems to me to be misplaced, yes. But certainly, that concern, is a very natural and immediate issue that arises when reading this chapter.

On the whole, I find your reading of him to be quite accurate, more accurate than me, given that I've read part I of the Treatise twice in a period of about 6 to 8 months.

Once you get to the imagination, you may see something you find convincing, though he spends a good deal of time on it. Browsing it now, not in great detail, his appeal to the imagination is elegant, and perhaps right to an extent, but it certainly leaves a lot to be desired.

why we would hold questionable beliefs and continue to hold them once shown to be groundless — that requires some explanation. — Srap Tasmaner

Maybe you're familiar with Donald Hoffman's recent work. Very, very briefly: we evolved for survival, not for discovering truths about the world. His analogy is that the objects we see are like desktop items, they're useful, but they're literally not what they seem, at bottom it's a bunch of code.

I don't find this too persuasive, but it has some merit.

It's not that they're groundless, our reasons, it's that they're not as good as we would like.

So perhaps my wondering 'what we get out of it', why nature would so order things, is misplaced. That nature does so order our minds is all Hume is trying to show.

Plausible? — Srap Tasmaner

In a way, taking Hume's phrase. But, if we admit his empiricism is false, not accepted today, then we need only a slight modification: that our minds so structure nature such that we postulate persisting objects. Of course, our minds are part of nature, but also separated from it by billions of years of evolution. But Hume's gist is quite plausible.

Not so for the external existence of objects. There has been nothing yet to explain why nature implanted this habit in us, why the belief in external objects is so necessary. What do we get out of this belief of such great importance that nature implanted it in us? — Srap Tasmaner

One option may be one of the things I cited, which is simply, we do not know - it may be one of those "secret springs", which we cannot understand. Of course, this could well be accused of being a cop-out, which - may be.

But he offers an explanation, it is due to the powers of our imagination - arguments you will eventually get to in due time, I don't want to monopolize with the length of my posts.

It is curious that he treats reasoning (with the principle example being mathematics) and the belief in distinct, persistent, external objects as separate questions, albeit giving them related answers. In the post-Frege world, we might naturally think these go together. We carve up the world into classifiable objects to make it safe for logic; conversely we analyze the world using the logic of predicates and classes because we have carved it up into distinct objects with properties in common. Logic and objects go together. Without distinct objects, there is nothing for the functions of logic (not the predicates, not the truth functions, quantifiers, or other operators) to be applied to. — Srap Tasmaner

And I think this is an example in which empiricism simply fails, the account it gives of mathematics make little sense. It does not explain why every person on Earth can do basic arithmetic, if it be brought to the fore.

As for objects, yes, we postulate them, but we should be warry of treating them as platonic things. And here I think Hume is correct to point out the frequency in which our perceptions are new.

That was a fantastic, fantastic post, much better than what I could muster myself. I think the arguments you present as your reading of Hume are correct. Which gives me very little to room to disagree so far. Let's see how to add or comment, and proceed:

we can't raise the question of external objects — because Nature — but we can look for causes of the belief we're stuck with. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. And notice a difficulty here, nature has made this issue too important to leave it to us to decide if objects ("body") exist or no, this, we take "for granted". Yet the thing taken for granted is what paves the way for Hume to ask, essentially, well what reasons do we have to believe in the continued existence of these objects? It turns out that the reasons we have (or the ones he gives) are not nearly as good as we would like to have.

You seem to be more methodical than me, so I'll add what I think I can contribute to, by way of agreement or disagreement, and perhaps not mention a section which others might find crucial, if so, they can bring it up.

He goes on to mention (in part iv) that the perceptions we have of objects are actual perceptions. It makes no sense that we should say that the perception feels different from the object, whose impression gives us the idea of it.

Then, concerning external existence, Hume states:

"The paper, on which I write at present, is beyond my hand. The table is beyond the paper. The walls of the chamber beyond the table. And in casting my eye towards the window, I perceive a great extent of fields and buildings beyond my chamber. From all this it may be infer'd, that no other faculty is requir'd, beside the senses, to convince us of the external existence of body." (pp.190-191)

This is pretty clear and one would even say, a "naive realist" view of the world. But he is quick to point, we to take into account several important facts (three in total), of which I will mention only the first, as it looks to me the most important one:

"...properly speaking, ’tis not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members but certain impressions, which enter by the senses." (p.191)

Which is true, and reminds me of Russell's comment that, strictly speaking, a neurologist is not looking at a brain when he studies it. He has a perception of something, which we call a brain, it's not as if the neurologist looking at a brain, is much different from us looking at our bodies, both are perceptions of "brains" and "bodies".

He points out that some of the things we attribute to external bodies, on minimal consideration, turn out to be internal affections, heat and sweetness and colours, etc. How far do we take this? It's not trivial, but we must at the very least allow the opportunity of contact with an object, to gain an impression, but for Hume, it's much more than this minimal consideration.

To end this post, he reiterates:

"[the senses] give us no notion of continu’d existence, because they cannot operate beyond the extent, in which they really Operate. They [the senses] as little produce the opinion of a distinct existence, because they neither can- offer it to the mind as represented, nor as original. To offer it as represented they [the senses] must present both an object and an image. To make it appear as original, they must convey a falshood ; and this falshood must lie in the relations and situation: In order to
which they must be able to compare the object with ourselves; and even in that case they do not, nor is it possible they shou’d, deceive us" (pp.191-192)

As I understand it, if the senses represented "originals", objects as they are, we should be able to then compare these objects to ourselves, which would make them "external and independent" from us, as he says in p.190, 3rd paragraph.

Yes. Do be careful with the copyright issue, unless you took this for another site saying similar things.

Edit: Yep, much better.

Russia conducts first nuclear weapons drill since Ukraine invasion

https://www.ft.com/content/e28b0aa8-0260-4249-9954-4e346ebda68a

The article is paywalled, but I'm sure folks know how to read this - or find the same info elsewhere. Not good.

He does point it out a lot and I think he is factually correct about this, though carrying out experiments on conceptual posits might prove to be quite difficult.

that neither reason nor observation justify us explaining these resemblances by positing a constant object they are perceptions of. — Srap Tasmaner

And this is a difficulty both as stated in this chapter given his assumptions, and also hard given rationalist or even Kantian assumptions.

The sense I get is that if you really think about it, it's an extremely complex problem to justify the continued existence of the object, because, as he says:

"When we have been accustom’d to observe a constancy in certain impressions, and have found, that the perception of the sun or ocean, for instance, returns upon us after an absence or annihilation with like parts and in a like order, as at its first appearance, we are not apt to regard these interrupted perceptions as different, (which they really are) but on the contrary consider them as individually the same, upon account of their resemblance.

But as this interruption of their existence is contrary to their perfect identity, and makes
us regard the first impression as annihilated, and the second as newly created, we find ourselves somewhat at a loss, and are involv’d in a kind of contradiction. In order to free ourselves from this difficulty, we disguise, as much as possible, the interruption, or rather remove it entirely, by
Supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which we are insensible."

Emphasis mine.

So he says this, which I think is correct, nevertheless we can't forget that he says, at the beginning of this chapter: "...tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings."

So - very very hard.

Very good post and you are quite right. In fact, assuming you don't already know this, Hume regarded his account to be an empirical theory, meaning scientific, motivated in no small part by Newton's achievement, he was trying to establish a "science of man", what we would today perhaps call a psychology, as you mention.

Your conclusion that Hume was a "sensual" philosopher is correct and is stated explicitly by the (apparently) first serious scholarly work on Hume by Norman Kemp Smith.

His views on the imagination are perhaps the most profound out of the classical figures, which gives him an extra unique factor worth exploring for those interested in the topic. Nevertheless, the imagination as well as his "missing shade of blue", and most of all, by far, his famous Appendix to the Treatise show that he faced insurmountable difficulties given the account of mind he assumed to be true.

Actually, the imagination could be argued about, in terms of its status in relation to innatism.

It's a modern imposition, perhaps influenced by Kant when he categorized philosophers before him as "dogmatists" and "skeptics". But Descartes and Leibniz were more scientific than Locke, Berkeley or Hume. Yet both "camps" used elements of both empiricism and rationalism. The main difference I find between them, is in how strong a power(s) they ascribe to the mind, Hume much less so than Descartes, for instance.

As for Hume, a little quote, that is very important, which shows he does not believe the mind is empty:

"But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation, there are also many parts of it, which they derive from the original hand of nature; which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions; and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate Instincts, and are so apt to admire, as something very extraordinary, and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding. "

That's in his Enquiry

Similar comments are found in his Treatise. He tries to downplay it by saying it just a mechanical instinct, but he can't really suppress it much. Also, his "missing shade of blue" is extraordinary, in that by accepting it, he should have realized his system was fatally injured, imo.



It's a good question, but in my experience, a good deal of the contemporary discussion on these topics aren't very interesting to me, too technical and narrow. So, I couldn't tell you.

Having said that, I believe Hume's problems of causation remains a big problem in philosophy, due to the amount of literature on the topic. One could argue that Kant's framework improved the way we should think about these issues.

But I think the problems remain, concerning causation and the reasons we have for believing in the continuity of external objects.

Pardon for giving a sloppy reply, which doesn't even address your question (reply below) , my reading of Hume was heavily influenced by Galen Strawson's books about Hume, both which are excellent.

But he does raise a point, which though you have not argued for or against, is very important to know in the context of the discussion of causation.

My paperback copy of Hume has perhaps too many highlights, so providing more coherent quotes would take a long time, nevertheless he says:

"...I explain only the manner in which objects affect the senses, without endeavouring to account for their real nature and operations.... my intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the secret causes of their operations... I'm afraid such an enterprise is beyond the reach of human understanding, and that we can never pretend to know otherwise than by those external properties, which discover themselves to the senses."

pp.111-112 in the Penguin Edition of Humes Treatise

There are other quotes, but it would be a bit long to provide them here. The point is to state, that Hume did not think that all there was to causality is constant conjunction (this is frequently claimed, it's not true), it's that it's the only thing we can discover about it. We know not the "secret springs" of nature.

This is the argument based on his account of our judgments of cause and effect being derived from the experience of constant conjunction. He argues that the claim that some object causes our perceptions cannot be accepted because we never have the opportunity to observe the object, on the one hand, accompanied by the perception, on the other, much less constantly. — Srap Tasmaner

I think this is the case with say, billiard balls hitting each other or a bullet flying off a barrel. But in the case of the examples he gives of the paper in front of him, and the chimney, he is constantly looking at the object, it's not an issue of it being seen very quickly.

So, on this reading, this would not be huge problem to the "two world account" he is critiquing. But, I could be wrong in my interpretation, for sure.

Yeah, I think this is going to be fun, many of the issues you raise based on what he says is quite important, and obviously open to interpretation, as evidenced by all the literature there is on him.

Yes, impressions are a bit like breathing or digestion, we don't have a choice in having them. He does say elsewhere that we can't have a simple idea without a corresponding simple impression. It gets much murkier when we get to complex impressions.

Sticking to the topic you raised:

Hume seems to think he doesn't need it, that you can coherently say 'impression' and dodge the question, "Impression of what?" — Srap Tasmaner

As impressions, perhaps that's right (I'm no expert at all either), but we can have ideas of something, these being based originally on impressions.

The argument goes round, that the hypothesis of 'double existence' is insupportable, which would be true if impressions are the same as ideas. But is that claim based only on introspection? Or does it arise from a methodological choice not to consider the 'what' that impressions are of? (Here I really have to reread.) — Srap Tasmaner

This is extremely difficult, and fascinating for that reason, in my opinion. Let's see, if ideas are merely weaker impressions, then the problem is completely insurmountable.

But let's say they're not. Let's say ideas and impressions are significantly different than what Hume says, is the problem solved?

Let's assume Hume's wrong, and let's look at a statue. We can say we got the idea of this specific statue by looking at it. We close our eyes, and some crumbs of marble, imperceptible to us, fall from the object. (We can't call strictly speaking consider this a statue at this specific point, it could have disappeared, but there is nothing there to "verify" that there is a statue, we are the ones who do that.) We open our eyes and see the same statue, we don't notice a difference, but that statue has changed.

If there was no statue there, we wouldn't have the idea of this specific statue (we may have ideas of other statues). Every instance, it seems to me we have a different perception, and strictly speaking (again) the statue is also changing.

It looks to me as if this situation is one of double existence, which is very strange.

Something like that, on first approximation.

It is sooo tempting to troll here and say, real is just another word for metaphysics.

Because saying it twice is not funny. But still, I giggle because I share that same frustration with T Clark.

On a more serious note and putting aside what I said earlier about "real" here, if a word is causing more obscurity than clarity, perhaps its best either to drop the word, or using it sparingly. We can get awfully tangled up in arguing about the meaning of words as opposed to arguing ideas.

In so far as Hume is attempting to give a theoretical account of what's empirically available to us (according to his system), your conclusion does seem to follow from what he writes here. It would extend this discussion to add much, but he does say that "the essence of mind" is "unknown", so there may be other factors in play, which we cannot account for.

It becomes complicated, because he readily allows that "bodies" exist, which aren't internal to the mind, this is something we take for granted. The real problem is how to neatly distinguish between "inner" and "outter", when it comes to the mind.

If the bee has experience, then the situation for the bee would be that it relates to thing out there, which we call a flower. But it would likely have no account of the continued existence of the flower, it would merely go to it.

For us, the continued existence of objects, according to Hume, is due to the imagination.

Edit: Misread your last sentence. From relation to state... perhaps, though I suspect that something about our mental architecture plays a role, even if he likes to downplay this aspect.

This must mean that you like Putin.

Very interesting. I've read similar studies; it does however create an issue. If an infant can recognize an object, then it looks to me as if causality is already in play, that is the object is a stimulus for the infant, "absorbed" by the infant's intentionality. This can be debated.

What's outlined in this chapter, is perhaps too difficult to create an experiment on. Or maybe not, that's a good question for discussion.

It is a problem for Christians given that they present God with the usual attributes of wisdom, goodness and so on.

But I've also asked myself the question - which may or may not be applicable to religion - why is evil a problem specifically?

Perhaps God doesn't consider evil what we call evil, regardless of how horrific it may look to us. Either this option "dissolves" the problem or, just what you mentioned, we postulate the devil.

But then what do we postulate for those acts that are neutral, not good, not evil? We'd need a third God for that...

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