The concept is not a thing in the head, but a capacity to do stuff. — Banno

You need a concept to recognize an object as being X= laptop, tree, etc.

One can know a lot about how to fix an a car, but have no idea how the thing works.

So tell me something, any updates at all regarding more literature on innate ideas?

I'm now going to the pragmatists, but they don't say much about it that I've found. Perhaps obscurely in Peirce, but not much.

Sorry about the mess in replies, there are several posts on different topics with you and I lost the order, hah. I too have gone astray here on subjective states because I think we have them.

I think Wayfarer is correct. But if he doesn't convince you, nor others, I don't think I'd be able to, honestly.

So tell me something, any updates at all regarding more literature on innate ideas? — Manuel

I was going to quote a snippet from Jacques Maritain. Of course, Maritain has an enormous literature, and I'll freely admit barely having skimmed the surface. But he's one of the neo-Thomists I have in mind. The following is from one of his essays making the case for the knowledge of universals. As such, it's a lecture in real metaphysics, in that it analyses the importance of the idea of universals, and then how we are impoverished by the lack of the understanding of the faculty which grasps them.

For empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).

Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is sugar or what is intruder. He plays, he lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And his field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in man -- the potential infinity of knowledge.

Such are the basic facts which Empiricism ignores, and in the disregard of which it undertakes to philosophize. The logical implications are: first, a nominalistic theory of ideas, destructive of what ideas are in reality; and second, a sensualist notion of intelligence, destructive of the essential activity of intelligence. In the Empiricist view, intelligence does not see, for only the object or content seen in knowledge is the sense object. In the Empiricist view, intelligence does not see in its ideative function -- there are not, drawn form the senses through the activity of the intellect itself, supra-singular or supra-sensual, universal intelligible natures seen by the intellect in and through the concepts it engenders by illuminating images. Intelligence does not see in its function of judgment -- there are not intuitively grasped, universal intelligible principles (say, the principle of identity, or the principle of causality) in which the necessary connection between two concepts is immediately seen by the intellect. Intelligence does not see in its reasoning function -- there is in the reasoning no transfer of light or intuition, no essentially supra-sensual logical operation which causes the intellect to see the truth of the conclusion by virtue of what is seen in the premises. Everything boils down, in the operations, or rather in the passive mechanisms of intelligence, to a blind concatenation, sorting and refinement of the images, associated representations, habit-produced expectations which are at play in sense-knowledge, under the guidance of affective or practical values and interests. No wonder that in the Empiricist vocabulary, such words as 'evidence', 'the human understanding', 'the human mind', 'reason', 'thought', 'truth', etc., which one cannot help using, have reached a state of meaningless vagueness and confusion that makes philosophers use them as if by virtue of some unphilosophical concession to the common human language, and with a hidden feeling of guilt. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

You need a concept to recognize an object as being X= laptop, tree, etc. — Manuel

As argued, if this were so we would never learn; we would require the concept in order to recognise the concept.

So that's wrong.

Fantastic. Many thanks. I'm going to have to read that essay now. :cheer:

As argued, if this were so we would never learn; we would require the concept in order to recognise the concept.

So that's wrong. — Banno

I don't see the need for an infinite regress. We just need the concept and then the thing. Not a concept of a concept.

Sure, I could be wrong.

I don't see the need for an infinite regress. — Manuel

But you said:

You need a concept to recognize an object as being X= laptop, tree, etc. — Manuel

...as if you had to have the concept "laptop" before you encountered a laptop or hear anything about it.

You can't see the problem there?

X meaning any specific concept. It could stand for laptops, trees, rivers, books, this was shorthand.

as if you had to have the concept "laptop" before you encountered a laptop or hear anything about it.

You can't see the problem there? — Banno

The person who first thought of an abacus had to have an idea of what it would be before he finalized it. He may have been playing with pebbles or sticks, but he/she got the idea to create an abacus. There was none prior to that, I'd think.

Yes, it is a massive problem. With very, very little contact with objects (sometimes with no contact at all) , we come up with concepts. It is crazy. I just happen to think it's true. I can't explain it, as I said.

AH, well, that was a waste of time.

As if the abacus emerged perfect and complete from the mind of one individual. No, it emerged over time, through many iterations, and across more than one mind. It was a process, not a miracle.

The picture holds you enthralled.

