Sure. I am not sure that I phrased the last part quite well. Russell was not giving primacy to the mind, I think he was highlighting our general ignorance of it. This is were he developed his idea of "neutral monism", which states that the world is neither mental nor physical as we understand these terms.

Thanks for your reply, it was quite comprehensive. :up:

In general that the "new physics", as it was when Russell wrote about these topics, renders the ideas of objects as not being tenable. He thought we should think of the world as being composed of "events". This "new physics" was also the final nail in the coffin of our idea of impenetrable matter, and "has become as ghostly as anything in a spiritualist séance."

This combined with his view on how little we know about psychology prompts him to say that we don't know if "the physical world is, or is not, different in intrinsic character from the world of mind".

That's a general outline. I assume that some of what he says is outdated, but he did interesting work.

Thus, in my humble opinion, we would be doing ourselves a great favor by reminding ourselves that the word "myth" is a synonym for "it was just too complex". — TheMadFool

I mean, many myths are about how the world was made by Gods. Whether Amaterasu in Japan or Brahma in India, so sure these are complex. But these contain little factual truth.

On the other hand, Haack mentions the Legend of King Arthur. Some parts of that are based in history others not. But I tend to be of the mind that everything is quite complex. And absolutely taking cell phones back to the past would've been akin to magic or miracle.

Over millennia, the metaphysics might've altered in such a way that souls became nonviable entities and disappeared [species have gone extinct when the environment transformed and became hostile to them (fossils)]. Thus, what was true in the past is false in the present. — TheMadFool

I'd only modify that but saying souls were approximations of what they thought was true. Now we much more accurate approximations, but we can translate the word "soul" in Plato or Descartes intelligibly in many instances.

As you will have realized by now, my objective is to raise doubts about the well-hidden assumption that the metaphysics of the world doesn't change. — TheMadFool

Clearly, it must if when we are trying to articulate metaphysics, we use the concepts and ideas of our time. And these must change, if our knowledge has changed. So it's likely that metaphysics is constantly changing itself. So we must rediscover or restate what it is, every so often. Peter Strawson argued for something like this in Individuals.

I was reading some of your replies, quite interesting. You work in/with quantum physics?

If you go through some of Russell's works such as The Analysis of Matter or An Outline of Philosophy, I think you could find some connections to metaphysics with sound scientific basis.

And I'd gladly participate if it didn't include Gödel.

I'm sure other threads will appear that will offer the opportunity to highlight a problem in language use.

I've read very little Austin. And mathematical logic is something I cannot do at all, it's beyond me I'm afraid. The only philosophy of language I can do are the people I mention in my profile and a little Wittgenstein, though nowhere near your level.

As for the OP, I can't even comment much. I don't understand what "prov[ing] everything in mathematics" would even entail.

So you can go ahead and go wild, if you like.

I mean if you can incorporate this topic to Susan's Haack's "Innocent Realism", then the thread can stay of topic as it concerns the nature of reality and how it sometimes appears in parts. Thus a story may contain parts of it that are true - events that actually happened in the world, with events that did not happen, which would make it fictitious. And there may be exaggerations and so on.

I doubt that in such short periods of time, which for our history as a species is nothing, would show noticeable changes in gravity or any other fundamental force of nature. At least I haven't seen any evidence for it.

As for the other options, maybe. But given the fact that we can distort stories quite severely in a day, myths going back thousands of years are prone to be extremely exaggerated. I'm not saying that they couldn't contain some elements of truth in it, but the further back you go, the harder it is to believe in aspects of stories which by today's would be impossible.

So again, if you can keep the topic within a metaphysical framework, that is, covering one of the many aspects of metaphysics, then this can be discussed. But if that's not possible given what you want to expand on, then going to another thread would be better.

It's an interesting question. I suppose you'd have to take into consideration the fact that fictional characters are created based on traits that real people have. And novels, for instance, allow you to get into someone else's head for a while, so you live a similar experience to the characters you are reading. But I don't think the difference between fact and fiction is nearly as strong as is sometimes believed.

There's also the curious aspects of many myths. I assume such stories are told more or less accurately, but as hundreds if not thousands of years go on, aspects of the story become exaggerated to the point were there maybe very little if anything is such myths, which is a true description of events. I have in mind national myths and ancient folklore and the like.

