Think carefully about that. The same applies to everything else of which you conceive. If it is true, then we have no explanation for how we might learn anything.

And yet we do learn.

SO it seems something has gone astray. — Banno

I have thought about it and I agree with the first part.

Putting aside things like facts in history and the like, I don't think we learn things. Rather they grow in each species: we don't learn puberty, or learn how to see, we grow and are able to see or reach puberty.

I think innate ideas are facts about human beings. How it happens is baffling and I couldn't explain it. But I think it's true.

Well, I don't know of any cases of disembodied minds, if that's what you are asking -- although there are many folk who claim there are such things, their examples strike me as wishful thinking. — Banno

Here we entirely agree. :up:

I'd say certainty rather than faith. That serves to step away from the hegemony of religion. — Banno

Fair enough.

Ah, but if you didn't have the concept, what is it that you would be missing?

I suppose it would be the ability to talk about and use the laptop as a laptop. — Banno

If we didn't have a concept of a laptop, we couldn't come up with it in the first place.

What was the person who was thinking about laptops doing before he/she/they set up to build one?

Spot on. Mass and mind do not seem to be related in this way. As if we could measure the mass of your love for your mother.

Talk of mass does not fit talk of mind. — Banno

Stated like this, I don't have a problem.

Only one last question on this topic: would you say the mind is made of physical stuff?

I think that laptops were designed by a person before he had the physical object in the world. So there was no laptop prior to the first one.

If mind is matter, and consciousness is mind, then when one is unconscious, one ought be lighter, because one would lack the mass of one's mind. — Banno

Ah, got it. Thanks.

I've been miss-speaking, which is why talking to people like you is good for me. I should use the word "physical stuff" instead of matter. Physical stuff includes things that have no mass. But this still leaves me unclear on something:

I don't know of what evidence could count for the claim that mind has no mass.

Is it? What sort of thing is a concept? — Banno

That's really hard. A concept is something like a kind of categorization we give to objects in the world.

One cannot type on a concept-of-laptop; one types on a laptop. — Banno

I agree. But if you didn't have the concept of a laptop, you wouldn't know you have one in front of you.

The concept of a laptop is in your head, but not the object you are typing on, that's in the world.

It carries some connotation related to faith. I don't actually believe that when I get up I'll melt through the floor, I understand that I wont. "Understanding" does not have that connotation, for example, nor does "comprehend".

Or to be more specific, it's so extremely improbable that it isn't worth taking into serious consideration.

DO you lose weight when you go to sleep? — Banno

I believe so. The more time passes the more calories you lose. I don't see the connection.

Can you explain this distinction to me? Are mental entities things like desires or beliefs? — Banno

It's complex in details, or at least Sellar's account of it is not always an example of clarity. From what I gather, the manifest image is the image we construct of the world in our daily life.

The computer you are typing on or the tree you may see outside your window, or the sun rising in the east: that's all manifest reality. It includes such things like getting in a car and driving to work or opening a fridge, etc.

As I understand it, the manifest image is also modified as time goes on. We no longer think that the Earth is the center of the universe nor that poking holes in our heads helps with diseases.

The scientific image is the image of the world as seen in science. In this aspect of the world we study the role that particles play in vision or how heat consists of molecules moving around at a faster rate.

This world is one in which the Earth goes around the sun. And so on with many scientific facts, which are generally hidden from us in our daily lives.

To give an account of mental entities is far too difficult. I can only say very general things. Are desires mental entities? Sometimes I guess, but I suspect most of the time we aren't aware of all our desires.

Beliefs are problematic, they carry religious connotations and even if we use it in a technical manner, I don't think we get entirely away from that aspect of the word.

Having said that, some beliefs can be made explicit, as when I'm asked whether I believe that global warming is a very serious threat or if you ask whether I "believe" that blue is prettier than pink. When it's explicit, its mental.

But at any single instance I have hundreds, if not thousands of beliefs. These can't be all be mental simultaneously, I could not possibly consciously entertain all my beliefs in a single instance.

However, I do appreciate this quote - very much - and would like to know more about it - source ? — Amity

He is difficult for everybody. It's just that some people spend more time with him and likely understand him better. I am not one of those. The good thing about him, on the other hand, is that since his phrases are so open to interpretation, you just defend what you think it means. Even Russell misunderstood some of Wittgenstein.