Cheers. Thanks for the chat.

Thank you.

You were heading in the right direction. Or at least heading in the same direction I already went.

With very, very little contact with objects (sometimes with no contact at all) , we come up with concepts. — Manuel

That's the amazing thing about a priori. Seems to me a lot of people take it for granted, or explain it away. But according to traditional philosophy, it's because the intellect (nous) comes pre-loaded with at least some ideas. Of course that's a no-no for empiricism, strictly Tabula Rasa in their book. But I think Chomsky's Universal Grammar is at least suggestive of something similar.

I'm aware that you know Kant well, other people told me this and I've since verified it. I don't expect agreement in many aspects on these topics, how could I, we all think differently to some extent.

And although we may agree on, say, 80% of the topics covered, it's that 20% or so that we focus on or make a big deal about.

In any case, I'm assuming you want to add something I missed or correct a mistake in my general argument?

Yes.

I think that there is not much difference between science and magic, for example. Sure, someone will say "we understand science", magic doesn't exist.

What's crazier that we can assemble parts of matter to create a laptop or that we can make a card look like it disappeared from thin air?

Not being scientisitc, the point is that I think those that deny the a-priori don't seem to me to be surprised enough about the phenomena of existence. But innatism should not be controversial, the fact that it is shows that empiricism in psychology, in modified form, is still the dominant view.

Where classical metaphysics has helped me, is in understanding that ideas - not all ideas, of course, many ideas are just thought-bubbles - but at least some ideas are real - not because they're the property of individual minds, but are real in their own right. Most think nowadays that only matter~energy is real in its own right, everything is composed of that or comes from that, including thought. But if ideas are real, then that has considerable consequences. That's what's important about metaphysics in my view, and once you begin to understand it, things fall into place, although caution is required so as not to give way to fantasy or empty speculation. But if you read it with reference to the classical authors in the tradition, it helps to ground it. That's why I mentioned Aristotle - not that everything should refer to Aristotle, and not that Aristotelianism wasn't at some points in history a suffocating dogma.

(Actually I remember well my very first lecture in philosophy of science. The lecturer mentioned an anecdote concerning a group of scholastic monastics arguing about how many teeth horses have. They all scuttled off to check Aristotle in the library, but found this item wasn't there. So they declared it was something that couldn't be known, and utterly bollocksed one of their number who suggested that they go look at an actual horse.)

Another good lecture on all of this is Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism. You can find the pdf here and even a Youtube video of him delivering it as a lecture here. Gerson is regarded as one of the pre-eminent authorities on Plato and Aristotle.

There's much more to reality that highlighting one aspect alone. Granted, physics is quite amazing and if not the, then its among the most important ideas we've discovered as a species. Having said that, to say that the mental isn't something real - meaning existing, is so irrational, it's hard to even comment about it.

Yes we can say this is a consequence of empiricist thinking and the like, but Locke and Hume would've never dreamed of denying experience. In many aspects, they were quite sophisticated, even if the view they took on the mind was mistaken.

I agree that some ideas are real. How this cashes out more precisely is extremely difficult to elucidate, because it seems to me that we cannot do metaphysics without very important epistemological input.

Why should we be able to ask these questions, discuss them and on rare occasion answer them, as happens sometimes in science, is amazing. It doesn't even have survival value, as far as I can see.

Aristotle is someone I've yet to work on. Thanks for the source, much appreciated. :up:

To my tiny brain language boils down to two elements viz. 1. semantics (meanings of words) and 2. syntax (rules for word combination). Worth noting though is syntax can alter meaning of statements e.g. "dog eats man" vs "man eats dog". Other aspects of language may matter but let's not get ahead of ourselves shall we.

Coming to metaphysics, I'll focus on existence because both it's the core idea of metaphyics and I'm just beginning to get acquainted with it.

To the extent that I'm aware there seems to be a huge controversy on the issue of what kinda things exist and what kinda things don't. Some claim that abstract objects like numbers exist and others disagree. The debate on the existence of numbers is an authentic one iff the word "exist" is used consistently i.e. the word must be semantically constant (same meaning); otherwise, it's just another case of two sides talking past each other.