Most times yes, sure. I think there are specific circumstances that a song or a movie will communicate with you even more deeply than words ever could. At least that's been my experience on certain occasions.

The way you spoke of reference in your post prior to this one, is not one I have much issues with. So I think we're OK. :up:

We can communicate with our gestures, our clothing, our way of walking, our facial expressions, our tone, etc.

We can also communicate with paintings, music, architecture, sculptures, etc.

No words are needed.

I'm not saying it's a contradiction. I think it's a fact that it's people who refer, not words themselves. I think we might be caught in a semantic quibble here.

What do you have in mind when you speak of "referring"?

I take reference in philosophy, a technical term, to mean a relation between the word uttered and a thing in the world.

The key for me, so far as my understanding of reference goes, is that the word I'm using must relate to something in the world. I don't think there has to be something in the world of which the word I'm using must "signal out" as it were.

I can speak of dragons or Planet 1234. There are no dragons in the world and there is no Planet 1234 anywhere, I just made it up. So I don't see a necessary word-object relation.

However, if you mean that by reference you have in mind an intended meaning or something like that. With this, I don't have any problems.

I'm not sure I'd even see it as a paradox, but just as different ways of thinking. — Janus

That's probably more accurate to what happens.

If proper nouns or names, like John, refer to particular things, then nouns or general terms like 'tree' 'cat' 'mountain' and so on refer to particular kinds of things. So, I don't see why those kinds of names can't be understood as rigid designators of particular kinds in a way analogous to how proper names are seen as rigid designators of particular entities. — Janus

I don't think names refer. Nor do words actually. People refer, it's an act that people do. Sometimes people use words to refer, like me referring to the keyboard I'm using to type out these words.

I mean sure, you can say that we speak in generalities many times, if not most of the time. Look at most conversations, both written and spoken. How often do we refer to specific things? Not that it very rare, it's just that referring is a small part of everything else involved in language.

What does it feel like to be pouring out such thoughts on a laptop at 02.16hrs ?
Bloody crazy. You know what I mean ? — Amity

It's not dissimilar to what Hume thought about when he had a psychological breakdown:

"Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? ... I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty.

Most fortunately it happens, that since Reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, Nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends. And when, after three or four hours' amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther.”

I think philosophy of language helps to clarify our thinking to others and most importantly, to ourselves. This in itself can be tremendously useful. Beyond that it surely can't resolve the question you pose, I don't think.

When we say words like "love", "hate", "joy", etc. we assume other people "like-me" will take that word and the meanings attached to it and interpret it in a way that approximates what I'm feeling. But we cannot know the other person will feel the way we actually feel. We simply cannot be precise enough to describe our emotions in many occasions.

So absolutely, philosophy of language has clear limits. I (believe) I know what you mean. :)

Sure. I wasn't intending to imply a contradiction. I suppose it's a bit of paradox if you will.

Yes, I'm familiar with Kripke to an extent. I do think rigid designators are true in science if our scientific theories are correct, that is the name we use for the entities postulated match, or form a correspondence. So if I say that Alpha Centauri is 4.36 light years away, the name and the numbers of that statement apply to the world.

Outside of science, I don't think this is the case. That is we can use words to refer, but it's not necessary, we use words all the time without referring to specific things in the world.

At least that's how I think of the topic.

If John is terribly burned or otherwise disfigured he may become unrecognizable, but measurements or DNA testing could still establish his unique identity. John's ashes are not really John, but are just John's ashes; the remains of his body after cremation. — Janus

I think that we recognize objects via something called "psychic continuity", similar I suppose to object permanence. That is, we have some conception of John, such that it would be true that he can go through several radical changes and still be John.

But a blow to the head may alter his personality and way of behaving in such a manner that although the name of that person is still "John", he is not the "John" we have in mind, when we usually talk about him. His DNA will be the same, but a radical change in behavior will cause us to consider them for all intent and purposes a different person.

Or take the story in which a witch turns a prince into a frog. We still know he's the prince, even if he's a different species. And similar stories. It doesn't matter much what the physical configuration of the person is, it matters that we conceive of them as being John (or Mary), etc.

:up:

I have no problems with 3 of the 4 categorizations you've given. The first one, or "0" is the one that I'm unclear of, which one of those mentioned would approximate your conception of what's real?