I believe this is from his Philosophical Investigations (115). I don't recall that passage myself. I first discovered it in the works of Raymond Tallis. I think his Why The Mind is Not a Computer is a good exercise in philosophy of language. You don't need to agree with him on many things, or even most things, to get value out of what he's doing.

But unfortunately, I cannot find it for free online. All I can see is parts of the introduction, which is not where the philosophy of language aspect can be most appreciated...

The Aeon chucklehead article by Nakul Krishna, edited by Nigel Warburton — Amity

Thanks for the source. :ok:

Sure it's quite useful, but if we go down that road of "what do you mean by X" too deeply, we end up yelling about a tree we're pointing at or about the colour of an apple.

Yes, Banno clearly knows this topic very well.

If that's all there was to it, the problem would have dissolved a long time ago. It is an inquiry into how two seemingly unrelated domains, matter and thought, are related. This is about as unlinguistic a metaphysical question as you can get. — hypericin

My example was bound to be controversial. I don't think I could come up with an uncontroversial example. I think you said it: "seemingly unrelated" - they seem unrelated. It doesn't follow that they are unrelated. Action at a distance looked seemingly unrelated to matter, or so Newton thought when he discovered it.

I should point out, by way of clarification that by saying a problem is linguistic, I don't mean to say that you are using words is a "merely" incorrect manner. The words we use have the content we give them. In this respect, it is thought that "matter" does not appear to have the properties of thinking.

If one takes this to be a property of the thing we refer to when we use the word "matter", then of course problems will arise such that the "mind body problem" arise, phrased in this manner. I think Newton showed - as Chomsky pointed out - that we have no conception of "body" anymore.

So word-use is related to thinking, and this plays a huge role in any question we phrase. But if we change the association of the word, the problem may appear in a new light.

There is a lot of content to this debate which is not a matter of "mere" words, such as the problem of consciousness, or the problem of matter, etc.

There is simply no ontology which dictates the boundaries of words. These boundaries are ultimately human contrivances. — hypericin

Sure. "John" is after all a mental construction which we project on a specific person. In this respect it's an ontology of everyday life, I think, which includes trees, rivers and so forth, but does not include atoms or chlorophyll. These latter components don't appear to us in everyday life absent certain equipment to detect or interact with them.

But it is still an important issue. As in if John has a stroke and doesn't behave or think at all as he used to, we'd say he's a different person. What do we do if the John prior to the stroke committed a crime but his trial is to occur after the stroke?

Should we punish post-stoke John?

For example, the Quarks that are supposed to be the building blocks of sub-atomic matter, "have never been observed empirically" (Science), but are inferred theoretically (Philosophy). Hence, I would say that Quarks & other hypothetical particles are meta-physical — Gnomon

I'm aware this topic enters into the whole realism vs anti-realism debate. I would still be careful in saying that the stuff posited by science is a metaphysical entity. We can of course debate if science is metaphysics or not. One can make a case that part of science is metaphysics, sure. But I wouldn't tell the physicist that I have special knowledge regarding his field.

Yet not all of them have any "substantive" effect on the material world, but may have "significant" effects on the human Mind (memes). Metaphysical questions are not resolved by practical experimentation, but only by philosophical argumentation, or mathematical calculation. — Gnomon

I largely agree on your last point here. Matter looks and feels substantial to us, which it is. But at bottom, it isn't. So we have two views on the nature of matter, our common sense conception of regarding tables and chairs and then we have what physics tells us about matter. This brings forth epistemological consideration on top of metaphysical ones.

I had severe mental cramps when I briefly studied that many years ago. Fodor's L.O.T. Language of Thought ! I have avoided it just as much as metaphysics. Until now. — Amity

It can be dense. And many aspects of Wittgenstein are difficult too. Nevertheless going back to Thomas Reid, one can see him discussing similar topics as Wittgenstein develops later on, in a pretty straightforward manner.

Also, listening or reading Chomsky's non-technical work and Bertrand Russell on many topics not limited to language, are useful in this regard. For philosophical matters, philosophy of language need not go beyond trying to be careful and clear and to not get stuck on a word or a phrase.

Wittgenstein says this nicely: "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." This can be interpreted in many ways, I take it to mean that we should avoid being held captive if we do not proceed with the way we are phrasing and/or thinking about a question.