The question then is, does "exist" mean the same thing in the two sentences below,

1. Stones exist
2. Numbers exist or don't exist


In the exchange of arguments between mathematical realists and their opponents (mathematical antirealists), I noticed that when the former claims that numbers exist, they don't mean it in the same sense that stones exist but when the latter rejects the claim that numbers exist they mean it in the sense that stones exist. A textbook case of fallacy of equivocation - ambiguity in the meaning of "exist" is to blame.

N.B. This is just a very superficial analysis of the role language plays in generating, perpetuating, and further complicating philosophical confusion. Perhaps if one digs a little deeper than I have here, the confusion may resolve into crystal clarity either because language and philosophy are connected in a profoundly interesting way or because there is no such relationship and philosophers can get back to what they were doing before the question arose with one less thing to worry about.

it's other purpose is to discuss the right way to do metaphysics
— Banno

Is there a 'right' way to 'do' metaphysics?
Is there an easy or a hard way...a 'just right' way..
Superficial or deep and wide-ranging...
https://www.wikihow.com/Study-Metaphysics
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/
What kind of metaphysics...
An SEP search - 1290 documents.
Feminist, Arab & Islamic, Chinese, Aristotle... — Amity

Reply to this from @Banno:

One response to what I've said is simply to ignore it. If that's what you want, go ahead. — Banno

Re: ignoring as a response choice. It is not one I chose. Indeed, the very opposite. I posted further responses which appear to have been ignored by yourself but not by @Manuel.

To ignore or not to ignore ? What, who or why ?
What does the act of ignoring signify ?
It is a nothing or something response.
A non-verbal speech-act, a positive communicative act...

How do we determine how 'ignoring' is to be interpreted ?
Possibly by context - previous experience or knowledge of the person.
How to react to someone's suggestion that if you don't like, ignore it...

It is hardly ever a case of 'simply' - ignoring has a bit more complexity.
It can have an effect on a person's self-respect. Depending.
That is sometimes what the ignorer wishes.
The silent treatment - words unspoken - can mean so much, or not.

On a forum, it is easy to miss a post, not to participate in an issue, or not communicate with a person for various reasons. Sometimes an apparent 'ignoring' is not worth losing any sleep over. Other times it can be worth pursuing.

My response to the questions raised by yourself and @Manuel was a positive one.
I engaged even though, or because, I had little to no knowledge in the issues.
And wanted to find out more.
I chose not to ignore. But you knew that.

I'm assuming you want to add something I missed or correct a mistake — Manuel

Nahhhh. You “took up arms in a sea of troubles” so up to you to suffer the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”.

Still, it would seem you had your dialectical legs kicked out from under you from the very beginning, for not establishing the legitimacy of the domain, prior to inquiring about the possibility of legitimate questions arising from it. And because of that, as soon as laptops and sundry post hoc ergo propter hoc foolishness writ large in language philosophy entered the field, the war was lost.

The whole idea of this thread was prompted by a suggestion made by Banno. He seemed to be implying that a lot of these questions are due to a confusion in language: free will, mind and the like are problems which can be seen correctly or dissolved once you properly analyze the propositions and words used.

So if someone's approach is philosophy of language, then I'll engage with the topic in a manner in which a person thinks it makes sense to talk about these issues. However there was bound to be some disagreement quite soon given the nature of different personal dispositions.

You are correct that I did not manage to specify the field in question in a sufficiently clear manner such that it can be seen as legitimate. Then again, besides mentioning some of the topics that go into the field called "metaphysics", I don't know how else to formulate the topic.

I did not manage to specify the field..... — Manuel

You did specify the field, in your response to . But all that does is presuppose that to which the field belongs, but says nothing about what that entails.

I don't know how else to formulate the topic. — Manuel

The historical precedent for formulation of anything, always begins by proving the possibility of it. If successful, its possibility is always followed by proving its necessity.

Exacting criteria, to be sure, but hey.......you brought it up, so the onus is on you.

Good luck!!!

Well, I'm speaking to the heavens here. I've been asked to state how metaphysics is possible. Such a formulation entails a Kantian framework. I'm unsure meeting this demand is necessary to even speak about metaphysics. I follow Susan Haack here and by extension parts of C.S. Peirce. I don't think "metaphysics" entails a special kind of knowledge, nor does it need special justification any more than ethics or epistemology or any other field in philosophy.