Hmmm. Sounds like a process philosophy of sorts.

I'd be interested in looking at that book. :cool:

"Real' gains traction only in a particular contrast.

A metaphysical speculation that attempts to use the word without such a particular context fails to gain traction. — Banno

That looks likely.

Then by definition illusions are fake.

What would you do with fiction then? Just leave it at fiction?

That's also look legitimate to me, perhaps even central.

Quine I believe does not like this solution, but we can speak of "real" and "existent" as separate but related concepts. Existence refers to things in the world, real to almost anything. Thus there are real fictional characters, such as Frodo but he doesn't exist in the world. But there can be fake fictional Characters such as Fred, who I just made up and is not in any novel.

On this view, one suggested by Haack, real is to be contrasted with fictional.

Existence is thus slimmed down somewhat, but continues to be very complicated.

For example, when Maxwell proposed the existence of an invisible and counterintuitive "field", to explain the weirdness of electromagnetism, he was practicing Philosophical Meta-physics. Today, we are accustomed to the concept of "fields", even though we have never seen one. What we observe are the effects of the field on certain kinds of matter, such as iron filings. We "see" those fields with the inner "eye" of imagination — Gnomon

Sure. I'd imagine that if we were miniscule creatures we could see these fields, that's what I imagine a commitment to some kind of realism entails, which is not inconsistent with some strands of idealism. All this depends on the meaning of each word and for what domain this idea is applied: I can be an idealist about tree and rivers, but think that particles aren't entirely dependent on me, though the way we apprehend them does depend on us.

Platonism about mathematics (or mathematical platonism) is the metaphysical view that there are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us and our language, thought, and practices. — Gnomon

That's sounds legitimate to me.

Peirce divided metaphysics into (1) ontology or general metaphysics, (2) psychical or religious metaphysics, and (3) physical metaphysics. — Gnomon

Though Peirce kept coming back to his categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness. He was a genius of the highest order, no doubt about it. But his ontological project expressed in these terms are quite obscure, or rather, I don't "get" why he needs these three categories as opposed to two. He stresses the simplicity of them, I don't see it yet.

Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. — Gnomon

Perhaps. It would need epistemology too. The distinction between what we see and what we see in our minds eye is not that straightforward to me. Though I see were you are coming from, in the case of math for example.

Analysis of language is indeed a legitimate topic for philosophy. But if that language is too specific & reductive, we soon lose the general & holistic meaning of the words. — Gnomon

Absolutely. It becomes talk about talk, instead of talk about the world or what we take to be the world.

Well, I'm speaking to the heavens here. I've been asked to state how metaphysics is possible. Such a formulation entails a Kantian framework. I'm unsure meeting this demand is necessary to even speak about metaphysics. I follow Susan Haack here and by extension parts of C.S. Peirce. I don't think "metaphysics" entails a special kind of knowledge, nor does it need special justification any more than ethics or epistemology or any other field in philosophy.

I think that metaphysics is about the world and relies on experience. I think its task it provide a general framework on how to think about the world: how it makes sense to divide it up and think about its many aspects. This unorthodox view on the field means that some of the traditional question of metaphysics, that of identity or of the nature of the self and others are more correctly thought of as epistemic questions as these pertain more to our understanding than it does the world.

Then again, this distinction may be misleading, as almost everything we analyze about the world is analyzed by us, and not some Martian.

If we don't do metaphysics, meaning analyze the various aspects of the world, we end up with bad metaphysics: everything is only particles or fields. But that doesn't reflect our living in the world or the complexity involved in our interactions with it.

In any case, so as to not take up more space here if not to reply to something, I'll post a very good article on metaphysics and how one could think about it in contemporary times.

The project is called "Innocent Realism" by Susan Haack:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305505412_THE_WORLD_ACCORDING_TO_INNOCENT_REALISM_THE_ONE_AND_THE_MANY_THE_REAL_AND_THE_IMAGINARY_THE_NATURAL_AND_THE_SOCIAL_2016

The whole idea of this thread was prompted by a suggestion made by Banno. He seemed to be implying that a lot of these questions are due to a confusion in language: free will, mind and the like are problems which can be seen correctly or dissolved once you properly analyze the propositions and words used.

So if someone's approach is philosophy of language, then I'll engage with the topic in a manner in which a person thinks it makes sense to talk about these issues. However there was bound to be some disagreement quite soon given the nature of different personal dispositions.

You are correct that I did not manage to specify the field in question in a sufficiently clear manner such that it can be seen as legitimate. Then again, besides mentioning some of the topics that go into the field called "metaphysics", I don't know how else to formulate the topic.

There's much more to reality that highlighting one aspect alone. Granted, physics is quite amazing and if not the, then its among the most important ideas we've discovered as a species. Having said that, to say that the mental isn't something real - meaning existing, is so irrational, it's hard to even comment about it.

Yes we can say this is a consequence of empiricist thinking and the like, but Locke and Hume would've never dreamed of denying experience. In many aspects, they were quite sophisticated, even if the view they took on the mind was mistaken.

I agree that some ideas are real. How this cashes out more precisely is extremely difficult to elucidate, because it seems to me that we cannot do metaphysics without very important epistemological input.

Why should we be able to ask these questions, discuss them and on rare occasion answer them, as happens sometimes in science, is amazing. It doesn't even have survival value, as far as I can see.

Aristotle is someone I've yet to work on. Thanks for the source, much appreciated. :up:

Yes.

I think that there is not much difference between science and magic, for example. Sure, someone will say "we understand science", magic doesn't exist.

What's crazier that we can assemble parts of matter to create a laptop or that we can make a card look like it disappeared from thin air?

Not being scientisitc, the point is that I think those that deny the a-priori don't seem to me to be surprised enough about the phenomena of existence. But innatism should not be controversial, the fact that it is shows that empiricism in psychology, in modified form, is still the dominant view.

I'm aware that you know Kant well, other people told me this and I've since verified it. I don't expect agreement in many aspects on these topics, how could I, we all think differently to some extent.

And although we may agree on, say, 80% of the topics covered, it's that 20% or so that we focus on or make a big deal about.

In any case, I'm assuming you want to add something I missed or correct a mistake in my general argument?

Thank you.

X meaning any specific concept. It could stand for laptops, trees, rivers, books, this was shorthand.

as if you had to have the concept "laptop" before you encountered a laptop or hear anything about it.

You can't see the problem there? — Banno

The person who first thought of an abacus had to have an idea of what it would be before he finalized it. He may have been playing with pebbles or sticks, but he/she got the idea to create an abacus. There was none prior to that, I'd think.

Yes, it is a massive problem. With very, very little contact with objects (sometimes with no contact at all) , we come up with concepts. It is crazy. I just happen to think it's true. I can't explain it, as I said.

Fantastic. Many thanks. I'm going to have to read that essay now. :cheer:

As argued, if this were so we would never learn; we would require the concept in order to recognise the concept.

So that's wrong. — Banno

I don't see the need for an infinite regress. We just need the concept and then the thing. Not a concept of a concept.

Sure, I could be wrong.

Sorry about the mess in replies, there are several posts on different topics with you and I lost the order, hah. I too have gone astray here on subjective states because I think we have them.

I think Wayfarer is correct. But if he doesn't convince you, nor others, I don't think I'd be able to, honestly.

So tell me something, any updates at all regarding more literature on innate ideas?

I'm now going to the pragmatists, but they don't say much about it that I've found. Perhaps obscurely in Peirce, but not much.

The concept is not a thing in the head, but a capacity to do stuff. — Banno

You need a concept to recognize an object as being X= laptop, tree, etc.

One can know a lot about how to fix an a car, but have no idea how the thing works.

You did learn to count. — Banno

Someone pointed out some very basic notions of counting, such that 1+1 = 2. But nobody was taught how to count all the numbers we can count. There isn't enough time in this world for that.

Think carefully about that. The same applies to everything else of which you conceive. If it is true, then we have no explanation for how we might learn anything.

And yet we do learn.

SO it seems something has gone astray. — Banno

I have thought about it and I agree with the first part.

Putting aside things like facts in history and the like, I don't think we learn things. Rather they grow in each species: we don't learn puberty, or learn how to see, we grow and are able to see or reach puberty.

I think innate ideas are facts about human beings. How it happens is baffling and I couldn't explain it. But I think it's true.

Well, I don't know of any cases of disembodied minds, if that's what you are asking -- although there are many folk who claim there are such things, their examples strike me as wishful thinking. — Banno

Here we entirely agree. :up:

I'd say certainty rather than faith. That serves to step away from the hegemony of religion. — Banno

Fair enough.

Ah, but if you didn't have the concept, what is it that you would be missing?

I suppose it would be the ability to talk about and use the laptop as a laptop. — Banno

If we didn't have a concept of a laptop, we couldn't come up with it in the first place.

What was the person who was thinking about laptops doing before he/she/they set up to build one?

Spot on. Mass and mind do not seem to be related in this way. As if we could measure the mass of your love for your mother.

Talk of mass does not fit talk of mind. — Banno

Stated like this, I don't have a problem.

Only one last question on this topic: would you say the mind is made of physical stuff?

I think that laptops were designed by a person before he had the physical object in the world. So there was no laptop prior to the first one.

If mind is matter, and consciousness is mind, then when one is unconscious, one ought be lighter, because one would lack the mass of one's mind. — Banno

Ah, got it. Thanks.

I've been miss-speaking, which is why talking to people like you is good for me. I should use the word "physical stuff" instead of matter. Physical stuff includes things that have no mass. But this still leaves me unclear on something:

I don't know of what evidence could count for the claim that mind has no mass.

Is it? What sort of thing is a concept? — Banno

That's really hard. A concept is something like a kind of categorization we give to objects in the world.

One cannot type on a concept-of-laptop; one types on a laptop. — Banno

I agree. But if you didn't have the concept of a laptop, you wouldn't know you have one in front of you.

The concept of a laptop is in your head, but not the object you are typing on, that's in the world.

It carries some connotation related to faith. I don't actually believe that when I get up I'll melt through the floor, I understand that I wont. "Understanding" does not have that connotation, for example, nor does "comprehend".

Or to be more specific, it's so extremely improbable that it isn't worth taking into serious consideration.

DO you lose weight when you go to sleep? — Banno

I believe so. The more time passes the more calories you lose. I don't see the connection.

Can you explain this distinction to me? Are mental entities things like desires or beliefs? — Banno

It's complex in details, or at least Sellar's account of it is not always an example of clarity. From what I gather, the manifest image is the image we construct of the world in our daily life.

The computer you are typing on or the tree you may see outside your window, or the sun rising in the east: that's all manifest reality. It includes such things like getting in a car and driving to work or opening a fridge, etc.

As I understand it, the manifest image is also modified as time goes on. We no longer think that the Earth is the center of the universe nor that poking holes in our heads helps with diseases.

The scientific image is the image of the world as seen in science. In this aspect of the world we study the role that particles play in vision or how heat consists of molecules moving around at a faster rate.

This world is one in which the Earth goes around the sun. And so on with many scientific facts, which are generally hidden from us in our daily lives.

To give an account of mental entities is far too difficult. I can only say very general things. Are desires mental entities? Sometimes I guess, but I suspect most of the time we aren't aware of all our desires.

Beliefs are problematic, they carry religious connotations and even if we use it in a technical manner, I don't think we get entirely away from that aspect of the word.

Having said that, some beliefs can be made explicit, as when I'm asked whether I believe that global warming is a very serious threat or if you ask whether I "believe" that blue is prettier than pink. When it's explicit, its mental.

But at any single instance I have hundreds, if not thousands of beliefs. These can't be all be mental simultaneously, I could not possibly consciously entertain all my beliefs in a single instance.

However, I do appreciate this quote - very much - and would like to know more about it - source ? — Amity

He is difficult for everybody. It's just that some people spend more time with him and likely understand him better. I am not one of those. The good thing about him, on the other hand, is that since his phrases are so open to interpretation, you just defend what you think it means. Even Russell misunderstood some of Wittgenstein.

I believe this is from his Philosophical Investigations (115). I don't recall that passage myself. I first discovered it in the works of Raymond Tallis. I think his Why The Mind is Not a Computer is a good exercise in philosophy of language. You don't need to agree with him on many things, or even most things, to get value out of what he's doing.

But unfortunately, I cannot find it for free online. All I can see is parts of the introduction, which is not where the philosophy of language aspect can be most appreciated...

The Aeon chucklehead article by Nakul Krishna, edited by Nigel Warburton — Amity

Thanks for the source. :ok:

Sure it's quite useful, but if we go down that road of "what do you mean by X" too deeply, we end up yelling about a tree we're pointing at or about the colour of an apple.

Yes, Banno clearly knows this topic very well.

If that's all there was to it, the problem would have dissolved a long time ago. It is an inquiry into how two seemingly unrelated domains, matter and thought, are related. This is about as unlinguistic a metaphysical question as you can get. — hypericin

My example was bound to be controversial. I don't think I could come up with an uncontroversial example. I think you said it: "seemingly unrelated" - they seem unrelated. It doesn't follow that they are unrelated. Action at a distance looked seemingly unrelated to matter, or so Newton thought when he discovered it.

I should point out, by way of clarification that by saying a problem is linguistic, I don't mean to say that you are using words is a "merely" incorrect manner. The words we use have the content we give them. In this respect, it is thought that "matter" does not appear to have the properties of thinking.

If one takes this to be a property of the thing we refer to when we use the word "matter", then of course problems will arise such that the "mind body problem" arise, phrased in this manner. I think Newton showed - as Chomsky pointed out - that we have no conception of "body" anymore.

So word-use is related to thinking, and this plays a huge role in any question we phrase. But if we change the association of the word, the problem may appear in a new light.

There is a lot of content to this debate which is not a matter of "mere" words, such as the problem of consciousness, or the problem of matter, etc.

There is simply no ontology which dictates the boundaries of words. These boundaries are ultimately human contrivances. — hypericin

Sure. "John" is after all a mental construction which we project on a specific person. In this respect it's an ontology of everyday life, I think, which includes trees, rivers and so forth, but does not include atoms or chlorophyll. These latter components don't appear to us in everyday life absent certain equipment to detect or interact with them.

But it is still an important issue. As in if John has a stroke and doesn't behave or think at all as he used to, we'd say he's a different person. What do we do if the John prior to the stroke committed a crime but his trial is to occur after the stroke?

Should we punish post-stoke John?

For example, the Quarks that are supposed to be the building blocks of sub-atomic matter, "have never been observed empirically" (Science), but are inferred theoretically (Philosophy). Hence, I would say that Quarks & other hypothetical particles are meta-physical — Gnomon

I'm aware this topic enters into the whole realism vs anti-realism debate. I would still be careful in saying that the stuff posited by science is a metaphysical entity. We can of course debate if science is metaphysics or not. One can make a case that part of science is metaphysics, sure. But I wouldn't tell the physicist that I have special knowledge regarding his field.

Yet not all of them have any "substantive" effect on the material world, but may have "significant" effects on the human Mind (memes). Metaphysical questions are not resolved by practical experimentation, but only by philosophical argumentation, or mathematical calculation. — Gnomon

I largely agree on your last point here. Matter looks and feels substantial to us, which it is. But at bottom, it isn't. So we have two views on the nature of matter, our common sense conception of regarding tables and chairs and then we have what physics tells us about matter. This brings forth epistemological consideration on top of metaphysical ones.

I had severe mental cramps when I briefly studied that many years ago. Fodor's L.O.T. Language of Thought ! I have avoided it just as much as metaphysics. Until now. — Amity

It can be dense. And many aspects of Wittgenstein are difficult too. Nevertheless going back to Thomas Reid, one can see him discussing similar topics as Wittgenstein develops later on, in a pretty straightforward manner.

Also, listening or reading Chomsky's non-technical work and Bertrand Russell on many topics not limited to language, are useful in this regard. For philosophical matters, philosophy of language need not go beyond trying to be careful and clear and to not get stuck on a word or a phrase.

Wittgenstein says this nicely: "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." This can be interpreted in many ways, I take it to mean that we should avoid being held captive if we do not proceed with the way we are phrasing and/or thinking about a question.

As related to metaphysical questions and concepts of identity and self in social experience. What our categorisations of reality are based on. — Amity

Sure, there's truth in that. In Spanish we have pronouns for objects, which is weird if you think about it. In French too. I don't know how different my experience of the world is in one language vs another.

people in a position of marginalization are prevented from creating concepts, terms and other representational resources that could be used in order to conceptualize and understand their own experiences, especially those having to do with being in that position of marginalization — SEP: Feminist philosophy of language

Yes, when it comes to power, the issue of gender is clear-er to see.

And we've seen examples of phrases such as "Black Lives Matter" or "#MeToo", which have been quite useful in changing aspects of the society.