As related to metaphysical questions and concepts of identity and self in social experience. What our categorisations of reality are based on. — Amity

Sure, there's truth in that. In Spanish we have pronouns for objects, which is weird if you think about it. In French too. I don't know how different my experience of the world is in one language vs another.

people in a position of marginalization are prevented from creating concepts, terms and other representational resources that could be used in order to conceptualize and understand their own experiences, especially those having to do with being in that position of marginalization — SEP: Feminist philosophy of language

Yes, when it comes to power, the issue of gender is clear-er to see.

And we've seen examples of phrases such as "Black Lives Matter" or "#MeToo", which have been quite useful in changing aspects of the society.

Sure. No problem. If I had to be repeating my views on this topic for 5 years, I'd be hesitant to repeat myself again. :up:

Yes and that approach makes sense. I suppose what's left if empirical evidence is not available, is to rely on the plausibility of the arguments. But we also use intuition here and this depends on our sensibilities as in one may prefer idealism because one thinks the mind creates the world or some other such view.

I can only think of What necessarily is not real, or an impossible object / world (i.e. membership rule/s for the Null Set)? A question (re: my apophatic conception) of negative ontology. — 180 Proof

I think I remember parts of that argument. It's interesting, but too technical for me to be able to reply intelligently.

I was intrigued to discover that there is a 'Feminist Metaphysics'. — Amity

Well, I'd like to think reason is neither masculine nor feminine as applied to these types of topics. It gets muddied in political affairs at times. But I had never heard of feminine metaphysics, but I'm not even surprised.

The point of me asking for a person to give an example of a metaphysical problem dissolving through language use and one which does not is simply to see if people are willing to point to one example in which analysis or clear use of words can put a problem to the side tends to show that philosophy of language can be useful.

Sometimes certain people tend to make all problems of philosophy a problem of using a word incorrectly. I think that's taking it way too far. On the other hand, if someone says philosophy of language is useless, then I think that's clearly wrong.

Many of these problems are substantive, but I'd be suspicious if someone said that not a single problem in the long list of these issues is one which was framed incorrectly.

But people have somewhat different ideas as to what constitutes metaphysics...

So what's that, then? A clear and obvious reality? A reality that is taken for granted, or is at hand, perhaps?

If we drop the word "manifest", what would change? There would presumably still be taxies. I don't see that we need "manifest reality" in order to will one's arm to move to hail a cab. The wording just doesn't obviously help. — Banno

It's Sellars distinction. I think it's a good one. Manifest reality deals with mental entities. Science, if our theories are correct, deal with mind-indepdent entities.

But your mind does not have a mass. So it is not a form of matter. — Banno

Hmmm, that's not clear to me. It certainly comes from mass, we just don't know how the mass realizes this feat of experience. I can't well take my mind out of my brain and confirm that it has no mass. It may seem to have no mass, I'm not sure it doesn't.

Then again, you may be correct.

It's a good indicator of something fishy going on. — Banno

Yes. It trivializes something which shouldn't be treated this way.

SO the question arrises, yes, OK, but which is it really - neurones or intent?

And that might be the metaphysical knot - the view that one description must have primacy.

And the strategy, the way of doing metaphysics, would be to probe deeply into any alternative solution to see if it does reduce mind to matter, or matter to mind.

So there's a start. — Banno

They both play a role. I think the problem here is to ask how do neurons relate to a willed action of raising my arm. I can hit my shoulder at a particular angle and my arm will raise. I can also move it. I don't doubt that neurons play a very big role here, and a puzzling one at that.

As to what really is going on, is suggested by what you yourself said: it depends on what aspect of the world you want to analyze. Do you want to speak of manifest reality where people raise there arms to hail a cab? Then I think it makes sense to speak of will.

Do you want to talk about how this is realized in the body? Then you can speak of neurons and physiology.

I think that mind is molded matter. So I'd take that question as meaning how does some matter, my arm, reduces to another piece of matter, my mind or vice versa. Unless you have a specific meaning for the word mind which would be different. Then we can talk about that. I think the terms experiential for mind and non-experiential for what we usually call body, is potentially less confusing.

But maybe not.

And you're right, my mistake, I try to avoid using "just" - it's very misleading.

I know none of this is helpful, but it does leave the problem of definition. But I would have you say not what metaphysics is, because that is problematic, and as well there are more substantial definitions, but nothing remotely like you've described. Instead, you decide. After all, your discussion. And when you've said, then the rest of us can pick at it, making it strong if it's any good. — tim wood

I see your point and it is valid to a large extent. Let me see if I can work around the definition issue by offering example of topics which are considered to pertain to metaphysics:

The ground of existence: is it non-mental, mental, neutral and so on.
The nature of the self: do they exist, if so, do they exist apart from the body.
Free will: Do we have it or don't we? Are we determined by causal forces or do we "interrupt" them in an act of freedom
Identity: Do objects have an identity or do we give them identity entirely? If so do we pick out the identity of object by its physical characteristics or by mental continuity?
Causality: Does it exist or should we speak of habits or tendencies in nature?
The nature of reality: Do we access it directly or are we stuck with appearances?

And so on. Honestly, I think it would be best if people take metaphysics to mean whatever they think they understand it to mean when they think of the word, minus New Age interpretations. Because today, I think it is basically impossible to speak of metaphysics without extremely substantial epistemological input.

So the best I can do is to say metaphysics is what we call a certain series of questions that fall under that name. So are the topics I named substantial or are they a problem of us using words incorrectly?

That's already a difficult question, with different people taking metaphysics to mean different things.

As I understand it metaphysics is the study of the most general features of the world and it essentially involves experience and language. Experience, obviously, otherwise we'd not be typing anything. And language because we need to express our thoughts in some manner in discussions of this kind.

I'd put my neck out and say that a good deal - but by no means not all - of metaphysics is a priori, that is, we need not go to the world and do empirical experiments about it, though we are not prevented from doing so, of course. So it is largely conceptual.

We just need our concepts and the world. So issues like whether God exists or not don't require much empirical experiments, nor do experiments tell us if the world is fundamentally mental or non-mental. For these we must rely on arguments that articulate our intuitions.

That's my approximation of metaphysics.

Fair enough. I don't know how to @ people yet in my post. But needless to say, you're invited. :wink:

Sure there is a point in saying that a large portion of metaphysics can be cleared up by clarifying what we mean when we use certain words. For example "real" is an honorific word in English, as in this is the deal and this is the real deal. There aren't two types of deals the deal and the real deal. We are just using real for emphasis in this instance.

What-it's-like arguments seem to me to be peculiar to English. They can't be articulated nearly as well in other languages, thus there is reason to be suspicious that we are being held captive by language, as Wittgenstein said.

At the same time, the classical debates in metaphysics of idealism vs realism or free will vs determinism and so on down the long list, aren't only about the use of words. If it were only that, I suspect that many of these debates would have died out. Nobody, or very few at most, speak about phlogiston anymore or of elan vital and the like.

The reason these questions remain, is because the issues are hard. Is the world fundamentally non-mental or is the entire world a product of our representations? Are we the product of one long causal chain in which the big bang set in motion all our choices and decisions or do we have the capacity to act in a manner that is not dictated entirely from previous act?

If there is no self - which is different from considering the self as distinct from the body - then why do we treat other people as if they had a self of some kind? We can perhaps clear up some confusion by clearing up what we mean when we say "mind" or "will", but that seems to me to leave the main point in these disputes entirely unresolved. And they may remain in this domain, as they have for thousands of years...

I mean, sure you could replace "white" in such quotes with "Hispanic", which I am in part, and you can say some stereotypes about it. It wouldn't necessarily be wrong about some people, often a minority in that group. There are some truths in stereotypes, I think. But it doesn't condemn an entire group. Nor is an individual (or group) a collection of stereotypes.

I don't think the language is particularly offensive. Maybe if you put in "black" and say such phrases, it might be ignorant. But there's a long history behind that. I think you can say that black people tend to be better at sports than white people and that isn't wrong. It just doesn't apply to everyone.

You can also say that black people support Obama much more than is merited by his actions. And I get that. I think it's a mistake to think Obama was so good, but I don't see the problem.

It's not as if the quote imples white people are f**king cra*ers that only f**k there cousins or something like that. That would be racist or close to it. But that's my take, I could be well wrong.

Sure, those are factors too. Wealth will shield or help out in many circumstances, so in this respect in today's society having more money rather than less, would mitigate the circumstances to some extent.

I think each issue should be taken in turn. If a person is homophobic but not racist, then one deals with that. But if the person is racist but not homophobic then that is the issue to work on. I think education, exposure and rational arguments are the best way to deal with these issues.

Some people will never change the way they view the world. Some may lessen the intensity of such feelings over time.

It's not about giving out a medal to those who are most oppressed. It's about pointing out that some people deal with more issues than others. Which does not make any persons particular grievance therefore invalid.

I think what I wrote is important, but it does go both ways. I strongly resist the idea that quantum mechanics has any metaphysical implications. It's physics. That's hard for me to maintain sometimes, given how much it has changed the way people think about the world. It's probably true that keeping the distinctions clear and definite has become something of an ideology for me. I probably need to work on that. — T Clark

It's not clear to me either. I've worked on this topic and have spoken with esteemed figures too, due to the work I was doing. I think "metaphysics" depends on were you are coming from. I suspect Sellar's distinction between the "manifest image" (ordinary everyday life) and the "scientific image" is crucial here.

For Strawson "metaphysics" is about the nature of the world, but part of it is a-priori. But as he says, some a-priori facts are facts about reality, just as much as empirical demonstrations are matters of fact. But not everything in metaphysics can be settled, far from it.

For Chomsky, "metaphysics" should be re-interpreted in the manner of Ralph Cudworth namely how the world interacts with our cognitive faculties.

So you are far from alone here. The way you use it is legitimate too. At least Schopenhauer and maybe even Kant would agree with you, which is not bad company necessarily.

On the forum we see a lot of seems-to-me theories about consciousness that don't take the results of lots of fairly recent work into consideration. — T Clark

Sure. The only issue is that some of the scientific work here, say, Hoffman's work on vision and how the eye works, leaves entirely open all options. But I agree that looking at empirical experiments can be useful.

Well "measuring" oppression can be tough if we are looking for exact numbers in terms of such a person is of X descent thus he is, on a scale from 1 to 10, an 8 on the oppression scale.

But sure, there are aspects in which one can be subject to oppression more than others. Like if a person were black, Jewish and gay simultaneously, then such a person would likely be subject to more oppression than if that person were "only" gay, at certain periods and countries in human history.

To be more precise that saying "reality is whatever there is", I would probably say that I'm a "rationalistic idealist", similar to the Neoplatonists of Cambridge or perhaps some strains of Kantianism.

What this means is essentially this: what is real is whatever happens to be in the world that interacts with our innate cognitive faculties. In this sense, reality is species-dependant. If something exists in the world, but it doesn't interact with us in some manner, then for intent and purposes it isn't part of our conception of reality. This means that there may be many aspects of reality we simple are ignorant about, but still exist for some other species to interact with.

This takes as a given that our mental images need not refer to any aspect of reality as seems to be the case with our thoughts. So we have the thoughts in our heads, which are infinite and whatever exists "out there" that we happen to interact it with by accident. There is no necessity in us being able to interact with the world the way we do, it just so happens that we are this way,

Yeah, I read the Allianza version. It was far from the full book, probably less than half.

I mean, it was good, but it was missing many arguments you could see many ... in the book.

I know the one due next year if the full version, I want to read his epistemology in detail, not a general outline. The Alizana version is good to get familiar with him.

Well yes, that's true actually. What I should have said is that I don't think that science is the whole of metaphysics. I'm using science extremely narrowly here meaning physics basically.

But I think the whole of science includes much more than physics. One such domain where we know very little is in psychology which includes our conception of the world, our perceptions too. These latter aspects can be called "philosophical", without too much controversy I'd think, although parts of perception and common-sense conceptions can be studied empirically.

Then there's the topic of monism, pluralism, dualism, idealism, physicalism and so on. At this point we just call these topics "metaphysical" ones, because I don't think these can be settled by empirical demonstrations.

The relationship between science and mathematics is one that perplexes me. This is an interesting quote. It has set me thinking. — T Clark

If you find that quote interesting, you might want to take a look at his An Outline of Philosophy, where he says this and plenty more. I thought it was quite good and pleasant to read.

Yes. His philosophy was very much based on science. He says in this book "matter has become as ghostly as anything in a spiritualist séance."

Nevertheless, I wish more philosophers at that time in the history of physics would have written about the subject and its implications for philosophy at large. Not many of them did that, so far as I know. Though some of the founders of QM did. Still, Russell did pretty good work, but I do agree with you that he goes a bit too far into science for my tastes.

Which is why, although he can be obscure to the extreme, I've always liked Whitehead quite a bit. Even more than Russell in some aspects.

I can speculate a bit based on what we've talked about, but it's never been to clear to me how much science should play a role, say, in metaphysics. I think it should have a significant role to play, but I wouldn't base an entire ontology or a worldview on the scientific image...

That's quite funny. I just finished the book where he says that. An Outline of Philosophy. It was extremely good even beyond comments of that type. I liked it better than his Human Knowledge

It's interesting that based on (for him) new physics, he describes the world in terms of events, not things.

Hey Banno, sorry if this breaks the rules you had in mind, but I remember one specific antinatilism thread where @unenlightened and @schopenhauer1 were arguing.

It got to the point were unenlightened said something like "you are wrong to disagree". I have never laughed so much on a public forum of any kind.

Just to see someone post that phrase was just spectacular. Maybe that thread in general was more of the same AN bs argument but, it was extremely funny.

I suspect some Presidents and VPs curse at what Israel is doing, I know Carter and Clinton have been pissed off before.

But if they don't go public and say something, things remains the same.

and possibly the VP, I think. — Benkei

Kamala Harris? No.

She's not going to do anything to shake the status quo.

Clint Eastwood - Gorillaz

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1V_xRb0x9aw

I ain't happy, I'm feeling glad
I got sunshine in a bag
I'm useless but not for long
The future is coming on
I ain't happy, I'm feeling glad
I got sunshine in a bag
I'm useless but not for long
The future is coming on
It's coming on, it's coming on
It's coming on, it's coming on

Finally someone let me out of my cage
Now time for me is nothin' 'cos I'm counting no age
Now I couldn't be there now you shouldn't be scared
I'm good at repairs and I'm under each snare
Intangible (Ah y'all), bet you didn't think so
I command you to, panoramic view (You)
Look I'll make it all manageable
Pick and choose, sit and lose
All you different crews
Chicks and dudes, who you think is really kicking tunes

Picture you getting down and I'll picture too
Like you lit the fuse
You think it's fictional, mystical - maybe
Spiritual hero who appears on you to clear your view
When you're too crazy
Lifeless to those a definition for what life is
Priceless to you because I put ya on the hype shift
Did ya like it?
Gut smokin' righteous but one talkin' psychic
Among knows possess you with one though

I ain't happy, I'm feeling glad
I got sunshine in a bag
I'm useless but not for long
The future is coming on
I ain't happy, I'm feeling glad
I got sunshine in a bag
I'm useless but not for long
The future (That's right) is coming on
It's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on

The essence, the basics without it you make it
Allow me to make this child like in nature
Rhythm you have it or you don't
That's a fallacy, I'm in them
Every spiralling tree, every child of peace
Every cloud I see you see with your eyes
I see destruction and demise
Corruption in the skies
From this fucking enterprise that I'm sucked into your lies
The Russell that is muscles
But percussion he provides

For me I say God, y'all can see me now
'Cos you don't see with your eye
You perceive with your mind
That's the end of it
So I'mma stick around with Russ and be a mentor
Bust a few rounds on motherfuckers
Remember what the thought is
I brought all this so you can survive when law is lawless (Right here)
Fearless, sensations that you thought was dead
No squealing, remember that it's all in your head

I ain't happy, I'm feeling glad
I got sunshine in a bag
I'm useless but not for long
The future is coming on

I ain't happy, I'm feeling glad
I got sunshine in a bag
I'm useless but not for long
My future is coming on

It's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on

My future
It's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on
It's coming on, it's coming on, my future
It's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on
It's coming on, it's coming on, my future
It's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on

One Headlight - The Wallflowers

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zzyfcys1aLM

Reality is, whatever there is.

Yeah, but I feel that saying "there is only one kind of stuff, namely matter" doesn't really say much. All we have to do to "save materialism" in this sense is to extend the definition of "matter" as far as we need. — SophistiCat

This is true in a sense. On the other hand we now know that what we should study is matter and physical stuff, not Gods or angels.

I think it's kind of astonishing that at bottom, there is only one kind of stuff, such that everything is physical. Maybe trivial sure, but also insane, given the world looks so pluralistic.

In any case materialism doesn't need to "saved" any more that "empiricism" or most other "isms". It all depends on what we mean when we say these words.

Sure, it is kinda funny.

As for the rest of your post, I don't think I have much to add that wouldn't be repetitive. In an case, interesting topic. :up:

:lol:

I guess he's that influential.

But I think DFW gets a fair share of attention, as he should. At least he did interview and wrote about many topics. Pynchon only has a few pages of autobiography in slow learner. We know almost nothing about him.

Wallace was rather open, given his issues.

Added to my reading list. — csalisbury

Since you like this type of literature, I guarantee you won't regret it.

Fair pushback on Mason & Dixon - I'll admit I haven't finished it (a few attempts, always faltered in the first section.) — csalisbury

I understand. I was in a Pynchon phase at the time, so I forced read through his tough books. With Mason & Dixon, I remember the beginning fairly well, and the ending. The rest is a blur, I recall almost nothing of it. I will have to go back to it sometime, when I'm up for a huge challenge.

In fact, my story with not finishing Pynchon is pretty bad. My biggest embarrassment as a reader which I hesitate to mention: I quit Against the Day at like 900 pages. :scream: I had like 150 pages left, but for some strange reason, I kept pushing it back and reading other stuff so that by the time I got back to it, I was lost. Yeah, insane on my part... I liked it, but burnout got to me. I should've forced myself just a bit more...

at a point I want to just yell - yes, we've had this conversation many times! I get it, man! It's spelled out in the first scene of your first book! — csalisbury

Yep, you are right. You can easily mix parts of V., GR and Against the Day into one book, and it would have significant similarities. It's like a genius paranoid speaking about everything. But clearly, he's not for everyone.

At the same time I'm a huge Melville fan, and he does this stuff too - there's no accounting for where and why you'll cut slack. — csalisbury

It's becoming harder and harder to find authors these days that can write and challenge and surprise you all in one go. I suspect there are some out there, but they're hidden way, way behind the "Bestsellers" section. It's a bit sad and very hard to find new stuff in this type of genre.

Yes. The idea is to say the same thing, in a profoundly different way. And style and vibe are very important.

As for Pynchon, I'd definitely agree that V. is his most fun work. Gravity's Rainbow obviously the most difficult, but perhaps his most wide ranging and profound. But I remember having to force myself to read 240 pages before I found a page that I could entirely follow. Granted, once he hits you with his incredible style, the book lifts off, pun intended.

I've heard Pynchon described as a "one-trick pony". This is perhaps not unfair. It's just that his trick is exceptional. Where I perhaps disagree with you a bit, is on Mason & Dixon. I think that even if he's riffing or not, there's evidence it took him over 20 years to write that book. The language displayed in that book is extraordinary and parts of that book are also magical.

One author, who is not well known at all, but who in my opinion writes like a mixture of Wallace and Pynchon + his own style is Jim Gauer, author of Novel Explosives. I think there's an argument for him being better than Pynchon and Wallace in some aspects, in that although his work is difficult, it is also very philosophical, it covers many topics and is probably the most fun book I've read, easily beating both mentioned authors in terms of fun factor alone while not sacrificing any depth.

The writing itself is subjective of course, some will prefer Wallace or Pynchon. It's a bit of a toss up for me in terms of style between the three.

It's crazy to think such a style of book could be exciting, profound and so so erudite. Yes I do propaganda for that novel. :razz:

La Vie En Rose - Edith Piaf

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFzViYkZAz4

True, eugenics led to a horror show. But during the enlightenment, we already had phrenology, which was used to try and justify slavery. And before that, class was used as weapon for the nobility. So in this respect we've always had plenty of quite ugly things to point to.

It is correct that the UDHR was an important moment in history. We now simply have to live to its words. But this applies practically to all documents, notably to constitutions the world over. I know that Rorty mentioned that pomo was probably born sometime in the late 19th century.

I think the pomo that is most prevalent is the one that arose from France, with Lyotard. And then we also have Jameson, who simply declared we live in a pomo society. I think I find more continuities with the French pomo school than a larger historical one.

Nevertheless, Wallace had this newer tradition in mind when he spoke of pomo, I think. I take it to mean a total confusion in regards to our epistemic situation and a regarding of different stories as mutually legitimate. That's fine. But it can be taken too far, and then we get into stuff like "there is no objectivity", "truth is dead", etc.

That's too much. Heck Plato was dealing with people who played with words over 2000 years ago with the sophists. But the French pomo puts this on steroids, it seems to me.