I think that metaphysics is about the world and relies on experience. I think its task it provide a general framework on how to think about the world: how it makes sense to divide it up and think about its many aspects. This unorthodox view on the field means that some of the traditional question of metaphysics, that of identity or of the nature of the self and others are more correctly thought of as epistemic questions as these pertain more to our understanding than it does the world.

Then again, this distinction may be misleading, as almost everything we analyze about the world is analyzed by us, and not some Martian.

If we don't do metaphysics, meaning analyze the various aspects of the world, we end up with bad metaphysics: everything is only particles or fields. But that doesn't reflect our living in the world or the complexity involved in our interactions with it.

In any case, so as to not take up more space here if not to reply to something, I'll post a very good article on metaphysics and how one could think about it in contemporary times.

The project is called "Innocent Realism" by Susan Haack:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305505412_THE_WORLD_ACCORDING_TO_INNOCENT_REALISM_THE_ONE_AND_THE_MANY_THE_REAL_AND_THE_IMAGINARY_THE_NATURAL_AND_THE_SOCIAL_2016

I'm aware this topic enters into the whole realism vs anti-realism debate. I would still be careful in saying that the stuff posited by science is a metaphysical entity. We can of course debate if science is metaphysics or not. One can make a case that part of science is metaphysics, sure. But I wouldn't tell the physicist that I have special knowledge regarding his field. — Manuel

It was not the intent of my post to imply that Philosophers have "special knowledge" that Scientists don't. Just the opposite : I was noting that when scientists theorize and speculate about topics with no empirical evidence, they are crossing over into the purview of Philosophy. Experimental scientists are doing highly specialized & technical work. But when Theoretical scientists, such as Einstein, use their imagination to "see" things that are not visible to the senses, they are actually practicing Philosophy, Someone once asked Einstein where his lab was, and he held-up a pencil.

There's nothing "special" or "technical" about imagination, except that some choose to focus their imagination on questions that were heretofore inaccessible to the physical tools of Science. For example, when Maxwell proposed the existence of an invisible and counterintuitive "field", to explain the weirdness of electromagnetism, he was practicing Philosophical Meta-physics. Today, we are accustomed to the concept of "fields", even though we have never seen one. What we observe are the effects of the field on certain kinds of matter, such as iron filings. We "see" those fields with the inner "eye" of imagination.

For many years, most scientists believed that studying Consciousness, was a silly philosophical pursuit, and not worthy of the time for serious scientists. That's because, they viewed Mind-stuff as Metaphysical, not physical -- hence not Real. But today, plenty of Neurologists and Physicists are beginning to take Consciousness seriously. They are not practicing "anti-realism", but merely expanding our definition of what's real. :nerd:

I largely agree on your last point here. Matter looks and feels substantial to us, which it is. But at bottom, it isn't. So we have two views on the nature of matter, our common sense conception of regarding tables and chairs and then we have what physics tells us about matter. This brings forth epistemological consideration on top of metaphysical ones. — Manuel

Yes. Quantum physics opened a can-of-worms for Materialists. They expected to find hard little Atoms at the foundation of reality. Instead, they found fuzzy mathematical Probabilities. Quantum theories defy commonsense, but seem to work well with mathematical logic. Maybe that's why Mathematicians are more likely to accept Metaphysics as a serious occupation, because they are acutely aware that the objects of their calculations do not exist in the Real Material world, but only as Ideas in the immaterial Mind. :cool:

Mathematical Metaphysics :
Platonism about mathematics (or mathematical platonism) is the metaphysical view that there are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us and our language, thought, and practices.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism-mathematics/

Peirce divided metaphysics into (1) ontology or general metaphysics, (2) psychical or religious metaphysics, and (3) physical metaphysics.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_metaphysics
Note -- Quantum Physics probably falls into the category of Physical Metaphysics

Meta-Physics :
4. Physics refers to the things we perceive with the eye of the body. Meta-physics refers to the things we conceive with the eye of the mind. Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. Matter is just the clay from which a thing is made. Meta-physics is the design (form, purpose); physics is the product (shape, action). The act of creation brings an ideal design into actual existence. The design concept is the “formal” cause of the thing designed.
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page14.html

This topic was prompted by another poster: to state it simply are there legitimate metaphysical questions as opposed to problems related to language use? — Manuel

Analysis of language is indeed a legitimate topic for philosophy. But if that language is too specific & reductive, we soon lose the general & holistic meaning of the words. I just came across this quote, which seems to reveal the Achilles Heel of the "linguistic turn" in Postmodern philosophy. :smile:

"Yet again, the detailed technical discussions about the theoretical concepts threaten to become postmodern narratives, where meaning, clarity, and understanding is at stake."
James Glattfelder, mathematician
--- referring to pro & con arguments about the mathematical & metaphysical theory of Consciousness, known as "Integrated Information Theory" (IIT)

For example, when Maxwell proposed the existence of an invisible and counterintuitive "field", to explain the weirdness of electromagnetism, he was practicing Philosophical Meta-physics. Today, we are accustomed to the concept of "fields", even though we have never seen one. What we observe are the effects of the field on certain kinds of matter, such as iron filings. We "see" those fields with the inner "eye" of imagination — Gnomon

Sure. I'd imagine that if we were miniscule creatures we could see these fields, that's what I imagine a commitment to some kind of realism entails, which is not inconsistent with some strands of idealism. All this depends on the meaning of each word and for what domain this idea is applied: I can be an idealist about tree and rivers, but think that particles aren't entirely dependent on me, though the way we apprehend them does depend on us.

Platonism about mathematics (or mathematical platonism) is the metaphysical view that there are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us and our language, thought, and practices. — Gnomon

That's sounds legitimate to me.

Peirce divided metaphysics into (1) ontology or general metaphysics, (2) psychical or religious metaphysics, and (3) physical metaphysics. — Gnomon

Though Peirce kept coming back to his categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness. He was a genius of the highest order, no doubt about it. But his ontological project expressed in these terms are quite obscure, or rather, I don't "get" why he needs these three categories as opposed to two. He stresses the simplicity of them, I don't see it yet.

Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. — Gnomon

Perhaps. It would need epistemology too. The distinction between what we see and what we see in our minds eye is not that straightforward to me. Though I see were you are coming from, in the case of math for example.

Analysis of language is indeed a legitimate topic for philosophy. But if that language is too specific & reductive, we soon lose the general & holistic meaning of the words. — Gnomon

Absolutely. It becomes talk about talk, instead of talk about the world or what we take to be the world.

That's also look legitimate to me, perhaps even central.

Quine I believe does not like this solution, but we can speak of "real" and "existent" as separate but related concepts. Existence refers to things in the world, real to almost anything. Thus there are real fictional characters, such as Frodo but he doesn't exist in the world. But there can be fake fictional Characters such as Fred, who I just made up and is not in any novel.

On this view, one suggested by Haack, real is to be contrasted with fictional.

Existence is thus slimmed down somewhat, but continues to be very complicated.

If I may ...

0. The Real – the ineluctable, encompassing horizon (that exhausts – exceeds – categories, concepts, symbolic systems (e.g. randomness, void)). See nonbeing, nonduality, nonlocality.

1. Reality – the ground, including logical / phase-spaces (i.e. reason), encompassed. See being, multiplicity.

2. Existence – maze-paths along the ground (i.e. transformations through logical / phase-space) ... ever-approaching but never arrivating at the horizon. See dasein, event, locality.

3. Fiction – untaken, circular or virtual paths. See illusion-duality (i.e. risk/uncertainty), agency-misery. — 180 Proof's Prolegomena for the Fourfold Root of Insufficient Reason

Soon in fine bookstores everywhere. :smirk:

It's not real, it's an illusion.

It's not real, it's a fake.

It's not real, it's a forgery.

It's not real, it's a toy.

It's not real, it's a hologram.

It's not real, it's a mirage.



"Real' gains traction only in a particular contrast.

A metaphysical speculation that attempts to use the word without such a particular context fails to gain traction.

Hmmm. Sounds like a process philosophy of sorts.

I'd be interested in looking at that book. :cool:

"Real' gains traction only in a particular contrast.

A metaphysical speculation that attempts to use the word without such a particular context fails to gain traction. — Banno

That looks likely.

Then by definition illusions are fake.

What would you do with fiction then? Just leave it at fiction?

Hmmm. Sounds like a process philosophy of sorts.

I'd be interested in looking at that book. :cool: — Manuel

Not Whiteheadian (or Bergsonian) in the least as far as I can tell. I take Spinoza, Zapffe, Wittgenstein, Cioran, Jaspers, Camus, Haack, Rosset, Meillassoux-Brassier ... as modern influences. :wink: